Phenomenology represents one of the directions in the philosophy of the 20th century, the task of which is to describe the phenomenon (phenomenon, event, experience) based on the primary experience of the cognizing consciousness (transcendental Self). Its founder is Husserl, although he had predecessors: Franz Bertano and Karl Stumpf.
Husserl's book "Logical Research" is the starting point for the emergence of this trend, which had a huge impact on the emergence and development of phenomenological psychology, phenomenological sociology, philosophy of religion, ontology, philosophy of mathematics and natural science, metaphysics, hermeneutics, existentialism and personalism.
The core of this trend is the concept of intentionality.- a property of human consciousness directed to a specific subject, that is, a person's interest in considering the philosophical aspect of a particular object.
Phenomenology aims to create a universal science that would serve as a justification for all other sciences and knowledge in general, had a rigorous justification. Phenomenology seeks to describe the intentionality of the life of consciousness, the existence of the individual, as well as the fundamental foundations of human existence.
A characteristic feature of this method is the rejection of any questionable premises. This direction affirms the simultaneous inseparability and at the same time the irreducibility of consciousness, human existence, personality, the psychophysical nature of man, spiritual culture and society.
Husserl put forward the slogan " Back to the things themselves!", which orients a person to the removal of functional and causal relationships between the objective world and our consciousness. That is, his call is the restoration of the connection between consciousness and objects, when the object does not turn into consciousness, but is perceived by consciousness as an object that has certain properties without studying its functions, structure, etc. He defended pure consciousness, free from dogma, imposed thought patterns.
AT 2 main methods were proposed as research methods:
- Evidence - direct contemplation,
- Phenomenological reduction is the liberation of consciousness from natural (naturalistic) attitudes.
The phenomenological reduction is not a naive immersion in the world, but focuses on what consciousness experiences in the world that is given to us. Then these experiences are used simply as certain concrete facts, but as ideal entities. This is then reduced to the pure consciousness of our transcendent Self.
"... The field of phenomenology is an analysis of what is revealed a priori in direct intuition, fixations of directly discernible entities and their interconnections and their descriptive cognition in a systemic union of all layers in a transcendentally pure consciousness," — Husserl, Ideas.
Using the method of phenomenological reduction, a person gradually comes to understand that being is preceded by pure ego or pure consciousness with the entities it experiences.
Phenomenology thus covers a vast field from simple contemplation of an object to philosophical reflection on the basis of its semantic cultures.
Husserl sought not only to understand the world, but also to construct, to the creation of a true world, in the center of which is the person himself. He wrote: "Philosophical knowledge creates not only special results, but also a human attitude, which immediately invades the rest of practical life ... It forms a new intimate community between people, we could say a community of purely ideal interests between people who live by philosophy, are connected by unforgettable ideas which are not only useful to everyone, but are identically mastered by everyone".
Currently, phenomenological research methods are used in psychiatry, sociology, literary criticism and aesthetics. The largest centers of phenomenology are located in Belgium and Germany. In the 90s of the 20th century, centers were established in Moscow and Prague. The International Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Education is located in the USA.
PHENOMENOLOGY - the course of Western philosophy of the 20th century. Although the term F. itself was used by Kant and Hegel, it became widespread thanks to Husserl, who created a large-scale project of phenomenological philosophy. This project played an important role both for German and French philosophy of the first half - the middle of the 20th century. Philosophical works such as Scheler's "Formalism in Ethics and the Material Ethics of Value" (1913-1916), Heidegger's "Being and Time" (1927), Sartre's "Being and Nothingness" (1943), Merleau-Ponty's "Phenomenology of Perception" (1945) ) are programmatic phenomenological studies. Phenomenological motives are effective within the framework of non-phenomenologically oriented philosophy, as well as in a number of sciences, for example, literary criticism, social sciences (primarily psychology and psychiatry).
This is evidenced by phenomenological studies of both contemporaries and students of Husserl, and living philosophers. The most interesting phenomenologists or phenomenologically oriented philosophers include: Heidegger, who used the phenomenological method as "a way of approaching that and a way of showing the definition of what is intended to become the topic of ontology", i.e. human Dasein, for the description and understanding of which F. must turn to the hermeneutics of Being and Time for help; The Göttingen School of Philosophy, originally oriented toward phenomenological ontology (A. Reinach, Scheler), whose representatives, together with the Munich School (M. Geiger, A. Pfender) and under the guidance of Husserl, founded in 1913 the Yearbook on Phenomenology and Phenomenological Research", opened by Husserl's programmatic work "Ideas to Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy", in which the already mentioned works of Scheler and Heidegger appeared; E. Stein, L. Landgrebe and E. Fink - Husserl's assistants; Polish phenomenologist of aesthetics R. Ingarden, Czech phenomenologist, fighter for human rights J. Patochka; American sociologically oriented phenomenologists Gurvich and Schutz; Russian philosophers Shpet and Losev. The situation in Germany on the eve of and during the Second World War excluded Husserl - a Jew by nationality - from philosophical discussions until the mid-1950s. His first readers were the Franciscan monk and philosopher Van Brede, the founder of the first Husserl Archive in Leuven (1939), as well as Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Ricoeur, Levinas, Derrida. The listed philosophers were under the strong influence of F., and certain periods of their work can be called phenomenological. Interest in F. today covers not only Western and Eastern Europe, but also, for example, latin america and Japan. The first World Congress on F. was held in Spain in 1988.
The most interesting modern phenomenologists in Germany include Waldenfels and K. Held. F. in the understanding of Husserl is a description of the semantic structures of consciousness and objectivity, which is carried out in the process of "bracketing" both the fact of the existence or being of an object, and the psychological activity of consciousness directed at it. As a result of this "bracketing" or implementation of the phenomenological "epoch", the object of study of the phenomenologist becomes consciousness, considered from the point of view of its intentional nature. The intentionality of consciousness is manifested in the direction of acts of consciousness on the object. The concept of intentionality, borrowed by Husserl in the philosophy of Brentano and rethought in the course of Logical Investigations, Part 2, is one of the key concepts of F. In the study of intentional consciousness, the emphasis is shifted from what or "bracketed" being of an object, to its as or the variety of ways of being given subject. From the point of view of it, the object is not given, but is manifested or manifests itself (erscheint) in consciousness. Husserl calls this kind of phenomenon a phenomenon (Greek phainomenon - showing itself). F. then is the science of the phenomena of consciousness. Its slogan becomes the slogan "Back to the things themselves!", which, as a result of phenomenological work, should directly reveal themselves to consciousness. An intentional act directed at an object must be filled (erfuehllt) with the being of this object. G. calls the filling of intention with existential content truth, and its experience in judgment - evidence. The concepts of intentionality and intentional consciousness are initially associated in F. Husserl with the task of substantiating knowledge that is achievable within the framework of some new science or science. Gradually, the place of this science is taken by F.
Thus, the first model of F. can be represented as a model of science that seeks to question the usual assumption of the existence of objects and the world, designated by Husserl as a "natural setting", and in the course of describing the diversity of their givenness - within the framework of the "phenomenological setting" - to come (or not come) to this being. The being of an object is understood in F. as identical in the variety of ways in which it is given. The concept of intentionality is then a condition for the possibility of a phenomenological attitude. Along with the phenomenological epoch, eidetic, transcendental and phenomenological reductions act as ways to achieve it. The first leads to the study of the essence of objects; the second, close to the phenomenological era, opens up for the researcher the realm of pure or transcendental consciousness, i.e. consciousness of the phenomenological attitude; the third turns this consciousness into transcendental subjectivity and leads to the theory of transcendental constitution. The concept of intentionality played a major role in the studies of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre and Levinas. Thus, in Merleau-Ponty's "Phenomenology of Perception" this concept is a prerequisite for overcoming the traditional classical philosophy and psychology of the abyss between mind and corporeality and allows us to speak of "incarnated mind" as the starting point of experience, perception and knowledge.
