Comments. Fundamentals of the theory of property rights Topic: "Actual problems of property rights"

federal education agency

State educational institution of higher professional education

"Voronezh State University"

Faculty of Law

Department of Civil Law and Process

Course work

On the discipline "Civil Law"

option 2

Topic: "Actual problems of property rights"

Completed by a student

Groups 1 (3) course

correspondence department

abbreviated form of education Nikolenko Irina

Voronezh 2008

INTRODUCTION

ChapterI. Property as an economic and legal category.
§ 1. The economic essence of property relations.
§ 2. Ownership as subjective right: concept and content.
§ 3. Restrictions and limits of the exercise of the right of ownership.

ChapterII. Subjects and objects of property rights.
§ 1. Subjects of property rights and problems of allocation of forms of ownership.
§ 2. Objects of property rights.

CONCLUSION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

INTRODUCTION

The term "property" is often used in a wide variety of meanings. In some cases, it is used as a synonym, an equivalent of the concepts of "property" or "things", speaking, for example, of "transfer of property" or "acquisition of property". In other cases, they believe that we are talking about a purely economic relationship, and sometimes, on the contrary, this concept is identified with a purely legal category- the right to property, etc. As a result of this confusion, erroneous ideas and stereotypes regarding property develop, in particular, the widespread opinion that economic relations of property are always legally formalized only with the help of property rights.

Property is one of those concepts around which the best minds of mankind have crossed for many centuries. However, the matter is not limited to the struggle in theoretical terms. Social upheavals, from which the whole world sometimes shudders, have one of their main causes, in the final analysis, attempts to change the existing property relations, to establish a new system of these relations. In some cases these attempts have been successful, in others they have failed. It happened that the society really moved to a new, higher level of its development. But it happened that, as a result of the breakdown of property relations, society was thrown far back and fell into a quagmire from which it did not know how to get out.

Property - historically developing social relations that characterize the distribution (appropriation) of things as elements of the material wealth of society between various individuals (individuals, social groups, the state). Property cannot be imagined without some people treating specific things, conditions, and products of production as their own, while others treat them as strangers. It clearly follows from this that property is the relationship of a person to a thing. At the same time, since we are talking about the relationship different people to one and the same concrete thing, then there is reason to speak of property as a relationship between people about things. The totality of things belonging to this owner constitutes the object of ownership, i.e., the property of the corresponding person, therefore, property relations are also called property relations. Being legally regulated by the state, they acquire the form of property rights. Ownership right - a set of legal norms that fix and protect the belonging of material goods to certain individuals or groups, providing for the scope and content of the owner's rights in relation to the property belonging to him, the methods and limits for exercising these rights. The right of ownership consists in the fact that the owner, at his own discretion, owns, uses and disposes of the property belonging to him.

The main goal of my course design is to determine the actual problems of property rights, namely the delimitation of economic and legal categories of property, the definition of the subjective concept of property rights and characterization of its content, to identify the main limitations and limits of the exercise of property rights, to characterize the main range of subjects of property rights and the problems of identifying forms property, list the objects of property rights.

ChapterI. Property as an economic and legal category.

§ 1. The economic essence of property relations.

Property can be defined as the relation of an individual or a collective to the thing that belongs to him as to his own. Any type and any form of property, no matter how high in a particular case the level of socialization or, what is the same, the level of collectivization of property, can exist only on condition that someone treats the conditions and products of production as their own. , and someone to strangers. Without it, there is no property at all. From this point of view, any form of ownership is private.

Property is the relation of a person to a thing. Since property is unthinkable without other persons who are not the owners of the given thing to treat it as someone else's, property means the relationship between people about things. At one pole of this relationship stands the owner, who treats the thing as if it were his own, at the other - non-owners, that is, all third parties who are obliged to treat it as someone else's. This means that third parties are obliged to refrain from any encroachment on someone else's thing, and, consequently, on the will of the owner, which is embodied in this thing. It follows from the definition of property that it has a material substratum in the form. A volitional content is also inherent in property, since it is the sovereign will of the owner that determines the existence of the thing belonging to him.

There are significant differences in the economic and legal understanding of ownership.

Property is, of course, not things and not property. It is a certain economic (actual) relationship subject to legal formalization. The economic relationship of property, firstly, consists of the relationship between people about a particular property (material wealth). It lies in the fact that this property is appropriated by a specific person who uses it in his own interests, and all other persons should not interfere with him in this; secondly, it also includes the attitude of a person to the appropriated property (material wealth, including things) as to his own (because an ordinary person treats his property differently than someone else's).

The law formalizes both named sides of economic (actual) property relations: relations between people regarding property, giving the owner the opportunity to protect against unreasonable encroachments of other (third) persons, and his attitude to the appropriated property, defining the boundaries of its permitted use. In the first case, the absolute nature of real legal relations, including legal property relations, is manifested. In the second case, we are talking about the content and real scope of the powers of the owner (or the subject of another real right). Thus, the legal form of property relations (appropriation) is predetermined by their economic content.

Property relations in the economic sense are relations between people in terms of certain material goods, expressed in the belonging (assignment) of these goods to one person and in the elimination of claims to them by other persons.

The owner has complete economic control over the thing, uses it at his own discretion and removes other persons from using it (or allows them to use the thing, but also at his own discretion).

The economic content of property relations lies, firstly, in the fact that a person appropriates certain material goods (property, things), which are thereby alienated from other persons. The obvious essence of appropriation lies in the attitude to the appropriated property as to one's own. At the same time, the appropriation of some property (thing) by one person inevitably entails the alienation of this property from all other persons, otherwise the appropriation loses all meaning. Therefore, for example, the attempts we have proclaimed to "eliminate the general alienation from the means of production" or from any other property are nonsense, because specific things cannot be appropriated by everyone at the same time. From this point of view, any property (appropriation) is private, because it formalizes the belonging of specific things to specific persons (subjects), including, for example, the state, since the latter, as an independent subject, in this sense opposes all other subjects.

Secondly, the appropriation of property is associated with the exercise of economic (economic) dominance over it, i.e., with the exclusive ability of the person who appropriated a particular property to decide at his own discretion how to use this property. At the same time, such a person is guided by his own interests, and not by the instructions of other persons, for example, state bodies, determining the directions for using his property (what part of it to put into circulation and on what conditions, what part to leave in reserve, what to consume, etc.), including including allowing other persons to use it or eliminating them from it.

Thirdly, the person who appropriated the property receives not only the pleasant "good" of owning it as a consequence of his economic dominance over the property. At the same time, the burden of maintaining his own belongings is also placed on him: the need to carry out repairs and protection; bearing the risk of accidental death or damage from causes for which no one is responsible, as well as the risk of possible losses from inept or irrational management of one's affairs (up to ruin and bankruptcy).

In this sense, the presence of the burden of property really obliges the owner of the property to be the real owner of his things. It is the combination of the good and the burden of property that characterizes the position of the real owner, and the absence of the burden of worries, risk and loss of property will never make him a true owner.

So, having analyzed the above, we can say that property is a social relation. Without the relation of other persons to the thing belonging to the owner as to someone else's, there would be no relation to it by the owner himself as to his own. The content of property as a social relation is revealed through those connections and relations that the owner necessarily enters into with other people in the process of production, distribution, exchange and consumption of material goods.

Possession means the economic domination of the owner over the thing. Ownership expresses the statistics of property relations, the attachment of things to individuals and collectives. Use means extracting useful properties from a thing through its productive and personal consumption. The order means the commission of acts in relation to a thing that determine its fate, up to the destruction of the thing. This is the alienation of a thing, and its leasing, and a pledge of a thing, and much more. The dynamics of property relations is already expressed in use and disposal.

Thus, economic relations of ownership are relations of appropriation by specific persons of certain property (material wealth), entailing its alienation from all other persons and providing the opportunity for economic domination over the appropriated property, combined with the need to bear the burden of its maintenance. one

§ 2. Ownership as a subjective right: concept and content.

The institution of property rights covers all the rules of law that fix (recognize), regulate and protect the ownership of material goods by specific persons. These, therefore, include not only the relevant norms of civil law, but also certain prescriptions of a constitutional and administrative-legal nature, and even some criminal-legal rules that establish the ownership of property by certain persons, assign to them certain possibilities for its use and provide for legal methods of protection. rights and interests of owners. one

Three lectures will be devoted to this topic. In the second lecture, we will discuss the problems that arise due to the complexity of the object to which property rights are attached. In the third lecture, we will talk about the problems that arise in connection with the complexity of the subject of ownership - a collective entity, or firm, where it is necessary to ensure the control of numerous owners over managers.

ABOUT PROPERTY RIGHTS

The mechanism of emergence of property rights in the classical form is characterized by the following chain of relations:

people Þ actions Þ assets.

A person performs actions in relation to some assets. In this sense, we can say that a person acquires ownership of these assets. The individual appropriates some assets in the course of actions, say, he picks an apple from a tree and eats it. This means that he appropriates the given apple. It becomes one way or another the object of his property.

The relation of appropriation, the use of some object, is the simplest relation of ownership. There are no social relations in it yet, there are no contradictions, problems, conflicts associated with relations between people, but there is simply a person and an object that he uses. The relationship between a person and an object underlies any property relationship, forms its material basis. What does the relationship of appropriation, use mean? What types of goods (assets) and forms of their appropriation can be distinguished here? We have already mentioned public goods, exclusive goods, etc. I would say that Goods are divided into those that we use as a snack, and those that we use at a glance. For example, in hunger, a person could use sugar as a bite, and then the sugar ended, or at a glance, and then it did not end, and the person was warmed by the consciousness that he still had sugar.

Goods that we enjoy. As a rule, they are an exclusive product and can be used in two ways:

o either a person in the process of use deforms this product,

or it does not allow another person to use this product (then it is most often a service).

Let's consider two examples. First: a person, eating an apple, thereby deforms it and turns it into some kind of pleasure. Second: a person working in a classroom at a computer or renting a car, of course, does not deform them, but when he uses these items, no one else but him can use them. What is the difference between the first and second examples?

The fact is that a person can only ultimately consume an apple. He cannot lend it, for that would mean only one thing: "Give me your apple, or what is left of it, and I will eat it." This is the so-called. "assignment relation". As for a computer or a car, a person can give it to someone for a while and then get it back. Those. ownership becomes more complex. In addition to the final property, there is the possibility of some kind of intermediate (weakened) property, when we give someone for a while, with certain conditions for use, our object of property.

Benefits we take advantage of. For example, we take advantage of the beautiful lilac that blooms behind the high neighbor’s fence (we admire: “Damn, what a lilac!” We smell it), but the angry neighbor’s dog prevents us from using it for a bite.

But, in principle, all the benefits belonging to someone can be used not only at a glance, but also at a bite, i.e. approach them like sugar - not only look at it, but also directly consume . For example, the standard use of Leonardo da Vinci's La Gioconda in the Louvre is the use of eye contact. You can look at it, and the only limitation here is the mass of people in front of this picture (the platform in front of it is a rare scarce resource). But some adventurer can try to steal it and use it at their own discretion (say, put a kettle on it at home). In other words, theoretically this good can become exclusive.

Finally, benefits that can only be used at a glance. An example of such goods is the Sun, the Moon. True, in N.V. Gogol’s “Evenings on a Farm near Dikanka”, the devil stole the moon, and the sun crocodile appropriated from Korney Chukovsky, i.e. they were also used as a snack. Obviously, everything depends on our capabilities. And yet, all atmospheric effects, everything related to environmental economics, are benefits that we use at a glance. Let us call them positive externalities of the activity of the Supreme being. We all breathe air, bask in the sun. However, our access to the river may already be limited in the same way as to the Monna Lisa.

Here are the problems that arise at the level of assignments. But note that in all this classification there is no rarity, so these relationships are, as it were, pre-economic. And they become economic when a particular good turns out to be rare, when a person is forced to choose.

A classic example is Adam and Eve living happily in Paradise until the tempting serpent appears, offering Eve an apple from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. But this use of an apple belongs to the forbidden class (you can’t eat it) and leads to conflict. Recall that property, according to Alchian, is the freedom (right) of an individual to choose for some object any use from a permitted (ie, non-forbidden) class of uses. Another example: even if you are driving your own car, you cannot run over an old woman while driving - this is a prohibited class of uses. In such situations, a problem arises that belongs to the class “tort” - “offense, crime”, social relations arise on this occasion, a choice arises. In fact, Adam and Eve measure the pleasure promised to them by the tempting serpent, which they hypothetically receive, and an indefinite, but very terrible punishment from the Lord God. And today we should thank our forefathers for the choice they made in the face of uncertainty.

SYSTEM OF RIGHTS (RELATIONS) PROPERTY (PROPERTY RIGHTS, or PR)

So, there is a limitation of goods (we introduce this parameter). And immediately in that idyll, where we are limited only by the choice of how to eat the available sugar - at a glance or a bite - the problem arises of establishing the order of use, appropriation of limited benefits.

The system of rights (relationships) of property is those relations of order, those institutions of regulation that arise between people regarding the use of limited goods. This system of rights consists of:

o the property rights themselves of the first, second and third order(see below for orders);

- systems of guarantees (protection mechanisms) of property rights.

Property rights guarantees are effectively a public contribution to your property rights. There are three types of guarantees of property rights: coercion, information, insurance.

Compulsion. Let's say if you bought a button accordion, the society guarantees you that it won't be stolen. But guarantees are provided by the society not by attaching guards to the button accordion, but by creating a mechanism for forcing compliance with the established affiliation and declaring that such a mechanism exists and operates. This mechanism is feared, due to which property rights are not violated. The mechanism consists of regulations, potentially somewhere there is a man with a gun, a prison in which you can be put. A man with a gun, prison is not attached directly to you or to each property. They just exist somewhere. However, they are activated when someone breaks the rules.

Information. So that no one steals the button accordion you purchased, others should know that this button accordion is yours. After all, the accordion itself does not say that it belongs to you. And if it is perceived as a draw, the temptation to appropriate it is great. We quite often encounter such behavior both in the older groups of the kindergarten and in the lower grades of the school, because the instincts of legal awareness have not yet been fully instilled in children at this age. Therefore, information is also among the mechanisms that guarantee our property. In society, there must be information systems that provide people with information about the ownership of a particular property.

For example, among illiterate peasants, the role of such an information mechanism is played by a peasant gathering, at which the whole community gathers and publicly divides the land. If later one of the peasants begins to dispute the furrow separating him from the neighboring land, all the peasants become witnesses of the division. They know everything about everyone, because their group is small, i.e. the visual level of information works. And as soon as we go beyond the community, there is a need to move to written titles of property, because everyone no longer knows about everyone. For this, there is a land cadastre, according to which, having a summer cottage, you privatize a land plot and receive a certain document - a title of ownership.

The visual level of information is also characteristic of the family. The family does not draw up a written contract, which says that it was Vanya who bought the green pants, and not Petya. After all, the family is small, and all its members remember well who mom bought green pants for. As a rule, this is not disputed, although, of course, there are conflicts. But they are resolved through peaceful negotiations with reference to the primary fact.

In our economy, the main problem of guaranteeing property rights at the level of information is the problem of registering shares. Until recently, the register of shareholders could be kept by the company itself or hire any, even dubious, firm for this purpose. And then the shareholder who bought the shares suddenly found out that he owns not 20%, but 3% of the shares, because it is written in the register. This happened all the time - after all, the registrar was private, not subject to any public control, any law.

Our other problem of guaranteeing property rights at the level of information is the problem of accounting in the enterprise. A foreign investor most often refuses to buy our enterprises because they cannot understand what their real assets and liabilities are. We do not have international accounting standards, so only a fool can buy our enterprise - after all, he will buy something from which all assets will be withdrawn even when he himself already owns this enterprise, because he does not see this enterprise, it is not transparent.

