Among the diverse types of scientific discoveries, a special place is occupied by fundamental discoveries that change our ideas about reality in general, i.e. worldview in nature.

TWO KINDS OF DISCOVERIES

A. Einstein once wrote that a theoretical physicist “as a foundation needs some general assumptions, the so-called principles, from which he can derive consequences. His work is thus divided into two stages. Firstly, he needs to find these principles, and secondly, to develop the consequences arising from these principles. To perform the second task, he is thoroughly armed since school. Consequently, if for some area and, accordingly, the set of relationships, the first problem is solved, then the consequences will not keep you waiting. The first of these tasks is of a completely different kind, i.e. establishing principles that can serve as a basis for deduction. There is no method here that can be learned and systematically applied to achieve the goal.

We will deal mainly with the discussion of problems associated with the solution of problems of the first kind, but first we will clarify our ideas about how problems of the second kind are solved.

Let's imagine the following problem. There is a circle through the center of which two mutually perpendicular diameters are drawn. Through point A, located on one of the diameters at a distance of 2/3 from the center of circle O, we draw a straight line parallel to the other diameter, and from point B - the intersection of this line with the circle, we lower the perpendicular to the second diameter, denoting their intersection point through K. Us it is necessary to express the length of the segment AK in terms of a function of the radius.

How are we going to solve this school problem?

Turning to certain principles of geometry for this, we restore a chain of theorems. In doing so, we try to use all the data we have. Note that since the diameters drawn are mutually perpendicular, the triangle OAK is right-angled. The value of OA = 2/3r. We will now try to find the length of the second leg, in order to then apply the Pythagorean theorem and determine the length of the hypotenuse AK. You can try some other methods as well. But suddenly, after carefully looking at the figure, we find that the OABK is a rectangle whose diagonals are known to be equal, i.e. AK = OV. OB is equal to the radius of the circle, therefore, without any calculations, it is clear that AK = r.

Here it is - a beautiful and psychologically interesting solution to the problem.

In this example, the following is important.

– Firstly, tasks of this kind usually belong to a well-defined subject area. Solving them, we clearly imagine where, in fact, we need to look for a solution. AT this case we do not think about whether the foundations of Euclidean geometry are correct, whether it is necessary to invent some other geometry, some special principles, in order to solve the problem. We immediately interpret it as belonging to the field of Euclidean geometry.

– Secondly, these tasks are not necessarily standard, algorithmic. In principle, their solution requires a deep understanding of the specifics of the objects under consideration, developed professional intuition. Here, therefore, some professional training is needed. In the process of solving problems of this kind, we discover new way. We notice “suddenly” that the object under study can be considered as a rectangle and it is not at all necessary to single out a right triangle as an elementary object in order to form the correct way to solve the problem.

Of course, the above task is very simple. It is needed only in order to generally outline the type of problems of the second kind. But among such problems there are immeasurably more complex ones, the solution of which is of great importance for the development of science.

Consider, for example, the discovery of a new planet by W. Le Verrier and J. Adams. Of course, this discovery is a great event in science, especially considering how it was made:

- first, the trajectories of the planets were calculated;

– then it was found that they do not coincide with the observed ones;

- then it was suggested that the existence of a new planet;

- then they pointed the telescope at the corresponding point in space and ... found a planet there.

But why can this great discovery be attributed only to discoveries of the second kind?

The thing is that it was made on a clear foundation of already developed celestial mechanics.

Although problems of the second kind, of course, can be subdivided into subclasses of varying complexity, A. Einstein was right in separating them from fundamental problems.

For the latter require the discovery of new fundamental principles which cannot be obtained by any deduction from existing principles.

Of course, there are intermediate instances between problems of the first and second kind, but we will not consider them here, but will go straight to problems of the first kind.

In general, there are not so many such problems before mankind, but their solution each time meant a huge progress in the development of science and culture as a whole. They are associated with the creation of such fundamental scientific theories and concepts as

geometry of Euclid?

heliocentric theory of Copernicus,

classical Newtonian Mechanics,

Lobachevsky geometry,

genetics Mendel,

darwin's theory of evolution,

Einstein's Theory Of Relativity,

quantum mechanics,

structural linguistics.

All of them are characterized by the fact that the intellectual base on which they were created, in contrast to the field of discoveries of the second kind, was never strictly limited.

If we talk about the psychological context of the discoveries of different classes, then it is probably the same.

– In its most superficial form, it can be described as a direct vision, a discovery in the full sense of the word. A person, as R. Descartes believed, "suddenly" sees that the problem must be considered in this way, and not otherwise.

- Further, it should be noted that the discovery is never one-act, but has, so to speak, a "shuttle" character. At first there is a sense of the idea; then it is clarified by deriving certain consequences from it, which, as a rule, clarify the idea; then new consequences are deduced from the new modification, and so on.

But in the epistemological plan, the discoveries of the first and second kinds differ in the most radical way.

Similar information.

Science is a specific activity of people, the main purpose of which is to obtain knowledge about reality.

Knowledge is the main product of scientific activity, but not the only one. The products of science include the scientific style of rationality, which spreads to all spheres of human activity; and various devices, installations, methods used outside of science, primarily in production. Scientific activity is also a source of moral values.

Although science is focused on obtaining true knowledge about reality, science and truth are not identical. True knowledge can also be unscientific. It can be obtained in a variety of areas of human activity: in everyday life, economics, politics, art, engineering. Unlike science, obtaining knowledge about reality is not the main, defining goal of these areas of activity (in art, for example, such a main goal is new artistic values, in engineering - technologies, inventions, in economics - efficiency, etc.) .

It is important to emphasize that the definition of "unscientific" does not imply a negative assessment. Scientific activity is specific. Other spheres of human activity - everyday life, art, economics, politics, etc. - each have their own purpose, their own goals. The role of science in the life of society is growing, but scientific justification is not always and everywhere possible and appropriate.

The history of science shows that scientific knowledge is not always true. The concept of "scientific" is often used in situations that do not guarantee the receipt of true knowledge, especially when it comes to theories. Many scientific theories have been debunked. It is sometimes argued (for example, Karl Popper) that any theoretical statement always has a chance of being refuted in the future.

Science does not recognize parascientific concepts - astrology, parapsychology, ufology, etc. She does not recognize these concepts, not because she does not want to, but because she cannot, because, according to T. Huxley, "accepting something on faith, science commits suicide." And there are no reliable, precisely established facts in such concepts. Coincidences are possible.

Regarding such problems, F. Bacon wrote as follows: “And therefore, the one who, when they showed him the image of those who escaped shipwreck by taking a vow, displayed in the temple and at the same time sought an answer, did he now recognize the power of the gods, asked in turn: “And where is the image of those who died after they made a vow?” This is the basis of almost all superstitions - in astrology, in beliefs, in predictions and the like. People who indulge themselves in this kind of fuss mark the event that has been fulfilled, and ignore the one that deceived, although the latter happens much more often.

Important features of the appearance of modern science are related to the fact that today it is a profession.

Until recently, science has been free activity individual scientists. It was not a profession and was not specially funded in any way. As a rule, scientists provided for their lives by paying for their teaching work at universities. Today, however, a scientist is a special profession. In the 20th century, the concept of "scientific worker" appeared. Now in the world about 5 million people are professionally engaged in science.

The development of science is characterized by opposition of various directions. New ideas and theories are established in a tense struggle. M. Planck said on this occasion: “Usually, new scientific truths do not win in such a way that their opponents are convinced and they admit they are wrong, but for the most part in such a way that these opponents gradually die out, and the younger generation learn the truth immediately.”

Life in science is a constant struggle of different opinions, directions, a struggle for the recognition of ideas.

Criteria of scientific knowledge

What are the criteria of scientific knowledge, its characteristic features?

One of the important distinctive qualities of scientific knowledge is its systematization. It is one of the criteria of scientific character.

But knowledge can be systematized not only in science. Cookbook, phone book, travel atlas, etc. etc. – everywhere knowledge is classified and systematized. Scientific systematization is specific. It is characterized by the desire for completeness, consistency, clear grounds for systematization. Scientific knowledge as a system has a certain structure, the elements of which are facts, laws, theories, pictures of the world. Separate scientific disciplines are interconnected and interdependent.

The desire for validity, evidence of knowledge is an important criterion of scientific character.

Justification of knowledge, bringing it into a single system has always been characteristic of science. The very emergence of science is sometimes associated with the desire for evidence-based knowledge. There are different ways to justify scientific knowledge. Empirical knowledge is substantiated by repeated checks, reference to statistical data, etc. When substantiating theoretical concepts, their consistency, compliance with empirical data, and the ability to describe and predict phenomena are checked.

In science, original, "crazy" ideas are valued. But the orientation towards innovations is combined in it with the desire to eliminate from the results of scientific activity everything subjective, associated with the specifics of the scientist himself. This is one of the differences between science and art. If the artist had not created his creation, then it simply would not exist. But if a scientist, even a great one, had not created a theory, then it would still have been created, because it is a necessary stage in the development of science, it is intersubjective.

Methods and means of scientific knowledge

Although scientific activity is specific, it uses reasoning techniques used by people in other areas of activity, in everyday life. Any type of human activity is characterized by reasoning techniques that are also used in science, namely: induction and deduction, analysis and synthesis, abstraction and generalization, idealization, analogy, description, explanation, prediction, hypothesis, confirmation, refutation, etc.

The main methods of obtaining empirical knowledge in science are observation and experiment.

Observation is such a method of obtaining empirical knowledge, in which the main thing is not to make any changes in the studied reality during the study by the process of observation itself.

In contrast to observation, within the framework of an experiment, the phenomenon under study is placed in special conditions. As F. Bacon wrote, "the nature of things reveals itself better in a state of artificial constraint than in natural freedom."

It is important to emphasize that empirical research cannot begin without a certain theoretical attitude. Although they say that facts are the air of a scientist, nevertheless, the comprehension of reality is impossible without theoretical constructions. I.P. Pavlov wrote about this as follows: “... at any moment a certain general idea of ​​​​the subject is required in order to have something to cling to facts ...”

The tasks of science are by no means reduced to the collection of factual material.

Reducing the tasks of science to the collection of facts means, as A. Poincaré put it, "a complete misunderstanding of the true nature of science." He wrote: “The scientist must organize the facts. Science is made up of facts, like a house made of bricks. And one bare accumulation of facts does not yet constitute science, just as a heap of stones does not constitute a house.

Scientific theories do not appear as direct generalizations of empirical facts. As A. Einstein wrote, "no logical path leads from observations to the basic principles of the theory." Theories arise in the complex interaction of theoretical thinking and empiricism, in the course of solving purely theoretical problems, in the process of interaction between science and culture as a whole.

In developing a theory, scientists use various ways theoretical thinking. So, even Galileo began to widely use thought experiments in the course of constructing a theory. In the course of a thought experiment, the theorist, as it were, plays out the possible behaviors of the idealized objects developed by him. A mathematical experiment is a modern version of a thought experiment in which possible consequences variations of conditions in the mathematical model are calculated on computers.

When characterizing scientific activity, it is important to note that in its course scientists sometimes turn to philosophy.

Of great importance for scientists, especially for theorists, is the philosophical understanding of the established cognitive traditions, the consideration of the studied reality in the context of the picture of the world.