Husserl's work in the field of describing intentional consciousness leads him to such new concepts or models of this consciousness as internal time-consciousness and consciousness-horizon. Internal time-consciousness is a prerequisite for understanding consciousness as a stream of experiences. The starting point in this flow is the point "now" of the present time, around which - in the horizon of consciousness - just-that-before and possible future are gathered. Consciousness at the "now" point is constantly correlated with its time horizon. This correlation allows you to perceive, remember and represent something only possible. The problem of internal time-consciousness has evoked a response in the studies of almost all phenomenologists. Thus, in Being and Time, Heidegger transforms Husserlian temporality of consciousness into the temporality of human existence, the starting point in which is now not the point "now", but "running ahead", the future that Dasein "projects" from its possibility to be. In the philosophy of Levinas, temporality is understood "not as a fact of an isolated and lonely subject, but as a relation of the subject to the Other." The origins of such an understanding of temporality can be easily found in the model of consciousness-time and time horizon, within which Husserl tries to build the relationship of me to the Other by analogy with the relationship of actual experience to the surrounding time horizon. Within the framework of consciousness or within the framework of its noematic-noetic (see Noesis and Noema) unity as a unity of experiences in terms of their content and fulfillment, objectivity is constituted, a process as a result of which the object acquires its existential significance. The concept of constitution is another most important concept of F. The source of constitution of the centers of accomplishment of acts of consciousness is I. Being I is the only being, the existence and significance of which, according to F., I cannot doubt. This being is of a completely different kind than objective being.
This motif is an obvious reference to Descartes, whom Husserl considers his immediate predecessor. Another way to address the Self is to understand it as a transcendental subjectivity, which connects F. Husserl with the philosophy of Kant. The introduction of the concept of "transcendental subjectivity" once again showed the specificity of F. as addressed not to objects and their being, but to the constitution of this being in consciousness. Husserl's appeal to the problem of being was picked up by subsequent phenomenologists. The first project of Heidegger's ontology is the project of F., which makes self-existing (phenomenal) ways and modes of human existence. Sartre in "Being and Nothing", actively using such concepts of Husserl as phenomenon, intentionality, temporality, connects them with Hegel's categories and Heidegger's fundamental ontology. He rigidly contrasts being-for-itself as consciousness (nothing) and being-in-itself as a phenomenon (being), which form a dualistic ontological reality. Sartre's phenomenological method is designed to emphasize, in contrast to Hegel's method, the mutual irreducibility of being and nothingness, reality and consciousness. Like Husserl and Heidegger, he turns to a phenomenological description of the interaction between reality and consciousness. The problem of the I as the core or center of the accomplishments of consciousness leads Husserl to the need to describe this Ya. F. acquires the features of a reflective philosophy. Husserl speaks of a special kind of perception of the ego - internal perception. It, like the perception of external objects, objectifies what it deals with. However, objectification is never done absolutely and once and for all, because it takes place in the consciousness-horizon and opens up ever new ways of presenting objects in it. What remains in the I after its objectification by consciousness, Husserl calls "pure I".
The unobjectified "pure I" became in the philosophy of Husserl's followers a prerequisite for the possible and incomplete existence of myself. Consciousness-horizon is the consciousness of my fulfillment, a link of references going to infinity. This is an infinity of possibilities for positing objects, which I still do not dispose of completely arbitrarily. Last and necessary condition such an appeal to objects in cognition is the world. The concept of the world, initially in the form of a "natural concept of the world", and then, as a "life world" is a separate and large topic of F. Heidegger (being-in-the-world and the concept of the worldliness of the world), Merleau-Ponty (being- to the world), Gurvich with his project of the world of doxa and episteme, Schutz with his project of a phenomenological and sociological study of the construction and organization of the social world. The concept of "life world" has come into use today not only in phenomenologically oriented philosophy, but also in the philosophy of communicative action, the analytical philosophy of language, and hermeneutics. In F. Husserl, this concept is closely connected with such concepts as intersubjectivity, corporality, the experience of the Alien and the teleology of the mind. Initially, the world acts as the most general correlate of consciousness or its most extensive objectivity. On the one hand, this is the world of science and culture, on the other hand, it is the basis of any scientific conception of the world.
The world is located between the subjects of this world, acting as a medium for their life experience and giving this life experience certain forms. Intersubjectivity is a condition for the possibility of the world, as well as a condition for the objectivity of any knowledge, which in the "life world" turns from mine, subjective, into something that belongs to everyone - objective. F. turns into a study and description of the transformation of opinions into knowledge, subjective into objective, mine into universally valid. Late Husserl's reflections on the "life world" link together all his projects of F. Within the framework of the "life world" and its genesis, the body of the mind itself unfolds, originally having the form of science teaching. F., describing the dual nature of the "life world" as the foundation of all knowledge and the horizon of all its possible modifications, puts at its foundation the duality of consciousness itself, which always comes from something alien to it and necessarily assumes it. In the mouth of such a modern phenomenologist as Waldenfels, the duality of consciousness is a statement of the differences between me and the Other and a prerequisite for the existence of a multidimensional and heterogeneous world in which building a relationship to the alien to my selfhood is a prerequisite for ethics. F. in the form of F. ethics is a description of the diverse forms of the relationship between me and the Other, belonging to and alien to my selfhood. Such a philosophy is both an aesthetics and a philosophy of everyday life and political life in which these forms are embodied. (See also Waldenfels, Lifeworld, Brentapo, Intentionality, Husserl.)
A.V. Filippovich, O.N. Shparaga
The latest philosophical dictionary. Comp. Gritsanov A.A. Minsk, 1998.
Phenomenology (the doctrine of phenomena) is a direction in the philosophy of the 20th century, which defined its task as an unconditional description of the experience of knowing consciousness and the identification of essential, ideal features in it.
The founder of the direction was Edmund Husserl, Franz Brentano and Karl Stumpf can be attributed to the immediate predecessors. The starting point of the phenomenological movement is Husserl's book Logical Investigations, the core of which is the concept of intentionality.
Key points in the development of phenomenology: the emergence of its diverse interpretations and the opposition of its main variants, the teachings of Husserl and Heidegger; application of the phenomenological method in psychology and psychiatry (Binswanger), ethics (Scheler), aesthetics (Ingarden), law (Reinach) and sociology (phenomenological sociology of A. Schutz, social constructivism), philosophy of religion, ontology, philosophy of mathematics and natural science, history and metaphysics (Landgrebe), communication theory (Wilem Flusser); influence on existentialism, personalism, hermeneutics and other philosophical currents; widespread in Europe, America, Japan and some other Asian countries. The largest centers of phenomenology are the Husserl Archives in Louvain (Belgium) and Cologne (Germany), the International Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Education (USA), which publishes the yearbook Analecta Husserliana and the journal Phenomenology Inquiry.
Phenomenology began with Husserl's thesis "Back to the things themselves!", which is opposed to the widespread calls of that time "Back to Kant!", "Back to Hegel!" and means the need to abandon the construction of deductive systems of philosophy, similar to Hegel's, as well as the reduction of things and consciousness to causal connections studied by the sciences. Phenomenology, therefore, involves an appeal to primary experience, in Husserl - to the experience of knowing consciousness, where consciousness is understood not as an empirical subject of study of psychology, but as a “transcendental Self” and “pure meaning formation” (intentionality).
The revelation of pure consciousness presupposes a preliminary critique of naturalism, psychologism, and Platonism and a phenomenological reduction, according to which we reject statements about the reality of the material world, taking its existence out of the brackets.
Phenomenology is a philosophical movement, the main direction of which is the desire to liberate philosophical consciousness from naturalistic attitudes, to achieve in the field of philosophical analysis the reflection of consciousness on its acts and on the content given in them, to identify the limiting parameters of cognition, the initial foundations of cognitive activity. Briefly, phenomenology can be defined as the science of objects of experience.
As an independent philosophical direction, phenomenology took shape in the 1920s. 20th century in the works of E. Husserl. The starting point of phenomenology was an attempt to consider non-experiential and non-historical structures of consciousness that ensure its real functioning and completely coincide with the ideal meanings expressed in language and psychological experiences.
For Husserl, phenomenology is, first of all, the elucidation of the semantic space of consciousness, the identification of those invariant characteristics that make it possible to perceive the object of knowledge.
Phenomenology is based on the understanding of a phenomenon not as a phenomenon of something else, but as something that reveals itself and directly appears to consciousness.
The main method of phenomenology is the intuitive perception of ideal entities.
This knowledge has several layers:
1) linguistic means of expression;
2) mental experiences;
3) meanings as invariant structures of linguistic expressions.
Objective existence acquires meaning, being correlated with consciousness. According to Husserl, this also acquires an objective meaning. One of the main tasks of cognition is seen in the search for this correspondence. When objective being and consciousness are correlated, being becomes a phenomenon, and consciousness cognizes being. The phenomenon is represented in consciousness, and consciousness appears in the phenomenon as a dual unity, which includes cognitive acts and subject content.
The task of phenomenology is to reveal the meaning of an object that is obscured by opinion, superficial judgment, inaccurate word, incorrect assessment. To achieve this, it is necessary to abandon naturalistic attitudes that oppose being to consciousness.