Insurance. This type of property guarantee, which, by the way, arose quite early, is an integral feature of the civilized world. These guarantees are more often applied to economic activity as such, but we can also talk about insurance of immovable, non-economic objects of property (for example, a personal car or a house).

These are the three types of property guarantees.

However, if the real violation of property relations refers to unregulated uses, it does not qualify as an offense (tort). A classic example is a certain system of relationships that has developed among a group of people, a system of intellectual property related to a specific game that someone invades, thereby violating their relationship of appropriation, their property. Such intrusion is not regulated by law. The state has absolutely nothing to do with it.

Another example: lying on the beach, you have built a beautiful sand fortress, and someone walked through and stepped on it. If you, avenging the destruction, start fighting with him, you will be to blame, since it was you who broke the law. You have the only legal way to protect your fortress - you must buy or rent this stretch of beach and, in addition, be sure to register your sandy creation as some kind of useful property, i.e. get a title on it - copyright (©). After all, in the court where you apply about its destruction, you will definitely be asked about the evidence that this sand fortress is a work of art. Otherwise, the court will take into account that the volume of sand from which your fortress was made after it was crushed, actually remained the same. Therefore, he will decide to weigh only those few grains of sand that your offender carried away on the soles of his feet, calculate how much they cost (half a penny!) And return this amount to you.

Definition of responsibilities. Any human actions cause the following chain to appear:

person Þ actions Þ consequences.

For example, a person's action is driving his car, and the consequences are a knocked down old woman. In other words, There are two sides to property rights: the rights themselves and the responsibilities.

The concept of “liabilities” is absent in Russian. There are rights and obligations in our country (for example, the right to breathe the air and the obligation to defend the homeland), but these are not rights and obligations in relation to property. Historically, we have not acted as owners. Our rights are only what the master is not interested in, and duties are what the master is interested in. Moreover, the gentleman does not care at all whether we want or do not want, say, to go to war with the Turks.

Unlike the Russian language, the English language reflects the centuries-old history of people who had rights and obligations. These are the rights and obligations of a private person, a private owner, who is his own master and with whom they bargain when they want to get something from him. In English, there is a word close in meaning to “liability”, the word “responsibility”, which also means “responsibility”, but these words are not synonyms. The word “liability”, on the one hand, means “responsibility” (“responsibility”), and on the other hand, a certain burden, a certain burden that a person bears because he has property.

The main liability associated with property is the payment of taxes on it. In any civilized state there is an imputed property tax. Only we don't have it. Recently, I was informed that I had not paid land tax for the last two years for my plot of 15 acres (I just forgot to do this) and they offered to pay 40 rubles along with fines and penalties! Those. It cannot be said that our system crushes a person. She's just completely clueless. In Russia, the owners of anything still do not have a clear responsibility. And we are trying, on the basis of rights and obligations, on the basis of a one-time act of purchase, to build some of the most important economic mechanisms.

Specific example. We have been trying to collect taxes for a very long time and cannot do it. Well, how to collect taxes in a country where 2/3 of the economy goes “under the table”?! In order to somehow cope with this problem, it was decided to tax the rich, and now it is necessary to pay about 70% of its value for importing a foreign car into the country. As a result, out of 1,900,000 imported foreign cars, 5 (!) people paid such a tax for them. Among these five was, for example, V.A. Gusinsky. The fact is that these five are so rich that they are under the most scrutiny. government agencies. Therefore, they are forced to buy their Mercedes-600 for the required $150,000, and not for $80,000 through the Bryansk region, while all our other owners of foreign cars seem to be “Chernobyl veterans” and do not pay these taxes.

In Russia, for some reason, it is believed that it is possible to fix the purchase of a car and take the tax due from it only at the time of transfer of rights. Meanwhile, there is an annual technical inspection, and if a progressive tax of $500-700 per year is set for each foreign car with a cylinder capacity of more than 2.5 liters, a rich person will not try to avoid this tax, but will come and pay. But when they want to tax him $40,000 at once, he will, of course, make every effort to avoid it. This is the liability - the responsibility for the property that you have, in the form of paying taxes on it. We have yet to create a system of responsibility for property in Russia in the coming years, since we will never be able to collect taxes in any other way.

Problems of Rights and Liabilities. The liabilities problem is primarily related to the fact that your use of property or the fact that you simply own it, your neighbors have external effects. The generation of external effects (externalities) is the economic meaning of the responsibility problem. Externalities can have a positive or negative value for other people (for example, a crushed old woman is the same externality of your activity that you have to pay for).

It must be said that the Communists did not discover anything new here. They, of course, sought to ensure that Soviet people lived approximately the same way, and no one would “stick out”, and those who “stick out” legally lived in state dachas and behaved like Janissaries. But, obviously, this is generally in the nature of a Russian person. Saltykov-Shchedrin's “History of a City” says: “... it seemed, for example, unforgivable insolence if a smerd poured oil on his porridge. It was not because it was insolence that it caused harm to someone, but because the people [town governors] ... assume in the stink one ability: to be firm in disasters. Therefore, they took away the porridge from the smerd and threw it to the dogs.” Building resilience is a clearly irrational goal of property rights regulation. A rational goal is to regulate externalities.

Types of regulation of property rights. Property rights are regulated law, custom or contract. Law and custom are in a sense forced upon man. As for contractual restrictions, which constitute a fairly large class of restrictions on property rights, they differ from regulation by law and custom, primarily by the procedure of bargaining. With the law, unlike a living person, you can not bargain. True, they said that “There is no law in Russia, // There is a pillar, and there is a crown on the pillar,” but you can’t bargain with the pillar either!

Economic theory is very actively involved in the contractual regulation of externalities (there is a huge literature on this subject). A classic example of quite rational contractual regulation of externalities: a certain pianist is very fond of playing the piano at night, but, realizing that his neighbor can complain to the police (according to the law, after 23.00 it is not supposed to make noise), he offers the neighbor 800 rubles as compensation for disturbing him. per month. The neighbor compares the proposed amount with his income (the effect of income will be taken into account here as a factor) and with the pianist's ability to pay. If the latter regularly tours abroad, then the neighbor, perhaps, for 800 rubles. will not agree, but will ask for 1000 or more, but he will stop at some amount. This is the usual procedure of bargaining, which is described by the tools of microeconomics known to us.

An example of an economically significant (that is, affecting many people) contractual regulation of negative externalities is the payment for harmful production. Someone needs to work with poisonous reagents, so the procedure for hiring in a hazardous shop is regulated by the wage rate, pension guarantees, some medical guarantees (ie, some kind of balancing procedure in the process of bargaining), and also by law. And if there is no unemployment, when people grab any job, then it will still be necessary to persuade a person to go there to work, for which he will be offered something in excess of what is required by law. But still, this example is rather mixed, since the worker is generally hired to do a specific job, and not to inhale poisonous fumes, and he has an incentive to agree to inhale these fumes. Hiring a workforce for an enterprise is rarely considered as an externality.

Another example: a plant creates negative operating conditions for a neighboring travel agency by pouring waste into the river (and such a drain is not prohibited by law). The affected party, the travel agency, will initiate the contract. The space of the contract is limited by the extremely rational positions of each of the parties. On the part of the camp site, this is the cost of treatment facilities (after all, it can build treatment facilities itself, and the plant is unlikely to object). On the part of the plant, this is the profit of the travel agency. If its profit is 800 thousand dollars, and the present value of the treatment plant is 1.5 million dollars, then the travel agency will not convince the plant not to drain waste at all, it will bargain with it within a maximum of 200-300 thousand dollars about so that he drains waste with a certain frequency (say, not during the season or at night), and the plant in the process of bargaining will compare its costs from such work and profits. But if the travel agency's profit is $8 million, and the present value of the treatment plant is $1.5 million, then the travel agency will simply pay for their construction.

A classic example of contract regulation of positive effects: a fashion boutique or museum (an enterprise that creates a positive effect) attracts a lot of people, so their owner can start bargaining with the owners of neighboring restaurants and shops, demanding 10% of the profit for such a beneficial neighborhood for them and threatening in case of refusal move to another area (he knows that moving will not damage his reputation).

First, second and third levels of ownership: PR 1 - possession, PR 2 - disposal, PR 3 - use. Economists rarely consider these categories, and yet they have a very definite economic meaning.

In terms of ownership a person can dispose of his asset in any way - sell, destroy, etc. In the economic (but not in the legal!) sense, ownership is his complete property. And lawyers have a much more detailed classification. For example, they have possession without the right to sell. Much in the legal system also depends on national characteristics.

Under the terms of the order man is no longer the supreme owner, he has been delegated this right. The economic meaning of the order is that the decision maker does not have the right to the final disposal of the asset, but has the right to extract and appropriate income from the commercial use of this asset.

Terms of Use a person has the right only to use this asset in the manner prescribed by the owner, but does not have the right to lease the asset.

This is the economic meaning of ranking levels of ownership.

A classic example is the use of buildings and structures. For example, a government agency can only use its building, but cannot partially rent it out, generate income and pay wages to employees. And a state unitary enterprise or educational institution has the right to dispose - it can lease the premises and use the money from the lease for its own statutory purposes. At present, organizations in Russia that officially only have the right to use federal property are forced to de facto transfer to the disposal of their funds (i.e., use them commercially), because otherwise they cannot exist. This basic contradiction in the use of federal and state property in general at the regional and municipal level has not been legally settled today, the transition to disposal at all levels of delegation of property rights is not allowed. But this is a rather exotic form of state ownership.

As for enterprises, there is a certain system of decision-making. There is a final decision that is made by the board of directors (it is made at the ownership level -PR 1). There is a decision that is made by the management layer (it is made at the level of orders - PR 2). Managers are obliged to generate income for the enterprise at their workplace, i.e. they somehow commercially use the assets entrusted to them. And at the level of use - PR 3 works, for example, a secretary who uses a typewriter and who, under pain of dismissal, cannot do “left” work on it.

In an ideal economic organization, at every level of decision making, the decision maker is fully responsible for the outcome of that decision, both positive and negative. It is assumed that all of them depend only on him. Unfortunately, no one has been able to build such a system anywhere. In practice, the owner cannot delegate his responsibility, along with all its consequences. He will not have any problems with his property if he only sells it. And while he owns it, he constantly has problems. If a hired worker, as a result of his decision, breaks the machine, both the manager and the owner are responsible for this. A manager employed by the owners of corporations, who has the right to make decisions, imposes on the owners heavy load responsibility.

The optimal economic organization is an organization in which the discrepancy between the level of decision-making and the level of responsibility for the results of this decision is minimized. And while theoretically, of course, it is possible to draw up an ideal contract, in which it would be clearly stated that the decision maker would bear such and such responsibility if such and such arises as a result of such and such, it is impossible to write complete contracts in reality. Therefore, it is also impossible to ensure that the decision maker bears full responsibility for these decisions. No matter how complete the contracts for hiring both managers and workers are, they still have zones of uncertainty, and within the enterprise there are zones of inefficiency. In principle, the branch of institutional economics concerned with intra-enterprise property relations and enterprise property relations in general is entirely aimed at reducing the costs that arise from such mismatches.

THE CONCEPT OF RESIDUAL RIGHTS AND RESIDUAL EFFECTS (RESIDUAL CLAIMS AND RETURNS)

The concept of residual rights and residual effects was introduced by Alchian and Demsetz in their famous article “Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization” (1972). And although this concept is now being attacked as incomplete, it nevertheless constituted an era in the development and establishment of neo-institutional economics, as well as in the formation of the methodology of the new subject "Law and Economics".

To understand what "residual rights" are, let's first try to imagine an exhaustive contract that can only exist on an ideal level. In such a contract, we have two partners BUT And IN, y BUT have an apple IN there are two rubles, and they exchange them ( BUT changes an apple for two rubles, and IN exchanges two rubles for an apple). There is a contract between them. It must provide for absolutely all possible distributions of the effects of this exchange, absolutely all possible distributions of rights to these two objects that are in dynamics (in the process of transfer) as a result of absolutely all the circumstances that may arise. Let's say the apple is rotten, the apple is wormy, N.S. Khrushchev abolished money and declared communism, BUT died, IN died, died and BUT, And IN, after the earthquake BUT And IN cannot find each other, etc.; if the apple is rotten, 1 ruble is returned for it; if the apple is wormy - 50 kopecks; if Khrushchev abolished money, the apple is divided in half; if BUT died, all inherit his relatives (it is indicated which ones); etc. The peculiarity of the full contract is that it tends to infinity. If we have concluded such a contract, then, of course, no residual rights arise for the parties.

However, in real life there are no full contracts. Even in a very simple exchange, we cannot foresee all possible options. In contracts that people enter into among themselves, not all property rights are specified, described. Those. in an incomplete contract and BUT, And IN will carry some residual effects. For example, if BUT handed over IN an Apple, IN handed over BUT money, and IN this apple is immediately stolen, then the negative residual effect carries IN(because the transaction was not insured by a third party); if the apple is wormy, then the negative residual effect is IN; if due to an earthquake BUT And IN they cannot find each other, both of them have a negative residual effect (both sides have not received any benefit); if Khrushchev canceled the money, then the secretary of the party committee probably takes the apple for himself, and both sides also bear the negative consequences.

So, in reality, either side BUT, or side IN, or both of these sides will necessarily bear some negative effects, as well as, of course, some positive effects (if BUT manages to slip IN rotten apple, then BUT has a positive effect). Such moments of ownership are not described in contracts, so they are called “residual” (“residual”). This is what remains after what is described in the contract. Residual effects represent those rights and benefits that are not reallocated or are inadvertently reallocated (thus a worm's apple represents a negative residual return).

The concept of residual rights and residual effects is seen more fully in the case of a firm. This model was created by Alchian and Demsets. They are considering the so-called. simple cooperation - team work (team work), when all participants are engaged in fairly homogeneous work. Let's say the workers gather together to carry a large log, and so long that the first and last of the workers carrying it do not see each other. Their work is the same. They cannot fully observe each other, so someone can take a break from work. After the transfer of the log, they will be paid a ruble and a bucket of vodka, which they will equally divide among themselves. Those. they are all equally interested in this work. Painting by I.E. Repin's "Barge haulers on the Volga" depicts the same example of simple cooperation from Russian reality in the 19th century.

In the case of simple cooperation, team members have two problems. Firstly, this is the problem of shirking (someone pulls the rope with all his might, and someone with half strength) and, secondly, this is the problem of the “free rider” (after all, they are going to share the results). Recall the economic rationale for free riding: for example, five people, each giving 100% of their efforts, bring a ruble (1 * 5). If one of them decided to cheat and give only 80% of the effort, then in the end everyone will get 4 * 5 + 0.80 = 4.80, which will be divided by 5, and thus he will be in a significant gain. The main thing is that he alone should be so cunning, but every “free rider” hopes for this. This is a very real problem that occurs in team work.

How do team members manage and control themselves? Alchian and Demsetz say it's most cost-effective for them to single out one person, free them from carrying the log, and delegate to them the rights to supervise the log-carriers (go around the lines and make sure no one is dodging), fire those who don't try, and hire new porters, i.e. make him team manager. However, it is hard to imagine that he will not have his own interest. Let's say he can extort money from those who work half-heartedly, but are afraid of losing their job. He will not fire them, the team will suffer losses, and he will fill his pocket at this time. He may take bribes from those he employs, and so on.

