NEP and the accelerated construction of socialism
New economic policy, proclaimed by the X Congress of the RCP (b), was a whole system of measures aimed at creating conditions for the revival of the Russian economy. These measures were developed already in the course of the announced new economic policy, which can be represented as a series of successive stages. The main efforts had to be directed against the growing food crisis, which could only be eliminated by raising agriculture. In the absence of state funds for this, it was necessary to liberate the manufacturer, give him incentives for the development of production. It was precisely for this that the central measure of the NEP was directed - the replacement of the surplus appropriation with the tax in kind. The size of the tax was much less than the apportionment, it was progressive in nature, i.e. decreased in the event that the peasant took care of increasing production, and allowed the peasant to freely dispose of the surplus products that he had left after paying the tax.

In 1922 measures to help the peasantry were intensified. The tax in kind was reduced by 10% compared to the previous year, but most importantly: it was announced that the peasant was free to choose the forms of land use and even hiring labor and renting land was allowed. The peasantry of Russia has already realized the advantage of the new policy, to which were added favorable weather conditions, which made it possible to grow and reap a good harvest. It was the most significant in all the years since the October Revolution. As a result, after the tax was handed over to the state, the peasant had a surplus that he could dispose of freely.

However, it was necessary to create conditions for the free sale of agricultural products. This was to be facilitated by the commercial and financial aspects of the New Economic Policy. The freedom of private trade was announced simultaneously with the transition from allotment to tax in kind. But in the speech of V.I. Lenin at the Tenth Party Congress, free trade was understood only as a product exchange between town and countryside, within the limits of local economic turnover. At the same time, preference was given to exchange through cooperatives, and not through the market. Such an exchange seemed unprofitable to the peasantry, and Lenin already in the autumn of 1921 admitted that the exchange of goods between the city and the countryside had broken down and resulted in buying and selling at "black market" prices. I had to go to the removal of limited free trade, encourage retail trade and put the private trader on an equal footing in trade with the state and cooperatives.

In turn, free trade demanded order in the financial system of the state, which in the early 20s. existed only nominally, because in the concept of the Bolsheviks on the creation of a socialist state, except for the nationalization of banks, no place was given to finance.

Even the introduction of the New Economic Policy did not provide for measures to restore order in the sphere of finance, because the exchange of goods could be carried out without money. The state budget was drawn up formally, the estimates of enterprises and institutions were also formally approved. All expenses were covered by printing unsecured paper money, so the rate of inflation was uncontrollable. Already in 1921, the state was forced to take a number of steps aimed at the rehabilitation of money. Individuals and organizations were allowed to keep any amount of money in savings banks and use their deposits without restrictions. Then the state ceased uncontrolled financing of industrial enterprises, some of which were transferred to self-financing, and some were leased. These enterprises had to pay taxes to the state budget, which covered a certain part of state revenues. The status of the State Bank was approved, which also switched to self-supporting principles, was interested in receiving income from lending to industry, agriculture and trade. Finally, measures were taken to stabilize the Russian currency, which were carried out in 1922-1924. and received the name of financial reform. Its creators are considered to be People's Commissar for Finance G. Sokolnikov, the director of the State Bank, the Bolshevik Sheiman, and a member of the board of the bank, the former minister of the tsarist government under S.Yu. Witte N.N. Cutler.

The rapid rise of agriculture, the revival of trade and measures to strengthen the financial system made it possible to move on to measures to stabilize the situation in industry, on the fate of which depended the fate of the working class and the entire Soviet state. Industrial policy was not formulated immediately, since the rise of industry depended on the state of affairs in other sectors of the national economy, primarily in the agricultural sector. In addition, it was beyond the power of the state to raise the entire industry at once, and a number of priorities had to be identified with which to start. They were formulated in a speech by V.I. Lenin at the XI Conference of the RCP (b) in May 1921 and were as follows: support for small and medium-sized enterprises with the participation of private and equity capital; reorientation of the production programs of a part of large enterprises to the production of consumer and peasant products; the transfer of all large-scale industry to self-financing, while expanding the independence and initiative of each enterprise. These provisions formed the basis of industrial policy, which began to be implemented in stages.

The new economic policy came into life gradually, manifested itself in different ways in various sectors of the national economy and provoked sharp criticism both from the part of the working class, concentrated primarily on large industrial enterprises, the fate of which was to be decided last, and from the part of the working class. leadership of the Bolshevik Party, who did not want to "compromise principles." As a result, the new economic policy went through a series of acute socio-political and economic crises that kept the whole country in suspense in the 1920s. The first crisis occurred already in 1922, when successes in stabilizing the national economy were not yet visible, but some negative aspects of the NEP appeared: the role of private capital increased, especially in trade, the term “Nepman” appeared, and a revival of bourgeois ideology was observed. Part of the Bolshevik leadership began to openly express dissatisfaction with the NEP, and its creator V.I. Lenin was forced to declare at the 11th Party Congress that the retreat in the sense of concessions to capitalism was over and private capital had to be placed within the proper limits and regulated.

However, the successes in the agricultural sector in 1922-1923. somewhat reduced the severity of the confrontation in the leadership and gave the NEP internal impulses for development. In 1923, the disproportion in the development of agriculture, which had been accelerating for two years already, and in industry, which had just begun to emerge from the crisis, had its effect. A concrete manifestation of this disproportion was the "price crisis", or "price scissors". In conditions when agricultural production was already 70% of the 1913 level, and large-scale industrial production - only 39%, prices for agricultural products fell sharply, while prices for manufactured goods continued to remain high. On these "scissors" the village lost 500 million rubles, or half of its effective demand.

The discussion of the "price crisis" turned into an open party discussion, and a solution was found as a result of the application of purely economic measures. Prices for manufactured goods have fallen, and a good harvest in agriculture allowed the industry to find a wide and capacious market for the sale of their goods.

In 1924 a new "price crisis" began, but for other reasons. The peasants, having gathered a good harvest, decided not to sell it (bread) to the state at fixed prices, but to sell it on the market, where private merchants gave the peasants a good price. By the end of 1924, prices for agricultural products rose sharply and the bulk of the profits went into the hands of the most prosperous peasants - the holders of bread. The discussion about the “crisis of prices” broke out again in the party, which was already more acute, as the leaders of the party split into supporters of continued encouragement of the development of the agrarian sector and further concessions to the peasantry and a very influential force that insisted on increased attention to the development of heavy industry. And although the supporters of the first point of view formally won and also got out of this crisis by economic methods, this was their last victory. In addition, hasty measures were taken to restrict the private trader in the market, which led to its disorganization and discontent of the working masses.

In the mid 20s. NEP's success in reviving the Russian economy was obvious. They were especially affected in the field of agriculture, which practically restored the level of pre-war production. State purchases of grain from the peasants in 1925 amounted to 8.9 million tons. Funds for the development of industry were accumulated in the countryside as a result of overpayments by the peasants for manufactured goods, which continued to be sold at inflated prices. got stronger financial system Soviet state. The gold chervonets, universally introduced in March 1924, became a stable national currency, quite popular on the world market. The implementation of a strict credit and tax policy, the profitable sale of bread allowed the Soviet state to make big profits. Growth rates of industrial production in 1922 - 1927 averaged 30 - 40%, and agriculture - 12 - 14%.

However, despite the significant pace of development, the situation in industry, and especially in heavy industry, did not look very good. Industrial production by the mid-20s. still far behind the pre-war level. Difficulties in industrial development caused huge unemployment, which in 1923-1924. exceeded 1 million people. Unemployment mainly hit young people, who made up no more than 20% of those employed in production. These distortions in the development of the national economy began to be seen by some of the leadership as undermining the social base of Soviet power.

These two reasons: the euphoria from the real successes in the economy and the difficulties in implementing industrial policy led to the beginning of a turn in the implementation of the NEP, which took place in the second half of the 1920s. Already in 1925-26 households. In 1999, the Soviet government planned a huge export of grain for the purchase of foreign equipment for the re-equipment of domestic industry. In addition, measures were envisaged to strengthen the centralized management of the economy and to strengthen the public sector in the national economy. This policy ran into new economic difficulties. In 1925, the volume of grain procurements was reduced and the government was forced to abandon its plans. Investment in industry declined, imports fell, and the countryside again experienced a shortage of manufactured goods. It was decided to increase the agricultural tax on kulaks and at the same time to think over a system of state measures to regulate prices. These measures were already administrative, not economic in nature.

Despite the measures taken, state grain procurements not only did not grow, but even decreased. In 1926, 11.6 million tons of grain were harvested, in 1927 - 11, and in 1928 - 10.9. Meanwhile, the industry demanded an increase in capital investments. In 1927, the volume of industrial production for the first time exceeded the pre-war level. New industrial construction began. In 1926, 4 large power plants were built in the country and 7 new mines were launched, and in 1927, 14 more power plants, including Dneproges and 16 mines. Money for industry was sought through emission, which in 1926-1928. amounted to 1.3-1.4 billion rubles; by raising prices; through the export of grain, which in 1928 amounted to 89 thousand tons; by seeking funds within industry itself - already in 1925, large-scale industry's own savings covered 41.5% of all its expenses.

However, all these sources could not cover the shortage of funds for financing industry in conditions when the pace of its development began to increase. The fate of industry was in the hands of the peasant, who had to be forced again to give everything he produced to the state. The fate of NEP depended on the methods used to resolve the issue of relations between town and countryside.