Appeal to philosophy is especially important at critical stages in the development of science. Great scientific achievements have always been associated with the advancement of philosophical generalizations. Philosophy contributes to the effective description, explanation, and understanding of the reality of the studied science.

Important features of scientific knowledge reflect the concept of "style of scientific thinking". M. Born wrote as follows: “... I think that there are some general tendencies of thought that change very slowly and form certain philosophical periods with their characteristic ideas in all areas of human activity, including science. Pauli, in a recent letter to me, used the expression "styles": styles of thinking are styles not only in art but also in science. By adopting this term, I am saying that there are styles in physical theory, and it is this circumstance that gives a kind of stability to its principles.

The famous chemist and philosopher M.Polani showed at the end of the 50s of our century that the premises on which the scientist relies in his work cannot be fully verbalized, i.e. express in language. Polanyi wrote: "That a large number of The study time that students of chemistry, biology and medicine devote to practical training testifies to the important role played in these disciplines by the transfer of practical knowledge and skills from teacher to student. From what has been said, we can conclude that at the very center of science there are areas of practical knowledge that cannot be conveyed through formulations.

This type of knowledge was called implicit knowledge by Polanyi. This knowledge is not transmitted in the form of texts, but by direct demonstration of samples.

The term "mentality" is used to refer to those layers of spiritual culture that are not expressed in the form of explicit knowledge, but nevertheless significantly determine the face of a particular era or people. But any science has its own mentality, which distinguishes it from other areas of scientific knowledge, but is closely related to the mentality of the era.

Speaking about the means of scientific knowledge, it should be noted that the most important of them is the language of science.

Galileo argued that the book of Nature was written in the language of mathematics. The development of physics fully confirms these words of Galileo. In other sciences, the process of mathematization is very active. Mathematics is included in the fabric of theoretical constructions in all sciences.

The course of scientific knowledge essentially depends on the development of the means used by science. The use of a telescope by Galileo, and then the creation of telescopes, radio telescopes largely determined the development of astronomy. The use of microscopes, especially electronic ones, has played a huge role in the development of biology. Without such means of knowledge as synchrophasotrons, the development of modern elementary particle physics is impossible. The use of the computer is revolutionizing the development of science.

The methods and means used in different sciences are not the same.

Differences in the methods and means used in different sciences are determined both by the specifics of subject areas and the level of development of science. However, in general, there is a constant interpenetration of methods and means of various sciences. The apparatus of mathematics is being used more and more widely. In the words of J. Wiener, "the incredible effectiveness of mathematics" makes it an important means of knowledge in all sciences. However, one should hardly expect the universalization of methods and means used in different sciences in the future.

Methods developed in one scientific area can be effectively applied in a completely different area.

One of the sources of innovation in science is the transfer of methods and approaches from one scientific field to another. For example, here is what academician V.I. Vernadsky wrote about L. Pasteur, referring to his work on the problem of spontaneous generation: “Pasteur ... acted as a chemist who mastered the experimental method, entered a new field of knowledge for him with new methods and methods of work, who saw in her something that naturalists-observers who had previously studied her did not see in her.

Speaking about the specifics of different sciences, one can note the features of philosophical knowledge. In general, philosophy is not a science. If in the classical philosophical tradition philosophy was interpreted as a special kind of science, then modern thinkers often develop philosophical constructions that are sharply separated from science (this applies, for example, to existentialists, neopositivists). At the same time, within the framework of philosophy, there have always been and are constructions and studies that can claim the status of scientific ones. M. Born refers to such “research common features structure of the world and our methods of penetrating this structure.

The emergence of natural science

In order to understand what is modern natural science, it is important to find out when it arose. In this regard, different views are being developed.

Sometimes the position is defended that natural science arose in the Stone Age, when a person began to accumulate and transfer knowledge about the world to others. Thus, John Bernal in his book “Science in the History of Society” writes: “Since the main property of natural science is that it deals with effective manipulations and transformations of matter, the main stream of science follows from the practical techniques of primitive man ...”

Some historians of science believe that natural science originated around the 5th century BC. in Ancient Greece, where, against the background of the decomposition of mythological thinking, the first programs for the study of nature arise. Already in Ancient Egypt and Babylon, significant mathematical knowledge was accumulated, but only the Greeks began to prove theorems. If science is interpreted as knowledge with its justification, then it is quite fair to assume that it arose around the 5th century BC. in the city-states of Greece - the center of the future European culture.

Some historians associate the emergence of natural science with the gradual liberation of thinking from the dogmas of Aristotelian views, which is associated with the activities of Oxford scientists of the 12th-14th centuries. - Robert Grosset, Roger Bacon, etc. These researchers called for relying on experience, observation and experiment, and not on the authority of tradition or philosophical tradition.

Most historians of science believe that it is possible to speak about natural science in the modern sense of the word only starting from the 16th-17th centuries. This is the era when the works of J. Kepler, H. Huygens, G. Galileo appear. The apogee of the spiritual revolution associated with the emergence of science are the works of I. Newton. The birth of science, natural science is here identified with the birth of modern physics and the mathematical apparatus necessary for it. At the same time, science was born as a special social institution. In 1662, the Royal Society of London was founded, and in 1666, the Paris Academy of Sciences.

There is a point of view that modern natural science arose at the end of the 19th century. At this time, science took shape as a special profession thanks primarily to the reforms of the University of Berlin, which took place under the guidance of the famous naturalist Wilhelm Humboldt. As a result of these reforms, a new model of university education has emerged, in which teaching is combined with research activities. This model was best implemented in the laboratory of the famous chemist J. Liebig in Giessen. As a result of the approval of a new model of education, such goods appeared on the world market, the development and production of which implies access to scientific knowledge (fertilizers, pesticides, explosives, electrical goods, etc.). The process of turning science into a profession completes its formation as a modern science.

Structure of scientific knowledge

The question of the structure of scientific knowledge deserves special consideration. It is necessary to distinguish three levels in it: empirical, theoretical, philosophical grounds.

At the empirical level of scientific knowledge, as a result of direct contact with reality, scientists gain knowledge about certain events, identify the properties of objects or processes of interest to them, fix relationships, and establish empirical patterns.

To clarify the specifics of theoretical knowledge, it is important to emphasize that the theory is built with a clear focus on explaining objective reality, but it directly describes not the surrounding reality, but ideal objects, which, unlike real objects, are characterized not by an infinite, but by a quite definite number of properties. For example, such ideal objects as material points, with which mechanics deals, have a very small number of properties, namely, mass and the ability to be in space and time. The ideal object is built in such a way that it is fully intellectually controlled.

The theoretical level of scientific knowledge is divided into two parts: fundamental theories, in which the scientist deals with the most abstract ideal objects, and theories that describe a specific area of ​​reality on the basis of fundamental theories.

The strength of a theory lies in the fact that it can develop, as it were, on its own, without direct contact with reality. Since in theory we are dealing with an intellectually controlled object, the theoretical object can, in principle, be described in any detail and obtain arbitrarily distant consequences from the initial ideas. If the original abstractions are true, then the consequences of them will be true.

In addition to the empirical and theoretical in the structure of scientific knowledge, one more level can be distinguished, containing general ideas about reality and the process of cognition - the level of philosophical premises, philosophical foundations.

For example, the well-known discussion of Bohr and Einstein on the problems of quantum mechanics was essentially conducted precisely at the level of the philosophical foundations of science, since it was discussed how to relate the apparatus of quantum mechanics to the world around us. Einstein believed that the probabilistic nature of predictions in quantum mechanics is due to the fact that quantum mechanics is incomplete, since reality is completely deterministic. And Bohr believed that quantum mechanics is complete and reflects the fundamentally irremovable probability characteristic of the microworld.

Certain ideas of a philosophical nature are woven into the fabric of scientific knowledge, embodied in theories.

A theory turns from an apparatus for describing and predicting empirical data into knowledge when all its concepts receive an ontological and epistemological interpretation.

Sometimes the philosophical foundations of science are clearly manifested and become the subject of heated discussions (for example, in quantum mechanics, the theory of relativity, the theory of evolution, genetics, etc.).

At the same time, there are many theories in science that do not cause disputes about their philosophical foundations, since they are based on philosophical ideas close to the generally accepted ones.

It should be noted that not only theoretical, but also empirical knowledge is associated with certain philosophical ideas.

At the empirical level of knowledge, there is a certain set of general ideas about the world (about causality, stability of events, etc.). These ideas are perceived as obvious and are not the subject of special studies. Nevertheless, they exist, and sooner or later they change at the empirical level as well.

The empirical and theoretical levels of scientific knowledge are organically linked. The theoretical level does not exist on its own, but is based on data from the empirical level. But it is essential that empirical knowledge is inseparable from theoretical ideas; it is necessarily immersed in a certain theoretical context.

The realization of this in the methodology of science sharpened the question of how empirical knowledge can be a criterion for the truth of a theory?

The fact is that despite the theoretical load, the empirical level is more stable, stronger than the theoretical one. This happens because the empirical level of knowledge is immersed in such theoretical representations that are unproblematic. Empirically tested more high level theoretical constructs than the one contained in itself. If it were otherwise, then a logical circle would result, and then empiricism would not test anything in theory. Since theories of another level are tested by empiricism, the experiment acts as a criterion for the truth of a theory.

When analyzing the structure of scientific knowledge, it is important to find out which theories are part of modern science. Namely, does, for example, modern physics include such theories that are genetically related to modern concepts, but created in the past? Thus, mechanical phenomena are now described on the basis of quantum mechanics. Does classical mechanics enter into the structure of modern physical knowledge? Such questions are very important in the analysis of the concepts of modern natural science.

They can be answered on the basis of the notion that a scientific theory gives us a certain slice of reality, but no system of abstraction can capture the entire richness of reality. Miscellaneous systems abstractions dissect reality in different planes. This also applies to theories that are genetically related to modern concepts, but created in the past. Their systems of abstractions are related to each other in a certain way, but do not overlap. So, according to W. Heisenberg, in modern physics there are at least four fundamental closed non-contradictory theories: classical mechanics, thermodynamics, electrodynamics, quantum mechanics.

In the history of science, there is a tendency to reduce all natural science knowledge to a single theory, to reduce it to a small number of initial fundamental principles. In the modern methodology of science, the fundamental unrealizability of such information is realized. It is connected with the fact that any scientific theory is fundamentally limited in its intensive and extensive development. A scientific theory is a system of certain abstractions, with the help of which the subordination of essential and non-essential properties of reality in a certain respect is revealed. Science must necessarily contain various systems of abstractions, which are not only irreducible to each other, but cut reality in different planes. This applies to all natural sciences, and to individual sciences - physics, chemistry, biology, etc. – which are irreducible to one theory. One theory cannot cover all the variety of ways of knowing, styles of thinking that exist in modern science.

Scientific discoveries

F. Bacon believed that he had developed a method of scientific discoveries, which was based on a gradual movement from particulars to ever greater generalizations. He was sure that he had developed a method for discovering new scientific knowledge that everyone could master. This method of discovery is based on an inductive generalization of the data of experience. Bacon wrote: “Our way of discovery is such that it leaves little to the sharpness and power of talent, but almost equalizes them. Just as for drawing a straight line or describing a perfect circle, firmness, skill and testing of the hand mean a lot, if you use only the hand, they mean little or nothing if you use a compass or a ruler. And so it is with our method."

Bacon constructed a rather sophisticated scheme of the inductive method, which takes into account not only the presence of the property under study, but also its various degrees, as well as the absence of this property in situations where its manifestation was expected.