The subject of phenomenology is the achievement of pure truths, a priori (pre-experimental) meanings, realized in language and psychological experience. These truths, conceivable in consciousness, are the lot of philosophy, which is defined by Husserl as the first philosophy. It is the science of the pure principles of consciousness and knowledge, it is the universal doctrine of method and methodology.
Cognition is considered as a stream of consciousness, internally organized and integral, independent of specific mental acts, of a specific subject of cognition and his activity. This is the main phenomenological setting, and on the way to its implementation, an understanding of the subject of cognition is achieved not as an empirical, but as a transcendental subject, as a receptacle of generally valid a priori truths. With these truths, he, as it were, fills with meaning the objects of reality, which are objects of knowledge; these objects acquire meaning and become those that correspond with consciousness, that is, they become phenomena.
Vadim Rudnev
Phenomenology - (from ancient Greek phainomenon - being) - one of the areas of philosophy of the twentieth century, associated primarily with the names of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger.
The specifics of phenomenology as philosophy consists in rejecting any idealizations as a starting point and accepting the only premise - the possibility of describing the spontaneously meaningful life of consciousness.
The main idea of phenomenology is the inseparability and at the same time mutual irreducibility, irreducibility of consciousness, human existence, personality and the objective world.
The main methodological technique of phenomenology is phenomenological reduction - reflective work with consciousness, aimed at revealing pure consciousness, or the essence of consciousness.
From Husserl's point of view, any object should be grasped only as a correlate of consciousness (a property of intentionality), that is, perception, memory, fantasy, judgment, doubt, assumption, etc. The phenomenological setting is not aimed at the perception of known and the identification of yet unknown properties or functions of the object, but on the process of perception itself as the process of forming a certain range of meanings seen in the object.
“The goal of phenomenological reduction,” writes the researcher of phenomenology V. I. Molchanov, “is to discover in each individual consciousness pure consonance as pure impartiality, which calls into question any already given system of mediation between oneself and the world. Impartiality must be maintained in a phenomenological attitude not in relation to objects and processes of the real world, the existence of which is not questioned - "everything remains as it was" (Husserl), - but in relation to already acquired attitudes of consciousness. Pure consciousness is not consciousness, Purified from objects, on the contrary, consciousness here for the first time reveals its essence as a semantic connection with the object.Pure consciousness is the self-purification of consciousness from the schemes, dogmas, patterned ways of thinking imposed on it, from attempts to find the basis of consciousness in what is not consciousness.The phenomenological method - this is the identification and description of the field of direct semantic conjugation of consciousness and the object, the horizons of which do not contain hidden entities that are not manifested as meanings.
From the point of view of phenomenology (cf. individual language in the philosophy of L. Wittgenstein), the experience of meaning is possible outside of communication - in an individual, "lonely" mental life, and therefore, linguistic expression is not identical with meaning, a sign is only one of the possibilities - along with contemplation - value implementation.
Phenomenology has developed its original concept of time. Time is considered here not as objective, but as temporality, the temporality of consciousness itself. Husserl proposed the following structure of temporal perception: 1) now-point (initial impression); 2) retention, that is, the primary retention of this now-point; 3) protention, that is, the primary expectation or anticipation that constitutes "what comes."
Time in phenomenology is the basis of the coincidence of the phenomenon and its description, the mediator between the spontaneity of consciousness and reflection.
Phenomenology has also developed its own concept of truth.
V.I. Molchanov writes on this occasion: “Husserl calls truth, firstly, as the very certainty of being, that is, the unity of meanings that exists regardless of whether anyone sees it or not, and being itself is” an object accomplishing the truth". Truth is the identity of the object to itself, "being in the sense of truth": a true friend, the true state of affairs, etc. Secondly, truth is the structure of an act of consciousness, which creates the possibility of seeing the state of affairs in this way , as it is, that is, the possibility of identity (adequacy) of the thinkable and the contemplated, evidence as a criterion of truth is not a special feeling that accompanies some judgments, but the experience of this coincidence.For Heidegger, truth is not the result of a comparison of ideas and not a correspondence of the representation of a real thing; nor is truth the equality of cognition and object […] Truth as true being is rooted in the mode of human being, which is characterized as openness […] Human being can be in truth and not in truth - truth as openness must be torn out, stolen from beings […]. Truth is essentially identical to being; the history of being is the history of its oblivion; the history of truth is the history of its epistemologicalization.
In recent decades, phenomenology has shown a tendency towards convergence with other philosophical trends, in particular with analytical philosophy. The proximity between them is found where it comes to meaning, sense, interpretation.
Bibliography
Molchanov V.I. Phenomenapology // Modern Western Philosophy: Dictionary, - M., 1991.
PHENOMENOLOGY
PHENOMENOLOGY - an influential trend in Western philosophy of the 20th century. Although the term F. itself was used by Kant and Hegel, it became widespread thanks to Husserl, who created a large-scale project of phenomenological philosophy. This project played an important role both for German and French philosophy of the first half - the middle of the 20th century. Philosophical works such as Scheler's "Formalism in Ethics and the Material Ethics of Value" (1913/1916), Heidegger's "Being and Time" (1927), Sartre's "Being and Nothingness" (1943), Merleau-Ponty's "Phenomenology of Perception" (1945) are programmatic phenomenological studies. Phenomenological motives are also effective within the framework of non-phenomenologically oriented philosophy, as well as in a number of sciences, for example, literary criticism, social sciences and, above all, psychology and psychiatry. This is evidenced by phenomenological studies of both contemporaries and students of Husserl, and living philosophers. The most interesting phenomenologists or phenomenologically oriented philosophers include: Heidegger, a student of Husserl, who used the phenomenological method as “a way of approaching that and a way of showing the definition of what is intended to become the topic of ontology”, i.e. the human Dasein, for the description and understanding of which phenomenology must turn to hermeneutics (Being and Time) for help; The Göttingen School of Phenomenology, originally focused on phenomenological ontology (A. Reinach, Scheler), whose representatives, together with the Munich School (M. Geiger, A. Pfender) and under the leadership of Husserl, founded in 1913 the Yearbook on Phenomenology and phenomenological research”, opened by Husserl's programmatic work “Ideas towards Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy”, in which the already mentioned works of Scheler and Heidegger appeared; E. Stein, L. Landgrebe and E. Fink - Husserl's assistants; as well as the Polish phenomenologist of aesthetics R. Ingarden, the Czech phenomenologist, fighter for human rights J. Patochka, the American sociologically oriented phenomenologists Gurvich and Schutz; Russian philosophers Shpet and Losev. The German situation on the eve of and during the Second World War excluded Husserl - a Jew by nationality - from philosophical discussions until the mid-1950s. His first readers were the Franciscan monk and philosopher Van Brede, the founder of the first Husserl Archive in Leuven (1939), as well as Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Riker, Levinas, Derrida. These philosophers were strongly influenced by F. , and individual periods of their work can be called phenomenological. Interest in F. today covers not only Western and Eastern Europe, but also, for example, Latin America and Japan. The first world congress on physics took place in Spain in 1988. The most interesting modern phenomenologists in Germany include Waldenfels and K. Held. F. in the understanding of Husserl is a description of the semantic structures of consciousness and objectivity, which is carried out in the process of "bracketing" both the fact of the existence or being of an object, and the psychological activity of consciousness directed at it. As a result of this "bracketing" or realization of the phenomenological epoch, consciousness becomes the object of study of the phenomenologist, considered from the point of view of its intentional nature. The intentionality of consciousness is manifested in the direction of acts of consciousness on the object. The concept of intentionality, borrowed by Husserl in the philosophy of his teacher Brentano and rethought in the course of “Logical Investigations. Part 2" is one of the key concepts of F.