Meanwhile, the state of affairs in agriculture and the countryside was not easy. On the one hand, the rise of industry and the introduction of hard currency stimulated the restoration of agriculture. The sown areas began to gradually increase: in 1923 they reached 91.7 million hectares, which was 99.3% of the level of 1913. In 1925, the gross grain harvest was almost 20.7% higher than the average annual harvest for 1909-1913 . By 1927, the pre-war level was almost reached in animal husbandry. However, the growth of large commodity peasant farming was restrained by tax policy. In 1922-1923. was exempted from agricultural tax 3%, in 1923-1924. - 14%, in 1925-1926. - 25%, in 1927 - 35% of the poorest peasant farms. Wealthy peasants and kulaks, who made up in 1923-1924. 9.6% of peasant households paid 29.2% of the tax amount. In the future, the share of this group in taxation increased even more. As a result, the rate of fragmentation of peasant farms was in the 20s. twice as high as before the revolution, with all the ensuing negative consequences for the development of production and especially its marketability. By separating the farms, the wealthy sections of the countryside tried to escape from the tax pressure. The low marketability of peasant farms held back, and then led to underestimated exports of agricultural products, and hence imports, which are so necessary for the modernization of the country's equipment.

Already at the XV Congress of the CPSU (b) in December 1927, in a speech by I.V. Stalin emphasized the need for a gradual but steady unification of individual peasant farms into large economic collectives. The crisis in grain procurements in the winter of 1928 played an important role in the transition to a different variant of the country's development. After his trip to Siberia in January 1928, I.V. Stalin became a supporter of the use of emergency measures during grain procurements: the application of the relevant articles of the criminal code, the forcible seizure of grain from the peasants.

The results of the new economic policy cannot be assessed unambiguously. On the one hand, its impact on the economy should be recognized as favorable. In the 20s. managed to restore the national economy and even surpass the pre-war level solely at the expense of internal reserves. Successes in the revival of agriculture made it possible to feed the population of the country, and in 1927-28. The USSR overtook pre-revolutionary Russia in terms of food consumption: the townspeople and especially the peasants began to eat better than before the revolution. Thus, the consumption of bread per capita by peasants increased in 1928 to 250 kg (before 1921 - 217), meat - 25 kg (before 1917 - 12 kg). The national income at that time increased by 18% per year and by 1928 it was 10% higher per capita than the level of 1913. And this was not a simple quantitative increase. During 1924 - 1928, when industry was not just recovering, but switched to expanded reproduction, with an increase in the number of labor forces by 10% per year, the growth in industrial output amounted to 30% annually, which indicated a rapid growth in labor productivity. The strong national currency of the Soviet country made it possible to use export-import operations to revive the economy, although their scale was insignificant due to the intransigence of both sides. The material well-being of the population increased. In 1925-1926. the average working day for industrial workers was 7.4 hours. The share of those who worked overtime gradually decreased from 23.1% in 1923 to 18% in 1928. All workers and employees had the right to regular annual leave of at least two weeks. The years of NEP are characterized by an increase in the real wages of workers, which in 1925-1926. the average for industry was 93.7% of the pre-war level.

On the other hand, the implementation of the NEP was difficult and was accompanied by a number of negative aspects. The main one was associated with the disproportionate development of the main sectors of the country's economy. Successes in the restoration of agriculture and the obvious lag in the pace of the revival of industry led the New Economic Policy through a period of economic crises, which were extremely difficult to resolve by economic methods alone. In the countryside, there was a social and property differentiation of the peasantry, which led to an increase in tension between the various poles. in the city throughout the 1920s. unemployment increased, which by the end of the NEP amounted to more than 2 million people. Unemployment created an unhealthy climate in the city. The financial system got stronger only for a while. Already in the second half of the 20s. in connection with the active financing of heavy industry, the market equilibrium was disturbed, inflation began, which undermined the financial and credit system. However, the main contradiction that led to the collapse of the New Economic Policy lay not in the sphere of the economy, which could develop further on the principles of the NEP, but between the economy and the political system, designed to use administrative-command methods of management. This contradiction became irreconcilable in the late 1920s, and the political system resolved it by curtailing the NEP.

It must be emphasized that in the specific conditions of the existence of the USSR at the turn of the 20s - 30s, in a situation where the country was surrounded by a ring of hostile states, when, in order to solve a qualitatively new and super-difficult task of modernizing the country with the aim of decisive, and most importantly, quickly overcoming backwardness, the USSR could not count on an influx of foreign capital (a prerequisite for industrialization is the example of France, the USA, tsarist Russia and other countries), and the possibilities of the NEP were very limited.

At the same time, it should be noted that the Leninist NEP, as the famous American historian W. Davis wrote, gave the world three elements of the economy of the future: government regulation, a mixed economy, and private enterprise. The example of today's China, which successfully solves the problems of its economic development on the principles of neo-nep, testifies to the great historical significance of the economic policy of the Bolsheviks in the 1920s.

Intra-party struggle
As already noted, the new economic policy gave rise to a number of serious contradictions. A large proportion of them were of a political nature, because the "private revival of capitalism" was carried out by the party, the formation of which took place not on the path of compromise with capital, but in a tough and merciless struggle against it. A significant part of the communists, as well as significant segments of the population, perceived the NEP as a return to private property, and with it - to social injustice and inequality. The “Workers' Opposition”, which had a fairly broad base in the party and the working class, practically did not accept the new course. Its leaders A. Shlyapnikov and V. Medvedev openly declared that the NEP was incompatible with the principles of the dictatorship of the proletariat and contrary to the spirit and letter of the party program. They believed that the peasantry, the bourgeoisie and the urban philistinism took advantage of the fruits of the victory of the working class, while the proletarians again turned into exploited sections of society. The "Working Group" headed by A. Myasnikov opposed the NEP, deciphering this abbreviation as "new exploitation of the proletariat." The party leadership could not disregard the forecasts of the Russian emigration about the development of the Soviet state along the path of the New Economic Policy. In the early 20s. “Smenovekhovism” appeared, the ideologists of which, in particular N. Ustryalov, called on the emigration to make peace with Soviet power and abandon active struggle against it, because “revolutionary Russia is turning in its social essence into a “bourgeois”, proprietary country”. Such assessments echoed the assessments of the NEP within the Bolshevik Party, in which significant sections of the communists associated the possibility of restoring capitalism with the private-property psychology of the peasantry, which, under favorable conditions, could become the mass support of the counter-revolution. Many party members believed that the NEP did not advance, but threw back, conserving the routine and backwardness of the country.

If the party leaders were able to relatively easily remove the leaders of the "workers' opposition" from active political life, then with the oppositions that were already taking shape within the framework of the NEP course, the situation was much more complicated. Among the party elite, heated discussions are unfolding on the key problems of the country's socio-economic development, which have become, to a large extent, a kind of ideological veil of the struggle for power, characteristic of the internal party life of the 1920s.

L. Trotsky was the first to attack the Politburo. In the conditions of the crisis of 1923, he accused the "dictatorship of the party apparatus" of unsystematic economic decisions and of imposing in the RCP (b) orders incompatible with party democracy. Trotsky insisted on the "dictatorship of industry" in the national economy, which ultimately did not fit into the framework adopted at the Tenth Congress of the course towards an equal economic union of the working class and the peasantry. Simultaneously with Trotsky, 46 prominent members of the party addressed the Politburo with a letter (“Statement of the 46”, signed by E. Preobrazhensky, V. Serebryakov, A. Bubnov, G. Pyatakov and others), in which the majority faction in the Politburo was accused of inconsistent politics. The triumvirate formed on the basis of the struggle against Trotsky - Stalin - Zinoviev - Kamenev - managed at the XIII Party Conference (January 1924) to pass a resolution that characterized the views of Trotsky and his supporters as a "direct departure from Leninism" and as a "petty-bourgeois" deviation in the party. The XIII Congress of the RCP (b) supported the decisions of the party conference. Trotsky soon loses leading positions in the party and the army, but continues to be an authoritative leader, to claim leading roles in the party and the state.

Since the mid 20s. The question of the possibility of building socialism in one country became the center of attention of intra-party discussions. Back in 1916, V.I. Lenin theoretically substantiated the possibility of the victory of the socialist revolution in one country, and then later, in his last articles, gave a positive answer to this question. After the death of Lenin, I. Stalin firmly defended the Leninist course of building socialism in one country. It was obvious to Stalin that the industrial potential inherited from old Russia did not provide acceptable rates of economic development, since the main production assets of factories and plants were obsolete and hopelessly lagged behind modern requirements.

Foreign policy factors also played a role. In the mid 20s. relations between the USSR and Great Britain and China worsened. In August 1924, the "Dawes Plan" was adopted, and foreign, mainly American, loans went to Germany in a wide stream. The party leadership has repeatedly stressed that the country is in a hostile imperialist environment and lives under the constant threat of war. The agrarian country had no chance to survive in the event of a military confrontation with the industrialized powers. The need to modernize the country was increasingly evident. Finally, the problem of locating the economic potential, which was mainly concentrated in the European part of the country, had to be solved. A new location of production facilities was required.

Under the conditions of a changing international situation, above all the stabilization of capitalism in America and Europe, which made the possibility of a world revolution unrealistic, Stalin abandoned the concept of world revolution and world socialism and transferred the problem of building socialism in one country from an abstract theoretical area to the area of ​​party practice. In the autumn of 1925, G. Zinoviev spoke out against the theory of "socialism in one country". He criticized Stalin's "nationally limited" views, linking the possibilities of socialist construction in the USSR only with the victory of revolutions in Europe and the USA. At the same time, Zinoviev took a step towards Trotsky, supporting his conclusions about the impossibility of the victory of socialism in the USSR without the support of the world revolution. A "new opposition" has arisen. At the Fourteenth Party Congress, the "new opposition" tried to give battle to Stalin and Bukharin. At the center of criticism of the party leadership by the opposition were Stalin's ideas about the possibility of building socialism in the USSR, as well as the thesis about underestimating the danger of strengthening capitalist elements under the NEP. However, Stalin managed to carry out his decisions at the congress. The XIV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks went down in history as an industrialization congress: it made an extremely important decision to take a course towards achieving the economic independence of the USSR. In the field of the development of the national economy, the congress set the following tasks: "To ensure economic independence for the USSR, protecting the USSR from becoming an appendage of the capitalist world economy, for which purpose to head for the industrialization of the country, the development of production, the means of production and the formation of reserves for economic maneuvering."

