Crib: Reform of federal relations in modern Russia. Federative reform in Russia: the problem and the search for a solution Reform of federal relations in brief

UDC 342.24(470)(091)

reform projects

federal relations in RUSSIA in the 1990s:

political and legal review

© Kazarin V. n., 2014

Irkutsk State University, Irkutsk

The article is devoted to the analysis of projects for reforming federal relations in post-Soviet Russia in one of the critical periods of its development - the 1990s. Various political and legal projects of variants of the evolution of Russian statehood have been studied. The author substantiated the conclusion that changes in the subject composition Russian Federation were not only possible, but also objectively necessary.

Keywords: the crisis of the Soviet federation; projects for reforming federal relations; options for the relationship between the center and the subjects of the Federation; discussion of the optimization of the subject composition of the Russian Federation; prospects for the evolution of federal relations in Russia.

The turn of the 80-90s. 20th century was the most difficult for the development of Russian statehood in its entire more than a thousand-year history. Obvious failures of the economic policy pursued by the Gorbachev leadership, the growing financial dependence of the USSR, and then the new Russia, on developed foreign states, a sharp drop in the living standards of the bulk of the country's population, political and ideological problems that broke out, religious and national / nationalist movements, geopolitical pressure West - all this shattered the statehood, could not but influence the relationship between the center and the regions. In the course of the intensified struggle for political and economic power, the most radical supporters of the liberal idea found themselves on a par with anti-Russian nationalist forces in most of the union republics.

As a result of the disintegration (collapse?) of the USSR, the Soviet federation ceased to exist both legally and in fact. The RSFSR, also formally a federal state, as the largest part of the former USSR in terms of territory and population, was under the threat of actual collapse. We are talking not only about separatism and the actual secession of the Chechen Republic from the RSFSR under the presidents D. Dudayev and A. Maskhadov, but also the separatism of individual republics and regions.

stey (Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Sakha/Yakutia, partly Sverdlovsk region, etc.).

With the strengthening of federal power, the real powers of many regional leaders were gradually reduced. But it also posed a potential threat. The formed local elite and bureaucracy, having felt the taste of power and property, intensified opposition to the federal authorities in various, more veiled forms. And this did not remove the issue of the potential collapse of the Russian Federation from the agenda.

Let's take a look at what projects possible options development of Russian statehood after the collapse of the USSR were discussed and in the presence of necessary conditions could be implemented.

First. The creation of the so-called Russian Republic, which, along with other already existing national-territorial republics, would become part of the Russian Federation. In the context of the multinational composition of historical Russia, this project was not only unrealizable, but also dangerous for the escalation of interethnic relations. The Russian Federation, not yet taking shape after the events of 1991, could repeat the fate of the USSR.

Second. Rejection of the national-territorial principle and the creation of federal units based on the economic and geographical zoning of the country. This project can be considered ideal, but therefore

and unrealizable in those specific conditions. Would the national elites then go to the rejection of the national-territorial principle? Have criteria for optimal economic-geographical zoning been developed? It was during that period, the turn of 1991-1992? Obviously, these are rhetorical questions.

The third. Creation of a federation of republics (national-territorial formations) and so-called lands (administrative-territorial formations of the type existing in Germany). But these projects were categorically rejected in the former autonomous republics, which did not want to have the same status as the administrative-territorial entities. Carrying out a policy of consolidation of administrative-territorial units in the conditions of a weak central government would mean creating a semblance of a confederation.

Fourth. These proposals were contained in the draft Constitution of the Russian Federation, developed by the political council of the Movement for Democratic Reforms of Russia (the developers of the project were lawyers S. S. Alekseev, A. A. Sobchak, Yu. Kh. Kalmykov). They proposed to recognize the national republics, provinces and autonomous national communities as subjects of the federation. Republics, in their opinion, are sovereign states, provinces are territorial state-administrative formations that would provide a combination state beginning and local government. Autonomous national communities were proposed to be created as part of provinces on the basis of territorial and ethnic autonomy of small peoples. They also advocated the idea of ​​concluding individual agreements between all subjects of the federation.

Analyzing these projects for the formation of the Russian Federation, we can assume that if they were implemented, Russia would have been waiting for the fate of the USSR.

Back in 1992, when the scientific legal community was discussing the draft of a new Constitution (preliminary, and not the one that was the basis of the 1993 Constitution), cand. legal Sci. A. A. Uvarov (Orenburg branch of MJI) noted that the weak point of the project is the section on the federal structure of Russia. He drew attention to the fact that we must strive to ensure that, on the basis of autonomous

dwarf republics did not arise in other regions and districts, as this would cause further destabilization of economic and political relations, new national conflicts. “Apparently,” wrote A. A. Uvarov, “it is necessary to develop on a scientific basis some criteria (economic, political, demographic, etc.), on the basis of which potential subjects of the Federation of Russia can be designed.”

One of the most actual problems, starting with the so-called sovereignty parade of the late 1980s and early 1990s. and throughout the last decade of the twentieth century, there was a problem of relations between the territories / regions and the former autonomous regions, which became equal subjects of the Federation under the Constitution of 1993 (clause 1, article 5). Chapter 3 "Federal structure" (Part 4, Article 66) defines the relations of the autonomous districts that are part of the territory or region. They "may be regulated by federal law and an agreement between the state authorities of the Autonomous Okrug and, accordingly, the state authorities of the territory or region." In practice, disagreements between the krai/oblast and the okrug continued to exist. What was the mechanism to overcome them? One of them was proposed by N. M. Dobrynin, deputy head of the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug, later - Doctor of Law. sciences, professor. He considered it expedient to regulate relations in three stages.

The first stage is the direct and voluntary interaction of equal subjects of the Federation. At this stage, economic treaties and agreements, the implementation of common programs aimed at achieving economic integration were desirable and necessary. It is also possible to transfer individual powers of the autonomous okrugs to regional government bodies. Thus, this is a set of measures aimed at ensuring the integrity of the region/region as a single legal and economic space.

The second stage is the formation of federal-regional relations. At this stage, it is desirable to sign agreements between the oblast and its constituent autonomous okrug. Such agreements were concluded, for example, between the Perm Region and the Komi-Permyak Autonomous

district, between the Irkutsk region and the Ust-Orda Autonomous Okrug.

At the third stage, a single legislative base of the two subjects was to be formed, possibly the formation of a regional/regional bicameral legislative assembly. The mechanism proposed by N. M. Dobrynin for the interaction of complex subjects of the Federation in those conditions of weakness and lack of will of the federal authorities was quite acceptable for resolving issues at the regional level.