Descartes believed that the method of obtaining new knowledge is based on intuition and deduction.

"These two paths," he wrote, "are the surest paths to knowledge, and the mind must not allow them any longer - all others must be rejected as suspicious and leading to error."

Descartes formulated 4 universal rules to guide the mind in search of new knowledge:

« First— never accept as true anything that I would not recognize as such with obviousness, that is, carefully avoid haste and prejudice to include in my judgments only what appears to my mind so clearly and distinctly that it can in no way give rise to doubt.

Second- to divide each of the difficulties I am considering into as many parts as necessary in order to better solve them.

Third- arrange your thoughts in a certain order, starting with the simplest and easily cognizable objects, and ascend little by little, as if by steps, to the knowledge of the most complex, allowing the existence of order even among those that in the natural course of things do not precede each other.

And last thing- make lists everywhere so complete and reviews so comprehensive that you can be sure that nothing is missing.

In the modern methodology of science, it is realized that inductive generalizations cannot make the leap from empiricism to theory.

Einstein wrote about it this way: “It is now known that science cannot grow on the basis of experience alone, and that in the construction of science we are forced to resort to freely created concepts, the suitability of which can be a posteriori check experimentally. These circumstances eluded previous generations, who thought that a theory could be constructed purely inductively, without recourse to free, creative creation of concepts. The more primitive the state of science, the easier it is for the researcher to create the illusion that he is supposedly an empiricist. Back in the 19th century Many believed that the Newtonian principle hypotheses non fingo- should serve as the foundation of any sound natural science.

Recently, the restructuring of the entire system of theoretical physics as a whole has led to the fact that the recognition of the speculative nature of science has become the common property.

In characterizing the transition from empirical data to theory, it is important to emphasize that pure experience, i.e. one that would not be determined by theoretical concepts does not exist at all.

On this occasion, K. Popper wrote as follows: “The idea that science develops from observation to theory is still widespread. However, the belief that we can start Scientific research without something resembling a theory is absurd. Twenty-five years ago I tried to instill this thought in a group of physics students in Vienna, beginning my lecture with these words: “Take a pencil and paper, observe carefully and describe your observations!” They asked, of course, what exactly they should observe. It's clear that simple instruction « Watch!” is absurd… Surveillance is always selective. It is necessary to choose an object, a certain task, to have some interest, a point of view, a problem ... "

The role of theory in the development of scientific knowledge is clearly manifested in the fact that fundamental theoretical results can be obtained without a direct appeal to empirical evidence.

A classic example of constructing a fundamental theory without direct reference to empirical evidence is Einstein's creation of general theory relativity. The special theory of relativity was also created as a result of consideration of a theoretical problem (Michelson's experiment was not essential for Einstein).

New phenomena can be discovered in science through both empirical and theoretical research. A classic example of the discovery of a new phenomenon at the level of theory is the discovery of the positron by P. Dirac.

The development of modern scientific theories shows that their basic principles are not obvious in the Cartesian sense. In a sense, the scientist discovers the underlying principles of the theory intuitively. But these principles are far from Cartesian evidence: the principles of Lobachevsky's geometry, and the foundations of quantum mechanics, the theory of relativity, Big Bang cosmology, and so on.

Attempts to construct various kinds of logics of discovery ceased in the last century as completely untenable. It became obvious that there is no logic of discovery, no algorithm of discoveries in principle.

Models of scientific knowledge

The German philosopher and logician Reichenbach wrote about the principle of induction as follows: “This principle determines the truth of scientific theories. Removing it from science would mean nothing more and nothing less than depriving science of its ability to distinguish between the truth and falsity of its theories. Without it, science would obviously no longer have the right to talk about the difference between its theories and the bizarre and arbitrary creations of the poetic mind.

The principle of induction states that the universal propositions of science are based on inductive inferences. We are actually referring to this principle when we say that the truth of some statement is known from experience. Reichenbach considered the development of inductive logic to be the main task of the methodology of science.

In the modern methodology of science, it is realized that it is generally impossible to establish the truth of a universal generalizing judgment with empirical data.

No matter how much a law is tested by empirical data, there is no guarantee that new observations will not appear that will contradict it. Carnap wrote: “You can never achieve a complete verification of the law. In fact, we shouldn't talk about " verification", if by this word we mean the final establishment of truth, but only about confirmation."

R. Carnap formulated his program as follows: “I agree that an inductive machine cannot be created if the purpose of the machine is to invent new theories. I believe, however, that an inductive machine can be built for a much more modest purpose. Given some observations e and hypothesis h(in the form of, say, a prediction, or even a set of laws), then I am sure that in many cases, by a purely mechanical procedure, it is possible to determine the logical probability, or degree of confirmation h based e».

If such a program were implemented, then instead of saying that one law is well substantiated and the other weakly, we would have accurate, quantitative estimates of the degree of their confirmation. Although Carnap built the probabilistic logic of the simplest languages, his methodological program could not be realized. Carnap, by his tenacity, demonstrated the futility of this program.

In general, it has been established that the degree of confirmation by the facts of a hypothesis is not decisive in the process of scientific knowledge. F. Frank wrote: “Science is like a detective story. All the facts support a certain hypothesis, but in the end a completely different hypothesis turns out to be correct. K. Popper noted: “It is easy to get confirmations, or verifications, for almost every theory if we are looking for confirmations.”

Since there is no logic of scientific discovery, no methods that guarantee the receipt of true scientific knowledge, insofar as scientific statements are hypotheses(from the Greek. "Assumption"), i.e. are scientific assumptions or assumptions whose truth value is uncertain.

This provision forms the basis of the hypothetical-deductive model of scientific knowledge developed in the first half of the 20th century. In accordance with this model, the scientist puts forward a hypothetical generalization, various kinds of consequences are deduced from it, which are then compared with empirical data.

K. Popper drew attention to the fact that when comparing hypotheses with empirical data, the procedures of confirmation and refutation have a completely different cognitive status. For example, no amount of observed white swans is sufficient evidence to establish the truth of the statement " all swans are white". But it is enough to see one black swan to recognize this statement as false. This asymmetry, as Popper shows, is crucial to understanding the process of scientific knowledge.

K. Popper developed the notion that the irrefutability of a theory is not its merit, as is often thought, but its vice. He wrote: "A theory not refuted by any conceivable event is unscientific." Refutability, falsifiability acts as a criterion for the scientific character of a theory.

K. Popper wrote: “Each real test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it, i.e. refute. Verifiability is falsifiability... Confirmatory evidence should not be taken into account except when it is the result of a genuine test of the theory. This means that it must be understood as the result of a serious but unsuccessful attempt to falsify the theory."

In the model of scientific knowledge developed by K. Popper, all knowledge turns out to be hypothetical. Truth turns out to be unattainable not only at the level of theory, but even in empirical knowledge because of its theoretical loading.

K. Popper wrote: “Science does not rest on a solid foundation of facts. The rigid structure of her theories rises, so to speak, above the swamp. It is like a building erected on stilts. These piles are driven into the swamp, but do not reach any natural or " given» grounds. If we stop driving piles further, it is not at all because we have reached solid ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that the piles are strong enough to support, at least for a while, the weight of our structure.”

Karl Popper remained a consistent supporter of empiricism. Both the acceptance of a theory and its rejection in his model are entirely determined by experience. He wrote: “So long as a theory stands up to the strictest tests we can offer, it is accepted; if she cannot stand them, she is rejected. However, theory is in no sense derived from empirical evidence. There is no psychological or logical induction. From empirical evidence only the falsity of a theory can be inferred, and this conclusion is purely deductive.

K. Popper developed the concept of " third world» – « the world of language, assumptions, theories and reasoning».

He distinguishes three worlds:

the first- reality that exists objectively,

second- the state of consciousness and its activity,

third- "the world of the objective content of thinking, first of all, the content of scientific ideas, poetic thoughts and works of art."

The third world is created by man, but the results of his activity begin to lead their own. own life. The third world is a “universe of objective knowledge”, it is autonomous from other worlds.

Popper wrote: “What happens to our theories is what happens to our children: they tend to become largely independent of their parents. The same thing can happen to our theories as to our children: we may acquire more knowledge from them than we originally put into them.”

The growth of knowledge in third world» is described by Popper with the following scheme

P –> TT –> EE –> P ,

where P is the original problem, TT is the theory that claims to solve the problem, EE is the evaluation of the theory, its criticism and elimination of errors, P is the new problem.

“This is how,” writes Popper, “we lift ourselves by the hair out of the mire of our ignorance, this is how we throw a rope into the air and then climb it.”

Criticism turns out to be the most important source of the growth of the "third world".

The merit of Lakatos in the modern methodology of science lies in the fact that he clearly emphasized the stability of the theory, the research program. He wrote: "Neither the logical proof of inconsistency, nor the verdict of scientists from an experimentally discovered anomaly, can destroy the research program with one blow." The main value of the theory, the program is the ability to replenish knowledge, to predict new facts. Contradictions and difficulties in describing any phenomena do not significantly affect the attitude of scientists to the theory, program.

Many scientific theories met with contradictions and difficulties in explaining phenomena. For example, Newton could not explain the stability of the solar system on the basis of mechanics and argued that God corrects deviations in the motion of the planets caused by various disturbances (Laplace managed to solve this problem only in early XIX century). Darwin could not explain the so-called " jenkin's nightmare". In the geometry of Euclid for two thousand years it was not possible to solve the problem of the fifth postulate.

Such difficulties are common in science and do not lead scientists to abandon the theory, because outside the theory the scientist is not able to work.

A scientist can always protect a theory from inconsistency with empirical data with the help of some tricks and hypotheses. This explains why there are always alternative theories, research programs.

The main source of the development of science is not the interaction of theory and empirical data, but the competition of theories, research programs in the best description and explanation of observed phenomena, prediction of new facts.

Lakatos noted that one could "rationally stick with a regressing program until it is overtaken by a competing program, and even after that." There is always hope for temporary setbacks. However, representatives of regressing theories and programs will inevitably face ever-increasing social, psychological and economic problems.

Scientific traditions

Science is usually presented as a sphere of almost continuous creativity, a constant striving for something new. However, in the modern methodology of science it is clearly realized that scientific activity can be traditional.

The founder of the doctrine of scientific traditions is T. Kuhn. Traditional science is called in his concept " normal science", which is "research firmly based on one or more past achievements, which for some time are recognized by a certain scientific community as the basis for the development of its future practical activities."

T. Kuhn showed that tradition is not a brake, but vice versa, necessary condition rapid accumulation of scientific knowledge. " normal science» develops not contrary to traditions, but precisely because of its traditional character. Tradition organizes the scientific community, generates " industry» knowledge production.

T. Kuhn writes: “By paradigms I mean scientific achievements recognized by all, which for a certain time provide a model for posing problems and their solutions to the scientific community.”

Sufficiently generally accepted theoretical concepts such as the Copernican system, Newtonian mechanics, Lavoisier's oxygen theory, Einstein's theory of relativity, etc. determine the paradigms of scientific activity. The cognitive potential inherent in such concepts, which determine the vision of reality and ways to comprehend it, is revealed during the periods " normal science when scientists in their research do not go beyond the boundaries defined by the paradigm.