“And who will oversee him himself?” - ask Alchian and Demsets. If another person is hired to supervise the warden, then in this or a subsequent iteration it will turn out to be economically unprofitable (the cost of such supervision will exceed the expected positive result). The team cannot decide the fate of the overseer by voting, because it has no criteria to evaluate whether it works well or badly. The overseer has a more complex nature of labor, boundless for the rest of the team members in the process of labor. Team members can evaluate the work of the overseer only by the final result - by how much they received for carrying the log, but during its carrying a lot can happen.

Alchian and Demsetz believe that there is one way to increase the efficiency of the overseer as an individual and the team as a whole - to make the overseer the owner of the entire product (the owner of the log carrying enterprise). They prove that in this case fixed contracts will be concluded with all team members. Let's say we have 50 people who agreed to move a log for 50 rubles (ie each of them for 1 ruble). Before starting work, they singled out one person from the team, and there were 49 + 1 of them. If they make this person the owner (i.e., a person who has the right to fire and hire), then he will fire four or five of the most inefficient workers and hire one or two more efficient workers for the same fixed payment - one ruble for carrying a log . Thus, the team will be 47 + 1 people. 47 people will receive a fixed income of 47 rubles. He will get what is left: 3 rubles. And all members of the team will be happy, because only those who do not carry the log will suffer, and those who carry it will not suffer, which, in fact, they wanted. In terms of resource allocation, the job was done most efficiently - three marginal people with negative performance left the team, resulting in optimal resource allocation.

This is the economic way of forming the owner. It is the owner, the owner of the company, who receives the residual income. If he manages poorly, his residual income may turn out to be minus 3 rubles. If he recruited such a weak team that it is difficult for 52 people to carry a log, and he is forced to hire a 53rd, etc., then he will have to pay for their work from his own funds, because the terms of the contract are fixed. The owner has a strong incentive to improve the efficiency of the enterprise as a whole and has no interest in trying to “grab” something at the expense of the enterprise. He is the owner of the enterprise, the owner of the residual income.

Imagine two businesses that have employees with fixed wages. salary). Every business has some potential profit. Their difference is that the first enterprise is managed by its owner, and the second by a hired manager.

In the first case, if the enterprise manages efficiently, the additional product of this enterprise objectively represents an addition not only for the owner, but also for the whole society, and at least for this enterprise.

In the second case, the additional product of the enterprise consists of the profit of the owner of the enterprise (revenue) and the share of the hired manager, which the latter will try to increase. He will not be able to do this at the expense of the salaries of employees, since their salaries are fixed. Therefore, he will seek, first of all, to expand his income at the expense of possible profit (i.e., redistribute it within the enterprise itself in his favor), and, secondly, to increase the efficiency of the enterprise as a whole. The hired manager will try to create subsidiaries and, using his ability to make decisions on the sale of products, pump the profits of the enterprise under obviously unprofitable contracts into these firms belonging to him. The logic of his actions is the same as that of a dishonest overseer who tries to take bribes from those who carry the log poorly.

Alchian and Demsetz formulated a very simple rule for the effectiveness of property rights: other things being equal, economic efficiency (or optimal allocation of resources) is achieved when decision makers are fully responsible for both the positive and negative consequences of their decisions. This is what distinguishes the owner in the first place.

Unfortunately, in the history of our country there are many examples when decision makers do not bear any responsibility at all or do not bear it in full measure for their consequences. A classic example at the political level from our recent past is the activity of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which made decisions, and the government was responsible for them. Now the Presidential Administration and, to some extent, the State Duma play the same role when they pass laws binding on the government. Nevertheless, the responsibility for these laws, for the poor work of the state apparatus in the public mind, for some reason, is assigned to the government, to the executive branch. It is obvious to all of us how badly and inefficiently a society functions in which decision-makers are not responsible not for their implementation (which is quite natural), but for their consequences.

Of course, it is impossible for someone to bear responsibility for all political decisions. This is a real problem for all countries of the world. And although all the efforts of organizational science, the theory of the firm, and the legal practice of regulating administrative problems are aimed at bringing together decision-making and responsibility for its consequences, this is far from always possible, because there are limitations here (we will talk about them when we analyze the mechanism functioning of a joint-stock company).

What Alchian and Demsetz described as the simplest model is called "classic firm". A classical firm is a firm in which the owner is not separated from the manager. but There are three global restrictions on the use of this model.

First, these are limitations associated with inefficient risk allocation. When one person (the owner) makes decisions on a gigantic scale, he, of course, takes them in his favor, however, he is not always able to assimilate a huge amount of information, is prone to errors, cannot calculate everything, cannot guarantee the rest that he simply does not going crazy at one point or another. And society usually limits the owner of a very large fortune in the disposal of this fortune in order to eliminate the consequences of his limited rationality. Actions with such large fortunes come under the scrutiny of the legislature, for which each country usually has certain damping mechanisms. They do not tell rich people where to spend their money and how to make decisions, but provide a certain procedure for reviewing and publicly discussing the consequences of these decisions in order to reduce the risk of bounded rationality of rich people.

Secondly, these are the restrictions associated with the monopoly effect. With unlimited growth, a classical firm can take a monopoly position. To avoid this, society imposes certain restrictions.

Thirdly, there are limitations associated with agency problems. With unlimited growth, the classical firm becomes so large that the owner can no longer survey his entire economy and is forced to delegate authority to more and more low levels, going from PR 1 to PR 2, and so on. Here comes the problem of the agency, which turns what was clear and beautiful in a classical firm into its opposite. It would seem that the classical firm should be the most efficient. Yet there is no single-owner, $1 billion firm. It is precisely because of the limited rationality of the individual, as well as because of the forced powerful process of delegating responsibility down, that the classical firm loses its effectiveness and degenerates into a completely different form of ownership. The classical firm has certain efficiency limits, which are limited by the ability of one person to survey his economy. In conditions of unitary ownership, only a small or medium-sized enterprise is usually effective.

Properties of effective property rights. Effective property rights usually have three properties (for example, three properties are distinguished by Milgrom and Roberts):

o clarity, unambiguity;

actuation, or feasibility (enforceability);
exchangeability.

The first two properties are usually referred to as "legal" conditions for the effectiveness of property rights, although this is not entirely true. After all, if we have a weak economy, a weak state, the legal apparatus does not work, officials steal, policemen get drunk, this is more of an economic problem. But, nevertheless, we will consider that the first two properties are “legal”, and they determine the third property, which provides the main economic condition for the effectiveness of property rights.

It is the third property - exchangeability that ensures the optimal redistribution of property rights in favor of the person who will use this property most effectively. Note that “exchangeability” is not a very good term. After all, this kind of redistribution was inherent in both the communal system and the feudal system, and it took place through scuffles or skirmishes, which can very roughly be called “exchangeability”. In fact, this is a redistribution mechanism. But the term itself has already established itself in the literature.

Clarity and unambiguity. This property has two main components.

The first is clarity, or transparency, for the participants in ownership. It should be clear to everyone that this item belongs to Petya, and that one belongs to Vanya; that Petya has no right to play the piano after 11 pm, and Vanya - to drive a nail into his head with a hammer if he so desires; that no one has the right to gather spikelets after the harvest on the collective farm field (this was already discussed in Lecture 1).

A classic example of ambiguity, incomprehensibility in relation to ownership is the ownership of a residential building. We all take care of their apartment up to the front door, and the stairwells, the entrance, the courtyard are a zone, such as a stalker's. Why this happens, no one can explain. Perhaps people simply do not understand that they are able to bypass this zone as well, i.e. for people their own possibilities for its arrangement are not transparent. In fact, there were such opportunities even in Soviet times - no one bothered people to get together and decide to repair the entrance or hire a concierge. But due to the indistinctness of property rights, they did not realize this. This negative example is inherited by us historically. And now even in condominiums (in houses completely redeemed by tenants), the entrances are still a pigsty.

The second is the specification of ownership of the properties of an object. We will consider this question in the next lecture, and now I will give just one example. Someone owns a piece of land on which grass grows. Deep below this area there are oil deposits. Planes fly overhead in the sky. And so, whether the owner of a given plot has ownership of the land in 2D, in 3D down, or in 3D up, there was a lot of legal action. It must be said that the specification of ownership is a favorite subject of Law and Economics.

Actuability, or feasibility. There are four main forms of enforcement of property rights in society.

First, it is the state system - the law and the system of coercion.

Secondly, it is a custom(soft institution). The fear of ostracism makes a person follow the custom, when people simply stop communicating with the one who violated the custom and turn him off from economic circulation.

Thirdly, this is the mafia. Mafia structures are some alternative mechanisms of coercion to the state (not necessarily armed - perhaps economic coercion or influence by persuasion). In one form or another, in all countries there is a market for such services with its own ethics, its own arbitration court for non-performance of services, etc. And just as a person hires a lawyer to use the government's enforcement system, he can also hire an alternative enforcement system in the form of "brothers."

Fourth, it is your own strength. Relatively speaking, this is the right of the strong. Self-reliance exists primarily where there is no state. A classic example is the situation in the American Wild West during the Gold Rush. A mass of healthy men armed with pistols (of about the same strength) gathered there, and they established a fairly good order. When one started to buzz, the other could well put a bullet in his forehead. But as soon as organized gangs began to take shape there, the gold diggers asked to take their land to the United States of America, because they could no longer cope with these gangs without a sheriff. Protecting one's property based on one's own strength is quite rational under certain circumstances, although these circumstances are historically transient.

Exchangeability. There are three exchange options.

First, it is redistribution through violence or donation, characteristic of early society. A person must not only appropriate something, but also transfer something, and he transfers this by giving. It is quite clear that such a system can only work in conditions where the set of benefits relevant to people is limited. Let's say that such a set includes beer, meat, horses, armor, women, houses, plows, peasants, etc. At the same time, guarantees are embedded in the very mechanism of redistribution - whoever is stronger is more efficient.

The same feudal lord is by no means a robber, forcing the peasants to work for himself. The early Middle Ages shows how free community members turned into feudally dependent peasants (and not into serfs, who, contrary to Marxist-Leninist fairy tales, practically did not exist in Europe). The peasants concluded a certain agreement with the feudal lord, according to which they guaranteed him a natural content, and he protected them (he fought for them). And the feudal lord who defeated another feudal lord proved his market advantage just as clearly as the firm that took over another, weaker firm. This is exactly what was expected from the feudal lord.

Giving, too, could exist only in conditions of extreme simplicity of needs. The leader, who had five more women, gave the boring sixth to his associate - this is a normal method of redistribution.

So, violence (armed appropriation of property) and donation (its further “non-commercial” redistribution) are typical of early society.

Secondly, this is an administrative redistribution, characteristic of bureaucratic or corporate societies. It reached its apotheosis in the USSR. Administrative redistribution is characterized by extremely limited efficiency, which is primarily due to information problems. Information in the Soviet administrative system was practically not transparent and, in addition, extremely asymmetrically distributed downwards, although the Center incurred huge transaction costs both in obtaining information and in controlling this information, as well as in controlling those who controlled both. other. This means that the Center, through which (in addition to a number of programs put forward by it) the redistribution of resources proceeded, was blind.

For example, the secretary of the regional committee turned to the Central Committee of the CPSU with a request to allocate such and such money, such and such funds, so many tractors, so many bulldozers for digging a certain canal. The Central Committee gave corresponding instructions to the State Planning Commission. There, an industry department or sub-department was assembled to decide where to withdraw scarce resources from. After all, a planned economy is characterized by a total deficit! Due to the shortage, each application was “cut off” exactly by half. And this meant that the Center had no information at all about what was really needed, because, anticipating that the application would be “cut off”, the lower level constantly overestimated the volume of applications, thereby misinforming the Center. Ultimately, this led to a very inefficient redistribution of resources, to their necrosis in completely non-rational, insane forms.

For example, at the time of the collapse of the USSR, we had 80,000 tanks in storage. All other countries produced the same amount in 25 years, but they have already written off most of them and melted them down, but we kept them, and this is money. In addition, the soldiers guarded them, regularly oiled them, etc., although 80,000 tanks, in principle, could not be used (they would fall apart on the road from Siberia to the theater of operations).

Another example is BAM, which absorbed about 10% of the USSR GNP over 8 years of its construction, and as a result, a single-track was built, which is not used in the economy to this day. For reference: 80 years before that, Russian merchants who took a contract for the construction of the CER (somewhat south of BAM) built railway in two ways in 3 years, spending about 10 times less, and this despite the fact, and not the current level of technical development! BAM is the most representative example of the inefficiency of administrative redistribution in the later stages of the historical development of society.

Thirdly, it is the property rights market. To be effective, it must be all-inclusive or maximally inclusive, transparent, organized. This is the same system of information, but not about declared property rights, but about events taking place on the market, i.e. direct market information.

Libmonster ID: RU-10180

V. VOLKOV, Doctor of Sociology, Vice-Rector of the European University at St. Petersburg

Despite periodic statements by members of the Russian government that state capitalism is not a desirable model for Russia 1 , its formation has become an indisputable fact. The state acquired controlling stakes in key enterprises in a number of industries, increased spending and investment, created large state holdings and state corporations, which, in fact, became industry management bodies, and significantly increased the capabilities of state banks 2 . Without becoming an effective regulator, the state has become the largest economic entity. The reform program announced by the country's leadership in 2000 was liberal. It assumed the leading role of private property in the economic development of the country, reducing the tax and administrative burden on business, and strengthening the judicial system. In contrast to this program and the statements of the top leadership, the result of the next decade was state capitalism. Therefore, it is logical to raise the question of the reasons and logic of the transformations, for which the consequences of the actions of the political and economic elite did not correspond to the original intentions.

We proceed from the fact that the factor that had a decisive influence on the formation of the political and economic model of Russia's development

The text was prepared with the support of the Institute for Public Design (grant agreement No. 9-G). The author thanks Ya. Pappe, V. Gelman, and A. Zudin for critical comments.

1 For example, I. Shuvalov, in an interview with the Vedomosti newspaper on February 15, 2005, said: “The authorities need to demonstrate that state capitalism is not our future, that we consider entrepreneurs as an engine of social development, that private initiative is the basis of jobs, growth wages and doubling GDP. At a meeting with the leadership of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation on December 11, 2007, V. Putin said: "We are not going to create state capitalism. This is not our choice, not our path."

2 See: Pappe Ya., Galukhina Ya. Russian big business: the first 15 years. M.: ID GU HSE, 2009. S. 161 - 194.

in the 2000s, became inability to solve the problem of reliable guarantees of private property rights. As a result, incentives for long-term investment on the part of market participants turned out to be insufficient and private business did not become the main agent of modernization. Having concentrated significant capital resources, the political leadership made a choice in favor of various options direct administrative control over the most important economic assets, delegating to a select circle of officials the rights to manage these assets and receive significant private or group benefits.

The problem of reliable guarantees of property rights

Modern researchers of economic institutions consider the state a necessary condition for sustainable economic development, since it forms the institutional structure of exchange, making it cheaper and expanding its scope beyond local communities 3 . A particularly sensitive area in terms of economic development is the specification and protection of private property rights 4 . In its most general form, property rights are defined as the rules governing the access of individuals or entities to limited goods. Therefore, the realization of property rights implies the exclusion of other applicants or the ordering of their claims. And this requires a resource of coercion. Hence follows the special role of the state as an organization that has advantages in the use of coercion, in determining and securing property rights, and hence in creating conditions for economic development. When rights are low, people tend to reap short-term benefits. They will refrain from making productive investments because there is no guarantee of future returns on those investments. Therefore, when a state is formed, mutual expectations of economic activity participants change and incentives for cooperation appear. The lengthening of the horizons of economic activity promotes productive investment of energy, ideas and capital and, accordingly, economic growth.