In the first period of the presidency (1990-1996) of B. N. Yeltsin, attempts were made to reform the power structure that was then established in the Russian Federation, with the intention of strengthening not only the role of the center, but also eliminating obvious distortions at the level of the former Soviet autonomous republics and territories / regions in favor of the latter. Attempts, it should be noted, are weak and ineffective. In 1993, Boris N. Yeltsin met with his authorized representatives, which took place in Petrozavodsk (Republic of Karelia). The President of Russia addressed them with a proposal to create a Federation Council, which would consist of representatives from all 89 subjects of the Federation and would be the upper house of the Russian parliament. But the leaders of the republics, as one would expect in a real situation, did not agree to this proposal. Why? In the case of equal representation in the Federation Council, the leaders of the territories and regions would have received a numerical superiority, and this, according to the leaders of the former autonomies who became presidents, significantly limited their influence on the central government in defending their often corporate interests. It is no coincidence that in 1994 the then leaders of Chechnya and Tatarstan refused to recognize the Constitution of the Russian Federation. In fact, President Boris N. Yeltsin was forced to sign a bilateral treaty with Kazan. Thus, the center's attempt to balance relations with the regions (subjects) by actually equalizing their status failed.

Were any projects proposed to reform federal relations in the Russian Federation in the 1990s? Yes, there were several. One of them is developed

In 1995, he worked in the Analytical Department under the President of the Russian Federation. The project provided for the formation of a network of approximately 30 federal districts with representative offices in small provincial towns of Russia. These districts would be in charge of resolving issues related to federal competence; at the same time, the division of the state into 89 subjects would be preserved, but their importance would decrease. For example, the creation of the Yenisei District, the Far Eastern District, the East Siberian (Baikal) District, etc. was proposed. According to the developers, Angarsk, Usolye-Sibirskoye or Listvyanka could become a possible administrative center of the last of the listed districts.

During the Yeltsin period, a specific system of federal relations took shape in Russia. Its main features can be summarized as follows:

1. The mixed ethno-territorial nature of the construction of the Federation, potentially and actually dangerous by conflicts on ethnic, religious (quasi-religious) grounds. A concomitant phenomenon that has taken on a mass character is ethno-pressure of representatives of some peoples by others under various pretexts, often with the use of violence or its threat.

2. The asymmetry of the scale of federal borders and, as a result, the unequal weight of the votes of the population living in them.

3. Inequality in the status of subjects of the Federation, expressed in significant differences between the republics and "simple" territories / regions, as well as in the presence of subjects of the Federation that are simultaneously part of other subjects. This last with someone's "light hand" was called "matryoshka".

4. Significant economic, social and political differentiation of the regions, which differed significantly from each other in terms of the degree of development of social infrastructure, living conditions of the population.

5. The subsidized nature of most subjects of the Federation and, consequently, their dependence on the size of the center's financial flows.

6. Unreasonably high role subjective factor when the personal qualities of the head of the region and his connections in the central corridors of power largely determined

the attitude of the federal authorities to the region and, thus, to the level of economic and social status of the citizens living in it.

8. Obvious "inconsistency" in the legislation of various subjects of the Federation.

Assessing the features of Russian federalism that took shape in the 1990s, Dr. Jurid. Sciences, Professor, Honored Worker of Science of the Russian Federation B. S. Krylov called it "phantom". Explaining his idea, the scientist noted that this phenomenon was formed under the influence of the views and decisions of sometimes short-sighted politicians who do not represent a perfect model of federal relations. The development of "perfect" federalism was hampered by the heterogeneity of the subjects of the Federation in terms of their political, economic and legal characteristics. In addition, other negative aspects were also obvious. On the one hand, the desire of some federal government bodies to centralize the maximum of powers, and, on the other hand, the attempts of the ruling elites of individual regions to expand their powers under the pretext of "protecting the interests of the titular nation" .

The concept of "phantom federalism" is also used by N. M. Dobrynin, referring it, however, more to the Soviet model of federalism. This is such a model of federalism, in which the structure of federal relations fixed in the norms of law differs significantly from the real one, where there is actually a systemic gap between the declared and actual state of the state system. All these "generic" features, unfortunately, persisted into the 1990s.

The beginning of the first presidential term of V. V. Putin was characterized by a considerable number of projects and proposals to resolve the difficult legacy of Yeltsin in the existing relations between the center and the subjects of the Federation. For example, A. B. Zubov, art. scientific collaborator Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, noted that “it is unlikely that the current administration (V.V. Putin. - V.K.), being captive to the narrow and selfish goals of maintaining the omnipotence of the oligarchic clan of the Yeltsin political “family”, will be capable of truly profound transformations of the system organi-

What way of development of Russia in this case was proposed by the author? He proposed to introduce self-government. At the same time, the statutes of the regions will become completely superfluous and even harmful elements of state life. Governors in this system must be appointed from the center. With the help of self-government it will also be possible to solve the national question.

A. B. Zubov concluded his proposals for reforming the post-Teltsin Russian Federation as follows: “The process of transition from the current feudal-federalism to a reasonable system of local broad self-government, extraterritorial national-cultural autonomies, limited autonomies of regional and corporate Upper House is not an easy task. Today, it is vitally important for us to ensure stable state development, gradually abandoning federalism unusual for Russia, and once again master the experience of zemstvo self-government.” As you can see, the proposals of A. B. Zubov were of a radical nature, up to the recognition of illegitimate legislative acts of the Soviet state on issues of state and national-state building. The proposals to start building the structure of the state from scratch bring to the proposed

projects elements of idealism and voluntarism at the same time. At the same time, ideas about expanding the foundations of local self-government and introducing national-cultural autonomy can be classified as quite sound.

However, the rejection of federalism as an idea and practice of the state structure of Russia had few supporters. A much larger number of proposals and projects concerned ways to improve Russian federalism. At the same time, projects, due to their socio-political and economic significance, were proposed, of course, not only by lawyers. Geographers D. N. Zamyatin and N. Yu. Zamyatina in the same initial period of the presidency of V. V. Putin proposed to expand the very concept of federalism. From the standpoint of their vision of the problem, they considered it possible to move from the interpretation of federalism as a specific territorial-political structure to its perception as a special system of territorial relations, not only legal, but also economic, financial and even cultural. Relations between the center and the subjects of the Federation for that period (2000 - early 2001) they characterized as not federal, but in fact, recreated feudal relations. The tradition of separating national-territorial formations during the Soviet period, in their opinion, entailed two negative consequences: the actual creation of an ideological basis for national separatism; contributing to the emergence of the so-called asymmetric federation, in which the status of national-territorial formations is overestimated in relation to administrative-territorial ones.

What methods of solving the problem were proposed by scientists? There are at least two of them. The first, as they themselves defined it, is ideal. These are changes in the administrative-territorial division of the country with the rejection of the principle: each nation has its own territory. And the second. The authors suggested moving on to the study and construction of figurative-geographical interpretations (OGI) of federalism. The latter included the study of geopolitical, geocultural, geoeconomic, geosocial images and the construction of megaregions. This, in their opinion, would have a powerful impact on the renewal of the administrative-territorial division of the state.