T. Kuhn describes the crisis phenomena in the development of normal science as follows: “The increase in competing options, the willingness to try something else, the expression of obvious dissatisfaction, the appeal to philosophy for help and the discussion of fundamental provisions - all these are symptoms of the transition from normal to extraordinary research.”

Crisis situation in development normal science is resolved by the emergence of a new paradigm. Thus, a scientific revolution takes place, and the conditions for the functioning of " normal science».

T. Kuhn writes: “The decision to abandon a paradigm is always at the same time a decision to accept another paradigm, and the sentence leading to such a decision includes both a comparison of both paradigms with nature, and a comparison of paradigms with each other.”

The transition from one paradigm to another, according to Kuhn, is impossible through logic and references to experience.

In a sense, advocates of various paradigms live in different worlds. According to Kuhn, different paradigms are incommensurable. Therefore, the transition from one paradigm to another should be carried out abruptly, like a switch, and not gradually through logic.

Scientific revolutions

Scientific revolutions usually affect the philosophical and methodological foundations of science, often changing the very style of thinking. Therefore, in their significance they can go far beyond the specific area where they occurred. Therefore, we can talk about private scientific and general scientific revolutions.

The emergence of quantum mechanics is a vivid example of a general scientific revolution, since its significance goes far beyond physics. Quantum-mechanical representations at the level of analogies or metaphors have penetrated into humanitarian thinking. These notions attack our intuition, common sense, affect the perception of the world.

The Darwinian revolution in its significance went far beyond biology. It radically changed our ideas about the place of man in Nature. It had a strong methodological impact, turning the thinking of scientists towards evolutionism.

New methods of research can lead to far-reaching consequences: to changing problems, to changing the standards of scientific work, to the emergence of new areas of knowledge. In this case, their introduction means a scientific revolution.

Thus, the appearance of the microscope in biology meant a scientific revolution. The entire history of biology can be divided into two stages, separated by the appearance and introduction of the microscope. Entire fundamental sections of biology - microbiology, cytology, histology - owe their development to the introduction of the microscope.

The advent of the radio telescope meant a revolution in astronomy. Academician Ginsburg writes about it this way: “Astronomy after the Second World War entered a period of especially brilliant development, a period of “ second astronomical revolution"(The first such revolution is associated with the name of Galileo, who began to use telescopes) ... The content of the second astronomical revolution can be seen in the process of transforming astronomy from optical to all-wave."

Sometimes a new area of ​​the unknown, a world of new objects and phenomena, opens up before the researcher. This can cause revolutionary changes in the course of scientific knowledge, as happened, for example, with the discovery of such new worlds as the world of microorganisms and viruses, the world of atoms and molecules, the world of electromagnetic phenomena, the world of elementary particles, the discovery of the phenomenon of gravity, other galaxies, the world of crystals , radioactivity phenomena, etc.

Thus, the basis of the scientific revolution may be the discovery of some previously unknown areas or aspects of reality.

Fundamental scientific discoveries

Many major discoveries in science are made on a well-defined theoretical basis. Example: the discovery of the planet Neptune by Le Verrier and Adams by studying perturbations in the motion of the planet Uranus on the basis of celestial mechanics.

Fundamental scientific discoveries differ from others in that they are not concerned with deduction from existing principles, but with the development of new underlying principles.

In the history of science, fundamental scientific discoveries are distinguished related to the creation of such fundamental scientific theories and concepts as Euclid's geometry, Copernicus' heliocentric system, Newton's classical mechanics, Lobachevsky's geometry, Mendel's genetics, Darwin's theory of evolution, Einstein's theory of relativity, quantum mechanics. These discoveries have changed the perception of reality in general, i.e. were worldview.

There are many facts in the history of science when a fundamental scientific discovery was made independently by several scientists almost at the same time. For example, non-Euclidean geometry was built almost simultaneously by Lobachevsky, Gauss, Bolyai; Darwin published his ideas about evolution almost at the same time as Wallace; The special theory of relativity was developed simultaneously by Einstein and Poincaré.

From the fact that fundamental discoveries are made almost simultaneously by different scientists, it follows that they are historically determined.

Fundamental discoveries always arise as a result of solving fundamental problems, i.e. problems that have a deep, ideological, and not private character.

So, Copernicus saw that two fundamental worldview principles of his time - the principle of the movement of celestial bodies in circles and the principle of the simplicity of nature are not realized in astronomy; the solution of this fundamental problem led him to a great discovery.

Non-Euclidean geometry was constructed when the problem of the fifth postulate of Euclid's geometry ceased to be a particular problem of geometry and turned into a fundamental problem of mathematics, its foundations.

Ideals of scientific knowledge

In accordance with the classical ideas about science, it should not contain " no admixture of delusions". Now truth is not considered as a necessary attribute of all cognitive results that claim to be scientific. It is the central regulator of scientific and cognitive activity.

Classical ideas about science are characterized by a constant search for " started learning», « solid foundation on which the whole system of scientific knowledge could be based.

However, in the modern methodology of science, the idea of ​​the hypothetical nature of scientific knowledge is developing, when experience is no longer the foundation of knowledge, but mainly performs a critical function.

To replace the fundamentalist validity as the leading value in the classical ideas about scientific knowledge, such a value as efficiency in solving problems is increasingly being put forward.

Various areas of scientific knowledge acted as standards throughout the development of science.

« Beginnings» Euclid has long been an attractive standard in literally all areas of knowledge: in philosophy, physics, astronomy, medicine, etc.

However, now the limits of the significance of mathematics as a standard of scientificity are well understood, which, for example, are formulated as follows: “In the strict sense, proofs are possible only in mathematics, and not because mathematicians are smarter than others, but because they themselves create the universe for their experiments, nevertheless the rest are forced to experiment with a universe not created by them.”

The triumph of mechanics in the 17th-19th centuries led to the fact that it began to be regarded as an ideal, a model of science.

Eddington said that when a physicist sought to explain something, “his ear struggled to catch the noise of the machine. A man who could construct gravity from cogwheels would be a hero of the Victorian age."

Since the New Age, physics has been established as a reference science. If at first mechanics acted as a standard, then - the whole complex of physical knowledge. Orientation to the physical ideal in chemistry was clearly expressed, for example, by P. Berthelot, in biology - by M. Schleiden. G. Helmholtz argued that “ final goal"of all natural science -" melt into mechanics". Attempts to build social mechanics», « social physics" etc. were numerous.

The physical ideal of scientific knowledge has certainly proved its heuristic, but today it is clear that the implementation of this ideal often hinders the development of other sciences - mathematics, biology, social sciences, etc. As N.K. questions at to which natural science gives the Judas kiss to sociology”, leading to pseudo-objectivity.

Humanities are sometimes offered as a model of scientific knowledge. The focus in this case is the active role of the subject in the cognitive process.

However, the humanitarian ideal of scientific knowledge cannot be extended to all sciences. In addition to sociocultural conditioning, any scientific knowledge, including the humanitarian, should be characterized by an internal, objective conditionality. Therefore, the humanitarian ideal cannot be realized even in its subject area, and even more so in natural science.

The humanitarian ideal of being scientific is sometimes regarded as a transitional step towards some new ideas about science that go beyond the classical ones.

In general, the classical ideas about science are characterized by the desire to single out " scientific standard”, to which all other areas of knowledge should “catch up”.

However, such reductionist aspirations are criticized in the modern methodology of science, which is characterized by a pluralistic tendency in the interpretation of science, the assertion of the equivalence of various standards of scientificity, and their irreducibility to any one standard.

If, in accordance with the classical ideas about science, its conclusions should be determined only by the reality under study, then the modern methodology of science is characterized by the adoption and development of the thesis about the socio-cultural conditionality of scientific knowledge.

Social (socio-economic, cultural-historical, ideological, socio-psychological) factors in the development of science do not have a direct impact on scientific knowledge, which develops according to its own internal logic. However, social factors indirectly influence the development of scientific knowledge (through methodological regulations, principles, standards).

This externalist trend in the modern methodology of science signifies its radical break with classical ideas about science.

Functions of Science

In the methodology of science, such functions of science as description, explanation, foresight, understanding are distinguished.

With all the empiricism characteristic of Comte, he was not inclined to reduce science to a collection of single facts. Foresight he considered the main function of science.

O. Comte wrote: "True positive thinking lies mainly in the ability to know in order to foresee, study what is, and from here conclude what should happen according to the general position of the immutability of natural laws."

E. Mach declared description to be the only function of science.

He noted: “Does the description give everything that a scientific researcher can require? I think yes!" Mach essentially reduced explanation and foresight to description. From his point of view, theories are, as it were, compressed empiricism.

E. Mach wrote: “The speed with which our knowledge expands thanks to theory betrays to it a certain quantitative advantage over simple observation, while qualitatively there is no significant difference between them either in terms of origin or in terms of the final result.”

Mach called the atomic-molecular theory " mythology of nature". The well-known chemist W. Ostwald took a similar position. On this occasion, A. Einstein wrote: “The prejudice of these scientists against the atomic theory can undoubtedly be attributed to their positivist philosophical attitude. This is an interesting example of how philosophical prejudices prevent the correct interpretation of facts, even by scientists with bold thinking and subtle intuition. The prejudice that has survived to this day consists in the belief that facts in themselves, without a free theoretical construction, can and should lead to scientific knowledge.

V. Dilthey shared the sciences of nature and " the sciences of the spirit" (Humanities). He believed that the main cognitive function of the sciences of nature is explanation, and " sciences of the spirit" - understanding.

However, the natural sciences also perform the function of understanding.

The explanation is connected with understanding, since the explanation demonstrates to us the meaningfulness of the existence of the object, and therefore allows us to understand it.

Ethos of science

Ethical norms not only regulate the application of scientific results, but are also contained in the scientific activity itself.

The Norwegian philosopher G. Skirbekk notes: “Being an activity aimed at searching for truth, science is governed by norms: “ seek the truth», « avoid nonsense», « speak clearly», « try to test your hypotheses as thoroughly as possible“- this is approximately how the formulations of these internal norms of science look.” In this sense, ethics is contained in science itself, and the relationship between science and ethics is not limited to the question of good or bad application of scientific results.

The presence of certain values ​​and norms that are reproduced from generation to generation of scientists and are mandatory for a person of science, i.e. a certain ethos of science is very important for the self-organization of the scientific community (at the same time, the normative-value structure of science is not rigid). Separate violations of the ethical norms of science in general are more likely to be fraught with great trouble for the violator himself than for science as a whole. However, if such violations become widespread, science itself is already under threat.

In conditions when the social functions of science are rapidly multiplying and diversifying, it is not enough and unconstructive to give a total ethical assessment of science as a whole, regardless of whether this assessment is positive or negative.

The ethical assessment of science should now be differentiated, relating not to science as a whole, but to individual areas and areas of scientific knowledge. Such moral and ethical judgments play a very constructive role.

Modern science includes human and social interactions that people enter into about scientific knowledge.

« Pure» the study of a knowable object by science is a methodological abstraction, thanks to which one can get a simplified picture of science. In fact, the objective logic of the development of science is realized not outside the scientist, but in his activity. Recently, the social responsibility of a scientist is an integral component of scientific activity. This responsibility turns out to be one of the factors that determine the trends in the development of science, individual disciplines and research areas.