Theoretically, rulers have a natural interest in the prosperity of their countries, since their personal income depends on the general welfare. This forces them to introduce and protect a system of property rights that would ensure economic growth 5 . But in reality

3 Polanyi K. The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time / Per. from English. A. A. Vasilyeva and others; under total ed. S. E. Fedorova. St. Petersburg: Aleteyya, 2002; Fligstin N. State, markets and economic growth // Analysis of markets in modern economic sociology / Ed. V. Radaeva. M.: ID SU HSE, 2007; Block F. The role of the state in the economy // Western economic sociology: a reader of modern classics / Ed. V. Radaeva. M.: ROSSPEN, 2004. S. 569 - 599; North D. Structure and Change in Economic History. N.Y.: Norton, 1981.

4 Demsetz H. Toward a Theory of Property Rights // American Economic Review. 1967 Vol. 57, No 2. P. 347 - 359.

5 Olson M. Power and Prosperity. N.Y.: Basic Books, 2000.

owners of means of coercion are always tempted to redefine property rights in their favor, or even to take as much income as possible without offering anything in return. The fewer restrictions on the actions of state power, the more likely it can happen. This situation creates an institutional dilemma: if the political community has sufficient power and resources to protect property rights within its jurisdiction (sovereignty), then it also has the ability to manipulate these rights in its favor. According to D. North, "the presence of the state is necessary for economic growth; the state, however, is the source of economic decline caused by the actions of people" 6 .

Therefore, in order for property rights to be reliably protected, mutual agreement between the state and citizens is not enough. In fact, the protection of property rights in exchange for investments and taxes is not a self-fulfilling contract, since the state, as the stronger party, always has incentives to violate it. For potential investors to have confidence in the safety of their assets and future income, strong institutional constraints are needed to make government promises to protect rights credible. In other words, the state must be strong enough to protect the property rights of citizens, but not so strong as to revise them unilaterally, that is, without the consent of the groups whose rights are in question. That's what it is credibility problem (the problem of credible commitment). Reliability is achieved not by promises, but by restrictions of a political nature, which objectively exclude the possibility of arbitrary actions. The solution to the problem of reliable guarantees, therefore, lies in the political plane.

The difficulty of solving this problem stems from the fact that not a single bearer of supreme power is inclined to voluntarily agree to the limitation of his power. Therefore, the question arises: what actions or circumstances can lead to such a restriction? As a result of which organizational, institutional or other decisions will guarantees of private property rights become reliable? How to ensure the appropriate expectations of business participants, that is, faith in the long-term stability of their rights? Why do attempts to solve the problem of strong guarantees fail in some cases?

Scientists have identified several options for answering these questions.

Karl Marx was perhaps the first to point out the crucial role of changing property rights and ensuring their political protection for the development of capitalism and the industrial revolution. Being a contemporary of these processes, he is harmless

6 North D. Structure and Change in Economic History. P. 20. B. Weingast formulated this dilemma as follows: "Any government strong enough to provide minimum institutional conditions for markets - for example, secure property rights, an objective legal system, a stable monetary system, - also has enough opportunities to appropriate the wealth of its citizens" ( Weingast B. The Political Commitment to Markets and Marketization // The Political Economy of Property Rights / D. Weimer (ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. P. 43).

sidelined the growth of the capitalist economy with the victory of the bourgeois revolutions in Holland, England and France. The bourgeoisie, or third estate, used political violence to limit or eliminate the power of the crown, to seize the state machine, which European monarchs by that time had made sufficiently strong, and to establish a system of property rights that would reflect the interests of this particular class. The solution to the problem of reliable guarantees, according to Marx, consisted in establishing direct political control over the state and turning it into a "committee managing the common affairs of the entire bourgeois class" 7 .

In modern historically oriented studies in line with neo-institutionalism, political violence and constitutional conventions are also considered the main points in explaining the transformation of property rights. For North and Weingast, the model case is 17th-century England, when civil war broke out as a result of royal defaults on debt payments and arbitrary tax increases in 1642. After the revolution of 1688, reforms took place, as a result of which an independent court was created, which had the status of political power, and the powers of parliament were expanded so that without its consent the crown could not take any important decision affecting the interests of other groups. Thus, a system of distribution of powers and a cross-veto arose, which served as a source of reliable guarantees of property rights and protection against the arbitrariness of the crown. Financial markets reacted to the reduction in political risks by lowering interest rates on loans, which contributed to the start of industrial modernization 8 .

The revolutionary past of some countries does not mean that political violence should be a necessary element in limiting executive power through the rule of law and that a formal (constitutional) distribution of power is the only way to solve the problem of reliable guarantees. In other cases, institutions for the protection of property rights arose as a result of the strategic interaction of political and economic actors, which was in the nature of a pact on the separation of powers, reached as a result of peaceful negotiations, and not collective violence.

Formal institutional (constitutional) solutions to the problem of reliable guarantees of property rights, summarizing the historical experience of the leading Western countries, are not the only possible ones. Economic and sociological studies show that restraining opportunistic behavior (the desire to suddenly violate obligations to increase one's own benefit) and stabilizing contractual relations can be social media. Interpersonal networks exercise powerful social control, therefore, to some extent, they supplement or even replace the central authority (the state) as a source of control over compliance with

7 Marx K., Engels F. Manifesto of the Communist Party // Op. 2nd ed. T. 4. S. 420.

8 North D., Weingast B. Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England // Journal of Economic History. 1989 Vol. 59, No 4. P. 803 - 832.

Personalized informal relationships and social networks have only relatively recently come to the attention of researchers who have tried to explain the peculiarities of the economic development of countries that do not have stable democratic institutions and the rule of law. Recent history knows many cases when the countries of Southeast Asia and Latin America showed economic growth in the absence of democracy. The political and economic elites of these countries are linked by close interpersonal relationships. The examples of Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Brazil and some other countries demonstrate different patterns of relations between the state and economic interest groups than in the Anglo-Saxon world. P. Evans designated such relations by the term "rooted autonomy" of the state, pointing out that states are not separated from interest groups, as Weber's principle of autonomy of the bureaucracy prescribes, but are closely connected with them by personal exchange relations that contribute to coordination when making decisions in the field of economic policy and development programs 10 .

Further studies of alternative models for solving the problem of reliable guarantees contributed to the introduction of the term "capitalism for one's own", or "kronism" ( crony capitalism, cronyism), and the concept of vertical political integration. In South Korea during the military regime of Park Chung Hee (1962 - 1978), modernization and import substitution programs were managed by a narrow circle of government officials and owners of large industrial conglomerates (chaebols). The military elite provided significant capital resources or loan guarantees to the private sector and guaranteed property rights to conglomerate owners in exchange for rents in the form of contributions to the ruling party's fund and payments of a corrupt nature. The military-political and economic elites of the country were connected by personal, including family relations, which functioned as sources of trust and limiters of arbitrariness. For sustainable development, the military was required to refrain from seizing assets or raising taxes, and company owners were required to meet investment obligations, follow five-year development plans, and not take funds abroad (i.e., not steal). And although the military relied on a strong state security service and held the owners of large businesses literally hostage, since they could subject them to repression at any time, the hostage effect

9 Granovetter M. Economic structure and social action: the problem of rootedness // Western economic sociology: a reader of modern classics. pp. 131 - 158.

10 Evans P. Predatory, Developmental and Other Apparatuses: A Comparative Political Economy Perspective on the Third World State // Sociological Forum. 1989 Vol. 4, No 4. P. 561 - 587.

was mutual. The high concentration of asset ownership not only made coordination easier (all business captains could be seated at the same table), but also meant that military intervention could harm a significant segment of the economy, as D. Kang 11 pointed out in his study.

In the absence of democracy and the rule of law, the main way to create reliable guarantees of property rights is vertical political integration. The authors of the study of the mechanisms of economic development of Mexico in the period between the dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz (1876 - 1910) and the revolutionary instability of 1910 - 1920. use this term by analogy with the theory of vertical integration developed in institutional economics 12 . Incentives to replace a market contract with direct administrative integration (incorporation into the firm) arise when the continued operation of the firm is highly dependent on some specific good or asset whose supply is potentially unstable. Accordingly, guarantees of property rights are considered as a specific benefit, the provision of which is problematic in conditions of authoritarianism or political instability. Vertical political integration can be a solution to the problem of stabilizing rights, allowing for long-term investment. The transfer of part of the regulatory powers to business representatives will then be similar to "backward" integration, and the granting of business shares to government members will be "forward" integration. "As in the case of integration within the firm, it (political integration. - V. V.) replaces contracts with direct management oversight. In the context of the political system, this implies a high degree of authoritarianism," says S. Haber 13 .

The problem of property rights has been relevant for Russia throughout the entire period of transformation and has been reflected in many ways in scientific literature fourteen . However, there are few studies devoted to the problem of reliable guarantees 15 . They get lost in more

11 Kang D. Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. According to another researcher, the dominance in South Korea of a family conglomerate that combines assets with little connection to any economic and technological logic is best explained by the desire to insure against the political risks posed by the "mafia" state, since maximizes the potential economic damage from destructive interference ( Oh I Mafioso, Big Business and the Financial Crisis: The State-Business Relations in South Korea and Japan. L.: Ashgate, 1999).

12 Crony Capitalism and Economic Growth in Latin America / S. Haber (ed.). Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002.

13 Haber S., Maurer N., Razo A. Sustaining Economic Performance under Political Instability: Political Integration in Revolutionary Mexico // Crony Capitalism and Economic Growth in Latin America. P. 36

14 Kapelyushnikov R.I. Economic theory of property rights. Moscow: IMEMO, 1990; Radygin A. D. Property reform in Russia: on the way from the past to the future. M.: Respublika, 1994; Property rights, privatization and nationalization in Russia / Ed. V. Tambovtsev. Moscow: New Literary Review, 2009.

15 Tambovtsev V. Improving the protection of property rights - an untapped reserve of Russia's economic growth? // Issues of Economics. 2006. No. 1.

general reflections on the topic of relations between the state and business, political authoritarianism, corruption. The exception is a survey of entrepreneurs conducted in 2000 to find out how protected property rights are in Russia and whether the perceived degree of protection of rights influences investment behavior 16 . The results of this survey showed that confidence in arbitration courts, especially in the ability to defend one's interests in a dispute with government bodies, membership in business associations, and the perception of government policy as (at the time) aimed at deepening market reforms, best predicted higher investment activity. But this study tested the hypothesis about the influence of the degree of security of property rights on economic behavior, with a focus on the rule of law and the distribution of power rather than kronism and vertical political integration. A similar survey conducted in 2007 showed some improvement in entrepreneurs' expectations regarding the security of property rights and propensity for investment behavior, but this improvement occurred where owners were able to take advantage of establishing stable informal relationships with regional authorities. In other words, the survey found informal integration of medium-sized businesses and regional authorities 17 .

This article attempts to explain the emergence of state capitalism after 2000 and its Russian specificity in the context of the problem of reliable guarantees of property rights and a solution to it through vertical political integration "forward", that is, direct control of state officials over large economic assets. IN in general terms the logic of development after 2000 can be described as follows. In the summer of 2000, the holders of the executive power entered into an informal contract with the elected owners of large businesses under the formula "sovereignty + taxes in exchange for guarantees of property rights." Further, both parties insisted that the terms of the contract were observed, although some violations took place. But as the state strengthened, the concentration of assets in the hands of elected owners increased, and the external economic situation changed, both sides had growing incentives to violate it. The Yukos case has become a watershed, showing that the state has the ability to confiscate any assets in sovereign territory. At the same time, judicial reform and civil service reform failed, gubernatorial elections were canceled, and political competition after the 2004 elections was curtailed. All this clearly indicated that the movement towards the rule of law and the distribution of power had stopped. Vertical political integration has become the only possible

16 Frye T. Credible Commitment and Property Rights: Evidence from Russia // American Political Science Review. 2004 Vol. 98, No 3. P. 453-466.

17 Frye T., Yakovlev A., Yasin Y. The Other Russian Economy: How Everyday Firms View the Rules of the Game in Russia // Social Research. 2009 Vol. 76, No 1. P. 29-54.

some form of stabilization of property rights, the Russian version of "capitalism for the inside" began to take shape, based on personal relationships and the participation of government members in business, which was formalized through the creation of state corporations.

Big business and a weak state

There is no great need to dwell on the origin of the oligarchs 18 . The essence of the behavior of this group is to use ties with the state to obtain property, use income from it to increase political influence, etc., that is, to receive rent and politically consolidate the opportunity to receive it further.

Initially, control over large enterprises did not imply the formalization of ownership, but relied on controlling the financial flows of export-oriented enterprises by forcing their management to purchase or sell through appointed offshore traders, in which all the profits remained. The idea was simple: first, withdraw all the profits of viable enterprises outside the country, and then use it to purchase shares of these enterprises, having received them as property.

The most famous examples of such behavior were the privatization of enterprises in the aluminum sector by the TWG group and the brothers M. and L. Cherny, as well as the control of Aeroflot and AvtoVAZ by B. Berezovsky. Thanks to loans-for-shares auctions, another group of owners received in 1995 a number of key enterprises at a price well below the market price. Yukos was sold to Menatep Bank (78% stake for $159 million and $200 million in investment liabilities); ONEKSIM Bank received 38% of Norilsk Nickel for $170 million, and 51% of Sibneft shares went to NFC Berezovsky for $100.3 million.

Under customary law, private property is legitimized by labor input, money, ideas, energy (even if it is the energy of conquest), not political power. The latter only assumes the function of its subsequent protection 19 . Although more than 15 years have passed since the loans-for-shares auctions, public opinion polls still show a negative attitude towards large owners 20 . For obvious reasons, individuals sought to obtain assets at the lowest price, but the way in which they achieved this, and the price itself, made the property illegitimate for a long time. The fundamental illegitimacy of property rights to assets during the 1990s predetermined the potential instability of these rights, facilitating state intervention and the redistribution of assets.

18 Zorkaya N. Privatization and private ownership in public opinion in the 1990s and 2000s // Otechestvennye zapiski. 2005. N 1. www.strana-oz.ru/?numid=22&article=1009.

19 Pappe I."Oligarchs": economic chronicle. 1992 - 2000. M.: Publishing House of the State University Higher School of Economics, 2000; Hoffman D. The Oligarchs: Wealth and Power in the New Russia. N.Y.: Public Affairs, 2002.

20 Bethell T. The Noblest Triumph: Property and Prosperity Through the Ages. N.Y.: St. Martin Press, 1999.

In the 1990s, a weak state did not pose a threat to private property, but it also did not have the ability to reliably protect rights. After the 1996 elections, vertical political integration took on the character of state capture by interest groups.

Berezovsky's interview immediately after the election unambiguously substantiated the right to participate in politics: "We hired Anatoly Chubais. We invested huge funds in the election campaign. We ensured Yeltsin's victory. Now we are counting on positions in the government and we can reap the fruits of our victory" 21 . He also named the bankers who allegedly controlled half of the Russian economy: Smolensky, Khodorkovsky, Gusinsky, Potanin, Fridman, Vinogradov and himself. In the same year, Potanin received the post of Deputy Prime Minister, and Berezovsky became a member of the Security Council.

Their influence on government decisions, especially in areas that directly affected their interests, was palpable. According to a member of the government of that time, “there were constant calls from different places with a proposal to accept specific people ... who tried ... to prove that their interests coincide with the interests of the state in specific ... issues ... Well ... it is difficult to describe it very briefly, but in principle it was clear that serious decisions are still made ... under the influence of commercial interests, and not entirely under the influence there in pure form rules, laws, etc. It was felt." When determining the banks allowed to service customs accounts, the respondent noted that he was under pressure, up to indirect threats. "I can say that I was subjected to quite severe pressure from certain structures. .. financial-industrial, up to the point, which means that they simply told me through bankers: “You are supposedly being watched” 22 .