Thus, President VV Putin received a heavy legacy. Without touching on economic, social, ideological, mental problems and moods in society, we note what relates to the topic of this study. The revival of nationalism and separatism in the multinational Federation, built on the national-territorial principle, made it especially vulnerable. The process of globalization, new challenges of the beginning of the XXI century. once again exposed these problems. Reflecting on this problem, Cand. philosophy Sciences, First Vice-President of the Foundation for the Development of Parliamentarism in Russia

A. A. Zakharov. He posed the question in a peculiar way: what would he do on the spot?

BV Putin a hypothetical ideal leader with a mandate of trust unprecedented in non-communist Russia? Answering this question, A. A. Zakharov singled out three points:

1) would start an administrative reform that would consolidate the subjects of the Federation;

2) would take disciplinary action against the “out of hand” national republics and their leaders, because at the end of the 20th century, in his opinion, the discrepancy between the republican constitutions and the Basic Law of the Russian Federation reached the point beyond which the disintegration of a single state begins;

3) would most decisively support local self-government, the natural backbone of a federal state.

Weak democratic and civil grounds domestic federalism made it the most vulnerable. Other options for the development of the situation boiled down to two trends: either sliding towards unitarism, or towards confederation. However, for Russia, the most acceptable option remained the preservation of the federation.

Another author, Ph.D. polit. Sciences M. G. Mironyuk, assessing the state and prospects for reforming federal relations in Russia, also pointed out as one of the priority steps to transform the subjects of the Federation into “really full-fledged political communities” by means of their consolidation, if such consolidation would lead to their economic efficiency.

period, noting that V.V. Putin resolutely began to build a power vertical, considering the lack of state power to be the cause of the inefficiency of the domestic model of federalism, as well as the failure of economic reforms. M. G. Mironyuk defined this approach as purely instrumental. The main thing, in his opinion, was not in the "abstract strengthening of the power vertical", but in the concretization of the functions of the state, both at the federal and regional levels. The trend towards strengthening the role of the federal center can also be seen in stable federations, that is, it is of a universal nature.

In this context, it is useful to look at how the prospects for reforming federal relations looked in public opinion. Among the most common opinions were: elimination of differences between territories, regions and republics; rejection of national-territorial division; creation of provinces. Separately, there was the issue of consolidation of the subjects of the Federation. At the same time, this proposal was supported by 35-43% of the experts of the "Russian" territories. On the other hand, the opponents of enlargement in the national republics turned out to be 60-68%. It is necessary to pay attention to an important circumstance, namely: 60-80% of the respondents representing various regions preferred a federation, and only 10-25% tended to a unitary state system.

At present, the fact is practically forgotten that back in February 2000, i.e. before the election of V.V. Putin to the post of President of the Russian Federation, the governors of the Belgorod, Kurgan and Novgorod regions issued an appeal in which they proposed them to 20-30, and abandon the election of governors. It is noteworthy that the center, or rather the administration of the President of the Russian Federation, heard these calls, but used them in relation to weak subsidized regions (autonomous districts). But here, too, a package of proposals from financial and industrial groups on the unification of the Tyumen Region with the Khanty-Mansiysk and Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrugs was blocked. Why? In this case, a powerful region in terms of industrial potential and territory would be formed,

possessing significant strategic raw material resources. As we can see, the approach of the federal government itself to the problem of amalgamation of the subjects of the Federation was of a “pointed” nature.

The question arises: after the unification of five "complex" entities, three of which are located on the territory of Eastern Siberia, projects for the further development of federal relations have arisen and are arising? Of course. After all, the process described and analyzed at the level accessible to us finally could not and was not intended to solve all the problems accumulating over a long period of time. The issue of legislative regulation of the territorial structure of the Russian Federation has not been removed from the agenda.

Optimization of the subject composition of the Russian Federation should not be reduced to a mechanical reduction in the number of subjects of the Federation, but should include other measures of territorial development. At present, there are three types of “macro-regions” in the Russian Federation: federal districts, associations of economic interaction between subjects of the Russian Federation, and economic macro-regions. Federal districts continue to ensure the exercise of the powers of the head of state in the territorial aspect. In accordance with the Concept-2020, which no one has canceled, it is planned to form 11 economic regions - territorial units of the macro-regional level. And within the economic macro-regions, interregional projects implemented by the subjects of the Federation, measures for industrial and scientific and technical integration can be implemented.

Thus, changes in the subject composition of the Russian Federation in the future are not only possible, but also necessary. At the same time, all previous experience should be taken into account, errors should be minimized; all possible socio-political, socio-economic projects should be discussed by the expert community, undergo a systematic legal examination. This should become an integral part of the implementation of the programs put forward by the leadership of the Russian Federation to turn Russia into a dynamically developing state, occupying a leading position in the modern world, capable of responding to all the challenges of the 21st century. E

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Reform Projects of Federal Relations in Russia in the 1990s: Political end Legal Review

© Kazarin V., 2014

The article deals the restructuring plans of federal relations in post-Soviet federal relations in the one of the crucial period of its development, the 1990-s. The article presents different political and legal projects evolution of the Russian state. The author concludes that changes the subject composition of the Russian Federation was not only possible but necessary.

Key words: crisis Soviet Federation; the restructuring of federal relations; optimizing Russian Federation subject composition; prospects for the evolution of the federal relations in Russia.

The transformation of federal relations or federal reform is an important achievement of Vladimir Putin as the new president of Russia. Perhaps, it was with the first major initiatives that started in the middle of the 2000s that Putin began his activity as head of the Russian state.

In the nineties, relations between the center and the subjects of the federation were rather difficult: there was no single legal field, there were no prospects in the economy, and the characterization of the Russian Federation as a state with a federal structure of government raised big questions. In this regard, Vladimir Putin set the task of strengthening the federal system.

The following goals were defined by the new leadership: the elimination of disunity and the expansion of federal legislation throughout the country; prevention of legal disorder; bringing all regions to uniform constitutional rights; the return of federal power, as well as the restoration of a single economic space.

The first real step in achieving the goals was the formation of seven federal districts, as well as the introduction of legislation subjects of the Russian Federation according to federal.

Later, Vladimir Putin insisted on making another important decision for Russia. He secured for the president the right to dissolve the legislature and remove the heads of the subjects of Russia from their posts.

In addition, he replaced the governors and heads of legislative power, who were part of the Federation Council, with appointed representatives.

Closer to 2003, Putin chose a course to enlarge the Russian regions. Then the Perm Region and the Komi-Permyatsky District merged into the Perm Territory, and the Tyumen Region and the Krasnoyarsk Territory also increased.

The regions had a number of powers, according to which they were obliged to use funds from their budget to resolve issues of local importance. According to the Federal Law of July 4, 2003 N 95-FZ (as amended on November 25, 2013) “On the General Principles of the Legislative Power of the Subjects”, the terms of reference of the regions were determined, which helped to significantly reduce the risk of misappropriation of money from the regional budget.