In the 1970s, scientists for the first time declared a moratorium on dangerous research. In connection with the results and prospects of biomedical and genetic research, a group of molecular biologists and geneticists led by P. Berg (USA) voluntarily announced a moratorium on such experiments in the field of genetic engineering that may pose a danger to the genetic constitution of living organisms. Then, for the first time, scientists, on their own initiative, decided to suspend research that promised them great success. Social responsibility scientists has become an organic component of scientific activity, significantly influencing the problems and directions of research.

The progress of science expands the range of problem situations for which the entire moral experience accumulated by mankind is insufficient. A large number of such situations arise in medicine. For example, in connection with the success of experiments on the transplantation of the heart and other organs, the question of determining the moment of death of the donor has become acute. The same question arises when an irreversibly comatose patient is supported by technical means for breathing and heartbeat. In the United States, such issues are handled by a special Presidential Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine, Biomedical and Behavioral Research. Under the influence of experiments with human embryos, the question of at what point in development a being should be considered a child with all the ensuing consequences becomes acute.

It cannot be assumed that ethical problems are the property of only some areas of science. Valuable and ethical foundations have always been necessary for scientific activity. In modern science, they are becoming a very noticeable and integral part of the activity, which is a consequence of the development of science as a social institution and the growth of its role in society.

Kuptsov V.I.

XII. THE NATURE OF FUNDAMENTAL SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERIES

Among the diverse types of scientific discoveries, a special place is occupied by fundamental discoveries that change our ideas about reality in general, i.e. worldview in nature.

1. TWO KINDS OF DISCOVERIES

A. Einstein once wrote that a theoretical physicist “as a foundation needs some general assumptions, the so-called principles, from which he can deduce consequences. His work is thus divided into two stages. Firstly, he needs to find these principles, and secondly, to develop the consequences that follow from these principles. To perform the second task, he is thoroughly armed since school. Consequently, if for some area and, accordingly, the set of relationships, the first problem is solved, then the consequences will not keep you waiting. The first of these tasks is of a completely different kind, i.e. establishing principles that can serve as a basis for deduction. There is no method here that can be learned and systematically applied to achieve the goal.

We will deal mainly with the discussion of problems associated with the solution of problems of the first kind, but first we will clarify our ideas about how problems of the second kind are solved.

Let's imagine the following problem. There is a circle through the center of which two mutually perpendicular diameters are drawn. Through point A, located on one of the diameters at a distance of 2/3 from the center of circle O, we draw a straight line parallel to the other diameter, and from point B - the intersection of this line with the circle, we lower the perpendicular to the second diameter, denoting their intersection point through K. Us it is necessary to express the length of the segment AK in terms of a function of the radius.

How are we going to solve this school problem?

Turning to certain principles of geometry for this, we restore a chain of theorems. In doing so, we try to use all the data we have. Note that since the diameters drawn are mutually perpendicular, the triangle OAK is right-angled. The value of OA = 2/3r. We will now try to find the length of the second leg, in order to then apply the Pythagorean theorem and determine the length of the hypotenuse AK. You can try to use some other methods. But suddenly, after carefully looking at the figure, we find that the OABK is a rectangle whose diagonals are known to be equal, i.e. AK = OV. OB is equal to the radius of the circle, therefore, without any calculations, it is clear that AK = r.

Here it is - a beautiful and psychologically interesting solution to the problem.

In this example, the following is important.

First, tasks of this kind usually belong to a well-defined subject area. Solving them, we clearly imagine where, in fact, we need to look for a solution. In this case, we do not think about whether the foundations of Euclidean geometry are correct, whether it is necessary to invent some other geometry, some special principles, in order to solve the problem. We immediately interpret it as belonging to the field of Euclidean geometry.

Secondly, these tasks are not necessarily standard, algorithmic. In principle, their solution requires a deep understanding of the specifics of the objects under consideration, developed professional intuition. Here, therefore, some professional training is needed. In the process of solving problems of this kind, we open a new path. We notice “suddenly” that the object under study can be considered as a rectangle and it is not at all necessary to single out a right triangle as an elementary object in order to form the correct way to solve the problem.

Of course, the above task is very simple. It is needed only in order to generally outline the type of problems of the second kind. But among such problems there are immeasurably more complex ones, the solution of which is of great importance for the development of science.

Consider, for example, the discovery of a new planet by W. Le Verrier and J. Adams. Of course, this discovery is a big event in science, especially considering how it was made:

First, the trajectories of the planets were calculated;

Then it was found that they did not coincide with the observed ones;

The existence of a new planet was then suggested;

Then they pointed the telescope at the corresponding point in space and ... discovered a planet there.

But why can this great discovery be attributed only to discoveries of the second kind?

The thing is that it was made on a clear foundation of already developed celestial mechanics.

Although problems of the second kind, of course, can be subdivided into subclasses of varying complexity, A. Einstein was right in separating them from fundamental problems.

For the latter require the discovery of new fundamental principles which cannot be obtained by any deduction from existing principles.

Of course, there are intermediate instances between problems of the first and second kind, but we will not consider them here, but will go straight to problems of the first kind.

In general, there are not so many such problems before mankind, but their solution each time meant a huge progress in the development of science and culture as a whole. They are associated with the creation of such fundamental scientific theories and concepts as

geometry of Euclid?

heliocentric theory of Copernicus,

classical Newtonian Mechanics,

Lobachevsky geometry,

genetics Mendel,

darwin's theory of evolution,

Einstein's Theory Of Relativity,

quantum mechanics,

structural linguistics.

All of them are characterized by the fact that the intellectual base on which they were created, in contrast to the field of discoveries of the second kind, was never strictly limited.

If we talk about the psychological context of the discoveries of different classes, then it is probably the same.

In its most superficial form, it can be described as direct vision, discovery in the full sense of the word. A person, as R. Descartes believed, "suddenly" sees that the problem must be considered in this way, and not otherwise.

Further, it should be noted that the discovery is never one-act, but has, so to speak, a "shuttle" character. At first there is a sense of the idea; then it is clarified by deriving certain consequences from it, which, as a rule, clarify the idea; then new consequences are deduced from the new modification, and so on.

But in the epistemological plan, the discoveries of the first and second kinds differ in the most radical way.

2. HISTORICAL CONDITIONING OF FUNDAMENTAL DISCOVERIES

Let us try to imagine the solution of problems of the first kind.

The advancement of new fundamental principles has always been associated with the activity of geniuses, with insight, with some secret characteristics of the human psyche.

An excellent confirmation of this perception of this kind of discovery is the struggle of scientists for priority. How

was in the history of the most acute situations in the relationship between scientists associated with their confidence that no one else could get the results they had achieved.

For example, the well-known utopian socialist C. Fourier claimed to have revealed the nature of man, discovered how society should be arranged so that there would be no social conflicts in it. He was convinced that if he had been born before his time, he would have helped people solve all their problems without wars and ideological confrontations. In this sense, he connected his discovery with his individual abilities.

How do fundamental discoveries come about? To what extent is their implementation connected with the birth of a genius, the manifestation of his unique talent?

Turning to the history of science, we see that such discoveries are indeed carried out by extraordinary people. At the same time, attention is drawn to the fact that many of them were made independently by several scientists almost at the same time.

N.I. Lobachevsky, F. Gauss, J. Bolyai, not to mention the mathematicians who developed the foundations of such geometry with less success, i.e. a whole group of scientists almost simultaneously came to the same fundamental results.

For two thousand years, people have been struggling with this problem of the fifth postulate of Euclid's geometry, and "suddenly", for literally 10 years, a dozen people solve it at once.

C. Darwin first published his ideas about the evolution of species in a report read in 1858 at a meeting of the Linnean Society in London. At the same meeting, Wallace also spoke with a presentation of the results of research, which, in essence, coincided with Darwin's.

The special theory of relativity bears, as you know, the name of A. Einstein, who outlined its principles in 1905. But in the same 1905, similar results were published by A. Poincaré.

Quite surprising is the rediscovery of Mendelian genetics in 1900, simultaneously and independently of each other by E. Cermak, K. Correns and H. de Vries.

Such situations can be found in the history of science a huge number.

And as soon as the situation is such that fundamental discoveries are made almost simultaneously by different scientists, then, consequently, there is their historical conditionality.

What is it in this case?

Trying to answer this question, we formulate the following general proposition.

Fundamental discoveries always arise as a result of solving fundamental problems.

First of all, let's pay attention to the fact that when we talk about fundamental problems, we mean such questions that relate to our general ideas about reality, its cognition, about the value system that guides our behavior.

Fundamental discoveries are often treated as solutions to particular problems and are not associated with any fundamental problems.

For example, when asked how the Copernican theory was created, they answer that studies showed a discrepancy between observations and those predictions that were made on the basis of the Ptolemaic geocentric system, and therefore a conflict arose between new data and the old theory.

To the question of how non-Euclidean geometry was created, the following answer is given: as a result of solving the problem of proving the fifth postulate of Euclid's geometry, which could not be proved in any way.

3. HELIOCENTRIC COPERNICK SYSTEM

Let's look from these positions at the features of the process of fundamental discoveries, starting our analysis with a study of the history of the creation of the heliocentric system of the world.

The presentation of the Copernican system of the universe as arising from the inconsistency of astronomical observations with the geocentric model of the world of Ptolemy does not correspond to historical facts.

First, the Copernican system did not at all describe the observed data better than the Ptolemaic system. By the way, that is why it was rejected by the philosopher F. Bacon and astronomer T. Brahe.

Second, even assuming that the Ptolemaic model had some discrepancies with observations, one cannot deny its ability to cope with these discrepancies.

After all, the behavior of the planets was represented in this model with the help of a carefully developed system of epicycles, which could describe an arbitrarily complex mechanical movement. In other words, there was simply no problem of coordinating the motion of the planets according to the Ptolemaic system with empirical data.

But how, then, could the Copernican system arise and even more so assert itself?

To understand the answer to this question, you need to understand the essence of the worldview innovations that she brought with her.

At the time of N. Copernicus, the theologized Aristotelian idea of ​​the world dominated. Its essence was as follows.

The world was created by God specifically for man. For man, the Earth was created as a place of his dwelling, placed in the center of the universe. The firmament moves around the Earth, on which all the stars, planets, as well as spheres associated with the movement of the Sun and Moon are located. The entire heavenly world is intended to serve the earthly life of people.

In accordance with this installation, the whole world is divided into sublunar (terrestrial) and supralunar (heavenly)

The sublunar world is a mortal world in which every single mortal person lives.

The heavenly world is a world for mankind in general, an eternal world in which its own laws operate, different from those on earth.

In the earthly world, the laws of Aristotelian physics are valid, according to which all movements are carried out as a result of the direct influence of some forces.

In the heavenly world, all movements are carried out along circular orbits (a system of epicycles) without the influence of any forces.

N. Copernicus radically changed this generally accepted picture of the world.

He not only changed the places of the Earth and the Sun in the astronomical scheme, but changed the place of man in the world, placing him on one of the planets, confusing the earthly and heavenly worlds.

The destructive nature of the ideas of N. Copernicus was clear to everyone. The Protestant leader M. Luther, who had nothing to do with astronomy, spoke in 1539 about the teachings of Copernicus as follows: “A fool wants to turn the whole art of astronomy upside down. But, as indicated Holy Bible, Joshua commanded the Sun to stop, not the Earth.”

Could any insignificant reason have caused such new radical ideas?

What does a person do when a splinter gets in his finger? He, of course, is trying to pull out a splinter, to treat his finger. Now, if gangrene has begun, then he will not spare a whole arm.