After the Fourteenth Congress, the struggle in the party unfolded over the methods, rates and sources of accumulation for industrialization. Two approaches emerged: the left, led by L. Trotsky, called for super-industrialization, while the right, led by N. Bukharin, advocated softer transformations. Bukharin emphasized that the policy of over-industrialization, the transfer of funds from the agrarian sector of the economy to the industrial sector, would destroy the alliance between the working class and peasants. Stalin supported Bukharin's point of view until 1928. Speaking at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (April 1926), Stalin defended the thesis of "the minimum rate of development of industry, which is necessary for the victory of socialist construction." The 15th Party Congress in December 1927 adopted directives for drawing up the first five-year plan. This document formulated planning principles based on strict observance of proportions between accumulation and consumption, industry and agriculture, heavy and light industry, resources, and so on. The congress proceeded from the correct orientation towards the balanced development of the national economy. At the suggestion of the chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR Krzhizhanovsky, two versions of the five-year plan were developed - the starting (minimum) and optimal. The tasks of the optimal variant were about 20% higher than the minimum. The Central Committee of the party took as a basis the best version of the plan, which in May 1929 the All-Union Congress of Soviets adopted as a law. Historians, when evaluating the first five-year plan, unanimously note the balance of its tasks, which, despite their scale, were quite real.

However, at the end of 1929, I. Stalin switched to the point of view of the policy of a super-industrial leap. Speaking in December 1929 at the congress of shock workers, he put forward the slogan "Five-year plan - in four years!". At the same time, planned targets were revised in the direction of their increase. The task was set to double capital investments and increase production by 30% annually. A course is taken for the implementation of an industrial breakthrough in the shortest possible historical period. The course towards super-industrialization was largely due to the impatience of the party leadership, as well as of the general population, to put an end to acute socio-economic problems at once and ensure the victory of socialism in the USSR by revolutionary methods of radically breaking the existing economic structure and national economic proportions. The bet on the industrial breakthrough was also closely connected with the course towards the complete collectivization of agriculture, which subordinated this vast sector of the economy to the state and created favorable conditions for the transfer of financial, raw materials and labor resources from the agricultural sector of the economy to the industrial one.

Speaking about the reasons for the turn to an industrial leap, one should also keep in mind foreign policy aspects. In the second half of 1929, the Western countries from the period of stabilization enter a period of severe economic crisis, and hopes reappear in the Soviet leadership and conviction grows stronger in the approaching collapse of the bourgeois world. Under these conditions, as the Kremlin believed, a favorable moment had come for an industrial breakthrough into the advanced powers, thus the historical dispute with capitalism could be resolved in favor of socialism. Therefore, it is no coincidence that, justifying the turn to forced industrialization, Stalin especially emphasized: “... to slow down the pace means to lag behind. And the retards are beaten. But we don't want to be beaten... We are 50-100 years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it or we will be crushed.” Such an appeal seemed to many to be the only right decision and found a response in the general population.

From the point of view of the country's internal development, accelerated industrialization was dictated, in Stalin's opinion, as already noted, by the need to create the prerequisites for the speedy collectivization of the peasantry. Stalin and his supporters believed that it was impossible to somehow base Soviet power on both large-scale state industry and individual small-scale production, since the growth and aggravation of the class struggle on a scale dangerous for the existence of the Soviet system is inevitable.

The Stalinist model of development was a variant of stepwise modernization based on the maximum concentration of resources in the main line at the expense of straining the entire economic system. In this strategy, everything was aimed at increasing the pace of industrial development, so that in the shortest possible historical period not only to overcome backwardness, but also to bring the country to the rank of the great powers of the world. For the sake of high rates and their constant maintenance, it is proposed to expand investment in industry in every possible way, including through a reduction in the consumption fund and the most severe savings in funds that determine the standard of living of the masses, the transfer of funds from the area of ​​\u200b\u200bproduction of group B to group A, although this inevitably led to acute shortage of consumer goods, to commodity hunger. It was proclaimed acceptable to use not quite balanced, tense plans, which, in conditions of a shortage of goods, inevitably led to an inflationary rise in prices.

A detailed justification for the option of forced construction of socialism was given in the documents of the XVI-XVII congresses of the CPSU (b), in the reports and speeches of I.V. Stalin 1928-1934 A logical continuation of the adoption of the maximum rate of industrialization as the most important means of achieving it is the line of restructuring the methods, the very style of managing the national economy. Neither the rapid "transfer" of funds from the consumption funds to the accumulation fund, nor the widespread use of non-economic measures of pressure on the peasantry are possible in the context of the NEP and the development of commodity-market relations. Therefore, the abolition of the main provisions of the NEP was a necessary condition for the implementation of the development option that Stalin advocated. Instead of economic in the Stalinist version, the main place was to be occupied by administrative-command forms of managing the national economy.

How vital was Bukharin's model? In those specific political, socio-economic and foreign policy conditions in which the USSR found itself, the idea of ​​a balanced development of the industrial and agricultural sectors of the economy, its implementation was significantly limited due to the lack of an influx of foreign capital. In addition, the USSR did not have and could not have colonies. Also, our country could not use such a traditional source of "capitalist" industrialization as indemnity as a result of a victorious war of conquest. The complete absence of an influx of foreign capital and other traditional sources of Western modernization began to be compensated by minimizing non-production costs, the labor enthusiasm of the people, the transfer of funds from the agrarian sector to the industrial sector, and the widespread use of non-economic coercion.

Collectivization became an integral part of the Bolshevik modernization of the country. Collectivization had several main goals. First of all, this is the official goal, fixed in party and state documents, in speeches, etc., to carry out socialist transformations in the countryside: to create, instead of unprofitable small-scale peasant farms, large mechanized collective farms capable of providing the country with products and raw materials. However, this goal did not justify the often crude methods and extremely short deadlines for collectivization. In many ways, the forms, methods and timing of collectivization were explained by its second goal - to ensure at any cost an uninterrupted supply of cities that were growing rapidly in the course of industrial construction. The main features of collectivization, as it were, were projected from the strategy of forced industrialization. The frantic pace of industrial growth, urbanization required a sharp increase in extremely short periods of food supplies to the city, for export. This, in turn, determined the appropriate pace of collectivization and the methods of its implementation: a lack of capital, a shortage of goods inevitably led to an increase in non-economic coercion in the agrarian sector; bread, other products, the further, the more they did not buy from the peasants, but "took". This led to a reduction in production by prosperous households, to open actions of kulaks against local authorities and village activists.

By 1927 collectivization was completed. Instead of 25 million small peasant farms, 400,000 collective farms began to operate.

Based on the subordinate position of collectivization in relation to industrialization, it fulfilled the tasks assigned to it: 1) reduced the number of people employed in agriculture; 2) supported with a smaller number of employed food production at a level that does not allow hunger; 3) provided the industry with irreplaceable technical raw materials. After the severe upheavals of the early 30s. in the middle of the decade the situation in the agrarian sector stabilized: in 1935 the card system was abolished, labor productivity increased, the country gained cotton independence; during the 30s. 20 million people were released from agriculture, which made it possible to increase the size of the working class from 9 to 24 million.

The main result of collectivization was that it ensured the solution of the main strategic task - the implementation of an industrial breakthrough. As a result, the transition of the entire economy to a single state track was ensured. The state approved its ownership not only of the land, but also of the products produced on it. It got the opportunity to plan the development of agriculture, to strengthen its material and technical base. An important result of collectivization was the increase in the marketability of agriculture. This led not only to the stabilization of the supply of grain to cities, workers, employees and the army, but also made it possible to increase the state stocks of grain, which was extremely important in case of war. It should also be noted that the policy of collectivization, despite all its shortcomings and difficulties, was supported by the poorest peasantry and significant sections of the middle peasants, who hoped to improve their position in the collective farms.

So, the Bolshevik modernization of the Soviet state had its own characteristics. It was carried out without an injection of foreign capital. Its tasks were solved at the expense of the country's internal resources. It was carried out directly in heavy industry without preliminary development of light industry. The primary tasks of industrialization were solved in the first and second five-year plans. The first five-year plan developed the GOELRO plan. It was designed to ensure that in 1929-1933. turn the USSR into an industrial power. It was a top priority. In the course of its implementation, the initial indicators increased, measures were taken to spur the pace of construction. The country's leadership stated that the targets set by the five-year plan were achieved ahead of schedule. The data show that this was not the case. But they cannot belittle the progress made. History cannot forget the commissioning of the Dneproges, the creation of the 2nd coal and metallurgical base in the east (Uralo-Kuznetsk Combine), the construction of the Kuznetsk and Magnitogorsk metallurgical plants, coal mines in the Donbass, Kuzbass and Karaganda, the Stalingrad and Kharkov tractor plants, Moscow and Gorky automobile plants and many other enterprises, the total number of which was 1500.

The second five-year plan, covering 1933-1937, set itself the task of completing the creation of a technical base in all sectors. As a result, 4,500 large state enterprises. Among the largest are the Ural and Kramatorsk Heavy Engineering Plants, the Ural Carriage Building and Chelyabinsk Tractor Plants, the Azovstal and Zaporizhstal metallurgical plants and many other plants and industrial enterprises. These were labor exploits of the Soviet industry. They included the Stakhanov movement and other labor initiatives. The organizer of mass labor enthusiasm was the established party-administrative system, the activities of trade union and Komsomol organizations. Labor enthusiasm was also born under the powerful ideological influence propagated by political slogans. A certain material interest in production and construction was also manifested in this. The system of moral encouragement for those who distinguished themselves in work was also important. An important driver of the labor enthusiasm of many heroes of industrialization was their belief that they were really building a bright future for themselves and their Motherland. An important source of labor exploits of the 30s. there was, of course, Russian patriotism, which always rescued the country in difficult and responsible times for it, the awareness of the historical necessity of the industrial breakthrough of their homeland.