The only measure that potentially threatened the interests of the owners at that time was the decision to create an Extraordinary Commission on Taxes, which was to individually collect tax debts from the largest enterprises. According to Deputy Finance Minister S. Shatalov, 70 largest enterprises paid less than 50% of taxes. The tax VChK compiled a list of debtors and, under the threat of bankruptcy, tried to force them to pay taxes. This can be considered the first attempt to strengthen the state or a test of its capacity, which turned out to be, however, not entirely successful. The actions of the Cheka did not affect the interests of politically influential owners (oligarchs). During 1997, 14 enterprises began to pay off their tax debts, paying off 1,999.5 billion non-denominated rubles out of 3,126.9 billion in debt. The largest amounts were paid by Tatenergo, Almazy Rossii - Sakha JSC, Kondpetroleum OJSC, Chernogorneft and Lukoil-Volgograd Pererabotka OJSC 23 . The government has negotiated with Yukos, Sibneft, Norilsk Nickel and AvtoVAZ to restructure their debts, but

23 Information on the state of settlements with the Federal budget of 14 enterprises and organizations considered at a meeting of the working group of the State Tax Service of Russia, www.nasledie.ru/finansi/23_4/article.php?art=4.

one of them did not pay any significant amounts, although all were included in the list of the ten largest debtors 24 .

The call to "equally distance" market participants from power was voiced in Vladimir Putin's pre-election speech on February 28, 2000, in the context of the discussion of the problem of sovereignty and the weakness of the state. Practical steps to "equidistant" the oligarchs, as is known, followed two days after the inauguration of the new president.

And in May, Gusinsky's Media-Most company was searched. Gazprom then demanded the return of $400 million in debt. While under arrest, Gusinsky signed an agreement to transfer the assets of Media-Most to Gazprom in exchange for freedom and the opportunity to leave the country. After public speaking against the plan for federal reform, a similar fate befell Berezovsky. In June 2000, after demanding the repayment of a $100 million loan to Vnesheconombank, Berezovsky was forced to transfer a 49% stake in ORT to the State Property Committee. After the beginning of the investigation into the misappropriation of funds from Aeroflot, Berezovsky also left the country, selling shares in Sibneft to R. Abramovich.

In continuation of the "equidistance" policy, that same summer the tax police carried out demonstrative raids on the offices of the Sibneft and Lukoil companies. Proposals followed to Potanin about additional payment of a certain amount as compensation for the purchase of Norilsk Nickel at a reduced price. Thus, the executive power sought to increase the degree of its autonomy from interest groups in order to be able to make decisions and implement certain economic policies. At the same time, a tax reform began, which provided for a reduction in income tax to 26% (later to 24%) and personal income tax to 13%, the introduction of a tax code and the abolition of tax incentives.

This paved the way for an informal pact with big business owners called the New Social Contract. Its terms were agreed in preparation for a meeting in the Kremlin on July 28 between Putin and 19 owners of large enterprises with the participation of M. Kasyanov, A. Kudrin and G. Gref 25 . V. Surkov, who participated in this meeting, later said that the oligarchs "were asked to keep their distance, not to hang around the Kremlin, not to roam around the ministries and not to resolve issues that are not within their competence. And so, in general, to walk together

24 Information on the work of state tax authorities on the forced collection of arrears on taxes and fees for 9 months of 1997 (according to operational data as of 10/13/97). www.nasledie.ru/finansi/23_4/article.php?art=5.

25 Meeting participants from large business: S. Vainshtok (CEO of Transneft), O. Deripaska (CEO of Russian Aluminum), V. Vekselberg (CEO of Siberian-Ural Aluminum Company), V. Alekperov (President of Lukoil "), K. Bendukidze (general director of the United Machine-Building Plants), V. Bogdanov (president of Surgutneftegaz), R. Vyakhirev (chairman of the board of Gazprom), D. Zimin (general director of Vimpelcom), O. Kiselev ( Chairman of the Board of IMPEXbank), V. Lisin (Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Novolipetsk Iron and Steel Works), A. Mordashov (CEO of Severstal), V. Potanin (President of the Interros Group), N. Pugin (President of the Gorky Automobile Plant), M. Fridman ( chairman of the board of directors of Alfa-Bank), M. Khodorkovsky (chairman of the board of YUKOS), S. Pugachev (chairman of the board of directors of Mezhprombank), T. Bolloev (general director of the Baltika brewing company), V. Kogan (president of Promstroibank-SPb), Ye Shvidler (President of Sibneft). Source: Kommersant. 2000. July 27; July 29.

and raise common questions for the overall development of market relations. It was proposed to pay taxes." 26 On these terms, Putin promised not to revise the results of privatization, that is, to guarantee property rights. As Khodorkovsky mentioned in his last media interview before his arrest, the problem of the irreversibility of the results of privatization was "solved in 2000, when the President gathered businessmen and said that we are creating a watershed: what was before 2000 now belongs to history, and now, after 2000, let's live by different laws. But if someone does not want to live by them, then we will deal with it. I think that it was this social contract that ensured the stable development of society over the course of three years" 27 .

1. Big business owners refrain from interfering in political decision-making and from buying unilateral advantages from the state.

2. Instead of individual informal lobbying, interaction between business and government should be organized in the form of regular collective meetings to coordinate economic policy.

3. The state reduces taxes, makes taxation rules more transparent and uniform.

4. Business pays taxes and does not resort to the most odious schemes to evade them.

5. The state does not review the results of privatization and guarantees property rights.

To implement the terms of this transaction, two negotiating platforms were appointed: the Council for Entrepreneurship under the Government of the Russian Federation and the recreated RSPP. Then the tax reform was carried out and the reform of the civil service was launched. Judicial reform was being developed to strengthen the judiciary and the rule of law.

The July 28 Pact, in fact, affected the fundamental rights of both parties. The state reserved the exclusive right to make and implement decisions relating to domestic and foreign policy - read, the restoration of sovereignty. It was ready to take into account the interests of business, but in a form that would not threaten the internal unity of the government. Tax cuts in exchange for increased tax discipline implied a new balance between private and public benefits from the use of the country's main industrial assets and natural resources. The promise not to revise the results of privatization was ambiguous. On the one hand, it was intended to stimulate the return of funds previously withdrawn abroad and a more productive attitude towards assets. On the other hand, against the background of pressure on business and the expropriation of the most politically active oligarchs, the fulfillment of any promises largely depended on the goodwill of the state leaders.

26 www.edinros.ru/news.html?id=111148.

27 www.khodorkovsky.ru/speech/732.html.

The main problem of the July 28 Pact was the mechanism for guaranteeing its implementation by both parties, as well as its stability in the face of changing external conditions or the balance of power. It had several built-in sources of potential instability. Firstly, the contract was informal and, therefore, left a lot of opportunities for interpretation of its terms by each of the parties. Its stability depended on further negotiations, precedents, and carried the danger of conflicting interpretations. Secondly, the parties to the contract were not individuals, but groups. Therefore, its observance depended on discipline and coordination within each group, which was problematic both in the community of large owners who competed among themselves for obtaining new assets, and for the state, which did not have a sufficient degree of internal unity. Thirdly, until reliable legal, that is, systemic restrictions were created, enforcement of the contract depended on the state as a stronger party, which carried the risks of manipulating property rights.

During 2000 - 2003. there was an increase in power and its concentration in the hands of the federal executive branch, as well as a concentration of assets mainly in the hands of the owners who participated in the meeting on July 28. But the solution to the problem of reliable guarantees of property rights, the relevance of which grew with the parallel concentration of power and property, was not clearly formed. It could be based either on an independent judiciary, the strengthening of parliamentary democracy and the territorial distribution of power (federalism), or on vertical political integration and "kronism". The first option assumed a consistent legal reform (its program was prepared by D. Kozak's group), as well as the preservation of federalism and political competition. Vertical political integration, as already mentioned, is based either on the inclusion of the main owners in the mechanisms for making political decisions on issues that directly affect their economic interests (through the legislative or executive branch), or on the transfer of part of the property rights, including the right to receive income, to members executive power. The first way is referred to as "backward" integration, and the second as "forward" integration.

It is important to note that the very methods by which the state was strengthened and assets were redistributed objectively turned out to be poorly compatible with strengthening the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law. The main components of the policy of strengthening the state are well known, and there is no need to analyze them in detail. This is a federal reform that included the creation federal districts, bringing regional laws in line with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the reform of the Federation Council and the abolition of gubernatorial elections. The result of this reform was the reduction of the territorial distribution of power and its significant centralization. Both the federal reform and the policy of strengthening the executive power relied heavily on law enforcement organizations - the prosecutor's office, the FSB, the tax

police and partly the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Their use corresponded to a political-administrative logic that had little to do with law or rights, which put them above the law and subordinated them to political tasks. The judicial and legal reform did not correspond to the current political tasks and was doomed to the lack of support both from the Kremlin and from within legal system.

The main industrial assets in ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, petrochemistry, machine-building and other enterprises passed under the control of the owners, most of whom were participants in the Kremlin meeting on July 28, 2000 (see Table 1), through the purchase of court decisions and the commercial use of law enforcement agencies . Large owners were not interested in strengthening the judiciary, as this would have made it difficult to take over numerous enterprises that took place in 2000-2003. with the help of "custom" bankruptcies or under the pretext of defending the rights of minority shareholders. With the support of the executive branch, the elected owners were interested in exclusive guarantees of property rights for themselves and in the absence of such guarantees for others. The merger or seizure of assets was dictated by the need to create vertically integrated or industry holdings, as well as interest in export-oriented enterprises, which became attractive due to changes in prices in international markets.

As a result of numerous acquisitions, the Rusal group merged aluminum production enterprises. Alfa/Renova Group consolidated assets in the oil and food industries, as well as in the telecommunications sector. The MDM Group united coal mining enterprises, pipe production, as well as banking and insurance businesses. Interros has set up a new holding, Power Machines, which unites enterprises producing equipment for the electric power industry. UMMC and the Evraz holding accumulated assets in the production of non-ferrous metals and the coal industry. New strong players have appeared in the steel industry, associated with large steel mills: Novolipetsk (Lisin), Magnitogorsk (Rashnikov) and Cherepovets (Mordashov) and their associated iron ore suppliers.

According to a study published by the World Bank on industrial concentration in Russia as of 2003, the 22 largest privately owned enterprises employed 42% of the country's workforce and accounted for 39% of annual sales. At the same time, these assets are concentrated in sectors with a higher level of concentration: the 10 largest groups owned 60.2% of the Russian stock market. In 2004, there were 25 people in Russia whose wealth exceeded $1 billion (in 2002 there were 7 of them, and in 2003 there were 17, see Table 1).

The policy of strengthening the state (concentration of federal power) and methods of concentration of large property objectively came into conflict with legal reform, which envisaged the creation of independence of the courts and the uniform application of laws. This should be considered the main reasons why the legal reform was curtailed. In combination with the strengthening of the central government, and then

Table 1

Russian billionaires


Khodorkovsky*	Khodorkovsky*	Khodorkovsky*	Khodorkovsky*	Abramovich
	Abramovich	Abramovich	Abramovich
Bogdanov*
		Vekselberg*		Deripaska*
Abramovich	Bogdanov*		Prokhorov	Vekselberg*
Alekperov*	Alekperov*	Prokhorov*		Mordashov*
	Deripaska*	Yevtushenkov	Mordashov*
Chernomyrdin		Deripaska*	Deripaska*	Prokhorov
		Alekperov*	Vekselberg*	Alekperov*
		Mordashov*	Alekperov*	Rashnikov
				Ivanishvili
				Yevtushenkov
		Bogdanov*
				Bogdanov*
			Shakhnovsky	Khodorkovsky*
			Bogdanov*
		Shakhnovsky	Yevtushenkov


				Kuzmichev

A source: www.forbes.com

and the curtailment of parliamentary democracy, the concentration of ownership created the prerequisites for kronism and vertical political integration. Recall that this method of securing property rights involves a small number of participants on both sides, since it is based on personal relationships and direct coordination (later this will be called "manual control").

The Yukos case and new uncertainty

In the context of the ongoing redistribution of assets and the low legitimacy of the results of privatization, the issue of reliable guarantees of property rights remained central in relations between the state and private business. The problem of guarantees was referred to as a refusal to revise the results of privatization, which primarily implied guarantees that the twelve large enterprises acquired by private individuals as a result of the loans-for-shares auctions in 1995 would remain in their ownership 28 . The issue of taxes and social responsibility was also essentially a question of property rights, since

28 These are stakes in Surgutneftegaz, Lukoil, Sidanko, Yukos, Sibneft, Nafta-Moscow, Norilsk Nickel, NLMK, Mechel, Murmansk Shipping Company, Severo -Western Shipping Company, Novorossiysk Shipping Company.

ku it affected the distribution of private and public benefits from the use of assets.

In a situation of a weak legal system, personal interaction with the presidential administration, as well as group meetings at the level of the RSPP presidium, were a mechanism that ensured the stability of the position of a limited group of owners. At the same time, the number of face-to-face meetings between representatives of big business and Putin exceeded the number of meetings as part of a group, that is, the direct coordination of the interests of the state and business was not limited to specially designated collective sites, as was originally intended (see Table 2).

Table 2

Meetings with Vladimir Putin, 2000 - 2006

Last name, first name	Position	Personal meetings	As part of a group of businessmen
Miller A.	Chairman of the Board of OAO "Gazprom"
Potanin V.	President of the holding "Interros"
Chubais A.	Chairman of the Board of RAO "UES of Russia"
Weinstock S.	President of JSC "Transneft"
Deripaska O.	Chairman of the Board of Directors of Rusal
Vekselberg V.	Chairman of the Board of Directors of SUAL Holding
Mordashov A.	General Director of OAO Severstal
Alekperov V.	President of OAO Lukoil
Friedman M.	Chairman of the Supervisory Board of Directors of the Alfa Group Consortium
Kostin A.	Chairman of the Board of Vnesheconombank
Khodorkovsky M.	Former Chairman of the Board of Yukos Oil Company

It was nominally in the interest of both parties to adhere to the "28 July Pact" since it was in the interests of both groups at the time of its conclusion. But in the future, the growth of the possibilities of the executive branch, the strengthening of the financial influence of big business, as well as changes in the external economic situation created the danger of its destabilization. The provisions of the pact were open to interpretation and depended on the internal discipline of the parties.

The conflict around the Yukos company and its owners that took place in 2003-2005 can be seen as a destabilization or even cancellation of the July 28 Pact, which led to changes

in forms of vertical political integration. The course of the conflict and its outcome are well known and hardly require a detailed presentation. But a number of key points are important from the point of view of the main theme of this article. At that time, Yukos was the leader in terms of capitalization. At the same time, the pending merger deal with the Sibneft company potentially led to the creation of Russia's largest oil company and a corresponding increase in its influence both in the country and abroad. At the same time, negotiations were going on on the possible sale of a blocking stake to a newly formed company of one of the American oil companies - Exxon-Mobil and Shevron-Texaco were named as candidates. In addition, Khodorkovsky promoted the construction of a private oil pipeline to export oil from Eastern Siberia to China, practically blocking the ESPO pipeline project. Deputies of the State Duma and members of the Federation Council from among the shareholders of Yukos, in turn, were actively involved in lobbying for tax preferences and through the Committee on Taxes of the State Duma blocked aspects of the tax reform that affected the interests of the company 29 .