In December 2004, a new procedure for electing heads of subjects of the Russian Federation was established, and in 2005 a system was introduced to delimit powers between the federal government and subjects of Russia. A year later, a large-scale reform of LSG was carried out.

In the end, Vladimir Putin's initiative to reformat federal relations, which had been implemented for several years, ended in success. Thanks to the implemented reforms, it was possible to form a single regulatory and economic space in Russia, which in the future had a great impact on economic growth and the general situation of the Russian economy.

Bringing the regional legislation to the federal one in the shortest possible time made it possible to ensure the effective implementation of not only the functions of the state, but also issues of local importance. The influence, which did not correspond to the Constitution, of regional elites in making important decisions at the state level was completely eliminated. At the same time, the heads of the constituent entities lost the opportunity to put pressure on the federal government on issues of solving problems at the regional level.

All this, one way or another, contributed to the strengthening of Russia as a federal state. And, we can say that it was the radical and balanced decisions of Vladimir Putin, who at that time had just taken office as president of the Russian Federation, that helped our country recover from the “dashing 90s” and set foot on a completely different path of development.

As is commonly believed, the federal reform began with the formation of federal districts and the introduction of the institution of presidential plenipotentiaries into them, although this institution existed in the regions before. From the point of view of some authors (N. M. Dobrynin, M. V. Gligich-Zolotareva, S. I. Nekrasov), federal districts, not being subjects of federal relations, represent a link in the vertical of executive power. The processes of their formation and activities are subject to consideration within the framework of administrative rather than constitutional law. "District" construction does not entail changes in the federal structure of the country and has nothing to do with federal reform. In this regard, the institute of plenipotentiary representatives of the President of the Russian Federation is considered by the indicated authors as an instrument of temporary, anti-crisis management 1 .

According to V. E. Chirkin, “although legally the creation of federal districts does not change the federal structure of Russia (districts do not have the rights of a subject of the Federation and relevant bodies), in fact, after their creation and the appointment of presidential representatives in them with some new tasks and rights, which the former representatives did not have, the situation has changed.

The situation has indeed changed drastically. I happened to work as a Deputy Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Adygea, the Republic of Dagestan, the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic, the Karachay-Cherkess Republic and the Stavropol Territory in the years preceding the federal reform (1997-1999). Therefore, there is something to compare with. Prior to the start of the federal reform, the main attention was paid to informing the federal center about the socio-political situation in the region and coordinating the activities of the territorial divisions of the federal executive bodies to solve priority state tasks. A special regional collegium of federal executive bodies was created to perform coordinating functions. At meetings of the board in 1998-1999. the issues of streamlining the structure of their territorial divisions, combining efforts in the receipt of tax payments in budget system Russian Federation, improving the management of federal unitary enterprises and others. At that time, representatives of the President practically did not deal with issues of influencing regional authorities.

In the process of federal reform, the dominant direction in their activities acquired direct influence on the state authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation with their inclusion in a single vertical of power.

In this incarnation, the institution of plenipotentiaries has made serious adjustments to the constitutional scheme for the division of state power between the Russian Federation and its subjects. According to V. N. Lysenko, this institution is in conflict with the constitutional and legislative delimitation of competence between different levels of public authority, replacing it with a single vertical of executive power from top to bottom. Thus, along with federal relations immanent to a federal state, based on equality and constitutionally limited independence of the parties, administrative relations of domination and subordination between the center and regions, more inherent in a unitary state, begin to take shape.

At the initial stage of the federal reform, federal control was established over the executive and legislative power of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, an institution of federal intervention was created, decisive measures were taken to ensure the supremacy of the Constitution and federal laws, and to bring all regional legislation and treaties between the Russian Federation and its constituent entities into line with them. A reform of the Federation Council was carried out, regional leaders were removed from its composition, who were replaced by representatives of the regional executive and legislative authorities.

Decisive and tough public policy gave its results. The legislative restriction of the contractual process, together with its real shortcomings and omissions, led to a negative attitude towards the contractual form of separation of state power, up to a complete denial of the possibility of its application in constitutional practice.

According to T. A. Rabko, a power group was clearly identified (employees of the Presidential Administration and a number of heads of subjects of the Federation), which categorically denied the contractual form of delimitation of jurisdiction and powers: “The main motive for public statements of representatives of this group is that contracts are a rudiment Yeltsin era; the content of the treaties was predetermined by the political reality of Russia at the end of the last century; they typically deviate from the provisions of federal law; in modern conditions, it is necessary not only to revise the concluded agreements, but also to completely abandon contractual relationships with the subjects of the Federation - to resolve all problems related to the delimitation of subjects of jurisdiction by federal laws” 1 . As a result, a tough political action was carried out to terminate the agreements between the Russian Federation and its subjects. According to N.V. Varlamova, “the most effective and flexible tool regulation of federal relations was first used ineptly and destructively, and then was simply discarded.

In order to ensure the supremacy of the Constitution and federal laws, the role and powers of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation in monitoring the legal space were significantly strengthened at that time. In accordance with Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of August 10, 2000 No. 1486 “On additional measures to ensure the unity of the legal space of the Russian Federation”, a federal bank of regulatory legal acts of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation was created - a federal register, the maintenance of which is entrusted to the Ministry of Justice. This department has been given the authority to conduct a legal examination of regional normative legal acts and make submissions to the regional ones that have adopted them, as well as to the relevant federal government bodies in case they are inconsistent with the Constitution and federal laws.

The question of the constitutionality of the expert and supervisory powers of the Ministry of Justice in relation to legislative bodies of state power of the subjects of the Russian Federation remains open. Giving similar competence to the federal executive body, an attempt to put federal executive power over legislative power in the regions contradicts, in our opinion, firstly, the principle of separation of powers (Article 10 of the Constitution), and secondly, the principle of delimitation of subjects of jurisdiction and powers between state authorities of the Russian Federation and its subjects (Part 3, Article 5 of the Constitution ). Obviously, the federal executive body is not entitled to exercise expert and control functions in relation to legislative activity, especially in the constituent entities of the Russian Federation. In addition, the delimitation of competence between the center and the regions on subjects of joint jurisdiction, including in such an area as ensuring the compliance of the constitutions (charters) and laws of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation (clause "a" part 1 of article 72 of the Constitution), is subject to regulation by the federal by law, but by no means by decree of the President of the Russian Federation.

It should be noted that the strengthening of the role of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation in this direction began to be seen back in the mid-1990s. Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of December 3, 1994 No. 2147 "On measures to improve the legal support of the activities of the President of the Russian Federation" and adopted in its execution by the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of June 3, 1995 No. 550 "On additional functions of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation" were fixed expert and control functions of the specified department in relation to the legislative activity of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation. Such innovations received critical reflection in scientific literature and the negative reaction of the Federation Council, designed to protect the interests of the regions that this chamber represents in the Federal Assembly. In a letter from Chairman of the Federation Council VF Shumeiko to the President and the Government of the Russian Federation, a critical analysis was given of such a division of competence and the inadmissibility of such federal interference in the legislative activities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation 1 . However, this letter did not have an effective result. Moreover, this direction in the activities of the Ministry of Justice of Russia began to acquire more and more priority. Sometimes an extreme point of view is generally expressed that the Ministry "acts as the only state body authorized to conduct a legal examination of acts of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation for their compliance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, federal legislation" . With such an approach, contrary to the Constitution, the judiciary and the prosecutor's office are taken outside the limits of normative control. At the same time, the state policy to reform federal relations was implemented by all its branches and bodies, including the courts and the prosecutor's office.