Phenomenology (philosophy)
Husserl. In the study of intentional consciousness, the emphasis is shifted from the what, or "bracketed" being of an object, to its how, or the variety of ways in which an object is given. From the point of view of it, the object is not given, but is manifested or manifests itself (erscheint) in consciousness. Husserl calls this kind of phenomenon a phenomenon ( Greek phainomenon - showing itself). F. then is the science of the phenomena of consciousness. Its slogan becomes the slogan “Back to the things themselves!”, which, as a result of phenomenological work, should directly reveal themselves to consciousness. An intentional act directed at an object must be filled (erfuehllt) with the being of this object. G. calls the filling of intention with existential content truth, and its experience in judgment - evidence. The concept of intentionality and intentional consciousness is associated in F. Husserl initially with the task of substantiating knowledge that is achievable within the framework of some new science or science of science. Gradually, the place of this science is taken by F. T. arr. the first model of F. can also be presented as a model of science that seeks to question the usual assumption of the existence of objects and the world, designated by Husserl as a “natural setting”, and in the course of describing the diversity of their givenness - within the framework of the “phenomenological setting” - to come (or not to come ) to this existence. The being of an object is understood as identical in the variety of ways in which it is given. The concept of intentionality is then a condition for the possibility of a phenomenological attitude. Along with the phenomenological epoch, eidetic, transcendental and phenomenological reductions act as ways to achieve it. The first leads to the study of the essence of objects; the second, close to the phenomenological era, opens up for the researcher the realm of pure or transcendental consciousness, i.e. consciousness of the phenomenological attitude; the third turns this consciousness into transcendental subjectivity and leads to the theory of transcendental constitution. The concept of intentionality played a major role in the studies of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre and Levinas. Thus, in Merleau-Ponty's "Phenomenology of Perception" this concept is a prerequisite for overcoming the gap between mind and corporality, traditional for classical philosophy and psychology, and allows us to speak of "incarnated mind" as the initial moment of experience, perception and knowledge. Husserl's work in the field of describing intentional consciousness leads him to such new concepts or models of this consciousness as internal time-consciousness and consciousness-horizon. Internal time-consciousness is a prerequisite for understanding consciousness as a stream of experiences. The starting point in this flow is the point of "now" of the present time, around which - in the horizon of consciousness - just-that-before and possible future are gathered. Consciousness at the “now” point is constantly correlated with its time horizon. This correlation allows you to perceive, remember and represent something only possible. The problem of internal time-consciousness has evoked a response in the studies of almost all phenomenologists. Thus, in Being and Time, Heidegger transforms the Husserlian temporality of consciousness into the temporality of human existence, the starting point in which is now not the “now” point, but “running ahead”, the future that Dasein “projects” from its possibility to be. In the philosophy of Levinas, temporality is understood "not as a fact of an isolated and lonely subject, but as a relation of the subject to the Other." The origins of such an understanding of temporality can be easily found in the model of consciousness-time and time horizon, within which Husserl tries to build the relationship of me to the Other by analogy with the relationship of actual experience to the surrounding time horizon. Within the framework of consciousness or within its noematic-noetic ( cm. NOESIS and NOEMA) of unity as a unity of experiences from the point of view of their content and accomplishment, the constitution of objectivity takes place, the process as a result of which the object acquires its existential significance. The concept of constitution is another most important concept of F. The source of constitution of the centers of accomplishment of acts of consciousness is I. Being I is the only being, the presence and significance of which I cannot doubt. This being is of a completely different kind than objective being. This motif is an obvious reference to Descartes, whom Husserl considers his immediate predecessor.
Another way to address the Self is to understand it as a transcendental subjectivity, which connects F. Husserl with the philosophy of Kant. The introduction of the concept of "transcendental subjectivity" once again showed the specificity of F. as addressed not to objects and their being, but to the constitution of this being in consciousness. Husserl's appeal to the problem of being was picked up by subsequent phenomenologists. The first project of Heidegger's ontology is the project of F., which makes self-existing (phenomenal) ways and modes of human existence. Sartre in "Being and Nothing", actively using such concepts of Husserl as phenomenon, intentionality, temporality, connects them with Hegel's categories and Heidegger's fundamental ontology. He rigidly contrasts being-for-itself as consciousness (nothing) and being-in-itself as a phenomenon (being), which form a dualistic ontological reality. Sartre's phenomenological method is designed to emphasize, in contrast to Hegel's method, the mutual irreducibility of being and nothingness, reality and consciousness. Like Husserl and Heidegger, he turns to a phenomenological description of the interaction between reality and consciousness. The problem of the I as the core or center of the accomplishments of consciousness leads Husserl to the need to describe this Ya. F. acquires the features of a reflective philosophy. Husserl speaks of a special kind of perception of the ego - internal perception. It, like the perception of external objects, objectifies what it deals with. However, objectification is never accomplished absolutely and once and for all, since it takes place in the consciousness-horizon and opens up ever new ways of giving objects in it. What remains in the I after its objectification by consciousness, Husserl calls "pure I". The unobjectified "pure I" became in the philosophy of Husserl's followers a prerequisite for the possible and incomplete existence of myself. Consciousness-horizon is the consciousness of my fulfillment, a link of references going to infinity. This is an infinity of possibilities for positing objects, which I still do not dispose of completely arbitrarily. The last and necessary condition for such an appeal to objects in cognition is the world. The concept of the world, initially in the form of the “natural concept of the world”, and then, as the “life world” ' is a separate and large topic of F. Heidegger (being-in-the-world and the concept of the worldliness of the world), Merleau-Ponty (being -to-world), Gurvich with his project of the world of doxa and episteme, Schutz with his project of phenomenological and sociological study of the construction and organization of the social world. The concept of "life world" has come into use today not only in phenomenologically oriented philosophy, but also in the philosophy of communicative action, the analytical philosophy of language, and hermeneutics. In F. Husserl, this concept is closely connected with such concepts as intersubjectivity, corporality, the experience of the Alien and the teleology of the mind. Initially, the world acts as the most general correlate of consciousness or its most extensive objectivity. On the one hand, this is the world of science and culture, on the other hand, it is the basis of any scientific conception of the world. The world is located between the subjects of this world, acting as a medium for their life experience and giving this life experience certain forms. Intersubjectivity is a condition for the possibility of the world, as well as a condition for the objectivity of any knowledge, which in the "life world" from mine, subjective, turns into something that belongs to everyone - objective. F. turns into a study and description of the transformation of opinions into knowledge, subjective into objective, mine into universally valid. Late Husserl's reflections on the "life world" link together all his projects of F. Within the framework of the "life world" and its genesis, the body of the mind itself unfolds, originally having the form of science. F., describing the dual nature of the “life world”, as the foundation of all knowledge and the horizon of all its possible modifications, puts at its foundation the duality of consciousness itself, which always comes from something alien to it and necessarily assumes it. In the mouth of such a modern phenomenologist as Waldenfels, the duality of consciousness is a statement of the differences between me and the Other and a prerequisite for the existence of a multidimensional and heterogeneous world in which building a relationship to the alien to my selfhood is a prerequisite for ethics. F. in the form of F. ethics is a description of the diverse forms of the relationship between me and the Other, belonging to and alien to my selfhood. Such a philosophy is both aesthetics and a philosophy of everyday and political life in which these forms are embodied.
Source: The latest philosophical dictionary on Gufo.me
E.G. - German philosopher, founder of phenomenology, student of Brento.
PHENOMENOLOGY
developed the basic provisions of phenomenology, the only discipline capable, in his opinion, of making philosophy a rigorous and exact science. Phenomenology is the science of phenomena. A phenomenon is that which manifests itself insofar as it manifests itself. The human "I" and all things surrounding it are phenomena. The basis of knowledge - the principle of phenomenological reduction - is to refrain (epoch) from believing in the reality of the surrounding world. Thus, we get the eidos of the world, its ideal value. From the point of view of reduction, it is eidetic. Since the phenomenon manifests itself in consciousness and only through an act of consciousness, i.e. subjective consciousness determines the state of things in reality, reduction is also transcendental.
In the double - eidetic and transcendental - dimension, the phenomenon, exactly like its manifestation to consciousness, is something absolute.
This is the essence of a thing, its being. The consciousness that carries out the reduction is self-sufficient.
Thus, according to Husserl, the only absolute being is revealed to us. Consciousness has an intention, a focus on an object. G. calls the intention to an object, directly and in the original given to consciousness, intuition. Intuition in phenomenology has the following meaning: to see everything that manifests as truly manifested and only as manifested. To complete his theory G. introduces the concept of "constituting". Consciousness is a constitutive flow. The form of constitution is phenomenological temporality - the unity of the past, future and present in one intentional act of consciousness. Through constitution in the form of temporality of consciousness, the “I” possesses the surrounding world and itself. According to Husserl, philosophy is the highest attempt of Reason to constitute with genuine evidence the "I" and what the world of this "I" is.
Edmund Husserl(German Edmund Husserl; April 8, 1859, Prosnitz, Moravia (Austria) - April 26, 1938, Freiburg) - German philosopher, founder of phenomenology. Came from a Jewish family. In 1876 he entered the University of Leipzig, where he began to study astronomy, mathematics, physics and philosophy, in 1878 he moved to the University of Berlin, where he continued to study mathematics with L. Kronecker and K. Weierstrass, as well as philosophy with F. Paulsen. In 1881 he studied mathematics in Vienna. On October 8, 1882, he defended his dissertation “On the Theory of the Calculus of Variations” at the University of Vienna with Leo Königsberger and began to study philosophy with Franz Brentano. In 1886, Husserl, together with his bride, accept the Protestant religion, in 1887 they get married, after which Husserl gets a job teaching at the university in Halle.