The results of the pre-war five-year plans
The enormous efforts of many millions of people made it possible to make a grandiose shift in the Soviet state. For 1928-1941 Almost 9,000 large and medium-sized enterprises were built in the USSR. During this period, the growth rates of industrial production in the USSR exceeded the corresponding indicators in Russia in 1900-1913 by about 2 times. and amounted to almost 11% per year. In the 30s. The USSR became one of the four countries in the world capable of producing any kind of industrial product. In terms of absolute indicators of the volume of industrial production, the USSR came out on the 2nd place in the world after the USA (Russia in 1913 - 5th place). In 1940, the USSR surpassed Britain by 21% in electricity production, France - by 45%, Germany - by 32%; for the extraction of the main types of fuel, respectively, England - by 32%, France - more than 4 times, Germany - by 33%; in terms of steel production, the USSR during this period surpassed England by 39%, France - four times, Germany - by 8%. The backlog of the USSR from the advanced countries of the world in terms of industrial output per capita has also decreased.

In the 20s. this gap was 5 - 10 times, and in 1940 - from 1.5 to 4 times. Finally, the Soviet Union eliminated its stage gap from the West: from a pre-industrial country, the USSR turned into a powerful industrial power.

Major changes in the socio-economic sphere in the 30s. in the USSR were also accompanied by the implementation of the policy of the cultural revolution. The purpose of such a revolution from above was to create a new socialist culture. Clearly organized state measures during this period actively solved the problem of eliminating the illiteracy of the population. On the eve of the implementation of the industrialization policy in the USSR, there were practically no own cadres of industry managers, their own engineering and technical staff, there were even no qualified workers. In 1940, there were almost 200,000 general education schools in the USSR with 35 million students. Over 600,000 studied at vocational schools. Almost 4,600 universities and technical schools worked. The USSR came out on top in the world in terms of the number of pupils and students. Significant progress was also made in the development of science and technology. More than 1800 scientific institutions operated. The largest were the All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences (VASKhNIL), the Research Physics Institute. P.N.Lebedeva, institutes of organic chemistry, physical problems, geophysics and others. Such scientists as N.I. Vavilov, S.V. Lebedev, D.V. Skobeltsin, D.D. Ivanenko, A.F. Ioffe, N.N. Semenov, K.E. Tsiolkovsky, F.A. Zander and others. New phenomena appeared in the development of fiction, various branches of art, and the formation of Soviet cinematography took place.

In the 30s. The political system of the Soviet society has undergone major changes. The core of this system - the CPSU (b) - increasingly grew into state structures. The old Bolsheviks were replaced by young cadres, who differed little from managers in the proper sense of the word. From January 1934 to March 1939, more than 500,000 new workers were promoted to leading party and government posts. Real political power was concentrated in the party organs. The Soviets only formally, according to the Constitution, were the political basis of Soviet society. In the 30s. their activities are mainly focused on solving economic, cultural and educational problems. Legally, the supreme body of state power in the USSR, according to the Constitution of 1936, was the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and the highest body of state administration was the Council of People's Commissars. However, in reality, the highest power was concentrated in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

Summing up the qualitative political, socio-economic and cultural transformations, the party-state leadership announced at the end of the 30s. about the victory of socialism mainly in the USSR. This conclusion was substantiated by the fact that private ownership of the means of production was eliminated in the country, free enterprise disappeared, and a transition was made from a market economy to a state-planned economy. The social structure of society has also changed. The exploiting classes have left the stage, the exploitation of man by man has been overcome, unemployment is gone. Other qualitative changes were noted in Soviet society. On this basis, the 18th Congress of the Bolshevik Party in 1939 set as the main political task in the Third Five-Year Plan the completion of the building of socialism in the USSR and the subsequent gradual transition to communism.

The level of human consumption remained low. Nevertheless, the country has achieved impressive economic results. Millions of Soviet people received an education, significantly improved their social status, joined the industrial culture; tens of thousands, having risen from the very bottom, took key positions in the economic, military, and political elite. For millions of Soviet people, the construction of a new society opened up a perspective, the meaning of life. Obviously, all these circumstances formed the basis of the cheerful attitude of a significant part of the Soviet people of that time that struck Western cultural figures and surprises us today. The writer Henri Gide, who visited the USSR in 1936 and noticed the “negative” in the then Soviet reality (poverty, the suppression of dissent, etc.), nevertheless notes: “However, there is a fact: the Russian people seem happy. Here I have no differences with Wildrac and Jean Pons, and I read their essays with a feeling similar to nostalgia. Because I also argued: in no other country, except for the USSR, people - met on the street (at least young people), factory workers relaxing in cultural parks - do not look so joyful and smiling.

Ultimately, the 20s. entered the history of the country as a stage when, in an extremely short historical period, a leap was made from an agrarian to an industrial society, thanks to which a powerful socio-economic and military potential of the Soviet Union was created and without which victory over Nazi Germany was impossible. This is the historical significance of the labor feat of millions of Soviet people.

The history of homeland. Edited by M.V. Zotova. - 2nd ed., corrected. and additional
M.: Publishing House of MGUP, 2001. 208 p. 1000 copies

Hello, dear readers and guests of the site blog!

Today we are discussing such a difficult topic as the political and economic development of the USSR in the 20-30s.

Soviet state in the first half of the 20sXX century

The crisis of late 1920 - early 1921

The state of the economic and social sphere of the RSFSR at the end of the Civil War left much to be desired. Serious damage was caused to many factories and deposits, the population was significantly reduced, and the amount of cultivated land decreased. In addition, the government did not immediately realize the failure of the policy of "war communism", because after the victory of the Bolsheviks, the "food detachments" continued to confiscate products from the population, and the authorities took actions that contradicted the demands of the workers and peasants (preparation for the abolition of money, strengthening the distributive economic policy). All this led to a famine in 1921 and the start of strikes. After suppression sailors' uprisings in Krondstadt (March 1921) the government began to take measures to restore the economy and meet the demands of the people.

New economic policy

On the XCongress of the RCP (b) (March 1921) Lenin proposed a new economic policy. It consisted in creating a mixed economy while maintaining the main "levers" in the hands of the government (foreign trade, centralized monetary system, public sector in industry).

The main objectives of the NEP were:

• Elimination of social tension
• Prevention of disruption and recovery from the crisis
• Creation of a base for building a socialist society

And in order to achieve them, the government had to deviate from some provisions of the Decrees adopted in October 1917, namely:

• Cancel general nationalization
• Weaken centralization in the economy
• Revive private trade

In order to quickly restore the economy, it was necessary to increase the amount of funds received by the state budget, as well as provide citizens with more opportunities to get these funds. To this end, the following activities were carried out:

• Replacing the surplus with a tax in kind (less than 2 times)
• Permission to sell overplanned products
• Permission to open and lease small and medium-sized enterprises
• Granting of concessions
• Targeting state enterprises for self-sufficiency
• Permission to lease land and use hired labor

There have been some changes in the banking system:

• Emergence of private banks
• Issue and forced distribution of state. loans
• Monetary reform in 1922 - reduction in the volume of issue of paper money (issues) and the introduction of the Soviet banknote of 10 rubles

Naturally, economic reforms were not without transformations in the social sphere:

• Acceptance of the new Labor Code (1922) (abolition of universal labor service, introduction of free employment)
• Reform of the wage system - introduction of a tariff scale
• Termination of labor mobilization

The New Economic Policy soon gave its positive results: light industry rapidly developed, the living conditions of the population improved, the cancellation of cards began. But all this solved only one of the tasks set by the NEP - overcoming the devastation.

The NEP became the cause of disagreements within the party, which threatened to disintegrate it. Some advocated the expansion of the economic rights of trade unions and the democratization of management (the "workers' opposition"). Others stood for the complete centralization of government and the elimination of trade unions (Trotsky). In order to avoid the strengthening of the opposition forces, the government carried out a "cleansing" among the members of the party. Also, many cultural figures who did not support the policy of the Bolsheviks were expelled from the country (1922 "philosophical ship").

Despite the decree on the separation of church and state, the Soviet government tried by all means to take control of the Russian Orthodox Church and even liquidate it. In 1922, during a mass famine, property was confiscated from the church. The propaganda of atheism intensified, the persecution of priests and the destruction of temples began.

All these actions described above can be called one phrase - the elimination of the opposition of the ruling party. And the result of these events was the strengthening of the one-party system and the establishment of the dictatorship of the Central Committee of the RCP (b).

The results of the domestic policy of the early 20s

At first, the NEP had a positive impact on the economy. But soon this policy caused certain difficulties.

Agriculture still dominated industry. The country needed to increase its defense capability, the heavy industry required large investments. The government tried to solve this problem in the following way: a very low purchase price was set for manufactured goods, but at the same time, their sales prices were greatly inflated. This actual siphoning off of money gave rise to the problem of the appearance on the market of expensive low-quality goods that the population refused to buy (the marketing crisis in 1923). Added to this was the price crisis of 1924, when the peasants did not agree to sell grain to the state at low prices, wanting to get more profit for the goods on the market. All this led to a reduction in the export of agricultural products, as a result, deprived the state of funds for the purchase of foreign industrial equipment.

In response, the state increased the centralization of government, limited the freedom of enterprises, increased taxes and prices, that is, began to curtail policy.

But the government could not just confess to the people in their mistakes, so the party leadership declared "enemies of the people" (wealthy peasants, agronomists, engineers, NEPmen) cause of their failures and began to pursue them.

Formation of the USSR

Before the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, economic and political ties already existed between some of the states that entered it.

During the Civil War, Russia entered into an alliance with Ukraine and Belarus (1919), according to which the countries were obliged to provide military and political assistance in confronting the anti-Soviet forces. After the Civil War, political ties between the states were preserved and economic ties intensified.