The problems of an accurate description of the observed trajectories of the planets, as already mentioned, could not be the basis for such bold and decisive actions.

On the other hand, it should be borne in mind that the astronomy of that time also contained considerable opportunities for fairly significant innovations. So, Tycho Brahe, solving astronomical problems associated with improving the calculations of the trajectories of the planets, proposed, in full accordance with the traditional worldview, a new system in which the Sun revolved around the Earth, and all the other planets revolved around the Sun.

Why did N. Copernicus need to put forward his ideas?

Apparently, he was solving some fundamental problem of his own.

What was the problem?

Both Ptolemy, and Aristotle, and Copernicus proceeded from the fact that in the heavenly world all movements occur in circles.

At the same time, even in antiquity, a profound idea was expressed that nature is, in principle, simple. This idea has become over time one of the fundamental principles of cognition of reality.

At the same time, observational astronomy had discovered by that time the following. Although the Ptolemaic model of the world had the ability to accurately describe any trajectory, for this it was necessary to constantly change the number of epicycles (today - one number, tomorrow - another). But in this case, it turned out that the planets did not move along the epicycles at all. It turns out that epicycles do not reflect the real movements of the planets, but are simply a mathematical device for describing this movement.

In addition, according to Ptolemy's system, it turned out that to describe the trajectory of one planet, a huge number of epicycles must be introduced. Complicated astronomy did not perform its practical functions well. In particular, it was very difficult to calculate the dates of religious holidays. This difficulty was so clearly recognized at that time that even the Pope himself found it necessary to make reforms in astronomy.

N. Copernicus saw that two fundamental ideological principles of his time - the principle of the movement of celestial bodies in circles and the principle of the simplicity of nature are clearly not implemented in astronomy.

The solution of this fundamental problem led him to a great discovery.

4. GEOMETRY OF LOBACHEVSKY

Let us pass to the analysis of another discovery - the discovery of non-Euclidean geometry. Let us try to show that here, too, we dealt with a fundamental problem. Considering this example, we will find out a number of other important points interpretation of fundamental discoveries.

The creation of non-Euclidean geometry is usually presented as a solution to the well-known problem of the fifth postulate of Euclid's geometry.

This problem was as follows.

The basis of all geometry, as it followed from the system of Euclid, was represented by the following five postulates:

1) through two points it is possible to draw a straight line, and moreover, only one;

2) any segment can be extended in any direction to infinity;

3) from any point as from the center, you can draw a circle of any radius;

4) all right angles are equal;

5) two straight lines intersected by a third will intersect on the side where the sum of the interior one-sided angles is less than 2d.

Already in the time of Euclid, it became clear that the fifth postulate was too complicated compared to the other starting points of his geometry. Other positions seemed obvious. It is because of their obviousness that they were considered as postulates, i.e. as something that is accepted without evidence.

At the same time, Thales proved the equality of the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle, i.e. a position much simpler than the fifth postulate. From this it is clear why this postulate has always been regarded with suspicion and tried to present it as a theorem. And Euclid himself constructed geometry in such a way that first those provisions were proved that were not based on the fifth postulate, and then this postulate was used to develop the content of geometry.

It is interesting that literally all major mathematicians, up to N.I. Lobachevsky, F. Gauss and J. Bolyai, who eventually solved the problem. Their decision consists of the following points:

The fifth postulate of Euclid's geometry is indeed a postulate, not a theorem;

It is possible to construct a new geometry by accepting all the Euclidean postulates, except for the fifth, which is replaced by its negation, i.e. for example, the assertion that through a point lying outside a line, one can draw an infinite number of lines parallel to a given one;

As a result of such a replacement, non-Euclidean geometry was constructed.

Let us now pose the following questions.

Why, for two millennia, no one even thought about the possibility of constructing non-Euclidean geometry?

To answer these questions, let us turn to the history of science.

Before N. I. Lobachevsky, F. Gauss, J. Bolyai, Euclidean geometry was regarded as the ideal of scientific knowledge.

Literally all thinkers of the past worshiped this ideal, believing that geometric knowledge as presented by Euclid is perfect. It seemed to be a model of the organization and proof of knowledge.

For I. Kant, for example, the idea of ​​the uniqueness of geometry was an organic part of his philosophical system. He believed that Euclidean perception of reality is a priori. It is a property of our consciousness, and therefore we cannot perceive reality differently.

The question of the uniqueness of geometry was not just a mathematical question.

It was ideological in nature, was included in the culture.

It was geometry that judged the possibilities of mathematics, the features of its objects, the style of thinking of mathematicians, and even the possibilities of a person to have accurate, demonstrative knowledge in general.

Where, then, did the idea of ​​the possibility of different geometries come from?

Why were N.I. Lobachevsky and other scientists able to come to a solution to the problem of the fifth postulate?

Let's pay attention to the fact that the time of creation of non-Euclidean geometries was a crisis from the point of view of solving the problem of Euclid's fifth postulate. Although mathematicians have been dealing with this problem for two thousand years, they have not had any stressful situations about the fact that it has not been solved for so long. They apparently thought this:

Euclid's geometry is a magnificently constructed building;

True, there is some ambiguity in it associated with the fifth postulate, but in the end, it will be eliminated.

However, tens, hundreds, thousands of years passed, and the ambiguity was not eliminated, but this did not particularly worry anyone. Apparently, the logic here could be as follows: in the end, there is only one truth, and there are as many false paths as you like. So far it has not been possible to find the right solution to the problem, but it will undoubtedly be found. The statement contained in the fifth postulate will be proved and will become one of the theorems of geometry.

But what happened at the beginning of the 19th century?

The attitude to the problem of proving the fifth postulate changes significantly. We see a number of direct statements about the very unfavorable situation in mathematics due to the fact that it is not possible to prove such an ill-fated postulate.

The most interesting and striking evidence of this is a letter from F. Bolyai to his son J. Bolyai, who became one of the creators of non-Euclidean geometry.

“I beg you,” my father wrote, “just don’t make any attempts to overcome the theory of parallel lines; you will spend all your time on it, and you will not prove the propositions of this all together. Do not try to overcome the theory of parallel lines in the way you tell me, or in any other way. I have explored all the paths to the end; I haven't come across a single idea that I haven't developed. I passed through all the hopeless darkness of that night, and I buried every light, every joy of life in it. For God's sake, I pray you, leave this matter, fear it no less than sensual passions, because it can deprive you of all your time, health, peace, all the happiness of your life. This hopeless darkness can sink thousands of Newtonian towers. It will never clear up on earth, and the unfortunate human race will never possess anything perfect even in geometry.

Why does such a reaction appear only at the beginning of the 19th century?

First of all, because at that time the problem of the fifth postulate ceased to be private, which may not be solved. In the eyes of F. Bolyai, it appeared as a whole fan of fundamental questions.

How should mathematics be constructed in general?

Can it be built on really solid foundations?

Is it valid knowledge?

Is it logically solid knowledge at all?

Such a formulation of the question was due not only to the history of the development of research related to the proof of the fifth postulate. It was determined by the development of mathematics in general, including its use in various fields of culture.

Up until the 17th century. mathematics was in its infancy. The most developed was geometry, the beginnings of algebra and trigonometry were known. But then, starting from the 17th century, mathematics began to develop rapidly and by the beginning of the 19th century. it represented a rather complex and developed system of knowledge.

First of all, under the influence of the needs of mechanics, differential and integral calculus were created.

Significant development has received algebra. The concept of a function organically entered mathematics (a large number of different functions were actively used in many branches of physics).

The theory of probability has developed into a fairly coherent system.

The theory of series was formed.

Thus, mathematical knowledge has grown not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively. At the same time, a large number of concepts appeared that mathematicians could not interpret.

For example, algebra carried with it a certain idea of ​​number. Positive, negative and imaginary quantities were equally her objects. But what negative or imaginary numbers are, no one knew this until the beginning of the 19th century.

There was no clear answer to a more general question - what is a number in general?

What are infinitesimal quantities?

How can one justify the operations of differentiation, integration, summation of series?

What is a probability?

At the beginning of the XIX century. no one could answer these questions.

In short, in mathematics by the beginning of the 19th century. the overall situation is complex.

On the one hand, this field of science has developed intensively and found valuable applications,

On the other hand, it rested on very obscure foundations.

In such a situation, the problem of the fifth postulate of Euclid's geometry was perceived differently.

The difficulties in interpreting new concepts could be understood as follows: what is unclear today will become clear tomorrow, when the corresponding field of research has received sufficient development, when enough intellectual efforts have been concentrated to solve the problem.

The problem of the fifth postulate, however, has existed for two millennia. And she still doesn't have a solution.

Perhaps this problem establishes a certain standard for interpreting the current state of mathematics and understanding what mathematics is in general?

Maybe then mathematics is not exact knowledge at all?

In the light of such questions, the problem of the fifth postulate ceased to be a particular problem of geometry.

It has become a fundamental problem in mathematics.

This analysis gives us yet another confirmation of the idea that fundamental discoveries are solutions to fundamental problems.

He also shows that fundamental problems become within the framework of culture, in other words, fundamentality is historically conditioned.

But within the framework of culture, not only fundamental problems are formed, as a rule, many components of their solution are also prepared in them. From this it becomes clear why such problems are being solved precisely at this moment, and not at any other time.

Consider again in this connection the process of creating non-Euclidean geometry. Let us pay attention to the following interesting fragments of the history of research in this area.

The proofs of the fifth postulate of Euclid were carried out for two millennia, but at the same time they were considered a problem of the second kind, i.e. the postulate was represented as a theorem of Euclidean geometry. It was a task with a clearly fixed foundation for its solution.

However, in the second half of the XVIII century. There are studies in which the idea of ​​the unsolvability of this problem is expressed. In 1762, Klugel, publishing a review of studies of this problem, came to the conclusion that Euclid was, apparently, right in considering the fifth postulate to be just a postulate.

Regardless of how Klugel felt about his conclusion, his conclusion was very serious, as it provoked the following question: if the fifth postulate of Euclid's geometry is really a postulate, and not a theorem, then what is a postulate? After all, a postulate was considered an obvious position, and therefore not requiring proof.

But such a question was no longer a question of the second kind.

He already presented a meta-question, i.e. brought thought to the philosophical and methodological level.

So, the problem of the fifth postulate of Euclid's geometry began to give rise to a very special kind of thinking.

The translation of this problem to the meta level gave it a worldview sound.

It has ceased to be a problem of the second kind.

Another historical moment. The studies carried out in the second half of the 18th century are very interesting. I.Lambert and J.Saccheri. I. Kant knew about these studies, and it was no coincidence that he spoke about the hypothetical status of geometric positions. If things-in-themselves are characterized geometrically, then why, I.Kant asked, should they not obey any other geometry other than Euclidean?

I. Kant's reasoning was inspired by the ideas of the abstract possibility of non-Euclidean geometries, which were expressed by I. Lambert and J. Saccheri.

J. Saccheri, trying to prove the fifth postulate of Euclid's geometry as a theorem, i.e. looking at it as an ordinary problem, he used a method of proof called "proof by contradiction."

J. Saccheri's line of reasoning was probably the following. If we accept instead of the fifth postulate a statement opposite to it, combine it with all other statements of Euclidean geometry and, deriving consequences from such a system of initial positions, we arrive at a contradiction, then we will thereby prove the truth of the fifth postulate.