His first publications were devoted to problems of the foundation of mathematics ("Philosophy of Arithmetic", 1891) and logic ("Logical Investigations" I, 1900; II, 1901). "Logical Investigations" becomes the first book of a new direction of philosophy, discovered by Husserl - phenomenology. Beginning in 1901, he met in Göttingen and Munich a friendly atmosphere and his first like-minded people (Reinach, Scheler, Pfender). It was during this period that he published a key article in the Logos - "Philosophy as a rigorous science" (1911) and the first volume of "Ideas towards Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy" (1913). In 1916, he received a chair at the University of Freiburg, which Rickert had occupied before him. Martin Heidegger, Husserl's most capable student, edits his Lectures on the Phenomenology of the Inner Consciousness of Time (1928). Then, in succession, "Formal and Transcendental Logic" (1929), "Cartesian Reflections" (in French, 1931), parts I and II of the work "The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology" (1936, the full text of the manuscript was published posthumously, in 1954). After the Nazis came to power, Husserl was dismissed for a while as a Jew, according to the state law of Baden; he was finally dismissed from office only after the adoption of the Nuremberg Laws, which deprived the Jews of citizenship. Heidegger in the spring of 1933 was elected rector of the university and soon joined the NSDAP; the question of his personal involvement in the persecution of Husserl and their relationship during this period causes much controversy. Husserl was forbidden to participate in the philosophical congresses of 1933 and 1937, both officially and privately; his old books were not removed from the libraries, but the publication of new ones was impossible. Despite the hostility that the Nazi regime surrounded him with, Husserl did not emigrate (his children went to the United States). He died in Freiburg in 1938 of pleurisy almost all alone. The Belgian Franciscan monk, graduate student of the Higher Institute of Philosophy Hermann Leo Van Breda, fearing Hitler's anti-Semitism, moved Husserl's library and unpublished works to Louvain, and also helped the philosopher's widow and students to leave Germany. If not for the intervention of Van Breda, Husserl's widow would have been threatened with deportation to a concentration camp, and his archive with confiscation and death. So the Husserl-Archive was founded in Louvain - the center for studying Husserl's heritage, which still exists. The disassembled archive of Edmund Husserl in Louvain has forty thousand unpublished sheets (partially transcripts), which are published in full assembly compositions - Husserlians.
Husserl's philosophical evolution, despite his passionate devotion to one idea (and perhaps precisely because of this), has undergone a number of metamorphoses. However, the commitment to the following remained unchanged:
- The ideal of rigorous science.
- The liberation of philosophy from accidental premises.
- Radical autonomy and responsibility of the philosophizer.
- The "miracle" of subjectivity.
Husserl appeals to a philosophy that, in his opinion, is capable of restoring the lost connection with the deepest human concerns. He is not satisfied with the rigor of the logical and deductive sciences and sees main reason the crisis of science, as well as European humanity in the inability and unwillingness of contemporary science to address the problems of value and meaning. The radical rigor that is implied here is an attempt to reach the "roots" or "beginnings" of all knowledge, avoiding everything doubtful and taken for granted. Those who decided to do this had to have a deep understanding of their responsibility. This responsibility cannot be delegated to anyone. In doing so, it demanded the complete scientific and moral autonomy of the researcher.
As Husserl wrote, "the true philosopher cannot but be free: the essential nature of philosophy lies in its extremely radical autonomy." Hence the attention to subjectivity, to the irremovable and fundamental world of consciousness, which understands its own existence and the existence of others. Husserl's life and scientific activity fully complied with the most stringent requirements of individual autonomy, criticism of thought, and responsibility to the epoch. These strong qualities impressed many students, in whose fruitful cooperation the phenomenological movement was formed. All students retained an unchanging respect for the one to whom they owed the beginning of their thinking, although none of them followed Husserl for a long time.
⇐ Previous12131415161718192021Next ⇒
Publication date: 2014-12-08; Read: 206 | Page copyright infringement
Studopedia.org - Studopedia.Org - 2014-2018. (0.001 s) ...
Phenomenology
consciousness of something
The meaning and meaning of the object in this case correlates with how it is grasped by consciousness. Thus, phenomenology is focused not on revealing previously unknown knowledge about the world and bringing it into line with what is already known, but on presenting the very process of perceiving the world, that is, to show the conditions and possibilities of knowledge as a process of forming meanings that are seen in the properties and functions of the subject.
Consciousness, in other words, is indifferent to whether objects really exist or whether they are an illusion or a mirage, because in the reality of consciousness, experiences are intertwined just like water jets twist and intertwine in a common stream. There is nothing in consciousness but the meanings of real, illusory or imaginary objects.
Phenomenology has undergone significant changes both in the concept of its founder Husserl and in many modifications, so that its history, notes the famous French philosopher Paul Ricoeur, can be presented as the history of Husserl's "heresies".
Phenomenology
Husserl begins with the idea of creating a science about science - the philosophical science of science. Philosophy, he writes, "is called upon to be a rigorous science and, moreover, one that would satisfy the highest theoretical needs, and in an ethical-religious sense would make life possible, governed by the pure norms of reason." The philosopher wants to give a clear answer to the question of what "things", "events", "laws of nature" are in essence, and therefore asks about the essence of a theory and the very possibility of its existence.
Phenomenology at the beginning of its formation claimed precisely to build philosophy as a rigorous science. That is exactly what - "Philosophy as a rigorous science" - is the name of one of Husserl's main works of the early period.
The discovery of this obvious truth presupposes a special method of moving towards it. Husserl starts from a position he calls natural setting natural world
phenomenological reduction
The first stage of the phenomenological reduction is the eidental reduction, in which the phenomenologist "brackets" the entire real world, refrains from any evaluations and judgments. Husserl calls this operation « era» « era»
(noema) and aspect of consciousness (noesis)
Consciousness in this case, as it were, opens up to meet the objective world, seeing in it not random features and characteristics, but objective universality.
At the same time, the phenomenon is not an element of the real world - it is created and controlled by a phenomenologist for the most complete penetration into the stream of perceiving consciousness and detection of its essence.
intersubjectivity
"life world"
Further development of the phenomenological tradition in the works of M. Heidegger (1889-1976), G. Shpet (1879-1940), R. Ingarden (1893-1970), M. Scheler (1874-1928), M. Merleau-Ponty (1908- 1961), J. - P. Sartre (1905-1980) is connected, on the one hand, with the assimilation of her method, and on the other hand, with criticism of the main Husserlian provisions. M. Heidegger, developing and transforming the idea of intentionality, defined human existence itself as the inseparability of the world and man, therefore the problem of consciousness, to which Husserl paid so much attention, fades into the background. Speech in this case will not be about the diversity of phenomena, but about the only fundamental phenomenon - human existence. Truth appears as the correctness of representation revealed to man.
Previous22232425262728293031323334353637Next
VIEW MORE:
Phenomenological philosophy of science.
In a broad sense, phenomenology is a branch of philosophy that studies phenomena (gr. - “the doctrine of phenomena”). This concept was used by many philosophers - Goethe, Kant, Hegel, Breptapo. In a narrower sense, this is the name of the philosophical doctrine of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), which was created at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries. and is actively developed by his followers (M. Heidegger, O. Becker, E. Fipk - Germany, M. Merleau-Popti, E. Levipas, M. Dufrepp - France, A. Schutz, M. Nathanson, A. Gurvich - America and etc.).
one of the leading themes of the phenomenological philosophy of E. Husserl and his followers. The task of an irrefutable, unconditionally reliable substantiation of the possibility of scientific knowledge is an essential stage in Husserl's program of transforming philosophy into a rigorous science. It should be noted that science is not understood here in terms of the really existing sciences, but rather as a truly rational type of research in its limiting possibilities. A characteristic feature of F.ph.s. there is a desire to radically clarify the foundations of scientific knowledge and the very possibility of cognition on the basis of the phenomenological method of revealing the self-givenness of “things themselves” in phenomenological experience. Phenomenology considers the “objective” knowledge of the positive sciences to be naive, since the very possibility of such knowledge remains unclear, the connection between the mental process of cognition and the object of cognition transcendent to it remains a mystery.