The combination of the above actions, combined with the growth of the company, could not but be perceived by the authorities as a threat to sovereignty, that is, the right to independently make and implement decisions regarding foreign and domestic policy. Therefore, the support of a number of parties on the eve of the Duma elections was not the root cause, as is sometimes believed, but rather the last gesture, which cannot but be put on a par with other violations of the July 28 Pact. As a result, Yukos' assets were sold at auction to pay off tax debts and fines in the amount of $27.5 billion, and M. Khodorkovsky and P. Lebedev each received eight years in prison. The very fact of the unexpected arrest of the company's leaders and decisive actions by the executive branch without any preliminary attempts to influence the behavior of the Yukos owners by other means indicates the weak readiness of both sides to comply with the pact and the limited possibilities of negotiating mechanisms. In addition, as the conflict developed, different representatives of the executive branch expressed different positions, which indicated a lack of unity within the executive branch. The emerging model of vertical political integration, based on the contract and the equality of its parties, did not work, and after the nationalization of Yukos, the July 28 Pact ceased to exist, since the results of privatization were actually revised.

This was followed by retrospective tax claims against other companies (see Table 3). Collection of additional taxes from private business in 2004-2005. worth more than 2.5 billion dollars (not including the debt of Yukos) demonstrated the strength of the state and its ability to unilaterally change property rights, which in 1997 the Government and the tax Cheka failed. Thereby

29 For a detailed analysis of the Yukos case, see: Sakwa R. The Quality of Freedom: Khodorkovsky, Putin, and the Yukos Affair. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Table 3

Retrospective tax claims (USD 2004 - 2005.)

Company	tax claims


Sibneft
Vimpelcom

the question of reliable guarantees of private property rights became acute again. But unlike in 2000, when the prospects for judicial reform and separation of powers were not yet clear, after 2004 vertical political integration ("kronism") remained the only solution. The question now was what specific forms the vertical integration of government and business would take and how stable and capable they would be of economic growth.

The Yukos affair sparked a temporary outflow of capital from Russia and a new discussion about the guarantees of privatization agreements. In this situation, the second term of Putin's presidency suggested a new agreement, but it did not follow. In early 2005, Putin made several announcements that there would be no new action to revise privatization results and that property rights must be respected. But instead of an informal pact, an attempt was made to legislate the guarantees, and on June 21, 2005, Putin signed an amendment to Article 181 of the Civil Code, which reduced the statute of limitations for transactions from 10 to 3 years. Thus, all acquisitions of assets made before 2002 were recognized as irreversible, at least within the framework of the Civil Code. Putin justified the initiative: "This will help the business community to look ahead more confidently, make long-term plans for the development of their business, invest in its development ... will bring peace to the business environment regarding guarantees of property rights" 30 .

Has the head of state's forecast come true? The amendment introduced could increase the level of business confidence in the authorities, but it did not create long-term guarantees. Yes, head Accounts Chamber S. Stepashin stated that the reduction of the statute of limitations for privatization transactions from ten to three years ("a welcome political step") does not exclude liability for criminal offenses 31 . In other words, it is possible to put pressure on the owners with the help of the Criminal Code, in which the statute of limitations for crimes remains ten years. As subsequent events showed, the previously used practice, when a criminal case was opened against a businessman, and then in exchange for freedom or an end to persecution, he was offered to sell assets at a price below the market price or simply ordered a "buyout", became the main source of risks for owners.

31 www.vremya.ru/2005/108/8/127957.html.

Statistics on the activity of law enforcement agencies in the field of economic crimes, in particular, initiation of cases under articles of the Criminal Code related to economic activity, reflects the growth of such risks. An analysis of the official statistics of the Ministry of Internal Affairs shows a significant and outstripping growth in the number of registered crimes of an economic nature, that is, criminal cases initiated, compared with cases that were referred to the courts, as well as with the number of sentences (Fig. 1). The activity of law enforcement agencies in initiating criminal cases without judicial prospects grew, and especially rapidly in the period 2004-2006.

A similar trend was demonstrated by the indicator of the number of cases initiated under article 159 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation “Fraud”, which is most often used to put pressure on entrepreneurs (Fig. 2).

Dynamics of the number of crimes in the sphere of economic activity

Rice. one

Fraud dynamics

Rice. 2

According to economic articles, only about 30% of criminal cases reached the court, and only 10 - 15% ended in sentences. This means that 85-90% of the initiated criminal cases were either closed at some stage or fell apart in court, that is, the activity of law enforcement agencies lost its connection with justice. This situation could not but create a strong negative effect in terms of stability and security of property rights and the owners themselves. After the Yukos case, the main way to change property rights or dilute them was to create a physical

threats to owners or restriction of their freedom and activities with the help of criminal proceedings.

It would be wrong to argue that the amendment to the Civil Code, which reduces the statute of limitations for transactions to three years, directly led to the activation of law enforcement agencies and the switch to the use of the Criminal Code as a tool for changing or diluting property rights. Rather, in the context of the growing activity of law enforcement agencies in terms of pressure on business, extortion of rent and power business (often with the participation and orders of representatives of the business itself), the amendment introduced by Putin, supposedly stabilizing property relations, turned out to be simply meaningless.

Events 2004 - 2005 demonstrated a change in the balance of power in favor of the state. In choosing the variant of vertical political integration between “backward” integration (co-optation of interest groups into government bodies) and “forward” integration (establishment of control over assets by the political elite), the choice was made in favor of “forward” integration, that is, an increase in the share of the state and personalized interest senior government officials in large companies.

Public platforms for coordinating the interests of government and business gradually lost their significance compared to closer personal coordination of decisions. According to a former member of the government, “RSPP or the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Delovaya Rossiya, etc. ... can claim to be ... centers for coordinating the interests of the state and business ... But in reality, so far they are also using ... less institutionalized forms ... establishing direct contacts between major business leaders ... with ... the Kremlin administration, to the extent that they even ask permission to conduct certain significant transactions. Well, that is, they consider it more acceptable for themselves in this way communicate and coordinate their activities with the authorities.

The situation, in which the stability of large property was ensured not by laws and the legal system, but by the intensity of direct relations between business leaders and the executive branch, was finally consolidated during Putin's second presidential term. During the same period, democratic and formal legal restrictions on the actions of the executive branch were finally eliminated, and a stable partnership between the state and business did not develop, as evidenced by periodic episodes of criminal procedural pressure on private business, followed by the sale of this business and either forced emigration, or by depriving its owners of their liberty 32 .

In this situation, the owners considered it more rational to maximize short-term benefits. Favorable conditions in the international financial markets made it possible to borrow heavily, reducing the need for state-controlled capital resources. Owners continued to invent schemes for tax evasion, concealment of income and ownership structure, including with the active use of the offshore sector,

32 The most notorious were the criminal cases against M. Gutseriev, V. Nekrasov and E. Chichvarkin.

which could not but cause irritation on the part of the executive branch. Interviews with owners and other sources indicate that the use of offshore companies and financial centers became in the 2000s a means of reducing the tax burden and separating the finances of enterprises from real estate assets in case the latter become the object of hostile takeovers or claims from the authorities. "Offshores began to be massively created in our country 9 years ago, around 2000. PWC, KPMG and others came and began to convince that offshores are the recommended scheme for doing business in Russia, for 100-200 thousand euros they made an ownership scheme through offshores. This is convenient for those who are associated with imports or exports. Plus, the tax office cannot calculate the income of individuals" 33 . In 2006, out of 21 IPOs conducted by Russian companies, only 7 were held domestically. The rest were offered either in parallel to Russian and foreign investors, or placed on foreign exchanges, and 6 were held on behalf of offshore companies 34 .

Hiding information about the structure of the company, its owners and beneficiaries should be considered not only as a means of avoiding taxes, but also as a way to reduce the risks associated with pressure on owners. Even medium-sized companies, for which the state appears in the form of regional or city authorities and regulatory services, tend to maintain a high informal component of doing business. The owners explained this by the fact that such a company is less attractive for capture, since it cannot be effectively managed without having insider information 35 .

Personified state capitalism

For the period 2000 - 2007. total income state budget from the export of hydrocarbons amounted to about 700 billion dollars. According to the Ministry of Finance, by the end of 2007, part of this amount (340 billion dollars) had accumulated as a result of the sterilization of oil excess profits (above the cut-off price of 20, and later 24 dollars per barrel) , of which $116 billion went to repay external debt, $122 billion was transferred to the stabilization fund, and $102 billion was later transferred to government spending. Compared to the 1990s, when there was an acute deficit of the budget and investment resources, after 2005 the situation became the opposite.

But in itself, an excess of capital resources is not capable of ensuring development if there are no organizations capable of conducting effective economic activity, as well as investment mechanisms that guarantee the distribution of the benefits of participants in investment projects (implementation of tasks, distribution of private and public benefits, control). In the arsenal of the government were

33 Interview with the owner of a large retail chain, April 2009.

34 Speech by Oleg Vyugin, Chairman of the Federal Financial Markets Service, at the anniversary conference on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs. www.pcnn.pcp/Attachment.aspx?Id=2632.

35 Interview with investment bank owner, April 2009.

"National projects" (investments in human capital), the implementation of which obviously slowed down after the elections of 2007-2008, and state investment programs, which assumed a cumbersome mechanism of government approvals and tenders for their implementation. At this time, from various political forces there was criticism of the government and the Ministry of Finance, the essence of which was that huge resources are placed in foreign securities instead of investing in the Russian economy and working for development. The tough position of the Ministry of Finance, which sought to limit government spending, cannot be considered a sufficient explanation for the current situation. The decisive factor, apparently, was the uncertainty about which economic organizations to transfer resources, who and how will make direct investment, under what conditions, how to create guarantees for the fulfillment of these conditions.

In contrast to the countries of Southeast Asia, where the state, having concentrated capital resources, transferred them to the private sector for subsequent investment in priority projects, the Russian government chose to go the other way. It approved the acquisition Russian business foreign assets and attracting investments in international financial markets in the form of loans and initial public offerings. However, the excess capital accumulated in the budget as a result of increased revenues from the export of hydrocarbons did not go to the private sector in the form of loans, loans or state guarantees, but was spent on increasing the state's share in the share capital of companies up to the acquisition of controlling stakes, the creation of new state holdings and state corporations. .

In itself, the presence of large state-owned companies in the country's economy cannot be considered something exceptional from the point of view of international, including European, experience. The Russian specificity was expressed in an extremely personalized version of such control, as opposed to institutional, that is, based on legal and procedural mechanisms. The Russian version of state capitalism is distinguished by a high degree of "kronism", and as "their own", that is, persons who are entrusted with the functions of owners, after 2004, state officials themselves began to act more and more often, and not representatives of private business, as was the case in the Asian version state capitalism. The circle of persons to whom the powers of asset management were delegated consisted of the highest officials of the state and remained constant over the subsequent time, that is, it did not undergo significant rotations. As one of the former employees of the Presidential Administration noted in an interview with the author, "formal positions mean little. The real criterion for belonging to the inner circle is membership in the board of directors of a large company." Some information about persons who combine high official positions in the state and membership in the boards of directors of state-owned companies is presented in Table 4.

Head of the Presidential Administration, First Deputy Prime Minister

Rosneft

Deputy Prime Minister

Kudrin A.

Minister of Finance

Sovcomflot

Shuvalov I.

Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration

Aeroflot

Ivanov V.

Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration, Assistant to the President

Transnefteprodukt

Surkov V.

Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration

United Aircraft Corporation

Ivanov S.

Deputy Prime Minister

ORT-Channel One

Naryshkin S.

which were headed by Deputy Prime Ministers Sergei Ivanov and Igor Sechin, respectively. In 2007, a new and rather original institutional solution was implemented to reorganize several industries and invest budgetary funds. By the adoption of separate laws, six NCOs were created in the form of state corporations: the Development Bank, Olympstroy, the Housing and Utilities Reform Assistance Fund, Rosnano, Rosatom and Rostekhnologii. They were given assets in the nuclear, defense and engineering sectors worth about $80 billion and budget funds (more than $35 billion). According to the law on NGOs and related separate laws, the transferred property became the property of state corporations and its disposal was no longer regulated by the Budget Code. State corporations were removed from the jurisdiction of the Russian government and its controlling bodies, and their management was entrusted to supervisory boards and directors appointed by presidential decrees 36 .

The creation of state corporations was dictated by distrust both in private business and its ability to solve the problems of national development, and in the state as a formal bureaucratic

36 For a detailed analysis of the creation of state corporations, see: Volkov V. State corporations: an institutional experiment // Pro & Contra. 2008. September-December. pp. 75 - 88.

structure. On the one hand, the transfer of assets and investment resources to state corporations did not become privatization, since, being NGOs, these are not private organizations and their activities are not evaluated by market criteria (profit, return on investment, market share, etc.). On the other hand, they were removed from the jurisdiction of the state, and assets and financial resources ceased to be state property. Being formally limited by the statutory goals and procedures prescribed in a special law for each state corporation, but in reality - by personal control by the head of the executive branch, a group of senior government officials did not lose control over these assets and resources, but, in fact, acquired partially formalized rights ownership, including the use of assets and the receipt of benefits (see Table 5).

Minister of Transport

Development Bank

Khristenko V.

Minister of Industry and Trade

Putilin V.

First Deputy Chairman of the Military Industrial Commission

Russian Technologies

Serdyukov A.

defense minister

Russian Technologies

Nabiullina E.

Minister of Economic Development

Development Bank, Rosnano, Russian Technologies

Siluanov A.

Deputy Minister of Finance

Fursenko A.

Minister of Education and Science

Zubkov V.

first vice premier

Development Bank

Sobyanin S.

vice premier

According to the Constitution, the state guarantees everyone the right to property and promotes its acquisition. The inviolability of property and the right to inherit it are protected by law. Legally acquired property is protected by the state
In the event of a violation of property rights, the mechanisms for its protection come into effect, provided for by various branches of law (criminal, civil, etc.). Each of these mechanisms has its own characteristics.
Civil law protection of property rights and other rights in rem is a set of civil law provisions.
legislation of the legal means that can be used in case of violation of these rights.
A feature of civil law remedies for protecting property rights is that they are aimed at restoring or protecting the property interests of the owners of this right. However, they are also different. The use of certain means of protecting the right of property depends on the nature of the violation of this right. If such a violation arose in connection with non-fulfillment or improper fulfillment of contractual obligations, causing damage to property, then the legal remedies provided for by the norms of contractual law or legislation on causing harm come into effect.
In the event that the owner's rights to property are disputed, he may file a claim for recognition of the right of ownership.
In case of violation of the owner's rights to own and use property, property-law methods of protecting the right of ownership are applied. In case of violation of the owner's right to own property, such a method of protecting property rights as a vindication claim is applied. This is a claim by the owner to recover his property from a person holding such property without legal grounds.
The owner has the right to reclaim his property from someone else's illegal possession. Such a claim is based on a violation of a property right, which, as mentioned above, is absolute. Therefore, any person who similarly violates the authority of the owner can be the defendant in the claim. If the property about which the dispute arose is the subject of an agreement concluded between the parties, or the object of another legal relationship under obligations, a vindication claim cannot be applied.
The right of the owner to the thing belonging to him follows this particular thing, regardless of its location. Through a vindication claim, it is possible to recover from someone else's illegal possession only an individually defined thing (the same thing that was unlawfully seized from the owner's possession) that is available to the defendant at the time the claim is filed. Individually defined things are the only ones of their kind (for example, the original painting), or distinguished from other similar things by established signs (for example, by the number indicated on the thing). If a thing is generic, it is determined in civil circulation by indicating the quantity, volume.
weight, it cannot be the subject of a vindication action. In case of unlawful deprivation of possession of such a thing, the owner has the right to demand only compensation for losses caused to the owner, but not the thing itself. Similarly, the issue is resolved in the case when the thing, unlawfully seized from the possession of the owner, by the time the claim is filed, does not exist in nature.
The owner or other legal owner in all cases has the right to reclaim the property from the person who, through his unfair actions, took possession of this property (for example, from the person who stole the thing). The basis of such a decision is the guilt of the actions of the illegal owner. If a person at least illegally, but in good faith, acquires possession of certain property, the legislator is forced to make a choice - to protect the right of the owner or the interest bona fide purchaser(for example, a person who bought a stolen thing and, due to the circumstances of the case, did not know about it).
Money and bearer securities (these include securities the right to which can be exercised by any owner of the security) cannot be claimed from a bona fide purchaser. In other cases, the decision depends on the nature of the disposal of property from the possession of the owner and the method of acquisition of property by the illegal owner. If an illegal owner acquired this property free of charge (for example, as a gift) from a person who did not have the right to alienate it, the owner has the right to claim his property. If the property was acquired for compensation from a person who did not have the right to alienate it, about which the acquirer did not know and should not have known, then the owner has the right to claim this property from a bona fide purchaser only if the property is lost by the owner or the person to whom it was transferred by the owner into possession, or stolen from one or the other, or left their possession in some other way against their will.
Violation of the owner's rights can be expressed not only in depriving him of the opportunity to own a thing, but also in creating conditions that make it impossible or difficult for the owner to use it. The owner has the right to demand the elimination of such violations. Such a claim is called negatory.
The owner may demand the elimination of any violation of his right, even if these violations were not connected with the deprivation of possession. Such a claim can be used both against the actions of other participants in civil law that violate the rights of the owner (for example, the owner of a neighboring land plot that has closed the owner’s passage to his plot), and against the actions of state bodies that have the same consequences (for example, if, in the order of application measures to secure a claim, foreclosure on the debtor's property in pursuance of a decision, sentence or court order on administrative case, as a measure for the protection of hereditary property and in other cases provided for by law, seizure is imposed on property belonging not only to the debtor (convicted person), but also to other persons, the latter have the right to present to the debtor and organizations or persons in whose interests the property is seized, a claim for the elimination of this obstacle in the use of property by releasing it from arrest (exclusion from the inventory).