The scheme of this reasoning is very simple. It can be either A or not-A, and if all the other postulates are true and we allow not-A, but get a lie, then it is A that is true.

Using this standard method of proof, J. Saccheri began to develop a system of consequences from his assumptions, trying to discover their inconsistency. Thus, he deduced about 40 theorems of non-Euclidean geometry, but did not find any contradictions.

How did he assess the current situation? Considering the fifth postulate of Euclid's geometry to be a theorem (i.e., a problem of the second kind), he simply concluded that in his case the method of "proof by contradiction" does not work. So, looking at this problem as a problem of the second kind, he, having a new geometry in his hands, could not correctly interpret the situation.

Two conclusions follow from this.

First, in a certain sense, the new geometry appeared in culture already before non-Euclidean geometry was discovered.

Secondly, it is precisely the correct assessment of the problem of the fifth postulate, i.e. its interpretation as a problem of the first, and not of the second kind, allowed N.I. Lobachevsky, F. Gauss and J. Bolyai to come to a solution to the problem and create a non-Euclidean geometry. It was necessary to understand the very possibility of creating such geometries.

J. Saccheri allowed this possibility only as a logical one, taking a constructive step in solving the problem of the Euclidean postulate in the traditional style. But he did not at all consider it seriously, believing that non-Euclidean geometries were impossible, although logically admissible.

Thus, history not only prepares the problem, but also largely determines the direction and possibility of its solution.

Consider the Copernican revolution from this perspective.

As is well known, it was not N. Copernicus who discovered the heliocentric system. It was created by Aristarchus in antiquity. Maybe N. Copernicus didn't know about it? Yes, nothing like that! He knew and referred to Aristarchus.

But then why are they talking about Copernican?

The fact is that N. Copernicus transferred the already known model to a completely new cultural environment, realizing that with its help it is possible to solve a number of problems. This was precisely the essence of his revolution, and not at all in the creation of a heliocentric system.

5. THE DISCOVERY OF G. MENDEL

Let us now consider the issue of the cultural preparation of discoveries using the example of G. Mendel's discovery.

This discovery contains not only the so-called Mendel's laws, which represent the empirical patterns that are usually talked about, but also a system of very important theoretical provisions, which, in fact, determines the significance of G. Mendel's discovery.

Moreover, the empirical patterns, the establishment of which is attributed to G. Mendel, were not established by him at all. They were known even before him and were studied by O. Sazhre, T. Knight, S. Noden. G. Mendel, in fact, only clarified them.

It is also significant that his discovery had methodological significance. For biology, it provided not only a new theoretical model, but also a system of new methodological principles, with the help of which it was possible to study very complex phenomena of life.

G. Mendel suggested the presence of some elementary carriers of heredity, which can be freely combined during cell fusion in the process of fertilization. It is this combination of the rudiments of heredity, which is carried out at the cellular level, that gives various types of hereditary structures.

Such a theoretical model includes a number of very important ideas.

Firstly, this is the selection of elementary carriers at the cell level.

Justifying such a selection, G. Mendel obviously relied on the theory of the cellular structure of living matter. She was very important to him. G. Mendel got acquainted with its main provisions in the course of lectures by F. Unger at the University of Vienna. Unger was one of the innovators in the use of physicochemical methods in the study of the living. At the same time, he believed that these studies should reach the level of the cell. - Secondly, G. Mendel believed that the laws that govern the carriers of heredity are as certain as the laws that govern physical phenomena.

Obviously, here G. Mendel proceeded from a general worldview that was deeply rooted in the culture of that time, i.e. installations about the laws of nature, which extended to the phenomena of heredity.

Thirdly, G. Mendel implemented in his research the general ideal of physical knowledge of the world, according to which one should identify an elementary object, find the laws governing its behavior and then, based on this knowledge, construct more complex processes, describing and explaining their features.

Fourthly, G. Mendel suggested that the laws governing his elementary carriers are probabilistic laws. For 1865, in which he published his discovery, it was very new idea. After all, it was at that time that probabilistic representations began to be introduced into physics. A little earlier - in the 30s - a probabilistic description of the phenomena of reality entered the culture, thanks to the work of G. Quetelet on social statistics. G. Mendel borrowed ideas of probabilistic description from social statistics.

In addition, G. Mendel assumed that his theory would explain heredity only if it was confirmed by experience. This was very important, especially since in the science of that time the phenomena of life, like many other phenomena, were explained in a speculative way.

But how could this theory be compared with experience in biology?

For G. Mendel, a new problem arose here. It had to be carried out on the basis of statistical processing of elementary data. It was the inability to process statistical material, according to G. Mendel, that did not allow, for example, S. Noden to establish the correct quantitative relationships in the splitting of features.

Finally, it should be noted that the Mendelian experimental approach in biology was planned for a very long time. G. Mendel himself conducted experiments for about ten years, realizing a pre-planned research program.

The success of his experiments was due primarily to the choice of material. Mendelian laws of heredity are very simple, but actually appear on a small number of biological objects. One of these objects is peas, for which, moreover, it was necessary to choose clean lines. G. Mendel was engaged in this selection for two years. He clearly imagined, following the physical ideal, that the object he chooses should be simple, completely controllable in all its changes. Only then can precise laws be established. Of course, G. Mendel did not imagine for sure all the details that he would receive in the future.

But there is no doubt that all his studies were clearly planned and based on a system of theoretical views on the patterns of inheritance.

In principle, he could not take even one step along this path if he did not have sufficient theoretical ideas developed in advance.

Thus, the discovery of G. Mendel includes not just the discovery of a set of empirical patterns that were not so much discovered by him as clarified.

The main thing is that G. Mendel was the first to build a theoretical model of the phenomena of heredity, which was based on the selection of its elementary carriers, subject to probabilistic laws.

The very system of methodological ideas related to the assessment of the role of statistics, probability and planning of empirical research in science deserves special attention.

The discovery of G. Mendel was not accidental.

It, like other fundamental discoveries, is due to the peculiarities of the culture of his time, both European and national.

But why was this outstanding discovery made by G. Mendel, a monk, and why exactly in Moravia, essentially a periphery Austrian Empire?

Let's try to answer these questions.

G. Mendel was a monk of the Augustinian monastery in Brno, which concentrated within its walls many thinking and educated people. So, the abbot of the monastery F.Ts.Napp is considered prominent figure Moravian culture. He actively contributed to the development of education in his region, was interested in natural science and dealt, in particular, with selection problems.

Among the monks of this monastery was T. Bratranek, who later became the rector of Krakow University. T. Bratranek was attracted by the natural-philosophical ideas of F. Goethe, and he wrote works in which he compared the evolutionary ideas of Ch. Darwin and the great German poet.

Another monk of this monastery - M. Klatsel - was passionately fond of the teachings of G. Hegel on development. He was interested in the patterns of formation of plant hybrids, and conducted experiments with peas. It was from him that G. Mendel inherited the site for his experiments. For his liberal views, M. Klatsel was expelled from the monastery and left for America.

P. Krzhizhkovsky, a reformer of church music, who later became a teacher of the famous Czech composer L. Janacek, also lived in the monastery.

G. Mendel from childhood showed great abilities in the study of sciences. The desire to get a good education and get rid of heavy material worries led him in 1843 to the monastery. Here, while studying theology, he at the same time showed an interest in agriculture, horticulture, and viticulture. In an effort to obtain systematic knowledge in this area, he listened to lectures on these subjects at the Philosophical School in Brno. As a very young man, G. Mendel taught Latin, Greek and German languages, as well as a course of mathematics and geometry in the gymnasium of the city of Znojmo. From 1851 to 1853, G. Mendel studied the natural sciences at the University of Vienna, and from 1854, for 14 years, he taught physics and natural history at the school.

In his letters, he often called himself a physicist, showing great affection for this science. Until the end of his life, he retained an interest in various physical phenomena. But in particular he was occupied with the problems of meteorology. When he was elected abbot of the monastery, he no longer had time to conduct his biological experiments, besides, his eyesight deteriorated. But he was engaged in meteorological research until his death, and at the same time he was especially fond of their statistical processing.

Already these facts from the life of G. Mendel give us an idea of ​​why G. Mendel, a monk, was able to make a scientific discovery. But why did this discovery take place in Moravia, and not, say, in England or France, which at that time were the undoubted leaders in the development of science?

During the life of G. Mendel, Moravia was part of the Austrian Empire. Its indigenous population was subjected to severe oppression, and the Habsburg monarchs were not interested in the development of Moravian culture. But Moravia was an extremely favorable country for development Agriculture. Therefore, in the 70s of the XVIII century. The Habsburg ruler Maria Theresa, carrying out economic reforms, ordered the organization of agricultural societies in Moravia. In order to collect more products from the land, everyone who manages the economy was even ordered to take exams in the basics of agricultural sciences.

As a result, agricultural schools began to be created in Moravia, and the development of agricultural sciences began. In Moravia, a very significant concentration of agricultural societies has developed. There were probably more of them than in England. It was in Moravia that they first started talking about breeding science, which was also introduced into practice. Already in the 20s of the XIX century. in Moravia, local breeders actively use the hybridization method to develop new breeds of animals and especially new varieties of plants. The problems of breeding science became colossally acute just at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries, since the rapid growth of industry and the urban population required the intensification of agricultural production.

In this situation, the discovery of the laws of heredity was of great practical importance. This problem was also acute in theoretical biology. 19th century scientists knew quite a lot about the morphology and physiology of the living. Thanks to the theory of natural selection, Charles Darwin managed to understand the essence of the process of evolution of life on Earth. However, the laws of heredity remained unknown.

In other words, a clearly expressed problem situation of a fundamental nature has been created.

The remarkable and even surprising results obtained by G. Mendel were also rooted in the culture of that time.

In this sense, the idea of ​​the probabilistic nature of the laws of heredity is especially indicative. It was borrowed by G. Mendel from social statistics, which, thanks primarily to the work of A. Quetelet, attracted everyone's attention at that time. The practice of statistical processing of empirical material, both in social statistics and in physics, which was expanding at that time, undoubtedly contributed to its spread to the field of life phenomena.

At the same time, the desire to isolate the elementary units of inheritance and, on the basis of their interaction, to explain the features of the inheritance process as a whole was a clear adherence to the physical methodology of cognition.

This ideal was clearly formulated already at the beginning of the 19th century. And he actively penetrated into all sciences. By the way, it was precisely following it that biology began to increasingly apply physical and chemical methods. In psychology, I. Herbart conducted research directly guided by this ideal. O.Kont relied on him, substantiating the need to create sociology. G. Mendel followed the same path in the study of the phenomena of heredity.

The idea to construct a scientific theory of inheritance at the cell level could only have arisen in the middle of the 19th century.

Finally, if we talk about such details as the choice of the object of study itself - peas - then the properties of splitting, the dominance of this object, were discovered at the end of the 18th - beginning of the 19th centuries. There are a number of works that describe these properties, which attracted the attention of Mendel.

In short, here, as in other examples, we see that fundamental discoveries are the solution to a fundamental problem.

They are always historically prepared.

Prepared is not only the problem itself, but also the components of its solution.

But this should not create the illusion that geniuses are not needed at all for such discoveries. Awareness of the fundamental problem, finding real ways to solve it requires a huge intellect, broad education, purposefulness, which allow the scientist to feel the breath of the times better than others.