The real experience of consciousness, which mediates any objective scientific experience, always turns out to be "overlooked" by positive science. This means that all positive-scientific knowledge and its methodology are relative. Guided by the principle of nonpresupposition, phenomenology refers directly to the primary sources of experience and sees the essence of the cognitive connection in the intentionality (direction of consciousness to the object) of consciousness. Penetrating into the essence of cognition, phenomenology declares itself as a universally substantiating science, as a science of science. Husserl puts forward the idea of a unified system of scientific and philosophical knowledge, in which phenomenology, or the “first philosophy”, is called upon to play a fundamental role, acting as a universal methodology. All other scientific disciplines are divided into eidetic ("second philosophy") and positive in accordance with the fundamental difference between the two sides of the object of study: the essential (necessary) and the actual (random). AT common system scientific knowledge, eidetic sciences, as an example of which one can cite mathematics and “pure” natural science, turn out to be a link between transcendental (going beyond reason) phenomenology and positive sciences, they are assigned the role of a theoretical foundation for rationalization and transcendental comprehension of the factual material of positive sciences. The method of the eidetic sciences is ideation within the limits of eidetically reduced experience. Clarifying the essential structures of various kinds of science, eidetic sciences form ontologies: a formal ontology containing a priori forms of objectivity in general and prescribing a formal structure for particular sciences, as well as regional, or material, ontologies that unfold the concepts of formal ontology on the material of two main regions of existence: nature and spirit. Ontology (science, study the problems of being) of nature, in turn, is divided into ontology of physical nature and ontology organic nature. Each regional ontology is considered as an autonomous sphere of a certain objectivity with peculiar essential structures comprehended in ideation (contemplation of the essence). Eidetic sciences make it possible to clarify the fundamental concepts of regions, such as "space", "time", "causality", "culture", "history", etc., as well as to establish the essential laws of these regions. At the level of studies of the factual material, each regional ontology corresponds to a group of positive sciences, in which the semantic
34. Social epistemology.
Epistemology (from other Greek ἐπιστήμη - “scientific knowledge, science”, “reliable knowledge” and λόγος - “word”, “speech”); epistemology (from other Greek γνῶσις - “knowledge”, “knowledge” and λόγος - “word”, “speech”) - the theory of knowledge, a section of philosophy. SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY (English social epistemology, German soziale Erkenntnistheorie) is one of the modern areas of research at the intersection of philosophy, history and sociology of science, science of science. Over the past 30 years, it has been actively developing, producing new approaches and generating discussions. Proponents of classical epistemology believed that there were three sources of knowledge. This is, firstly, an object that is in the focus of cognitive interest; secondly, the subject himself with his inherent cognitive abilities; thirdly, the social conditions of cognition. At the same time, the positive content of knowledge was seen mainly in the object; the subject is a source of interference and illusions, but at the same time provides a creative and constructive nature of knowledge; social conditions are wholly responsible for prejudice and error. A number of modern epistemologists have taken a significantly different position. They argue that all three sources of knowledge are in fact reducible to one - to the social conditions of knowledge. Both subject and object are social constructs; only that which is part of the human world is known, and in the way that social norms and rules dictate it. Thus, both the content and the form of knowledge are social from beginning to end - such is the point of view of some (but not all) supporters of S. e. Question status. Within S. e. three main directions can be distinguished, associated respectively with the names of their representatives: D. Bloor (Edinburgh), S. Fuller (Warwick) and E. Goldman (Arizona). Each of them is positioned in its own way in relation to classical epistemology and philosophy in general. So, blur in the spirit of the "naturalistic trend" gives the status of "authentic theory of knowledge" of cognitive sociology, designed to replace the philosophical analysis of knowledge. G oldman recognizes the importance of many scientific disciplines for the theory of knowledge, but emphasizes that it should not be just their empirical union. Epistemology should retain its distinction from the "positive sciences"; not only a description of the cognitive process, but also its normative assessment in relation to truth and validity is the essence of its "social epistemics" as a variant of the analytical theory of knowledge. Fulle p occupies an intermediate position and follows the path of synthesizing the philosophy of K. Popper, J. Habermas and M. Foucault. He considers S. e. not just as one of the versions of the modern theory of knowledge, but as its global and integrative perspective, closely related to what is called “science and technology studies”. A detailed (although not devoid of bias, does not mention the work of D. Bloor with the subtitle "Social Theory of Knowledge") analysis of SE is given by E. Goldman in the article of the same name in the Stanford Philosophical Encyclopedia. He defines it as the study of the social dimensions of knowledge or information, but finds significantly different opinions about what the term "knowledge" covers, what is the scope of the "social" and what kind of socio-epistemological research and its purpose should be. According to some authors, the SE should retain the basic tenet of classical epistemology, given, however, that the latter was too individualistic. According to other authors, SE should be a more radical departure from the classical one and, at the same time, replace it altogether as a given discipline. prospects social epistemology Some representatives of social epistemology consider the concepts of rationality, truth, normativity generally alien to the socio-epistemological approach. This is the path to the minimization of philosophy in epistemology, to the transformation of the latter into a branch of sociology or psychology. But even so, it is difficult to completely abandon some of the basic norms of rational discourse that limit the freedom of permissiveness in theoretical consciousness. They form the basis of the version of social epistemology that the author of these lines and his colleagues are developing. We designate the first fundamental thesis as anthropologism: a person has a mind that distinguishes him from other natural phenomena, endows him with special abilities and special responsibility. Anthropologism opposes total ecologism and biologism, which affirm the equality of all biological species and the primacy of man's natural conditionality over sociocultural one. The second thesis, the thesis of reflexivity, emphasizes the difference between image and object, knowledge and consciousness, method and activity, and indicates that the normative approach refers only to the first members of these dichotomies. This thesis is opposed to the extreme descriptivism in the style of L. Wittgenstein, who exaggerates the importance of case studies and the practice of participant observation. Criticism is the third thesis of the new social epistemology. It involves radical doubt, the application of "Occam's razor" to the results of interpretation, intuitive insight and creative imagination. At the same time, the edge of criticism is aimed at mystical intuitionism as an epistemological practice of connecting to the "stream of world consciousness". This does not mean limiting epistemological analysis to scientific knowledge. Forms of extra-scientific knowledge should undoubtedly be studied using objective sources - the results of religious studies, ethnographic, cultural studies. And finally, the regulative ideal of truth should be preserved as a condition for theoretical knowledge and its analysis. At the same time, it is necessary to build a typological definition of truth, which would allow operational use in the context of a variety of types of knowledge and activity. This position is opposed to both naive realism and relativism. About the subject C. e. With all the evidence of the central question - what is sociality? - it is rarely stated explicitly and just as rarely purposefully solved in foreign works on S. e. a banal definition of sociality as interests, political forces, the sphere of the irrational, interactions, groups and communities. It turns out that S. e. simply borrows an element of the subject area from sociology, cultural studies, history, and social psychology, which fits perfectly into the naturalistic orientation of a number of currents in modern philosophy. However, philosophical thinking itself, as a rule, assumes a different position.
Philosophy gives independent definitions of man and the world, proceeding precisely from their correlation and building a specific concept of "the world of man." Therefore, one of the main tasks of S. e. today - to understand what kind of sociality we are talking about in the context of the philosophical analysis of knowledge. Refine common her understanding of knowledge to sociality and the relation of sociality to knowledge - allows, the typology of sociality. The first type of sociality is the permeation of knowledge with forms of activity and communication, the ability to express them in a specific way, by assimilating and displaying their structure. This is the “internal sociality” of cognition, a property that is inherent in the cognitive activity of a person, even if he is excluded from all available social connections (Robinson Crusoe). The ability of the subject to think, generalizing his practical acts and subjecting to reflection the procedures of thinking itself, is a socio-cultural product embedded in a person by education and experience. At the same time, the subject produces ideal schemes and conducts mental experiments, creating conditions for the possibility of activity and communication. The second type of sociality - "external sociality" - acts as a dependence of the spatio-temporal characteristics of knowledge on the state of social systems (speed, breadth, depth, openness, concealment). Social systems also shape the requirements for knowledge and the criteria for its acceptance. The cognizing subject uses images and analogies gleaned from contemporary society. Natural science atomism was inspired by individualistic ideology and morality. Within the framework of the mechanistic paradigm, God himself received the interpretation of the "supreme watchmaker". The methodology of empiricism and experimentalism is indebted to travel and adventure in the context of the great geographical discoveries. All these are signs of the relation of knowledge to the era of the New Age. The third type of sociality is represented by "open sociality". It expresses the inclusion of knowledge in cultural dynamics, or the fact that the total sphere of culture is the main cognitive resource of a person. The ability of a person to remove an arbitrarily chosen book from the library shelf and fall into dependence on the thoughts read is a sign of his belonging to culture. Culture is the source of creativity, creativity is the openness of knowledge to culture, you can create only standing on the shoulders of titans. The same fact that knowledge exists in many different cultural forms and types is another manifestation of open sociality. A specific study of the types of sociality involves the involvement in the epistemological turnover of the results and methods of the social sciences and the humanities.