In 1922 Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia formed the Transcaucasian Soviet Socialist Federation. The principles of the Constitution of the ZSFSR were the same as those of the RSFSR.

In order to jointly restore and develop the economy, improve defense capabilities and strengthen the socialist system, ties between the republics required reaching a new level.

In December 1922, congresses of Soviets were held in all the republics, which accepted Lenin's proposal to create a union state of a federation of republics with equal rights.

On December 30, 1922, the First All-Union Congress was held, which approved the Declaration and Treaty on the Formation of the USSR. The first to join the Soviet Union were the RSFSR, the ZSFSR, the Ukrainian and Byelorussian SSR.

In January 1924, the Second Congress approved the Constitution of the USSR.

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Formation of a union state

The Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia, which proclaimed the equality and sovereignty of all peoples, their right to self-determination up to secession and the formation of independent states, the free development of all national minorities, was one of the first decrees of the new government after the October Revolution and the victory of the Bolsheviks.

The Declaration of the Rights of the Working and Exploited People, which was included as an integral part of the text of the first Constitution of the RSFSR (1918), legally formalized the federal principle, as well as the right of peoples to freely decide on their entry into the Soviet Federation. In accordance with the principle of the right of nations to self-determination, the Soviet government recognized the state independence of Finland, a decree was signed renouncing the treaties on the previous partitions of Poland.

Having exercised their right to self-determination up to secession during the years of the Civil War, many peoples of the former Russian Empire created their own national-state formations, although not all of them were sustainable. After the end of the Civil War, the process of movement towards unification began, which resulted in the formation of a new Russian statehood - the USSR.

Formation of the USSR:

1) the act that established the Union of the SSR was the Treaty, which was signed by four republics: the RSFSR, Ukraine, Belarus and the Transcaucasian Federation;

2) On December 30, 1922, the congress of plenipotentiaries of these republics (I Congress of Soviets of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) approved the Treaty on the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR);

3) the foundations of the state structure of the USSR were fixed by the Constitution of the USSR, which was adopted in 1924. In accordance with the Constitution of the USSR, a federal structure was fixed (I.V. Stalin originally proposed an autonomization plan) and the right to freely secede from the USSR.

USSR in the 20-30s. 20th century

Historians believe that "war communism" was not limited to the economic and social spheres. It was an integral system that had its reference points in politics, ideology, culture, morality, and psychology. In the program of the RCP(b), adopted by the Eighth Congress in March 1919, the policy of "war communism" was theoretically comprehended as a direct transition to a communist society. "War Communism", on the one hand, made it possible to subordinate all resources to the control of the "belligerent party", turn the country into a single military camp, and ultimately win the Civil War. On the other hand, it did not create incentives for economic growth, engendered discontent among almost all segments of the population, and created an illusory belief in violence as an all-powerful lever for solving all the problems facing the country. With the end of the war, military-communist methods have exhausted themselves. This was not immediately understood: back in November-December 1920, decrees were adopted on the nationalization of small industry, on the abolition of payments for food and fuel, and utilities.

Crisis of 1920-1921 had a comprehensive character: economic ruin (industry, according to some indicators, thrown back to the level of 1861, inactive transport, halved areas under crops, inflation measured in thousands of percent a year, a collapsed financial system) was supplemented by a social catastrophe (falling living standards, declassing, high mortality , famine) and political tension (distrust of Soviet power, increased anti-Bolshevik sentiment).

A terrible warning was the uprising of peasants in the Tambov province (Antonovshchina) and the uprising of sailors, soldiers and workers in Kronstadt under the slogans of political freedom, re-election of the Soviets, removal of the Bolsheviks from power. The crisis was not only a consequence of the war.

In the spring of 1921, at the Tenth Congress of the RCP(b), the New Economic Policy (NEP) was announced. Fundamentally, the goals have not changed - the transition to communism remained the programmatic task of the party and the state, but the methods of this transition were partly revised. The NEP included a number of measures:

replacement of the surplus with a smaller tax in kind;

· allowing free trade in agricultural products;

· denationalization of small and medium-sized industry while retaining the state's so-called commanding heights (metallurgy, transport, fuel industry, oil production, etc.);

· consolidation of large enterprises into trusts operating on the basis of self-financing and subordinate to the Supreme Council of the National Economy;

· the abolition of labor service and labor mobilization, the introduction of wages at tariffs, taking into account the quantity and quality of products;

· permission of freedom of private capital in industry, agriculture, trade, service sector (with restrictions), encouragement of cooperation; admission of foreign capital (concession, lease);

Reconstruction of the banking and tax systems;

· Carrying out a monetary reform based on the limitation of emission, the displacement of Soviet signs and the introduction of a stable currency - chervonets.

The achievements of the NEP are significant: by 1925, the pre-war level of industrial and agricultural production was basically reached, inflation was stopped, the financial system was stabilized, and the material situation of the population improved. At the same time, the successes of NEP should not be exaggerated. NEP was characterized by very serious contradictions, which led to a whole series of crises: the sale of industrial goods (autumn 1923), the shortage of industrial goods (autumn 1924, autumn 1925), grain procurements (winter 1927/1928).

The most important thing was the contradiction between economics and politics: an economy based on the partial recognition of the market and private property could not develop steadily in the face of a tougher one-party political regime, the program goals of which were the transition to communism - a society free from private property. The end of the NEP was officially announced in December 1929.

The economic basis of Soviet-type totalitarianism was a command-administrative system built on the nationalization of the means of production, directive planning and pricing, and the elimination of the foundations of the market. In the USSR, it was formed in the process of industrialization and collectivization. The one-party political system was established in the USSR already in the 1920s. The merging of the party apparatus with the state apparatus, the subordination of the party to the state became a fact at the same time. In the 30s. The CPSU(b), having gone through a series of sharp fights of its leaders in the struggle for power, was a single, strictly centralized, rigidly subordinated, well-oiled mechanism.

The Communist Party was the only legal political organization. Leading party figures occupied leading positions in the state. As for the Komsomol, trade unions, and other public organizations, they were nothing more than "transmission belts" from the party to the masses. The spiritual basis of the totalitarian society in the USSR was the official ideology, the postulates of which - understandable, simple - were introduced into the minds of people in the form of slogans, songs, poems, quotes from leaders. The slightest deviation from these simple truths was punished: "purges", expulsion from the party, repressions were called upon to preserve the ideological purity of citizens. The cult of Stalin as the leader of society was perhaps the most important element of totalitarianism in the 1930s. In the image of a wise, merciless to enemies, simple and accessible leader of the party and people, abstract appeals took on flesh and blood, became extremely concrete and close. The whole pyramid of totalitarian power closed on Stalin, he was its undisputed, absolute leader.

In the 30s. the previously established and significantly expanded repressive apparatus (the NKVD, extrajudicial reprisals - the “troikas”, the Main Directorate of the Camps - the GULAG, etc.) worked at full speed. Since the end of the 20s. waves of repressions followed one after another, the "Great Terror" claimed the lives of almost 1 million people who were shot, millions of people passed through the Gulag camps. Repression was the very tool by which a totalitarian society dealt not only with real, but also with the alleged opposition. Terror also had economic significance: millions of prisoners worked on the construction sites of the first five-year plans, contributing to the economic power of the country.

The Constitution of the USSR adopted in 1936 can be considered a symbol of the era. It guaranteed citizens the entire set of democratic rights and freedoms. The USSR was characterized as a socialist state of workers and peasants. The Soviets of Working People's Deputies were recognized as the political basis of the USSR, and the role of the leading core of society was assigned to the CPSU (b). There was no principle of separation of powers.



MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

BELGOROD LEGAL INSTITUTE

Department of Humanitarian and Socio-Economic Disciplines

Discipline: Domestic history

ESSAY

on topic No. 8: "The USSR in the 20s - 30s"

Prepared by: Student 453 group

Pronkin N.N.

Prepared by: teacher of the department of G and SED militia captain Khryakov R.N.

Belgorod - 2008

Introduction

The civil war was a terrible disaster for Russia. It led to a further deterioration of the economic situation in the country, to complete economic ruin. Material damage amounted to more than 50 billion rubles. gold. Industrial production decreased by 7 times. The transport system was completely paralyzed. Many segments of the population, forcibly drawn into the war by the opposing sides, became its innocent victims. In battles, from hunger, disease and terror, 8 million people died, 2 million people were forced to emigrate. Among them were many members of the intellectual elite. Irreplaceable moral and ethical losses had profound socio-cultural consequences, which for a long time affected the history of the Soviet country.

In the first half of the 1920s, the main task of domestic policy was to restore the destroyed economy, create a material, technical and socio-cultural basis for building socialism, which the Bolsheviks promised to the people.

1. Economic and political crises of 1920 -1921 Transition to the New Economic Policy

During the civil war, the Soviet government was forced to mobilize all the resources it had, to turn the country into a single military camp. To this end, the Bolshevik Party subordinates to its control all spheres of society. From the second half of 1918, the Soviet state carried out a number of measures aimed at centralizing state control and management of all spheres of economic life. The complex of these extraordinary actions was called "war communism".

The constituent elements of the policy of war communism were:

1) in the city: the abolition of utility bills, the introduction of wages in kind (food is distributed at enterprises through cooperatives). Labor service is introduced for persons with mental labor. In the sphere of industrial production, enterprises are being nationalized, first large ones, then smaller ones, up to handicrafts (a total of 38,200 enterprises were nationalized). To manage enterprises, a system of state bodies was created: the Supreme Council of the National Economy - the provincial councils of the national economy - the Main Committees for Branches (GLAVKs). In 1920, 52 Glavkas were created in the country, to which enterprises of state importance were directly subordinate. A system of strict vertical subordination of enterprises to committees and centers was created. In fact, the trend of over-centralization of the industrial life of Russia has won;

2) in the countryside: a series of emergency measures taken in connection with the need to supply the gigantic army and industrial workers with food, expressed in the introduction of food taxes or surplus appropriations. In May 1918, the Soviet government took a number of measures, called the food dictatorship. According to the decree of May 13, 1918, the People's Commissariat of Food was endowed with emergency powers in the field of procurement and distribution of food, the grain monopoly of the state and fixed prices for bread were confirmed. To levy food taxes, special food detachments are created, later - the Prodarmia, endowed with emergency powers.