Sometimes, due to a misunderstanding of the state policy itself, it is believed that some branches or bodies of state power are supposedly “depoliticized”. “But power outside of politics is absurd,” says N. I. Matuzov. - For example, the Constitutional Court constantly declares its "apoliticality". However, this most important body is an integral part (branch) of state power and, as such, embodies and implements its policy. Otherwise it can not be. The fact that high judges do not participate in rallies does not mean that they are out of politics. All decisions of the Constitutional Court, being legal in nature, inevitably acquire political significance. And some of them are pronounced (for example, the decision on the “Chechen case”, concerning the interpretation of Article 111 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, etc.)” 1 .

It was the Constitutional Court that was implementing the state policy of reforming federal relations, when in June 2000, by its decisions, which we will discuss below, the legal possibility of sovereignty (even limited) of national republics was rejected and a number of sovereign rights proclaimed in their basic laws. These and other legal positions were the basis for the revision of most of the constitutions of the republics in the course of the federal reform.

By the end of 2001, the provisions of 66 constitutions and charters of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation were brought into line with federal legislation. In 2001 alone, more than 4 thousand illegal legal acts of regional authorities were revealed, of which 2/3 were canceled or brought into line on the basis of the prosecutor's response. As a result, comprehensive measures taken by all branches of government and at all levels "led to a relative stabilization of legal discipline and the rule of law, ensuring constitutional legality" .

“A truly strong state is also a strong federation,” noted President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin in his 2001 Address to the Federal Assembly. - Today we can already say: the period of “spreading” of statehood is over. The disintegration of the state, which was mentioned in the previous Message, has been stopped. The initial stage of preserving statehood had been passed and a fundamental concept of further reforming public authority in the Russian Federation was required, the consideration of which requires a preliminary scientific analysis of the above-mentioned June (2000) decisions of the Constitutional Court on state sovereignty and ensuring a single legal space of the Russian Federation.

The Commission under the President of the Russian Federation for the preparation of proposals on the delimitation of subjects of jurisdiction and powers between federal state authorities, state authorities of the constituent entities of the Federation and local governments, headed by D.N. Kozak and proposed a draft administrative reform in the form in which it is carried out by the federal center today (the Commission was established in accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of June 21, 2001. No. 741). power structures. Based on the results of the analysis, the Commission developed proposals for improving federal legislation, with the aim of consolidating the optimal model for organizing state and municipal authorities in Russia; new laws were adopted that, in fact, opened a new page in the history of federalism in Russia. (After the completion of the work of the Commission, new federal laws were adopted: Federal Law of October 6, 1999 No. 184-FZ “On the General Principles of Organization of Legislative (Representative) and Executive Bodies of State Power of the Subjects of the Russian Federation” (with subsequent amendments and additions) // Collection of Legislation of the Russian Federation (hereinafter SZ RF), 1999, No. 42, Art. Executive Bodies of State Power of the Subjects of the Russian Federation" and the Federal Law "On Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights and the Right to Participate in a Referendum of Citizens of the Russian Federation"; Federal Law No. 131-FZ of October 6, 2003 "On the General Principles of Organization of Local Federation "(Rossiyskaya gazeta of October 8, 2003 N202; SZ RF, 2003. No. 40. Art. 3822). Both places in recent political history are occupied by the federal law on the monetization of benefits, adopted at the initiative of the Government of the Russian Federation. (Federal Law “On Amendments to the Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation and the Recognition of Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation as Invalid in Connection with the Adoption of Federal Laws “On the Introduction of Amendments and Additions to the Federal Law “On the General Principles of Organization of the Legislative (Representative) and Executive Bodies of State Power of the Subjects of the Russian Federation” and “On the General Principles of Organization of Local Self-Government in the Russian Federation””).

The work of this Commission and the implementation of its proposals are part of the general administrative and legal reform announced by the President of the Russian Federation. Speaking to authorized representatives on the eve of the presidential elections in Russia, V.V. Putin identified one of the main tasks of state building during his second term, saying: “We must also complete the program of our political transformations. In this regard, I want to emphasize that our actions in this direction will be as consistent as everything that is done to stabilize the country. last years. First of all, we are implementing a reform of federal relations. In the coming years, we will bring to an end the key transformations that are currently underway at the level of local self-government.” (Izvestia. 2004. February 13).

This was one of the few statements of the presidential candidate regarding federalism in Russia. “We are implementing the reform of federal relations” - what did V.V. Putin, the Russians were able to see afterwards. Many politicians have shown concern about the fate of federalism in Russia. “Federalism is not threatened by anything,” the Chairman of the Federation Council Committee on Federation Affairs and Regional Policy A.I. Kazakov. (Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 2004. October 29). He expressed confidence that the proposed reform does not affect any of the fundamental constitutional principles. And after its implementation, Russia, in full accordance with Article 1 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, will remain a democratic federal state of law with a republican form of government.

Considering the ontological component of regional policy, we should first of all focus on two of its aspects: (a) the influence of the regions on Moscow politics and (b) the influence of the center on the processes taking place in the regions.

Formally, according to the Constitution, the influence of the regions on Moscow politics is exercised through one institution - the Federation Council, where each region has two representatives. In fact, of course, there are much more channels of such influence. Take, for example, the State Duma. It is no secret that the lists of the Our Home - Russia bloc in 1995 were drawn up largely by regional power elites, which, naturally, affected the composition of the Duma faction of the NDR. Even more important is the position of local authorities in the course of elections in single-mandate constituencies. No wonder any candidate for the State Duma seeks to enlist the support of the local authorities; according to some expert estimates, such support provided approximately 50% of success in a significant number of Russian regions.

Of course, today, with the advent of a new federal law that determined the procedure for empowering the heads of subjects through regional legislative assemblies, the situation has changed radically. Regional authorities are increasingly losing their influence in the center, as they suddenly turned out to be completely dependent on the federal center.