Hence the importance of the interdisciplinary orientation of S. e. S.'s methods e. In a number of specific techniques of S. e. the leading place is occupied by borrowings from the social sciences and the humanities. The practice of case studies and "field" studies of laboratories is adopted from the history and sociology of science. The theory of rhetoric is applied as an approach to the analysis of scientific discourse. Another analytical method used in S. e. is the theory of probability. For example, it can be used to prescribe rational changes in the degree of conviction of the cognitive subject, in assessing the degree of trust in other subjects and their degree of conviction (see: Lehrer K., Wagner C. Rational Consensus in Science and Society. Dordrecht, 1981) . For social epistemology, some methods of economic analysis, game theory, can also be useful. As the most typical method S. e.
31. Phenomenology as a direction of modern philosophy
case studies. The idea of case studies is the most complete and theoretically unloaded description of a particular cognitive episode in order to demonstrate ("show") the social nature of cognition. The task is to show how social factors determine the fundamental decisions of the cognizing subject (formation, promotion, justification, choice of idea or concept).
Phenomenology
Phenomenology is one of the leading and most influential trends in philosophy and culture of the 20th century. The ideas of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), the founder of phenomenology, had a huge impact on all major currents in philosophy, as well as on law and sociology, political science, ethics, aesthetics, psychology and psychiatry. The spread of phenomenology is not limited by the limits of European philosophizing: having arisen in Germany, it has developed and continues to develop actively in other countries, including Russia.
The main idea of phenomenology is intentionality (from Latin intentio - striving), which implies the inseparability and at the same time the irreducibility of consciousness and being - human being and the objective world. Intentionality expresses Husserl's original thesis "Back to the objects themselves", which means the recreation of directly experienced life meanings that arise between consciousness and the object.
From the point of view of phenomenology, the formulation of the question of the world itself is completely incorrect - objects must be understood as correlated with consciousness. The objectness of the world is correlative - objects are always correlated with memory, fantasy, judgment, that is, objectivity is always experienced. Consciousness is always consciousness of something, therefore, phenomenological analysis is an analysis of consciousness itself, in which it represents the world.
The meaning and meaning of the object in this case correlates with how it is grasped by consciousness. Thus, phenomenology is focused not on revealing previously unknown knowledge about the world and bringing it into line with what is already known, but on presenting the very process of perceiving the world, that is, to show the conditions and possibilities of knowledge as a process of forming meanings that are seen in the properties and functions of the subject. Consciousness, in other words, is indifferent to whether objects really exist or whether they are an illusion or a mirage, because in the reality of consciousness, experiences are intertwined just like water jets twist and intertwine in a common stream. There is nothing in consciousness but the meanings of real, illusory or imaginary objects.
Phenomenology has undergone significant changes both in the concept of its founder Husserl and in many modifications, so that its history, notes the famous French philosopher Paul Ricoeur, can be presented as the history of Husserl's "heresies". Husserl begins with the idea of creating a science about science - the philosophical science of science. Philosophy, he writes, "is called upon to be a rigorous science and, moreover, one that would satisfy the highest theoretical needs, and in an ethical-religious sense would make life possible, governed by the pure norms of reason." The philosopher wants to give a clear answer to the question of what "things", "events", "laws of nature" are in essence, and therefore asks about the essence of a theory and the very possibility of its existence. Phenomenology at the beginning of its formation claimed precisely to build philosophy as a rigorous science. That is exactly what - "Philosophy as a rigorous science" - is the name of one of Husserl's main works of the early period.
Especially active in his early works, Husserl opposes psychologism, which grew up on the basis of experimental psychology that claims to be accurate. Psychologism developed such an idea of logic and logical thinking, in which it was based on the forms of people's life behavior - the truth in this case turned out to be relative and subjectivized, since it acted as a result of a person's "feeling" of his experiences in the world of objects.
Rightly pointing to the proximity of psychologism with the idea of Protagoras, according to which man is the measure of all things , Husserl will develop his scientific doctrine as a doctrine of a single truth that overcomes all temporality. And this ideal truth must undoubtedly possess universal obligatory nature and the property of self-evidence.
The discovery of this obvious truth presupposes a special method of moving towards it.
The meaning of the word PHENOMENOLOGY in the Newest Philosophical Dictionary
Husserl starts from a position he calls natural setting in which the philosopher, like every person, is addressed to the fullness of human life - its natural course, in the process of which humanity purposefully transforms the world in acts of will and action. natural world is understood in this case as the totality of things, living beings, social institutions and forms of cultural life. The natural attitude is nothing but a form of realization of the cumulative life of mankind, which proceeds naturally and practically. But the true philosophical position, which Husserl calls transcendental, is carried out in opposition to the natural attitude - what is significant for everyday life must be eliminated from philosophical knowledge. The philosopher should not turn the natural attitude into the starting point of his analysis, he should only preserve the idea of the givenness of the world in which man lives.
Therefore, it is necessary to reveal the generic essence of thinking and cognition, and for this to carry out a special cognitive action, which is called phenomenological reduction . The natural attitude must be overcome by the transcendental understanding of consciousness.
The first stage of the phenomenological reduction is the eidental reduction, in which the phenomenologist "brackets" the entire real world, refrains from any evaluations and judgments.
Husserl calls this operation « era» . All statements that arise in the process of natural attitude are the result of « era» overcome. Freeing himself at the first stage from using any judgments concerning the spatio-temporal existence of the world, the phenomenologist at the second stage of phenomenological reduction brackets all the judgments and thoughts of an ordinary person about consciousness and spiritual processes.
Only after the operation of cleansing the consciousness is able to deal with the consideration of phenomena - integral elements of the perception of the world, grasped in intuitive acts. This stream of consciousness cannot be observed from the outside, it can only be experienced - and in this experience each person establishes for himself the undoubted truth of the essences of the world. The meaning of life is, as it were, directly grasped by the experiencing consciousness of the phenomenologist.
In phenomenological intentional analysis, a holistic sequence of perceptions is built, the main positions of which are acts, subject aspect (noema) and aspect of consciousness (noesis) . The unity of the noematic and noetic aspects of conscious activity provides, according to Husserl, the synthesis of consciousness: the integrity of the object is reproduced by the holistic consciousness. The representative of the philosophy of existentialism, J.P. Sartre, who was strongly influenced by Husserl's ideas, writes that “Husserl reintroduced charm into things themselves. He returned to us the world of artists and prophets: frightening, hostile, dangerous, with shelters of the grace of love. In other words, phenomenology restores trust in the things themselves without dissolving them in the perceiving consciousness. There are grounds for such an assertion: the phenomenological method is interpreted as a way of intuitively contemplative "perception of the essence" through phenomena. That is, the givenness of consciousness through which this or that reality or semantic content represents itself.
Husserl designates the phenomenon with the following words: “self-revealing, revealing itself through self-revealing”. A feature of the phenomenon is that it is multi-layered and includes both direct evidence and experience, as well as meanings and meanings that rely through the subject. It is in the meanings that the relation to the object is constructed: as a result, it turns out that using statements in accordance with the meaning and using the statement to enter into a relation to the object means one and the same thing.
Consciousness in this case, as it were, opens up to meet the objective world, seeing in it not random features and characteristics, but objective universality. At the same time, the phenomenon is not an element of the real world - it is created and controlled by a phenomenologist for the most complete penetration into the stream of perceiving consciousness and detection of its essence.
Phenomenological reflection means nothing more than an appeal to the analysis of the essential principles of individual consciousness, in which self-observation, introspection, self-reflection are very important. The phenomenologist must learn to imagine - to perceive entities in the world and freely navigate in the world of "self-revealing entities" that he creates. At the same time, the structure of perception is temporal or temporal: now - the point is connected with retention (remembering) and protention (expectation). It should be noted that in this case Husserl develops the understanding of time that was already established in medieval philosophy by Augustine: it is not about objective time, but about the time of experience. Ultimately, the phenomenological understanding of consciousness and time turns out to be focused on the utmost attention to the world and is expressed in the imperative: “Look!”.
Subsequently, phenomenology evolved from an empirical or descriptive orientation towards transcendentalism, seeking to correlate the idea of intentionality and phenomenon with the structure of the real world as a universe of vital connections. In the works of 20-30 years. Husserl addresses the issues intersubjectivity, which raises the question of the socio-historical prerequisites for the deployment of consciousness. In other words, the problem of interaction and understanding of phenomenological subjects is solved, because the procedure of "bracketing" in a certain sense led to the loss of the possibilities of understanding and communication.