It should be noted that the implementation of emergency measures in the countryside contributed to the growth of food collections, mainly at the expense of the central provinces. On the outskirts of the country (Don region, Ukraine), the efficiency of these innovations turned out to be extremely low, causing a wave of discontent and mass uprisings. The peasantry refused to supply the necessary amount of bread to the city. A wave of peasant uprisings swept through: in the Ukraine the anarchist movement (N. Makhno) was gaining wide popularity, and in Western Siberia a partisan army rose up. The largest performance was the rebellion in Tambov and in a number of provinces adjacent to it (A.S. Antonov, who was a member of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, led the speech). The Red Army threw its best forces against the Antonovites under the command of the talented commander M.N. Tukhachevsky. The suppression of the uprising was carried out exclusively by military measures using artillery and poisonous gases, claiming 50,000 lives on both sides.

The apogee of discontent was the uprising of the Kronstadt sailors, who had previously supported the Bolsheviks. The sailors demanded respect for the rights and freedoms proclaimed in October 1917, an end to forced confiscations, etc. Despite the fact that the Bolsheviks managed to suppress the uprising, it came as a real shock to them. Members of the party elite realized that the policy of war communism had exhausted itself; as a result, the Bolsheviks were forced to retreat, having developed a new economic policy.

The essence of the new economic policy of the Bolsheviks. At the X Congress of the RCP (b), decisions are made to change the policy: in particular, the surplus appropriation is replaced by a tax in kind (it was collected based on the real share of the sown area and was about two times less). Free trade in surplus was allowed, that is, what remained after the withdrawal of the tax in kind.

These measures were the beginning of a new economic policy - the economic sphere underwent decentralization: the largest technically equipped enterprises united in trusts, endowed with the rights to plan, distribute funds, and conduct trade operations. The system of piecework wages began to be widely used again. Wage depended on the skill of the worker and the quantity of products produced. The state began to lease small enterprises to private individuals, they were also allowed to sell private industry items. One of the characteristic features of the NEP became concessions - enterprises based on agreements between the state and foreign firms.

Thus, with the transition to the New Economic Policy, an impetus was given to private capitalist entrepreneurship. Despite this, state regulation remained in a fairly high volume in the form of supervision, control, etc. The scope of activity of private traders in industry was limited to the production of consumer goods, the extraction and processing of certain types of raw materials, the manufacture of the simplest tools, in trade - mediation between small commodity producers, the sale of goods of private industry.

The state reserved heavy industry enterprises, the extraction of priority raw materials, and foreign trade. In an effort to prevent excessive concentration of capital in private individuals, the state used the tax burden, carried out through the financial authorities. As for, for example, concessions, they were also placed under the control of the Soviet state apparatus and labor legislation.

As a result, the state, even after partial denationalization, had at its disposal the most powerful sector of the national economy, "the commanding heights in the economy."

2. Formation of the USSR

At the end of 1922, the USSR was formed. It included 4 republics: the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, the Byelorussian SSR and the Transcaucasian Federation, which united Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. All the republics included in the USSR previously formed the territory of the Russian Empire. There were historically established economic ties between them. After the October Revolution of 1917, the communists of the republics, who fought for the establishment of Soviet power, created a military-political alliance. So, on June 1, 1919, a military alliance was concluded between Russia, Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania and Belarus "to fight world imperialism." In 1922, in connection with the preparations for the Genoa Conference, a diplomatic alliance was formed between the republics. The RSFSR was instructed to represent the interests of all the republics at the conference. In the early 1920s, military-economic treaties were signed between individual republics and Soviet Russia.

In the process of developing military, economic and diplomatic cooperation, the leading role belonged to the RSFSR, because. this process was guided by the Central Committee of the RCP(b). As a result, the functions of the general body began to be performed by the Council of Labor and Defense, the State Planning Committee of the RSFSR and the Council of National Economy of the RSFSR, representatives of all Soviet republics began to take part in the work of the All-Russian Congresses of Soviets.

On August 10, 1922, the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) created a commission to prepare for the Plenum the question of relations between the RSFSR and the independent Soviet republics.

In August - September 1922, the commission of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), under the leadership of Stalin, prepared a project for unification (the so-called "autonomization plan"). In accordance with this project, all Soviet republics were to enter the RSFSR as autonomies. This approach met with sharp objections from Lenin, who proposed the creation of a new union state by uniting all Soviet republics on an equal footing. The Plenum of the Central Committee approved this proposal.

On December 30, 1922, the First Congress of Soviets of the USSR adopted the Declaration and Treaty on the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. These documents fixed the main principles of the formation of a new state, which were based on federalism. The 1st Congress of Soviets of the USSR elected the highest legislative body - the Central Executive Committee (CEC of the USSR) and its four chairmen - one from each republic.

The proclaimed creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on a federal basis has not received a real implementation. In the process of drafting the Constitution of the USSR, a number of amendments were introduced into its draft, expanding the competence of the all-union authorities and limiting the rights of the republics. In addition, in the Chamber of Nationalities - the second chamber of the Central Executive Committee - the RSFSR was supposed to have 64 - 72 votes, the Transcaucasian Federation - 12, and the BSSR and the Ukrainian SSR - 4 votes each.

On January 31, 1924, the first Constitution of the USSR was adopted at the II All-Union Congress of Soviets. In accordance with the Constitution, the following issues were within the competence of the highest authorities of the USSR: foreign policy, borders, armed forces, transport, communications, economic planning, declaration of war and conclusion of peace. Formally, each republic had the right to secede from the Union. The supreme body of power was the All-Union Congress of Soviets, in the intervals between them - the Central Executive Committee, consisting of two chambers: the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities.

3. The results of the NEP, the reasons for its curtailment

Speaking about the results of the new economic policy, it can be noted that they contributed to the stabilization of the economy and the growth of production indicators. In the autumn of 1922, the famine ended. By the mid-1920s, light and heavy industry enterprises had largely restored their pre-war output. Improved economic performance in the countryside: after the abolition of the surplus appropriation and replacing it with a tax in kind, which was much lower than the first, the peasants had incentives to work. At the same time, the additional allotment of land under the decree “On Land” also affected. Permission of small private enterprise and private trade made it possible to relatively quickly revive small industry and fill the shelves of shops with goods of daily demand.

Within the framework of the NEP, the Soviet government managed to achieve some success. But as the recovery proceeded, the old problems of the Russian economy, its structural disproportions and contradictions, returned. If pre-revolutionary Russia was not among the advanced economically developed states, then in the 1920s its lag was further aggravated. The country became even more agrarian than it was, its industrial development directly depended on the state of agriculture. Neither industry nor agriculture have created markets for expanded production. The countryside could not meet the needs of industry and the city in marketable agricultural products, acquiring a semi-natural character. In turn, the needs of industrialization required a different orientation of production than rural demand. Commodity exchange between the countryside and the city was disrupted. The first had nothing to give for the commodity surplus and the peasants began to leave them in their households. In the second half of the 1920s, the established grain procurement plans failed.

On the basis of economic troubles, a split appeared within the ruling elite. One of the first critics of the NEP were representatives of the workers' opposition associated with the state sector of the economy (the workers of Leningrad). They criticized the party, which, they said, had forgotten about its main task - the development of large-scale industry. Gradually, the idea of ​​the need for radical changes in the country's economy matures in the leadership of the party. Part of the party elite saw a way out of the current situation in the reconstruction of the NEP, the implementation of "super-industrialization", the development of heavy industry in order to hold the approaches to the world revolution.

It is worth noting that the new economic policy was initially considered only as a temporary measure, a retreat, and not a long-term line. More Lenin in last years Life warned that in connection with the transition to the NEP, on the basis of free trade, there would be a revival of the petty bourgeoisie and capitalism, which could actually annul the achievements of the revolution. Representatives of the left wing in the party in the mid-1920s stated that the economy of the USSR, as a result of the measures being taken, was increasingly integrating into the world economy and thereby turning into a state capitalist one. Considering that in terms of economic indicators, the level of industrial production in the late 1920s, the USSR was 5 to 10 times inferior to the leading Western countries, it becomes obvious that further development of the economy within the framework of the NEP would threaten to turn the Soviet Union into a secondary power. The Soviet Union was in the position of catching up, lagging behind (outsider). In this "race for the leader" it was impossible, in the opinion of the party leadership, to make mistakes, to act for sure. The crisis that broke out in the West in 1929 strengthened the confidence of the political elite of the USSR that the market economic model is unpredictable and unstable, so a different approach to the country's economic development is needed.

The factors of the international position played a big role in choosing the model of the country's economic development. At the end of the 1920s, few doubted that a world revolution would not happen in the near future, and the young Soviet republic would find itself in an atmosphere of capitalist encirclement under the pressure of a rapidly growing military threat. The course towards the world revolution, the original revolutionary romanticism, is being replaced by an attitude towards pragmatism - a line towards building "socialism in a single country."

A group of pragmatists headed by Stalin, who concentrated enormous power in their hands and took control of the party apparatus and the nomenklatura, were promoted to the first roles in the leadership of the party and the country. The party apparatus is gradually ousting the opposition from its posts, putting forward the idea of ​​the need to overtake and overtake the advanced capitalist countries in the shortest historical period. The XV Congress of the CPSU (b) in 1927 adopted a five-year plan for the development of the national economy. The plan was based on a high rate of industrialization, an attack on the private capitalist elements of the city and countryside through a significant increase in tax rates, and the strengthening of cooperatives in the countryside. To successfully confront the capitalist camp, it was necessary to create a strong economic base. It was necessary to create a powerful industry, primarily heavy, associated with the production of weapons. As a result, at the end of the 1920s, the party leadership took a course towards the industrialization of the country, the strengthening of the planned and directive construction of socialism, and the "curtailment of the NEP."