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Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation

Kazan State University of Architecture and Civil Engineering

Department of Economic Theory

COURSE WORK

In the discipline "Institutional Economics"

On the topic: “Property Rights: Problems of Guarantees and Liability”

Completed by: Akhmetov Ilmir

Damirovic

Scientific adviser: Bikchantaeva Alsu Ildarovna.

Introduction

Chapter 1. Basic theories of property rights

1.2. The concept of property rights

1.4 Property typology

Chapter 2. Property Rights

2.2 Guarantees of property rights, guarantee issues

Conclusion

Bibliography

Introduction

The issue of property is one of the main issues that determine the existence and development of human society. The stability and well-being of any society, as well as each individual member of society, depends on how and by whom it is set, decided and regulated at a given moment in time. Most conflicts on Earth, from quarrels between relatives to wars, arise precisely because of the ability to own and dispose of this or that property. There is nothing surprising in this, because from birth a sense of ownership is fixed in a person: “my toy”, “my apartment”, “my car”, etc.

Property - historically developing social relations that characterize the distribution (appropriation) of things as elements of the material wealth of society between different persons (individuals, social groups, state). Property cannot be imagined without some people treating specific things, conditions, and products of production as their own, while others treat them as strangers.

It clearly follows from this that property is the relationship of a person to a thing. At the same time, since we are talking about the attitude of different people to one and the same concrete thing, then there are grounds to speak of property as a relationship between people about things. The totality of things belonging to this owner constitutes the object of ownership, i.e., the property of the corresponding person, therefore, property relations are also called property relations. Being legally regulated by the state, they acquire the form of property rights.

Ownership right - a set of legal norms that fix and protect the belonging of material goods to certain individuals or groups, providing for the scope and content of the owner's rights in relation to the property belonging to him, the methods and limits for exercising these rights. The right of ownership consists in the fact that the owner, at his own discretion, owns, uses and disposes of the property belonging to him.

Enterprises, property complexes, land plots, mining allotments, buildings, structures, equipment, raw materials and materials, money, securities, other property for industrial, consumer, social, cultural, other purposes, as well as products of intellectual and creative labor.

The objects of intellectual property are works of science, literature, art and other types of creative activity in manufacturing, including discoveries, inventions, innovations, industrial designs, know-how, trade secrets, trademarks, trade names and service marks.

1. Basic theories of property rights

1.1 Formation of property rights

To understand how property rights arise, let's look at several theories. It makes sense to divide them into two large groups. The first group of theories considers the emergence of property rights, in no way taking into account the influence of political and social institutions existing in society. With this approach, the state plays the role of an agent behind the scenes and does not participate in decision-making. The second group of theories, on the contrary, deals with the consideration of the state factor as central in the creation of a particular system of property rights.

1. "Naive theory"

The "naive" theory proposes to consider this or that system of property rights, comparing the costs and benefits of its existence with the costs and benefits of its absence. With regard to a resource, we can do two things: make the rights to it exclusive or allow open access to it.

In the first case, we will have certain costs and benefits (the benefits are due to exclusivity itself, and the costs are due to the need to protect this exclusivity). In the second case, we will bear the costs associated with the dismantled property, as well as the costs of communication between people who can get to this resource. The main postulate of the "naive" theory is that we consider the ownership of a certain resource and compare the costs and benefits of the exclusivity of rights to this resource with the costs and benefits of accessibility to this resource. One of the first adherents of this theory was Demsetz, well known to you, who, together with Alchian, wrote the famous article on incentives, and in addition, he studied various kinds of primitive societies, trying to trace the evolution of certain property rights on their example.

In his work, he formulated the main postulates of the "naive" theory. Demsetz defined property rights as a social institution that helps people form their expectations, because, knowing these rights, people can calculate future costs and benefits and the possible behavior of counterparties based on them. And in the absence of property rights, the formation of expectations would be simply impossible - people would not know how their partners act, what is beneficial for them and what is not, and, accordingly, their choice of behavior would be difficult.

The phrase "property rights determine how people derive the costs and benefits of owning a particular resource" means, in particular, that property rights determine who should pay for changing these costs and benefits, i.e. who and how should internalize externalities. Thus, property rights are closely related to externalities. According to Demsetz, the main function of property rights is to provide incentives for greater internalization of externalities. And in this case, in order to analyze the emergence or change of property rights, it is necessary to analyze how certain external effects change in society with the development of technology, with the course of historical progress.

The development of various kinds of technologies is constantly accompanied by the emergence of new positive or negative external effects. For example, environmental pollution began with the advent of harmful technologies, and before that such a problem simply did not exist.

The emergence of certain property rights in different societies is also due to historical development. Demsetz, studying the East Canadian Indians, tried to analyze how they developed exclusive property rights for the production of furs. He explained it as follows. In the absence of an opportunity to sell furs to white people, its opportunity cost for the Indians was zero. The Indians used the harvested beavers only for their own needs, and no reuse of property occurred. And as soon as the possibility of commercial trade appeared (ie, the opportunity cost of the resource increased sharply), beavers began to be intensively caught, and their population began to decline. The depletion of the resource and the increase in its opportunity cost led to armed conflicts.

Then there was an incentive to form such property rights that would clearly define who and what in these parts has the right. As a result, in just two decades, the Indians went from full open access to full exclusive ownership of every site where beavers were found.

2. The theory of "interest groups"

One of the modifications of the "naive" theory is the theory of "interest groups" that lobby these rules, achieve beneficial changes in property rights and direct transfers. Interest groups theory proposes that social and political institutions be treated as data. She tries to explain the structure of property rights existing in various industries by the interaction of various interest groups in the political market. But property rights that serve the interests of certain groups often lead to significant losses in the welfare of society as a whole, which is due to:

The presence of transaction costs;

The possibility of manifestation of the strategy of "free rider";

Information asymmetry between different economic agents in society.

Small, compact groups pursuing their own interests benefit from large groups and have the opportunity to make changes that interest them. In principle, individuals can choose one of two strategies to maximize their well-being:

Focus on production within existing property rights;

Seek any change in ownership of your

3. The theory of "rent seeking"

The "rent seeking" theory is the most advanced of the three above. It already takes into account social and political factors, various interest groups. And yet, it has a number of disadvantages. So, within the framework of this theory, it is completely incomprehensible what a state is. The state here is a certain set of competing interest groups that, in the process of struggle, somehow achieve equilibrium in the political market and establish certain property rights (for example, a group pursuing the interests of representatives of natural monopolies; a group representing the interests of large industrialists; and etc.). But on the other hand, if the influence of the state is weak, then the distribution of property rights that arises in the theory of "rent seeking" will coincide with the distribution of rights predicted by the "naive" theory, i.e. these theories fit together very well.

4. Theories that take into account social and political changes

It is known that open access, collapsible form of ownership reduces the welfare of society. To limit open access and maintain exclusive property rights, society has developed the following four groups of mechanisms.

1) The system of violence and the threat of violence (moreover, the threat of violence is often more important than the violence itself).

2) The value system or ideology inherent in a given society that influences the incentives of individuals and reduces the cost of protecting property rights. For example, if social ideology or some social values block the free rider strategy, the costs of protecting property rights will be much lower.

3) Customs and laws based on custom, not established by the state. These are the rules in various types of non-state societies (for example, in communities), according to which clans, “vendetta groups”, etc. are formed.

4) Rules that are introduced by the state or its agents of any kind (constitution, legal system, etc.). In order to study the influence of these mechanisms and, in particular, to understand how important the role of the state is here, we first consider the first three groups of mechanisms that operate societies without a state. We have already considered the question of how and due to what the distribution of property rights arises, and now we will try to answer the question of how this or that system of property rights is protected when there is no state. A society in which there is no state, first of all, has the problem of protecting its resources from attack. This problem is usually illustrated by the prisoner's dilemma.

There are two groups of individuals - A and B - each of which has a certain resource and can choose either an aggressive or non-aggressive (passive) strategy.

For example, each of two medieval families has 10 castles (10 properties). If both families prefer a non-aggressive strategy (that is, do not encroach on each other's property, recognizing each other's exclusive ownership rights to these resources), then they remain with their resources. If both families decide to encroach on each other's property, then a struggle occurs between them, as a result of which part of the resources is lost. If one family adheres to a non-aggressive strategy, and the other to an aggressive one, then the aggressor seizes part of the resource of the passive participant in the conflict or almost all of its resource (if he did not build any fortifications at all and did not maintain troops). Obviously, in this situation, the equilibrium will be such that both will prefer aggression, because aggression in this case is the dominant strategy.

A classic example of establishing a system to protect one's property in the absence of a state is the period of the "gold rush" in California. There was a certain resource - plots of land that had some expected value (it could be extracted by mining gold on the site). There was a group of prospectors - possessing remarkable physical strength, well-armed men, each of whom, in principle, could kill any other.

However, even in the absence of the state, they developed effective mechanisms to protect their property, and property was redistributed in such a way that they all became owners of the same plots of land in terms of expected utility. To understand why this happened, suppose that initially there were two individuals, one of whom owned a large piece of land, and the other a small one.

The latter, making a decision on the distribution of his force either for gold mining or for an attack, considered it effective for himself to allocate part of his labor resources to seize an additional plot of land. And the struggle between them went on until the distribution reached an effective state. And when they both turned out to be owners of plots of the same size, it became more profitable for each to protect and cultivate his plot than to take from another part of his plot.

True, here we consider individuals as pure egoists. If we consider market interactions, then it really makes sense to see these individuals as people maximizing their own utility. And when considering non-market interactions, the importance of social factors increases, and customs and ideology begin to play an important role.

So, firstly, the mechanism for protecting property rights in a pre-state society is connected with the fact that in some situations it is simply unprofitable for people, as pure egoists, to attack other people's property.

Secondly, the mechanism for protecting property rights in a pre-state society is the so-called. “vengeance groups”, or “vendetta groups” (the custom of vendetta, for example, exists in the same Sicily today). Knowing about these groups, you understand that you will be retaliated if you attack a member of a powerful clan or encroach on his property.

Thirdly, the mechanism for protecting property rights in a pre-state society is a kind of compensation mechanism, which is also extremely common in primitive societies. So, hunting on someone's territory, you were obliged to compensate the owner for the violation of his rights by some act of donation or transfer.

So, we found out that there is a group of theories that only exogenously considers the state, and listed their advantages and disadvantages. We have identified four groups of factors that affect the maintenance of certain formed property rights. Of these, we attributed three to non-state societies, and the fourth - to state ones. Using the example of a society without a state, we have shown how non-state mechanisms for protecting property rights work.

1.2 The concept of ownership

The right of ownership is the original right among other property rights. The right of ownership is an absolute right, since it simultaneously implies the rights: 1) possession - the possibility of real possession of a thing; 2) use - the actual ability of the owner to use the thing, while deriving profit from it; and 3) disposal of property - the ability of the owner to determine the fate of the thing.

The owner has the right, at his own discretion, to take any actions with respect to his property that do not contradict the law and other legal acts and do not violate the rights and legally protected interests of other persons, including alienate his property into the ownership of other persons, transfer to them, while remaining the owner, the rights possession, use and disposal of property, pledge property and encumber it in other ways, dispose of it in another way. These powers constitute the content of the right of ownership.

Everyone has the right to be an owner, that is, to own, use and dispose of their property and other objects of property, both individually and jointly with other persons.

The owner can transfer his property for trust management to another person (trustee), while he does not lose the ownership of the property.

Legislation creates restrictions on the rights of the owner. So, for example, the Constitution of the Russian Federation imposes a ban on the owner of a land plot to cause damage to the environment, violate the rights and legitimate interests of others. The Civil Code of the Russian Federation also indicates that the possession, use and disposal of land and other natural resources to the extent that their circulation is permitted by law, they are freely carried out by their owner, if this does not damage the environment and does not violate the rights and legitimate interests of other persons.

The right of ownership imposes certain obligations on the owner of the property: 1) the burden of maintaining the property; 2) the risk of accidental loss or accidental damage to property. Features of the acquisition and termination of the right of ownership of property, possession, use and disposal of it, depending on whether the property is owned by a citizen or legal entity, owned by the Russian Federation, a subject of the Russian Federation; walkie-talkie or municipality, can only be established by law.

Legislation defines the types of property that can only be in state or municipal ownership (for example, according to the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, only property can be turned into state property through nationalization). Thus, the legislation establishes certain restrictions on the right of private property in relation to state property. At the same time, the rights of all owners are protected equally.

The system of property rights is "a set of methods for granting specific individuals "authority" to choose any way to use specific goods from the class of not prohibited ways to use these goods."

Thus, from the point of view of economic theory, property rights are the right recognized by society to perform certain actions. “To own the land” usually means to have the right to cultivate the land, to mine minerals, to offer these rights to sell, etc., but not the right to throw the land at passers-by, use it to change the course of a river, or force someone to buy it. What is the object of property is the right recognized by society to perform certain actions.

Property rights in every economy determine how one can benefit from one's property and how much damage one can and cannot do to other people in the course of using one's property. For example, in one state it is allowed to harm a competitor by producing better and cheaper goods, but you cannot shoot a person who has violated the border of your possessions, even if it is obvious that he encroaches on your property.

Another state may have a different system of property rights: you may have the right to kill a person who invades your property, but you are prohibited from selling goods at prices below the minimum limit set by the state.

"Property rights" is a descriptive term that is more general than property rights. This notion of "property rights" used by neo-institutional economics should not be confused with the legal meaning of this expression.

The economic definition of property rights is broader than their legal definition, since it covers not only formal rules, but also a variety of informal ones. social norms that govern the rights of individuals to use resources. So, property rights define the norms of people's behavior (formal and informal) in relation to limited goods, which people must comply with or bear the cost of punishment for non-compliance with these rules. Use of resources not authorized by the owner of the property rights would be illegal or innovative if the current property rights do not cover these new uses of the resources.