Justifying this sphere of interaction, Husserl introduces the concept "life world" , which is understood as a sphere and a set of "initial evidence" and is the basis of all knowledge. A person carries out a certain perception of himself as immersed in the world and retains this perception in its constant significance and further development. The life world is pre-scientific in the sense that it was given before science and continues to exist in this origin. The life world is primordial and primary to any possible experience. The task of phenomenology in this case is to give value to the primordial primordial right of vital evidence and to recognize the undoubted priority of the life world in comparison with the values of objective-logical evidence.
Further development of the phenomenological tradition in the works of M. Heidegger (1889-1976), G. Shpet (1879-1940), R. Ingarden (1893-1970), M. Scheler (1874-1928), M. Merleau-Ponty (1908- 1961), J. - P. Sartre (1905-1980) is connected, on the one hand, with the assimilation of her method, and on the other hand, with criticism of the main Husserlian provisions. M. Heidegger, developing and transforming the idea of intentionality, defined human existence itself as the inseparability of the world and man, therefore the problem of consciousness, to which Husserl paid so much attention, fades into the background. Speech in this case will not be about the diversity of phenomena, but about the only fundamental phenomenon - human existence.
Truth appears as the correctness of representation revealed to man.
The Russian phenomenologist G. Shpet turned to the study of the problems of ethnic psychology as an irreducible reality of ideological integrity and experience. J. - P. Sartre presents a description of the existential structures of consciousness, deprived of the possibility of understanding and identification. The Polish phenomenologist R. Ingarden studied the problems of life, cultural (cognitive, aesthetic and social) and moral values and customs, understanding values as cultural entities that mediate between man and the world. For the French phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty, the source of the meaning of existence is in the human animate body, which acts as an intermediary between consciousness and the world.
Having developed ideas about the existence of consciousness, phenomenology has had and continues to influence most of the philosophical and cultural trends of the twentieth century. The problems of meaning, meaning, interpretation, interpretation and understanding are actualized precisely by the phenomenological tradition, the dignity of which lies in the fact that the phenomenological doctrine of consciousness reveals the limiting possibilities of the diverse ways of meaning formation.
Phenomenology is one of the most influential philosophical movements of the 20th century. The founder of phenomenology is the German philosopher-idealist, mathematician Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), who sought to turn philosophy into a "rigorous science" through the phenomenological method. His students Max Scheler, Gerhard Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Roman Ingarden introduced phenomenological principles into ethics, sociology, jurisprudence, psychology, aesthetics, literary criticism. Phenomenology is close to existentialism, which, having become the most influential trend in Western European culture after the Second World War, was based on Husserl's phenomenology to the same extent as on the philosophy of S. Kierkegaard. According to Husserl's definition, phenomenology denotes a descriptive philosophical method, which at the end of the last century established an a priori psychological discipline, which turned out to be able to create the basis for the construction of all empirical psychology. In addition, he considered phenomenology to be a universal philosophy, on the basis of which a methodological revision of all sciences can be made. Husserl believed that his method was the key to understanding the essence of things. He did not divide the world into appearance and essence. Analyzing consciousness, he investigated subjective cognition and its object at the same time. The object is the activity of consciousness itself; the form of this activity is an intentional act, intentionality. Intentionality - the constitution of an object by consciousness - is a key concept of phenomenology. The first attempt to apply phenomenology to the philosophy of art and literary criticism was made by W. Konrad in 1908. Konrad considered the "aesthetic object" to be the subject of phenomenological research and distinguished it from the objects of the physical world.
The next important step in the history of phenomenology is the activity of the Polish scientist Ingarden. As an object of study, Ingarden chose fiction, the intentional nature of which he considered obvious, trying to show that the structure of a literary work is both a way of its existence and its essence. The existentialist version of the phenomenological approach to literature is characterized by a shift in emphasis from "transcendent subjectivity" to "human existence". Phenomenology in its Husserlian version strove to be a science. Existentialists, and above all M. Heidegger, often replaced the tradition of logical methodological research with intuitive calculations. Heidegger's Being and Time (1927) had a marked influence on French existentialism. If Husserl's phenomenological reduction led him to pure consciousness, the essence of which was a constitutive act, intentionality, then Heidegger turned pure consciousness into a type of existential "primitive consciousness". He most fully used the phenomenological-existential orientation in the study literary creativity E. Steiger in the book "Time as a Poet's Imagination" (1939). W.Kaiser's monograph "A Work of Verbal Art" (1938) continued the study of literature in this direction. J. Pfeiffer, the popularizer of the work of Heidegger, Jaspers and M. Geiger, in his thesis of 1931 defined the phenomenological semantic method of research. The main principle of the phenomenological-existentialist approach to literature is the consideration artwork as a self-contained and “perfect” expression by a person of his ideas. According to this concept, a work of art fulfills its purpose by the very fact of its existence, it reveals the foundations of human existence. It is pointed out that a work of art should not and cannot have a purpose other than ontological and aesthetic. hallmark French philosophers of art is that they adhere to a more scientifically rigorous methodology and are much more rational in their approach to a work of art (M. Dufrenne, J.P. Sartre, M. Merleau-Ponty).
The methodological principles of the phenomenological analysis of a literary work are based on the assertion that phenomenology - a descriptive scientific method that considers a phenomenon out of context, based on itself. Complex phenomena are dissected into separate components, levels, layers, thereby revealing the structure of the phenomenon. The phenomenological description and disclosure of the structure constitutes the first methodological step in the study of a literary work. Descriptive and structural analysis lead phenomenologists to an ontological study of the phenomenon. The application of ontology in literary studies constitutes the second most important aspect of the phenomenological approach to literature. The third essential issue of the phenomenological approach is related to the identification of the relation of a work of art to reality, i.e. with the identification of the role of causality in the phenomenological concept of a work of art.
Phenomenological method
The method of identifying layers in a phenomenological description was first used by Husserl, who built a “model” of the layered structure of an object perceived by consciousness, the essence of which is that its layers, representing each separately an independent unit, together create an integral structure. Ingarden applied this principle to a literary work. It was phenomenologists who first approached the study of the structure of a work of art, i.e. applied the methodology used later by structuralism. Some Eastern European scientists (Z.Konstantinovich, G.Vaida) consider phenomenological method of research by the German equivalent of Russian formalism(see Formal School) and the Anglo-American New Criticism. The most widely accepted idea is that the phenomenological method considers a work of art as a whole. Everything that can be found out about a work is contained in it, it carries its own value, has an autonomous existence and is built according to its own laws. The existentialist version of the phenomenological method, based on the same principles, differs only in that it highlights the inner experience of the interpreter of the work, emphasizes his “parallel flow” with the work, his creative abilities necessary for the analysis of the work of art. The phenomenological method considers the work of art outside the process of reality, separates it from the realm of reality and “brackets” not only reality that exists outside of consciousness, but also the subjective psychological reality of the artist’s consciousness in order to approach “pure” (transcendental) consciousness and pure phenomenon (essence). ).
In the United States, since the early 1970s, there has been a gradual, but clearly tangible change in orientation from the neopositivist model of cognition to phenomenological. The appeal to the phenomenological methodology, which postulates the inseparability of subject and object in the act of cognition, was explained by the desire to offer something new in comparison with the traditional methods of "new criticism". The consideration of a work of art as an object that exists independently of its creator and the subject that perceives it, under the influence of the revision of subject-object relations in philosophy, has been replaced by the development of a set of problems related to the relationship "author-work-reader". European in origin varieties of receptive aesthetics, which analyzes the relationship "work - reader" and the Geneva School, which reveals the relationship "author - work", are becoming relevant for American criticism in a new way. In the United States, there are three schools of phenomenological methodology: receptive criticism, or the reader's reaction school; criticism of consciousness; Buffalo School of Critics. The subject of research in these literary-critical schools is the phenomena of consciousness.
However, there are significant differences between these schools, and above all in terms of the basic concept - the relationship "reader - text". Critics of consciousness view the text as the embodiment of the author's consciousness, which is mystically shared by the receptive reader. Critics of the Buffalo school argue that the reader unconsciously shapes and determines the text in accordance with his personality. Receptionists consider the text as a kind of "controller" of the reader's response process. The unprincipledness of the discrepancies is removed by the conviction that any characteristics of the work should be derived from the activity of the cognizing subject. All varieties of phenomenological criticism emphasize the active role of the reader as the subject of aesthetic perception.
The word phenomenology comes from English phenomenology, German Phanomenologie, French phenomenologie.