On what principles should federal relations be built in Russia? There are seven main principles:

  • 1. The invariability of the provisions of the Constitution of the Russian Federation.
  • 2. Correspondence between the rights and freedoms of man and citizen enshrined in the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws and the specific responsibilities of each level of public authority to ensure their implementation (including financial).
  • 3. Combination of independence of state and municipal authorities with political and legal responsibility in the exercise of their own powers.
  • 4. The supremacy of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws in the exercise of powers, supported by the presence in the federal legislation of specific and effective mechanisms for ensuring such supremacy.
  • 5. Inadmissibility of arbitrary and unreasonable assignment to a lower level of public authority of duties that require a specific amount of expenses not financed from the budget of the level of public authority that made the relevant decision.
  • 6. Definition by law of the composition and content of their own powers of public authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and local governments of various types.
  • 7. The relationship of territorial and functional foundations of local self-government.

Well-known Russian politician and scientist R.G. Abdulatipov, speaking of the constitutional legal framework akh of the Russian Federation, noted that: "the main factor at this stage of the development of the Russian Federation may be the resolution of the problems of Russian federalism on the basis of improving legislation and coordinating the actions of federal and regional government bodies within the framework of the current Constitution of the country." (Abdulatipov R.G. Russian Federation: constitutional and legal foundations. // Fragment from the book “The National Question and the State Structure of Russia. M. 2000).

The above fundamental provisions are subject to implementation in specific legislative mechanisms that ensure the exercise of the powers of public authorities. Improving the principles and procedures for the delimitation of powers dictated the need to make significant changes to the existing federal legislation, necessitates the task of changing regional legislation and improving activities government agencies authorities in the subjects of the Federation.

Deputy State Duma RF V.A. Ryzhkov in one of his articles calls our federation "strange". In particular, he writes: “In general, an analysis of the constitutional and legal foundations of modern Russian federalism allows, in my opinion, to conclude that our country is not among the formed federations. It is a federation of an intermediate type: neither contractual nor constitutional; Not symmetrical, but not asymmetrical either. IN modern theory federalism, it is difficult to find a definition that would accurately describe the current state of the Russian Federation. You can call it a strange federation or, more strictly, a spontaneous federation (in the sense that it was the result not of someone's policy or intelligent will, but of spontaneous processes). And the second conclusion, related to the first one: this is a federation in which there is no center in the generally accepted meaning of the concept, i.e. a center that has its own interests and implements them in some kind of consistent policy.

Commission D.N. Kozak, proposals were developed to improve federal legislation. The purpose of the legislative reform is to consolidate the optimal model for the organization of state and municipal authorities in the Russian Federation and improve the procedure for delimiting powers between them in various areas of public relations. When formulating proposals, the Commission sought to legislate such a mechanism for delineating powers between federal state authorities, state authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and local governments, which would allow public authorities to solve the tasks facing them at the level that is able to do this most rationally. First of all, it was about accessibility for citizens public services, maximum consideration of the interests of citizens living in the respective territories, as well as the efficiency of the use of state and municipal financial and other material resources.

The socio-economic and political basis of modern federal relations is the market economy recognized in Russia, private property, local self-government and the established constitutional system of government.

The democratic model of federalism, which is proclaimed in the first article of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, is immanently connected with the level of development of civil society. In this regard, the description of the generic features of Russian federalism will be incomplete without taking into account the problems of interaction between a relatively young democracy, an underdeveloped civil society, and authorities that have not yet learned how to work effectively in the conditions of a growing self-awareness of civil society.

New attempts are being made to develop a mechanism for ensuring the unity of Russia's legal space. From time to time, supporters of centralized sovereignty introduce bills aimed under the guise of strengthening state integrity to limit the independence of subjects of the Russian Federation. The latest initiatives of the President of the Russian Federation are among such phenomena.

The bill was proposed and announced by the President as a measure to mobilize the authorities to fight terrorism. However, many politicians saw in this act an encroachment on fundamental constitutional principles. According to some deputies of the State Council of the Republic of Tatarstan, these initiatives are aimed at liquidating the national republics. V. Postnova, a regional correspondent for Nezavisimaya Gazeta, describes the meeting of the State Council of the Republic of Tatarstan in the following way: “President Shaimiev quickly stopped free speeches: “If President Putin speaks, then we must support him.” Everyone says how bad everything is in the country, but no one says what to do. But he immediately spoke out categorically against the possibility of dissolving the State Council of Tatarstan. This point of view of the republican leadership, as reported by an NG source in the State Council, was expressed by Chairman of the State Council of Tatarstan F. Mukhametshin at a meeting of speakers of the parliaments of the Volga Federal District chaired by Plenipotentiary S. Kiriyenko in the first half of October 2004 in Nizhny Novgorod. Kireenko replied: "You can approve or disapprove, the law will be adopted in the version proposed by the president." (Nezavisimaya gazeta. 2004. October 27). Comments, as they say, are unnecessary. This is "federalism a la Russe".

The need to strengthen the unity and integrity of Russia actualizes the problem of forming a common legal space. In today's context of Russia's political and legal development, it is mainly about "bringing into line", but not about harmonization of federal and regional legislation. Meanwhile, it is known that in many areas the laws of the subjects of the Russian Federation are ahead of the federal laws. It is obvious that the growth of the authority of the federal government and the level of implementation of federal legislation in the regions will be largely determined by a balanced assessment by the federal authorities of the experience gained in the regions and its application throughout the Federation as a whole. The policy pursued by the Center should not hamper the initiative and creativity of the regional legislator. Increasingly, we are dealing with facts when the fight is not against violations of federal laws in the regions, but against federalism in general.

There is no doubt that the emerging conflicts between different levels of public authority are not generated by federalism as a form of government, but stem from the imperfection of federal relations, primarily in the sphere of delimitation of powers. It is quite obvious that the subject of the Commission's work on the delimitation of jurisdictions and powers between different levels of public authority is one of the most important tools for the federalization of all spheres of public and state life. And here it is extremely important to rely on general principles that would become a reliable legal basis for the organization of Russian power as a whole.

Over the ten years of development of federal relations, the country has accumulated colossal experience in federal and national development. The country has something to lose. Unitarians of all stripes have raised their heads and are hooting about the already former independence of the regions. The federal districts represent the federal government and do not even think about the fact that the constituent entities of the Russian Federation could count on their help and support in solving the most acute problems of the population and in defending federal programs for the region. Alas, the vector of ambitions of the federal districts is directed only in one direction - down. The new governors-general want to "steer" in the regions. But after all, very soon (after the implementation of the proposals of the D.N. Kozak Commission in the field of delimitation of powers and changes in federal laws), their main opponents will no longer be the governors and presidents of the republics-subjects of the Russian Federation, but representatives of federal ministries and departments in the subjects. In this contradiction, as well as in the desire of some Representatives of the President of the Russian Federation in the districts to act as enlarged subjects of the Federation, lies the obvious hopelessness of the federal administrative districts as an institution of federal power in the regions, if they continue the vector unilaterally directed policy that they are pursuing today.

A peculiar and at the same time unique experience in building federal relations is practically ignored today. Moreover, the state organizers of the new model want to do everything, that is, to bury federalism without delay. But that doesn't happen in real life! Without taking into account the conditions of transition, our society will not build a democratic federal state. Unless, of course, we want to build it! But we may well have time to create a "vertical of power". It is known that in Russia the people "respected" the authorities and all power verticals and dictatorships unconditionally. Try it, don't care.