At the origins of market formation in developed countries There were two legal traditions that define property rights in different ways. Therefore, two different definitions of property rights can be found in the legal literature. The basic idea of European continental law, which goes back to Roman law, is that the right to property is unlimited and indivisible*. It is believed that the owner has an unlimited right to dispose of his thing (if his actions do not contradict other laws and do not violate the rights of third parties). Ownership applies only to material objects. For practical reasons, private ownership is limited to things that can be used exclusively by the owners and can be clearly and unambiguously defined. The exclusive right of use cannot be applied to air, waters flowing in rivers, waters of the open sea, etc. With regard to these resources, the concepts of ownership that are used in civil law do not work. property right property legislation

The Anglo-Saxon legal system dates back to the tradition of feudal law, in which land ownership was not absolute. The owner of the land shared this right with the king. This legal system allows for the fragmentation of ownership of any objects into partial powers of individuals.

The difference between the definition of land ownership in civil law and in the Anglo-American legal tradition is illustrated by Merriman with the following

* During the French Revolution, an approach came into vogue that saw the splitting of property rights as a relic of feudalism. A theory has emerged that the division of powers should be strictly limited to a small number of well-defined types. This idea was even more popular than the Napoleonic Code itself. This anti-feudal approach, for example, is reflected in the German Civil Code, which establishes that only material goods can be the object of property rights. Indeed, in the feudal structure, many property rights had the intangible nature of the example. Property in civil law can be represented as a box with the inscription "property" on it. Whoever owns this box is the owner. In the case of full unencumbered ownership, the box contains certain rights, including the right to use and possess, the right to receive income from the property, and the right to alienate. The owner may, however, open the box and transfer one or more of these rights to others. But as long as the box itself remains with him, he retains ownership even if the box is empty. There is no such box in Anglo-American law. There is only a different set of legal rights. Whoever has an unconditional right to property simply has the largest possible bundle of such rights. When he transfers to another person one or more powers from his bundle, he loses the right to a part of his bundle of property rights.

The approach of economic theory to property rights is close to that of the Anglo-American legal system. Economic theory in the spirit of this legal tradition admits the possibility of splitting the property right into separate powers and the possibility of exchanging separate powers. What are the powers of ownership? The English lawyer Honore singled out 11 elements that can be combined in a certain way. Kuter included the following powers in the list of powers into which the full and perfect right of ownership falls: to use; consume; exhaust; destroy; improve; develop; transform; sell; present; bequeath; lay a resource; rent out.

Economists usually use a shorter list that includes:

The right to use the asset (usus), which determines which uses of the asset are legal;

The right to receive income generated by an asset (usus fructus);

The right to change the form of an asset and its substance (abusus);

The right to transfer the asset to others at a mutually agreed price, i.e. the right to dispose of the asset.

The third and fourth rights are of most interest to economists because they mean the right to change the value of an asset.

1.3 Principles for the efficient distribution of property rights

The problem of efficient distribution of property rights is central to two disciplines - in institutional economics as such and in the more specialized subject of law and economics. Alchian defined ownership as the right to choose a particular use for an object from a class of uses that is not prohibited. Thus, he emphasized that an economist should not be interested in the physical properties of an object, but in what aspects of this object and how people use it, enjoying it or, conversely, being annoyed. Those. we are talking about certain uses of certain aspects of the object.

There is a basic principle that the use of your property must not cause direct physical damage to the property of others.

It is important to emphasize that, from the point of view of the economist, the incomplete regulation of property rights is the ground for progress. This is the most fundamental conclusion that follows from the economic theory of property rights. After all, a society where everything is theoretically possible to foresee, where everything that a person can achieve is predetermined, will be a society without money, without any conflicts, and thus without significant incentives to create something new.

In such a society, the owner of certain assets can use them, change them, but his property rights are clearly built, and he cannot introduce any new use of his assets. And progress is ensured precisely by the fact that the owner provides for some new uses of property rights to his objects.

The second problem - the problem of separation of ownership is related to the fact that a physical object or group of objects can be used alternatively or complementary.

In Eggertson's book, the so-called. "smoker's problem". This is the Edgeworth box - a classic conflicting ownership situation. By drawing an open or closed Edgeworth box, one can clearly see (depending on who we attribute the right to smoke or the right to prohibit smoking in the cell) how the total value - money and fresh air - that people in the cell have will be distributed.

The problem of forming sets of property rights is one of the most frequently encountered applied economic problems.

Everything has its price, both positive and negative, and its limitations. No type of building a property cluster can be said to be absolutely good or absolutely bad.

In some cases, it is necessary to choose one type of its construction, in some - another, depending on the goals pursued. And yet the fundamental features that this or that type of contracting entails remain unchanged.

When they talk about the beneficial effects of certain property objects, they mean not the process, but the result of their use (which in some cases coincides with the process). Usually in economic literature it doesn't stand out. Complex properties themselves and the complex processes associated with these objects produce complex results.

Milgrom and Roberts take the textbook situation as an example. They write that two professors at Stanford University, Milgrom and Roberts, got together and decided to prepare a textbook.

In the course of their work, the problem of commensurate contributions may arise (though not necessarily) when it is necessary to find out how each of its participants contributed to the work and how to share the results of the work among them. Such a problem has a number of dimensions - in addition to simply measuring the amount of work done and the time that the participant spent on it, it is very important to measure the quality of his work.

1.4 Property typology

1. Exclusive private property, which can be in two forms: - individual private property;

Collective private property.

What matters here is that it is private property. Ultimately, it either directly belongs to private individuals, or is determined by their interests. Sole proprietorship is your direct ownership of the use of a particular physical object (say, ownership of a sole proprietorship that includes its title).

Collective private property is a properly registered share in an enterprise or in a particular resource. A share in an enterprise can be expressed in shares, bonds, preferred shares, etc. A share in a resource implies that you have certain ownership rights (usually with or without restriction of sale), such as a member of a housing cooperative, or a garage-building cooperative, or a garden cooperative.

2. Public (or political) property. She can

belong to the state of which you are a citizen or to the municipality where you live. This is a completely separate type of property both in nature and in the efficiency of its use. Public property differs from collective private property, firstly, in that you dispose of it not directly, but indirectly - through the political process, through the election of leaders who establish rights (this is the election of the Legislative Assembly) and directly use these rights; and, secondly, by the fact that you do not have the opportunity to sell, liquidate your share of this property. You can leave your city or even country, but unfortunately you will not be given anything from your property. This problem- the problem of civil law, international law, which is widely discussed in the world.

3. The property of public organizations is a kind of combination of political and collective private property, but still it is closer to political property. It's like a virtual municipality that you create. Having contributed something to a public organization, you can use it as a member, but you cannot take your share if you decide to leave it.

4. Common property, or open access property, or collapsible property (common access property) is the ownership of resources, the use of which is not limited by any standards, or these standards are ineffective (their non-compliance is not punished), i.e. the rights to this property are poorly defined. Such resources are, for example, air, water, forest. Breathing the air, you don't feel like you have to pay anything for it. You don't count how much water you use, even though you pay for it.

A classic example of open access property is the mushroom forest. And although the foresters could theoretically check the baskets of all mushroom pickers at the exit of the forest to make sure that they did not pick more mushrooms than they should, not a single forestry will do this (it will not keep 50 foresters for this purpose). But if in the same forest you try to harvest firewood or timber, the forest department will start up here and you will be arrested, because legally the forest is the property of the forest department, and they have enough strength to look after it. And they did not even try to register ownership of the mushrooms, because they do not have the technical capabilities to monitor the mushroom pickers, and if there were any, they would certainly register the ownership of the mushrooms. Those. there is political ownership of the use of the forest (trees) and open access ownership of mushroom picking.

It should be emphasized that public access property is the least efficient in terms of resource use. Its rational use in this form of organization of property relations is simply impossible. In particular, this applies to valuable natural resources that people take away without knowing the measure (here there is a crowd effect).

As a result, fish in the sea is becoming less and less, as well as mushrooms in the forest. No private owner would allow 300 tons of fish to be caught with an annual increase of 220 tons, and with open access property, anyone can do it. Fascinated by the exploitation of the resource, people no longer see that at some point, in relation to the volume of the resource being developed, further investment of labor and capital in it becomes inefficient, and they continue to exploit it until it sharply decreases. Only then do people gradually abandon the development of this resource. Thus, the exploitation of resources (mushrooms, fish, etc.) that are in common ownership proceeds in waves.

Relatively speaking, a signal that the resource has been exhausted and its further development is unprofitable is given only the next year, when there are already fewer mushrooms (or fish), after which there is an outflow of production activity.

2. Ownership rights

2.1 System of property rights

The system of property rights is those relations of order, those institutions of regulation that arise between people regarding the use of limited goods. This system of rights consists of:

2.2 Guarantees of property rights, guarantee issues

Property rights guarantees are effectively a public contribution to your property rights. There are three types of guarantees of property rights: coercion, information, insurance.

Compulsion. Let's say if you bought a button accordion, the society guarantees you that it won't be stolen. But guarantees are provided by the society not by attaching guards to the button accordion, but by creating a mechanism for forcing compliance with the established affiliation and declaring that such a mechanism exists and operates. This mechanism is feared, due to which property rights are not violated. The mechanism consists of regulations, potentially somewhere there is a man with a gun, a prison in which you can be put. A man with a gun, prison is not attached directly to you or to each property. They just exist somewhere. However, they are activated when someone breaks the rules.

Information. So that no one steals the button accordion you purchased, others should know that this button accordion is yours. After all, the accordion itself does not say that it belongs to you. And if it is perceived as a draw, the temptation to appropriate it is great. We quite often encounter such behavior both in the older groups of the kindergarten and in the lower grades of the school, because the instincts of legal awareness have not yet been fully instilled in children at this age. Therefore, information is also among the mechanisms that guarantee our property. In society, there must be information systems that provide people with information about the ownership of a particular property.

Insurance. This type of property guarantee, which, by the way, arose quite early, is an integral feature of the civilized world. These guarantees are more often applied to economic activity as such, but we can also talk about insurance of immovable, non-economic objects of property (for example, a personal car or a house).

Issues of warranties and ownership

Our other problem of guaranteeing property rights at the level of information is the problem of accounting in an enterprise. A foreign investor most often refuses to buy our enterprises because they cannot understand what their real assets and liabilities are. We do not have international accounting standards, so only a fool can buy our enterprise - after all, he will buy something from which all assets will be withdrawn even when he himself already owns this enterprise, because he does not see this enterprise, it is not transparent.

2.3 Definition of liability, liability issues

Any actions of a person cause the emergence of the following chain: a person. actions. consequences.

In other words, there are two sides to property rights: the rights themselves and the responsibility. The problem of responsibility is primarily related to the fact that from your use of property or from the fact that you simply own it, your neighbors have external effects. The generation of external effects (externalities) is the economic meaning of the responsibility problem. Externalities can have positive or negative value for other people.

In a contractual society, property rights are regulated only with the aim of minimizing/maximizing negative/positive externalities. And in a society that claims to be better than the person himself, knows why he will be happy, regulation pursues a different goal. The rational goal is to regulate externalities. The concept of residual rights and residual effects was expounded by Alchian and Demsetz in their famous article Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization (1972). And although this concept is now being attacked as incomplete, it nevertheless constituted an era in the development and establishment of neo-institutional economics, as well as in the formation of the methodology of the new subject "Law and Economics" ("Law and Economics"). The concept of residual rights and residual effects is seen more fully in the case of a firm. This model was created by Alchian and Demsets. They are considering the so-called. simple cooperation - team work (team work), when all participants are engaged in fairly homogeneous work. They cannot fully observe each other, so someone can take a break from work. In the case of simple cooperation, team members have two problems. First, there is the shirking problem, and secondly, there is the free rider problem. Alchian and Demsetz believe that there is one way to increase the efficiency of the overseer individually and the team as a whole - to make the overseer the owner of the entire product. The property rights efficiency rule: other things being equal, economic efficiency (or the optimal allocation of resources) is achieved when the persons accepting decisions are fully responsible for both the positive and negative consequences of their decisions. This is what distinguishes the owner in the first place. What Alchian and Demsetz described as the simplest model is called the "classical firm." A classical firm is a firm in which the owner is not separated from the manager. However, there are three global restrictions on the use of this model.

First, these are limitations associated with inefficient risk allocation. When one person (the owner) makes decisions on a gigantic scale, he, of course, takes them in his favor, but he is not always able to assimilate a huge amount of information, and is prone to mistakes.

Secondly, these are the restrictions associated with the monopoly effect. With unlimited growth, a classical firm can take a monopoly position. To avoid this, society imposes certain restrictions.

Thirdly, there are limitations associated with agency problems. With unlimited growth, the classical firm becomes so large that the owner can no longer survey his entire economy and is forced to delegate authority to lower and lower levels.

Properties of effective property rights. Have effective rights

property is usually allocated three properties (for example, three properties

distinguished by Milgrom and Roberts):

Clarity, unambiguity;

Actuability, or feasibility (enforceability);

Exchangeability.

Conclusion

Thus, based on the material presented in the conclusion, the following conclusions follow

The right of ownership is the original right among other property rights. The right of ownership is an absolute right, since it simultaneously implies the rights:

1) possession - the possibility of real possession of a thing;

2) use - the actual ability of the owner to use the thing, while deriving profit from it and

3) disposal of property - the ability of the owner to determine the fate of the thing.

A system is “a set of methods for granting “authorities” to specific individuals to choose any way to use specific goods from the class of not prohibited ways to use these goods”

The system of rights (relationships) of property is those relations of order, those institutions of regulation that arise between people regarding the use of limited goods.

This system of rights consists of:

Ownership rights themselves of the first, second and third order;

Systems of guarantees (protection mechanisms) of property rights.

Property rights guarantees are effectively a public contribution to your property rights.

There are three types of guarantee of property rights: coercion, information, insurance.

Compulsion. Guarantees are provided by society by creating a mechanism for enforcing compliance with the established affiliation and declaring that such a mechanism exists and operates.

Information. In society, there must be information systems that provide people with information about the ownership of a particular property. Example: privatization of an apartment obtaining a title of ownership.

Insurance. This type of property guarantee is an integral feature of the civilized world. These guarantees are more often applied to economic activity as such, but we can also talk about insurance of immovable, non-economic objects of property (for example, a personal car or a house).

Thus, from all the above material it follows that the issues of objects of property rights are quite debatable.

References

1. Institutional economics: tutorial/ under hand acad. D.S. Lvov. - M.: INFRA-M, 2001. - S. 96-225.

2. Kuzminov, Ya.I. Institutional economy. Course of lectures / Ya.I. Kuzminov, M.M. Yudkevich. - M.: INFRA-M, 2009. - S. 118-162.

3. Oleinik, A.N. Institutional economics: textbook / A.N. Oleinik. - M.: INFRA-M, 2002. - S. 105-131.

4. Varian H. Microeconomics. Intermediate level. M.: Unity, 1997, chapter 31.

5. Kapelyushnikov R. I. Economic theory of property rights. M., 1990, chapter 3.

6. Muller D. Theory of public choice // Panorama of economic thought. Greenaway D., Blini M., Stuart I. (ed.) SPb. 2002, v. 1, chapter 12.2-12.3.

7. Oleinik A. N. Institutional economics. M.: Infra-M, 2000, lectures 3.2., 8.

8.Shastitko A.E. Neo-institutional economic theory. M.: TEIS, 1999, chapter 9.

9. Kuzminov Ya. I. Educational and methodological manual for the course of lectures on institutional economics. M.: GU-HSE, 1999.

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