4. Socio-economic development of the USSR in the 30s

The 16th Party Conference (April 1929), and then the 5th Congress of Soviets, approved after repeated upward revisions the "optimal version" of the five-year plan. This plan provided for an increase in industrial output by 136%, labor productivity by 110%, and a reduction in the cost of industrial production by 35%. According to the plan, priority was given to heavy industry, which received 78% of all capital investments.

The strongholds, the main base of the ongoing industrialization of the country were to become the old industrial regions. It was assumed that they would be the foundations of building up the industrial power of the country, they were subject to a system of priorities in the distribution of raw materials, equipment, labor (Central industrial region, Leningrad region, Donetsk-Krivoy Rog region of Ukraine and the Urals).

Economic policy was aimed at strengthening the role of directive planning and launching grandiose mass campaigns aimed at accelerating the pace of socialist construction. The industrialization plan provided for a change in technology and methods of production in the direction of developing energy capacities, expanding mass production, transferring advanced American and European technology to the country's economy, rationalization, and the scientific organization of labor.

In practice, this policy resulted in the active construction of new industrial facilities against the backdrop of strengthening the austerity regime, the voluntary-compulsory distribution of industrialization loans, and the establishment of card supply to the population of cities and workers' settlements. The Party leadership is developing mass socialist competition in factories, plants, transport, construction, etc. In connection with the transition to directive central planning, the entire system of managing the national economy is being transformed. On the basis of production syndicates, production associations are created that have subordinated production to centralized regulation. Unity of command was introduced in production, the heads of enterprises were directly made responsible for the implementation of the plan. The heads of enterprises and construction sites themselves were now appointed according to a special nomenclature list in a centralized manner.

Speaking about the economic results of industrialization, it can be noted that the Soviet leadership as a whole was able to successfully overcome the absolute lag behind the states of Western Europe in the production of the main types of industrial products. At the end of the 1930s (in contrast to the previous decade and pre-revolutionary times), the production of electricity, fuel, iron, steel, cement in our country exceeded the corresponding indicators of England, France and Germany. In terms of absolute volume of industrial output, the Soviet Union was second only to the United States. A number of modern industries are emerging, such as the aviation and automobile industries, tractor and combine building, the production of tanks, and much more, which were previously practically absent in our country before the turn to forced industrialization. The leadership of the country carried out huge investments in industry, relying exclusively on internal sources of accumulation. Forced industrialization, according to the Stalinist plan, was originally to be carried out by "transferring funds" from the countryside to the city. The very process of expanding industrial production was impossible without a regular supply of workers with food, but the grain crisis of 1927-1928 threatened the plan for forced industrialization and the supply of food to the city. In this situation, the government took a course towards the production cooperation of agriculture and an attack on the kulaks.

It was in the collective farms that the Stalinist leadership saw the production and distribution mechanism that made it possible to distribute funds and supply the cities and the army with bread without creating the threat of economic and political upheavals.

Representing socialist society as a "single factory" subordinated and controlled by Soviet society, Stalin and his supporters sought to involve the entire population in the workshops of this factory as quickly as possible. Moreover, in the countryside, it was decided to implement this through complete collectivization, which began to be carried out in the autumn of 1929.

The policy of collectivization involved the abolition of land leases, the prohibition of hired labor, the confiscation from wealthy peasants (kulaks) of the means of production, household and residential buildings, and enterprises for processing agricultural products. The means of production and property were transferred to the indivisible funds of the collective farms as contributions for the poor and laborers, with the exception of the part that went to pay off the debts of the kulak farms to the state. At the same time, part of the kulaks were supposed to be arrested and repressed as political criminals, another part was sent along with their families to the northern and remote regions of the country, and the third part was to be resettled within the region on specially allotted lands outside the collective farms.

Such measures naturally met with mass resistance from the peasantry. Anti-kolkhoz actions and other acts of disobedience on the part of the kulaks, the middle peasants, and part of the poor were suppressed through the use of the most severe measures of violence. The Stalinist leadership dispossessed and repressed approximately 900,000 households. 250,000 farms "dispossessed themselves", that is, they sold or abandoned their property and fled from villages, villages, villages.

The policy of collectivization by 1932 created 211.1 thousand collective farms (61.5% of peasant farms). Around 1937-1938, the complete collectivization of the country was completed. The leadership of the country used the methods of "carrot and stick" in relation to the collective farmers. On the one hand, the party-state apparatus is carrying out the most severe repressive measures, reprisals against opponents of grain procurement requisitions, on the other hand, it is trying to create among the collective farmers factors of interest in the results of their work by introducing a system of grain purchases, allowing them to create personal subsidiary plots. Peasants were also allowed to sell their products in the market. Thus, the party and the state managed for some time to find a compromise with the peasantry.

The created large-scale collective production demonstrated a number of economic and social advantages. During the years of collectivization, more than 5,000 machine and tractor stations (MTS) were built, which provided the village with agricultural machinery: tractors, combines and other machines. Labor productivity increased by 71% between 1928 and 1940.

The structure of sown areas has changed in the direction of increasing the production of industrial crops (sugar beet, cotton, potatoes, sunflower) necessary for industrial production. developed country. The country produced a minimum sufficient amount of bread, exceeding its production before collectivization.

The main social consequence of industrialization and collectivization was the formation of a massive multi-million core of industrial workers. The total number of workers grew from 8-9 million in 1928 to 23-24 million in 1940. On the other hand, employment in agriculture decreased significantly: from 80% in 1928 to 54% in 1940. The released population (15-20 million people) moved into industry.

The policy of accelerated industrialization plunged the country into a state of general, as in war, mobilization and tension. The choice of a forced strategy presupposed a sharp weakening, if not complete elimination, of the commodity-money mechanisms for regulating the economy and the absolute predominance of the administrative and economic system. This variant of economic development contributed to the growth of totalitarian principles in political system Soviet society, sharply increased the need for widespread use of administrative-command forms of political organization.

5. The formation of the totalitarian regime in the USSR in the 30s

Totalitarianism is a political regime in which the state exercises complete control and strict regulation of all spheres of the life of society and the life of every person, which is provided mainly by force, including the means of armed violence.

The main features of a totalitarian regime are:

1) the supremacy of the state, which is total in nature. The state does not simply interfere in the economic, political, social, spiritual, family and everyday life of society, it seeks to completely subjugate, nationalize any manifestations of life;

2) the concentration of the entirety of state political power in the hands of the leader of the party, which entails the actual exclusion of the population and ordinary members of the party from participation in the formation and activities of state bodies;

4) the dominance in society of one omnipotent state ideology, supporting the masses' conviction in the justice of this system of power and the correctness of the chosen path;

5) centralized system of control and management of the economy;

6) complete lack of human rights. Political freedoms and rights are formally fixed, but are not really present;

7) there is strict censorship over all media and publishing activities. It is forbidden to criticize government officials, state ideology, speak positively about the life of states with other political regimes;

8) the police and special services, along with the functions of ensuring law and order, perform the functions of punitive bodies and act as an instrument of mass repression;

9) suppression of any opposition and dissent through systematic and mass terror, which is based on both physical and spiritual violence;

10) suppression of personality, depersonalization of a person, turning him into a cog of the same type in the party-state machine. The state strives for the complete transformation of a person in accordance with the ideology adopted in it.

As the main factors that contributed to the formation of a totalitarian regime in our country, one can single out economic, political and sociocultural ones.

The accelerated economic development, as noted in one of the previous sections, led to a tightening of the political regime in the country. Recall that the choice of a forced strategy assumed a sharp weakening, if not complete destruction of the commodity-money mechanisms for regulating the economy, with the absolute predominance of the administrative and economic system. Planning, production, technical discipline in the economy, devoid of the levers of economic interest, was most easily achieved by relying on the political apparatus, state sanction, and administrative coercion. As a result, the same forms of strict obedience to the directive on which the economic system was built prevailed in the political sphere.

The strengthening of the totalitarian principles of the political system was also required by the very low level of material well-being of the vast majority of society, which accompanied the forced version of industrialization, attempts to overcome economic backwardness. The enthusiasm and conviction of the advanced sections of society alone was not enough to keep the standard of living of millions of people during a quarter of a century of peacetime at the level that usually exists for short periods of time, in years of war and social catastrophes. Enthusiasm, in this situation, had to be reinforced by other factors, primarily organizational and political, regulation of labor and consumption measures (severe penalties for theft of public property, for absenteeism and being late for work, restrictions on movement, etc.). The need to take these measures, of course, did not in any way favor the democratization of political life.

The formation of a totalitarian regime was also favored by a special type of political culture, characteristic of Russian society throughout its history. It combines a disdainful attitude towards law and law with the obedience of the bulk of the population to power, the violent nature of power, the absence of legal opposition, the idealization of the population of the head of power, etc. (subordinate type of political culture). Characteristic of the bulk of society, this type of political culture is also reproduced within the framework of the Bolshevik Party, which was formed mainly by people who came from the people. Coming from war communism, the "Red Guard attack on capital", the reassessment of the role of violence in the political struggle, indifference to cruelty weakened the sense of moral validity, the justification of many political actions that had to be carried out by the party activists. The Stalinist regime, as a result, did not meet active resistance within the party apparatus itself. Thus, we can conclude that a combination of economic, political, cultural factors contributed to the formation of a totalitarian regime in the USSR in the 1930s, the system of Stalin's personal dictatorship.