On the one hand, one cannot but respect the attempts to ensure the coordinated functioning of the authorities of the Russian Federation and its subjects. In 2000, for these purposes, the State Council of the Russian Federation was established, which includes ex officio heads of executive power of all subjects of the Russian Federation. A little later, the Council of Legislators began to function in the Federation Council, consisting of the heads of the legislative power of the subjects.

On the other hand, the processes taking place in the country bear little resemblance to the real federalism that many dreamed of in the 1990s. In a country where more than 170 peoples and ethnic groups live, the Ministry of Nationalities is being abolished. In a federal state, as Russia is under the Constitution, there is no institution of federalism. Of course, a lot of mistakes were made in the 1990s and there appeared great amount development challenges to be overcome. But is the movement towards a unitary state the right way to overcome these problems and the best way for today's Russia?

representative in the Federation Council
Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation
from the administration of the Perm region

Reform of federal relations in the Russian Federation

The topic of our today's meeting is the reform of federal relations in the Russian Federation. Before talking about the reform of federal relations, let's answer the question: a what is federal relations?

Federal relations are relations between the center, regions and municipalities, primarily in the sphere of distribution of jurisdiction and powers, which are reflected in the formation of budgetary relations.

Based on this, let's try to define the reform of federative relations! Reform is systemic or substantive change. Therefore, the topic of our today's conversation can be defined as systemic changes in the relationship between the center, regions and municipalities in terms of the redistribution of powers and changes in the tax and budgetary spheres.

In this sense, the reform of federal relations in Russia can be interpreted in a broad and narrow sense. In a broad sense, it began in 1999 and included the tax reform, the reform of interbudgetary relations, and the reform of the division of powers. In a narrow sense, this is a process of delimitation of powers, which began in 2003 and will end in 2009, when the federal law “On the general principles of organizing local self-government in the Russian Federation” will be fully introduced throughout Russia.

Let us consider the reform of federal relations in the narrow sense, as a process of differentiation of powers. Let's move on to the main content of the reform. So, we have said that the first block of issues that the reform is considering is directly related to spending powers.

What is an authority? In order to answer this question , must refer to the Constitution. The Constitution of the Russian Federation assigns strictly defined spheres or subjects of jurisdiction to the state. So, for example, Art. 71 determines which issues form the subjects of the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation. There are 18 such subjects of jurisdiction. These include such important functions of the state as establishing a system of legislative, executive and judicial authorities, regulating and protecting human rights and freedoms, defense and security, protecting the state border, establishing the legal foundations of a single market, and others.

In view of the federal structure of Russia, the implementation of powers is carried out at several levels: federal, regional and local. Therefore, in Art. 72 also defines the subjects of joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the constituent entities of the Russian Federation. There are 14 of them. The jurisdiction of the Russian Federation is regulated exclusively by federal laws.

Federal laws and the laws of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation adopted in accordance with them apply to subjects of joint jurisdiction. Thus, if the former are unified, uniform for the entire territory of the country, then the latter may differ in different regions. According to Art. 73 on all other issues not listed in Articles 71 and 72, the subjects of the Russian Federation have full state power. That is, all other issues form the subjects of the jurisdiction of the subjects of the Russian Federation. In a separate group, the subjects of jurisdiction of local self-government bodies (hereinafter referred to as LSGs) should be singled out. As well as those issues, the implementation of which can be transferred from one level to another. Thus, we have identified five types of subjects of jurisdiction, depending on two criteria: the level of power and the degree of freedom in decision-making.

Subjects of jurisdiction and spending authority

In Russian federation

1. Subjects of jurisdiction and spending powers* of the Russian Federation(Article 71 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation).

2. Subjects of joint jurisdiction of the Russian
Federation and subjects of the Russian Federation (
Art. 72 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation).

3. Subjects of jurisdiction and expenditure powers of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation.

4. Subjects of jurisdiction and expenditure powers of local self-government.

5. Delegated state powers.

* - authority for legal regulation, execution and financial support.

However, the subject of jurisdiction in itself (for example, ensuring defense and security) does not determine the obligations of the state in this area. They must be described in detail in one or more federal laws, if this is the subject of the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation, or laws of the subject of the Russian Federation, if this is the subject of the jurisdiction of the subject of the Russian Federation. Thus, the subject of jurisdiction includes a set of powers, or a set of obligations of the state to citizens, defined by law.

In this regard, the question arises, is the obligation of the candidate who won the election an authority? For example, an obligation to introduce free public transport for pensioners? Not! However, as soon as this obligation is enshrined in the law, the financial resources for its implementation are included in the budget, the circle of performers is determined - we can say that it has been transformed into an authority (expenditure authority). Therefore, it is customary to separate the powers of legal regulation (or the introduction of obligations), the powers of execution (or the fulfillment of obligations) and the powers of financial support (financing of obligations).

The system of spending authorities in the Russian Federation

Can they not match? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to move on to the third component of spending authority - the authority to provide financial support.

How are government obligations funded? Financing of powers is carried out at the expense of the state budget of one level or another, which are formed mainly from tax payments paid in accordance with the law. That's why general rules financing of the system of state powers are defined in the Tax and Budget Codes of the Russian Federation. The Tax Code establishes the types of taxes that may be levied on the territory of the country, and the rules for their payment. The Budget Code regulates the procedures for the implementation of budget expenditures, and also determines the types and procedures for the transfer of financial assistance to lower budgets, for which the received tax revenues are not enough to fulfill their obligations.

The relationship of state powers
and public finance

In this regard, the issue of matching the volume of state obligations and the volume of financial resources available in the budget for their implementation is extremely important. What happens if such funds are not sufficient? There is a situation of default of government obligations, some of which have to be canceled. How to cancel them? There is only one way - to change the legislation, reducing part of the state obligations to citizens.

Another issue that needs to be addressed is the issue of balancing the powers of each level. Obviously, the more powers are concentrated at the top level (the level of the federal center), the less federal the state is and, accordingly, vice versa. An example of a federal state with the broadest powers at the sub-federal level are the United States and Switzerland. For example, in the United States, the federal government is responsible for national defense, the postal service, the issuance of money, the regulation of interstate commerce, and international trade. State and local jurisdictions include education, welfare, police, fire services, and the provision of other local services such as library services, waste management, and others. taxes and is responsible for managing certain programs. What degree of federalism has developed in Russia today? Let's try to answer this question at the end of our lecture?

And now let's return to the reform of federal relations and talk about its prerequisites. Why was there a need to reform the system of powers? The current system had a number of significant shortcomings.

The volume of government obligations is usually measured as a share of government spending (budget spending at all levels) to the country's GDP. This indicator in different countries varies from 65–68% in Sweden, or 50–54% in France or Italy, to 35% in the US, Japan or Australia. It is generally accepted that only those countries with a high per capita income can afford the highest share of public spending.