The transition from one paradigm to another, according to Kuhn, is impossible through logic and references to experience.

In a sense, the advocates of different paradigms live in different worlds. According to Kuhn, different paradigms are incommensurable. Therefore, the transition from one paradigm to another should be carried out abruptly, like a switch, and not gradually through logic.

Scientific revolutions

Scientific revolutions usually affect the philosophical and methodological foundations of science, often changing the very style of thinking. Therefore, in their significance they can go far beyond the specific area where they occurred. Therefore, we can talk about private scientific and general scientific revolutions.

The emergence of quantum mechanics is a vivid example of a general scientific revolution, since its significance goes far beyond physics. Quantum-mechanical representations at the level of analogies or metaphors have penetrated into humanitarian thinking. These ideas encroach on our intuition, common sense, affect the worldview.

The Darwinian revolution in its significance went far beyond biology. It radically changed our ideas about the place of man in Nature. It had a strong methodological impact, turning the thinking of scientists towards evolutionism.

New methods of research can lead to far-reaching consequences: to changing problems, to changing the standards of scientific work, to the emergence of new areas of knowledge. In this case, their introduction means a scientific revolution.

Thus, the appearance of the microscope in biology meant a scientific revolution. The entire history of biology can be divided into two stages, separated by the appearance and introduction of the microscope. Entire fundamental sections of biology - microbiology, cytology, histology - owe their development to the introduction of the microscope.

The advent of the radio telescope meant a revolution in astronomy. Academician Ginsburg writes about it this way: “Astronomy after the Second World War entered a period of especially brilliant development, a period of second astronomical revolution“(The first such revolution is associated with the name of Galileo, who began to use telescopes) ... The content of the second astronomical revolution can be seen in the process of transforming astronomy from optical to all-wave.”

Sometimes a new area of ​​the unknown, a world of new objects and phenomena, opens up before the researcher. This can cause revolutionary changes in the course of scientific knowledge, as happened, for example, with the discovery of such new worlds as the world of microorganisms and viruses, the world of atoms and molecules, the world of electromagnetic phenomena, the world of elementary particles, the discovery of the phenomenon of gravity, other galaxies, the world of crystals , phenomena of radioactivity, etc.

Thus, the basis of the scientific revolution may be the discovery of some previously unknown areas or aspects of reality.

Fundamental scientific discoveries

Many major discoveries in science are made on a well-defined theoretical basis. Example: the discovery of the planet Neptune by Le Verrier and Adams by studying perturbations in the motion of the planet Uranus on the basis of celestial mechanics.

Fundamental scientific discoveries differ from others in that they are not about deduction from existing principles, but about the development of new fundamental principles.

In the history of science, fundamental scientific discoveries are distinguished related to the creation of such fundamental scientific theories and concepts as Euclid's geometry, Copernicus' heliocentric system, Newton's classical mechanics, Lobachevsky's geometry, Mendel's genetics, Darwin's theory of evolution, Einstein's theory of relativity, quantum mechanics. These discoveries changed the idea of ​​reality as a whole, i.e., they were of an ideological nature.

There are many facts in the history of science when a fundamental scientific discovery was made independently by several scientists almost at the same time. For example, non-Euclidean geometry was built almost simultaneously by Lobachevsky, Gauss, Bolyai; Darwin published his ideas about evolution almost at the same time as Wallace; The special theory of relativity was developed simultaneously by Einstein and Poincaré.

From the fact that fundamental discoveries are made almost simultaneously by different scientists, it follows that they are historically determined.

Fundamental discoveries always arise as a result of solving fundamental problems, i.e., problems that have a deep, worldview, and not a particular character.

So, Copernicus saw that two fundamental worldview principles of his time - the principle of the movement of celestial bodies in circles and the principle of the simplicity of nature are not realized in astronomy; the solution of this fundamental problem led him to a great discovery.

Non-Euclidean geometry was constructed when the problem of the fifth postulate of Euclid's geometry ceased to be a particular problem of geometry and turned into a fundamental problem of mathematics, its foundations.

Ideals of scientific knowledge

In accordance with the classical ideas about science, it should not contain " no admixture of delusions". Now truth is not considered as a necessary attribute of all cognitive results that claim to be scientific. It is the central regulator of scientific and cognitive activity.

Classical ideas about science are characterized by a constant search for " started learning», « solid foundation on which the whole system of scientific knowledge could be based.

However, in the modern methodology of science, the idea of ​​the hypothetical nature of scientific knowledge is developing, when experience is no longer the foundation of knowledge, but mainly performs a critical function.

To replace the fundamentalist validity as the leading value in the classical ideas about scientific knowledge, such a value as efficiency in solving problems is increasingly being put forward.

Various areas of scientific knowledge acted as standards throughout the development of science.

« Beginnings» Euclid has long been an attractive standard in literally all areas of knowledge: in philosophy, physics, astronomy, medicine, etc.

However, now the limits of the significance of mathematics as a standard of scientificity are well understood, which, for example, are formulated as follows: “In the strict sense, proofs are possible only in mathematics, and not because mathematicians are smarter than others, but because they themselves create the universe for their experiments, nevertheless the rest are forced to experiment with a universe not created by them.”

The triumph of mechanics in the 17th-19th centuries led to the fact that it began to be regarded as an ideal, a model of science.

Eddington said that when a physicist sought to explain something, “his ear struggled to catch the noise of the machine. A man who could construct gravity from cogwheels would be a hero of the Victorian age."

Since the New Age, physics has been established as a reference science. If at first mechanics acted as a standard, then - the whole complex of physical knowledge. Orientation to the physical ideal in chemistry was clearly expressed, for example, by P. Berthelot, in biology - by M. Schleiden. G. Helmholtz argued that “ final goal"of all natural science -" melt into mechanics". Attempts to build social mechanics», « social physics”, etc. were numerous.

The physical ideal of scientific knowledge has certainly proved its heuristic, but today it is clear that the implementation of this ideal often hinders the development of other sciences - mathematics, biology, social sciences, etc. As N.K. questions at to which natural science gives the Judas kiss to sociology”, leading to pseudo-objectivity.

Humanities are sometimes offered as a model of scientific knowledge. The focus in this case is the active role of the subject in the cognitive process.

Many major discoveries in science are made on a well-defined theoretical basis. Example: the discovery of the planet Neptune by Le Verrier and Adams by studying perturbations in the motion of the planet Uranus on the basis of celestial mechanics.

Fundamental scientific discoveries differ from others in that they are not about deduction from existing principles, but about the development of new fundamental principles.

In the history of science, fundamental scientific discoveries are distinguished related to the creation of such fundamental scientific theories and concepts as Euclid's geometry, Copernicus' heliocentric system, Newton's classical mechanics, Lobachevsky's geometry, Mendel's genetics, Darwin's theory of evolution, Einstein's theory of relativity, quantum mechanics. These discoveries have changed the perception of reality in general, i.e. were worldview.

There are many facts in the history of science when a fundamental scientific discovery was made independently by several scientists almost at the same time. For example, non-Euclidean geometry was built almost simultaneously by Lobachevsky, Gauss, Bolyai; Darwin published his ideas about evolution almost at the same time as Wallace; The special theory of relativity was developed simultaneously by Einstein and Poincaré.

From the fact that fundamental discoveries are made almost simultaneously by different scientists, it follows that they are historically determined.

Fundamental discoveries always arise as a result of solving fundamental problems, i.e. problems that have a deep, ideological, and not private character.

So, Copernicus saw that two fundamental worldview principles of his time - the principle of the movement of celestial bodies in circles and the principle of the simplicity of nature are not realized in astronomy; the solution of this fundamental problem led him to a great discovery.

Non-Euclidean geometry was constructed when the problem of the fifth postulate of Euclid's geometry ceased to be a particular problem of geometry and turned into a fundamental problem of mathematics, its foundations.

Bibliography

For the preparation of this work, materials from the site http://nrc.edu.ru/

IDEALS OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE

In accordance with the classical ideas about science, it should not contain "any admixture of delusions." Now truth is not considered as a necessary attribute of all cognitive results that claim to be scientific. It is the central regulator of scientific and cognitive activity.

Classical ideas about science are characterized by a constant search for the "beginnings of knowledge", a "reliable foundation" on which the entire system of scientific knowledge could be based.

However, in the modern methodology of science, the idea of ​​the hypothetical nature of scientific knowledge is developing, when experience is no longer the foundation of knowledge, but mainly performs a critical function.

To replace the fundamentalist validity as the leading value in the classical ideas about scientific knowledge, such a value as efficiency in solving problems is increasingly being put forward.

Various areas of scientific knowledge acted as standards throughout the development of science.

"Beginnings" of Euclid for a long time were an attractive standard in literally all areas of knowledge: in philosophy, physics, astronomy, medicine, etc.

However, now the limits of the significance of mathematics as a standard of scientificity are well understood, which, for example, are formulated as follows: “In the strict sense, proofs are possible only in mathematics, and not because mathematicians are smarter than others, but because they themselves create the universe for their experiments, nevertheless the rest are forced to experiment with a universe not created by them."

The triumph of mechanics in the 17th-19th centuries led to the fact that it began to be regarded as an ideal, a model of science.

Eddington said that when a physicist sought to explain something, "his ear struggled to catch the noise of the machine. A man who could construct gravity from cogwheels would be a hero of the Victorian age."

Since the New Age, physics has been established as a reference science. If at first mechanics acted as a standard, then - the whole complex of physical knowledge. Orientation to the physical ideal in chemistry was clearly expressed, for example, by P. Berthelot, in biology - by M. Schleiden. G. Helmholtz argued that the "ultimate goal" of all natural science is to "dissolve into mechanics." Attempts to construct "social mechanics", "social physics", etc. were numerous.

The physical ideal of scientific knowledge has certainly proved its heuristic, but today it is clear that the implementation of this ideal often hinders the development of other sciences - mathematics, biology, social sciences, etc. As N.K. questions under "which natural science gives the Judas kiss of sociology", leading to pseudo-objectivity.

Humanities are sometimes offered as a model of scientific knowledge. The focus in this case is the active role of the subject in the cognitive process.

However, the humanitarian ideal of scientific knowledge cannot be extended to all sciences. In addition to socio-cultural conditioning, any scientific knowledge, including the humanities, must be characterized by internal, objective conditioning. Therefore, the humanitarian ideal cannot be realized even in its subject area, and even more so in natural science.

The humanitarian ideal of being scientific is sometimes regarded as a transitional step towards some new ideas about science that go beyond the classical ones.

In general, the classical ideas about science are characterized by the desire to single out a "standard of scientific character", to which all other areas of knowledge should "catch up".

However, such reductionist aspirations are criticized in the modern methodology of science, which is characterized by a pluralistic tendency in the interpretation of science, the assertion of the equivalence of various standards of scientificity, and their irreducibility to any one standard.

If, in accordance with the classical ideas about science, its conclusions should be determined only by the reality under study, then the modern methodology of science is characterized by the adoption and development of the thesis about the socio-cultural conditionality of scientific knowledge.

Social (socio-economic, cultural-historical, ideological, socio-psychological) factors in the development of science do not have a direct impact on scientific knowledge, which develops according to its own internal logic. However, social factors indirectly influence the development of scientific knowledge (through methodological regulations, principles, standards).

This externalist trend in the modern methodology of science signifies its radical break with classical ideas about science. I

Bibliography

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