Home feature political regime in the 30s was the transfer of the center of gravity to the party, emergency and punitive bodies. The decisions of the XVH Congress of the CPSU (b) significantly strengthened the role of the party apparatus: it received the right to directly engage in state and economic management, the top party leadership acquired unlimited freedom, and ordinary communists were obliged to strictly obey the leading centers of the party hierarchy.

Along with the executive committees of the Soviets in industry, agriculture, science, culture, party committees functioned, whose role in fact becomes decisive. In conditions of concentration of real political power in the party committees, the Soviets carried out mainly economic, cultural and organizational functions.

The party's ingrowth into the economy and the public sphere has since become a distinctive feature of the Soviet political system. A kind of pyramid of party and state administration was built, the top of which was firmly occupied by Stalin as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Thus, the originally minor post of general secretary turned into a paramount one, giving its holder the right to supreme power in the country.

The assertion of the power of the party-state apparatus was accompanied by the rise and strengthening of the power structures of the state, its repressive bodies. Already in 1929, so-called "troikas" were created in each district, which included the first secretary of the district party committee, the chairman of the district executive committee and a representative of the Main Political Directorate (GPU). They began to carry out out-of-court trials of the guilty, passing their own sentences. In 1934, on the basis of the OGPU, the Main Directorate of State Security was formed, which became part of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD). Under it, a Special Conference (OSO) is established, which at the union level has consolidated the practice of extrajudicial sentences.

Relying on a powerful system of punitive organs, the Stalinist leadership in the 30s spins the flywheel of repression. According to a number of modern historians, the repressive policy in this period pursued three main goals:

1) a real cleansing of the “decomposed” from the often uncontrolled power of functionaries;

2) suppression in the bud of departmental, parochial, separatist, clan, opposition sentiments, ensuring the unconditional power of the center over the periphery;

3) removal of social tension by identifying and punishing enemies.

The data known today about the mechanism of the "great terror" allow us to say that among the many reasons for these actions special meaning the desire of the Soviet leadership to destroy the potential "fifth column" in the face of a growing military threat.

During the repressions, the national economic, party, state, military, scientific and technical personnel, representatives of the creative intelligentsia were subjected to purges. The number of prisoners in the Soviet Union in the 1930s is determined by figures from 3.5 million to 9-10 million people.

What was the result of the policy of mass repression? On the one hand, it must be admitted that this policy really increased the level of "cohesion" of the country's population, which was then able to unite in the face of fascist aggression. But at the same time, not even taking into account the moral and ethical side of the process (torture and death of millions of people), it is difficult to deny the fact that mass repressions have disorganized the life of the country. Constant arrests among the heads of enterprises and collective farms led to a drop in discipline and responsibility in production. There was a huge shortage of military personnel. The Stalinist leadership itself in 1938 abandoned mass repressions, purged the NKVD, but basically this punitive machine remained untouched.

Conclusion

As a result of mass repressions, a political system was consolidated, which is called the regime of Stalin's personal power (Stalin's totalitarianism). During the repression, most of the country's top leaders were destroyed. They were replaced by a new generation of leaders ("promoters of terror"), wholly devoted to Stalin. Thus, the adoption of fundamentally important decisions finally passed into the hands of the General Secretary of the CPSU (b).

Four stages are usually distinguished in the evolution of Stalinist totalitarianism.

1. 1923-1934 - the process of formation of Stalinism, the formation of its main trends.

2. The middle of the 30s - 1941 - the implementation of the Stalinist model of the development of society and the creation of a bureaucratic basis of power.

3. Period of the Great Patriotic War, 1941 - 1945 - partial retreat of Stalinism, highlighting the historical role of the people, the growth of national consciousness, the expectation of democratic changes in the internal life of the country after the victory over fascism.

4. 1946 - 1953 - the apogee of Stalinism, growing into the collapse of the system, the beginning of the regressive evolution of Stalinism.

In the second half of the 1950s, during the implementation of the decisions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, a partial de-Stalinization of Soviet society was carried out, but a number of signs of totalitarianism remained in the political system until the 1980s.

Bibliography

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The formation of the young Soviet state was quite difficult and long. This was largely due to the fact that the international community was not too in a hurry to recognize it. In such circumstances, the foreign policy of the USSR in the 20-30s of the 20th century was distinguished by rigidity and consistency, since it was necessary to solve many problems.

The main tasks facing diplomats

As we said, the main task was to normalize relations with other countries. But the USSR in the 1920s and 1930s also assumed the export of revolutionary ideas to other states. However, the romantic ideals of the revolution were quickly cooled by reality. Realizing the unreality of some ideas, the government of the newly minted country quickly switched to more realistic tasks.

First achievements

At the very beginning of the 20th century, a truly significant event took place: the USSR achieved the complete lifting of the trade blockade, which had a very painful impact on the country's economy, which was already greatly weakened. A very important role was played by the Decree on Concessions, which was issued on November 23, 1920.

In principle, immediately after the signing of all trade agreements with Great Britain, Kaiser's Germany and other countries, diplomats actually achieved unofficial recognition of the USSR throughout the world. The official one dragged on from 1924 to 1924. It was 1924 that turned out to be particularly successful, when it was possible to resume relations with more than three dozen foreign states.

This was the foreign policy of the USSR in the 20-30s. In short, it was possible to reorient the economy to the industrial direction, as the country began to receive a sufficient amount of raw materials and technologies.

Chicherin and Litvinov were the first foreign ministers who made this breakthrough possible. These brilliant diplomats, who received their education in Tsarist Russia, became a real "guiding bridge" between the young USSR and the rest of the world. They conducted the foreign policy of the USSR in the 20-30s of the 20th century.

It was they who achieved the signing of a trade agreement with England, as well as other European powers. Accordingly, it is to them that the Soviet Union owes the lifting of the trade and economic blockade, which impeded the normal development of the country.

New deterioration in relations

But the foreign policy of the USSR in the 20-30s knew not only victories. Approximately at the beginning of the thirties, a new round of deterioration in relations with the Western world began. This time, the pretext was the fact that the government of the USSR officially supported the national movement in China. Relations with England were practically broken due to the fact that the country was sympathetic to the striking British workers. It got to the point that the leaders of the Vatican openly began to call for a "Crusade" against the Soviet Union.

It is not surprising that in the 20-30s. 20th century was distinguished by extreme caution: it was impossible to give the slightest reason for aggression.

Relations with Nazi Germany

It should not be assumed that the Soviet leadership pursued some kind of inadequate, disproportionate policy. Just the same, the government of the USSR was distinguished in those years by rare sanity. So, immediately after 1933, when the National Socialist Party came to sole power in Germany, it was the Soviet Union that began to actively insist on the creation of a collective European security system. All the efforts of diplomats were traditionally ignored by the leaders of the European powers.

An attempt to stop Hitler's aggression

In 1934, another event occurred that the country had long been waiting for. The USSR was finally admitted to the League of Nations, which was the ancestor of the UN. Already in 1935, an allied treaty was concluded with France, which provided for friendly mutual assistance in the event of an attack on one of the allies. Hitler immediately responded by seizing the Rhineland. Already in 1936, the process of the actual aggression of the Reich against Italy and Spain began.

Of course, the political forces in the country understood what all this threatened, and therefore the foreign policy of the USSR in the 20-30s began to undergo serious changes again. The sending of equipment and specialists for confrontation with the Nazis began. This marked the march of fascism across Europe, and the leaders of the European powers practically did not oppose this.

Further aggravation of the situation

The fears of Soviet politicians were fully confirmed when in 1938 Hitler carried out the "Anschluss" of Austria. In September of the same year, the Munich Conference was held, which was attended by representatives of Germany, Great Britain and other countries.

No one was surprised that, following its results, the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia was unanimously given over to the power of the Soviet Union, which turned out to be almost the only country that openly condemned the fact of Hitler's undisguised aggression. In just a year, not only the whole of Czechoslovakia, but also Poland, is under his rule.

The situation was complicated by the fact that in the Far East the situation was continuously deteriorating. In 1938 and 1939, units of the Red Army came into fire contact with the Japanese. These were the famous Khasan and Khalkin-Gol battles. Also, hostilities were conducted on Mongolian territory. Mikado believed that the heir to tsarist Russia in the face of the USSR retained all the weaknesses of his predecessor, but he miscalculated: Japan was defeated, being forced to make significant territorial concessions.

Diplomatic relations with Germany

After Stalin tried no less than three times to negotiate the creation of the ill-fated European security system, the leadership of the USSR was forced to establish diplomatic relations with Nazi Germany. At present, Western historians are vying with each other to convince the world of the aggressive intentions of the Soviet Union, but its true goal was simple. The country tried to secure its borders from attack, forced to negotiate with a potential adversary.

Treaties with the Reich

In mid-1939, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed. Under the terms of the secret part of the document, Germany received Western Poland, and the USSR got Finland, the Baltic States, Eastern Poland, most of present-day Ukraine. Normalized before the relationship with England and France were completely spoiled.

At the end of September, the politicians of the USSR and Germany signed an agreement on friendship and borders. How can we better understand the goals pursued by the foreign policy of the USSR in the 1920s and 1930s? The table below will help you with this.

Stage name, years	Main characteristic
Primary stage, 1922-1933. Constant attempts to break the international blockade.	Basically, all policy was focused on raising the prestige of the USSR in the eyes of Western countries. Relations with Germany at that time were rather friendly, since with its help the country's leadership hoped to resist England and France.
"The era of pacifism", 1933-1939.	Soviet foreign policy began a large-scale reorientation, heading towards the establishment of normal relations with the leaders of the Western powers. Attitude towards Hitler - wary, repeated attempts to create a European security system.
The third stage, the crisis of international relations, 1939-1940.	Having failed in their attempts to negotiate normally with France and England, the politicians of the USSR began a new rapprochement with Germany. International relationships worsened after winter war 1939 in Finland.

This is what characterized the foreign policy of the USSR in the 20-30s.