It is quite obvious that the obligations that were enshrined in legislation were excessive in our country. It is no coincidence that the main reason for the reform of federal relations is most often called the excessive volume of state obligations and public spending. The amount of GDP that was redistributed through the state budget, in the late 90s was more than 46% of GDP. At the same time, government spending did not cover all government obligations. It was during this period that such a term as "unsecured mandates" appeared. They began to designate those obligations of the state that were not financed from the budgets and were suspended for execution. Thus, the consolidated budget of the state began to be characterized by a hidden deficit. Why hidden? Expenses exceeded hidden income. That is, part of the costs was not reflected in the federal budget. Why? Because the powers were fixed in the legislation, and the state was obliged to fulfill them, but there was no money for them.

Another reason for the reform was the lack of transparency in spending and the instability of regional budget revenues. Almost every year, the law on the federal budget established new rules for the formation of regional budget revenues. This happened as a result of a change in the norms for the distribution of income between the federal center and the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, which were approved by the federal law on the budget for the next financial year. In other words, every year the federal center determined what revenues and to what extent the constituent entities of the Federation would receive, what revenues local budgets would receive in the form of normative deductions from tax revenues.

An illustrative example in this sense is the share of revenues of the budget of the Perm region in the total volume of revenues collected in the territory of the Perm region:

1999 - 60%,

2000 - 56.1%,

2001 - 45%,

2002 - 39.2%.

The data presented show how significant were the changes in income depending on the decisions taken by the federal center, and how unstable they were. Since the standards changed annually, it was never possible to predict how much revenue the budget of the Perm Region would receive in the next year. fiscal year. Was it possible to plan a budget under these conditions?

Suspended

state obligations

billion rubles

Suspended
obligations

Through the federal
budget

Through territorial
budgets

Due to federal laws, laws of the Russian Federation, laws of the RSFSR, resolutions of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation

TOTAL

The figure above shows the extent of the “underfunded mandates” problem. By 2003, the volume of suspended state obligations reached 1,368 billion rubles. For comparison, I will cite the volume of revenues of the consolidated budget in Russia for 2003 - 3,990 billion rubles. Thus, one third of the obligations that were accepted by the states could not be fulfilled due to budgetary constraints.

At the same time, pay attention to the fact that these obligations were established by federal laws, and were to be fulfilled at the expense of regional budgets. Who is responsible for unfulfilled powers? I think that in the current circumstances this question was more rhetorical. .

Thus, by the beginning of 2003, there was an urgent need to streamline the system of delimitation of competence between all subjects of legal relations: the federal center, subjects of the Russian Federation and local self-government.

The prerequisites discussed above predetermined three key tasks that needed to be addressed in the course of the reform:

1) restructure and systematize powers according to the following criteria:

¨ according to the levels of power responsible for the introduction and regulation of relevant obligations;

¨ according to the scope of powers of each level of power (or the degree of freedom in decision-making);

¨ in relation to the consumer of the service;

2) describe each authority for expenditure obligations and forms of service delivery;

3) to distinguish on a long-term basis the financial sources necessary for the fulfillment of the relevant obligations.

All these tasks were solved by changing the federal legislation. So, the first stage of the reform - 2003 - the stage of restructuring and systematization of powers or delineation of regulatory powers.

Objectives of the reform of the federal

relations

OBJECTIVES OF THE REFORM OF FEDERAL RELATIONS

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Objectives of the reform of the federal

relations

At the first stage of the reform, two fundamental federal laws were adopted that determined the system of powers of local self-government and subjects of the Russian Federation. Work on these documents was carried out simultaneously.

For the preparation of draft laws, a special Commission under the President of the Russian Federation was created to delimit the subjects of jurisdiction and powers between state authorities of the Russian Federation, state authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and local governments.

The federal law "On the General Principles of the Organization of Local Self-Government in the Russian Federation" or the law on local self-government, as it is sometimes called, solved several problems. First, he established the principles of organizing local self-government and determined how the system of local self-government was formed.


Stage 1 - delineation of regulatory powers

2003 FZ No. 000 " On the general principles of the organization of local self-government in the Russian Federation”

¨ establishing the principles of territorial organization of LSG; (mandatory formation of municipalities has been established at two territorial levels - in settlements and municipal districts);

¨ differentiation and assignment of certain powers to each level of LSG; (each level was delimited and secured its inherent powers to address issues of local importance, as well as delegated state powers);

¨ determination of the procedure for the transfer of individual state powers to local self-governments;

¨ establishment of responsibility of local self-governments for the execution of powers

How many levels of local government are established by this law? Two: level municipal districts and level of settlements. Settlements are part of the structure of municipal districts - several settlements form one municipal district.

Secondly, the law delimited and assigned certain powers to each level of local self-government. He assigned to each level certain powers or certain obligations in relation to citizens. You can clearly see what obligations the local government has to each of you. The list is exhaustive, that is, the article defines all the functions of local government.

In addition, the law also determined the procedures for the transfer of certain state powers to local self-government bodies, and established responsibility for their implementation. The main task of this law was to bring local authorities as close as possible to the population, to ensure a different level of services provided to the population, and to create conditions for the socio-economic development of municipalities.

Reform of federal relations.
Stage 1 - delineation of regulatory powers.

2003 Federal Law No. 95 "On the Introduction of Amendments and Additions to the Federal Law "On the General Principles of Organization of Legislative (Representative) and Executive Bodies of State Power of the Subjects of the Russian Federation":

¨ determination of the powers of state authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and mechanisms of relations with federal authorities,

¨ establishment of the basic principles of management and disposal of state property in the subjects of the Russian Federation,

¨ determination of the basic principles for the formation and approval of the budgets of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation

The second fundamental law was aimed at the consistency and consistency of legislative norms relating to the status of public authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation. With its adoption, the federal law "On the principles and procedure for delimiting the subjects of jurisdiction and powers between state authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and their relationship with federal bodies" was declared invalid.

The law defined two types of powers of state authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation:

¨ powers, the implementation of which is fully funded from regional budgets. Federal regulation here is only a framework;

¨ powers on subjects of joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and subjects of the Russian Federation. These powers are exercised by the region, but financed in the form of earmarked funds from the federal budget.

Therefore, these powers are regulated in detail by the state authorities of the Russian Federation. They received the definition of delegated powers.

If you set out to find out what obligations the regions have today to those residents who live on the territory of these subjects of the Federation, then you will see that the list of these powers will also be exhaustive. The law also established the basic principles for the management and disposal of state property of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and determined the basic principles for the formation and approval of the budgets of the constituent entities.

Thus, after the adoption of these two laws, the current system of delimitation of “powers to regulate” between the levels of state power has developed. The current system is schematically presented in the following figure.

Reform of federal relations

Authority for:

regulatory

regulation of obligations

financial security of obligations