Soviet five-year plans. Five-year plans in the USSR. socialist industrialization The first and second five years are the most important

Sign

Sign "Drummer 11 five-year plan" Established by the Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League dated March 26, 1981 N304 "On the All-Union Socialist Competition for the successful fulfillment and overfulfillment of the tasks of the eleventh five-year plan."

Regulations on Badge "Drummer 11 Five-Year Plan" approved By the Decree of the Presidium of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions N P-8, the USSR State Committee for Labor N 289 dated 09/25/1981 "On approval of the Regulations on the unified all-Union sign "Drummer of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan"

Sign "Drummer 11 five-year plan" was awarded on the basis of the results of the 11th five-year plan (1981-1985). It is identical to the badge of the drummer of the 10th five-year plan.

The badge was made of aluminium, has an oval shape and is edged with laurel and oak leaves. Below on the sides are ears of wheat. In the center is an unfolded red banner with the inscription "drummer of the 11th five-year plan", at the bottom of the sign there is a red ribbon with the inscription "USSR" between the banner and the hammer and sickle ribbon, at the top is a red star.

The sign is attached with a pin. Along with the badge, an appropriate certificate was presented, which indicated the full name of the recipient and the name of the organization by whose decision the drummer was awarded.

Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League of March 26, 1981 N304 "On the All-Union Socialist Competition for the Successful Fulfillment and Overfulfillment of the Tasks of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan"

Extract:

"..8. Establish a memorial sign of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League "For the high efficiency and quality of work in the eleventh five-year plan" to reward teams of enterprises, associations, construction projects, collective farms, state farms, research and other organizations and to award the commemorative badge to teams that have achieved high quality work and the best performance in fulfilling the tasks of the eleventh five-year plan, repeatedly awarded the annual results of the All-Union Socialist Competition of the Red Banners of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League.

To award the winners in the All-Union Socialist Competition, establish the number of passing Red Banners of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and the Central Committee of the Komsomol and Commemorative Signs in accordance with the appendix (not given).

To reward workers, collective farmers, engineers and technicians, specialists and employees, to establish unified all-union badge "Drummer of the eleventh five-year plan" with the presentation of a memorable gift for achieving high rates in improving the efficiency and quality of work, ahead of schedule fulfillment of tasks and socialist obligations ... "

For the 11th five-year plan, the national task was to give the country's development even greater dynamism through more efficient use of production assets, their further development and renewal, the introduction of advanced technologies and the achievements of scientific and technological progress, especially in heavy industry. In the light and food industry, along with the creation of new capacities, the expansion and technical re-equipment of existing enterprises was actively carried out. The total length of the main oil and gas pipelines and branches from them reached 54,000 and 112,000 km, respectively. On the whole, during the five-year period, the national income and the gross social product increased by another 19 percent. Real incomes per capita, payments and benefits to the population from public consumption funds increased by 11 and 25 percent, respectively.

Badge "Drummer 11th Five-Year Plan" of the USSR is included in the list of departmental insignia in labor, giving the right to confer the title of "Veteran of Labor".

Industrialization in a broad sense is understood as the process of transition of all branches of the national economy of the country, and primarily in industry, to large-scale machine production. In a narrow sense, the Soviet industrialization of the 30s of the XX century is an accelerated build-up of energy-resource and factory capacities of the USSR economy, in order to overcome the catastrophic lag behind the industrialized West.

Socialist industrialization is usually associated with the implementation of the first five-year plans for the development of socio-economic potential Soviet Union. The process of industrialization in the USSR still causes conflicting assessments among specialists in history, economics and political science in terms of goal-setting, methods, means and results of an outstanding phenomenon of the 20th century.

In order to form your own idea of ​​the process, it is necessary to consider the initial data, the content, and the real results of Soviet industrialization.

Despite embellishing the achievements of pre-revolutionary Russian Empire, the industrial potential did not fully meet many needs and was mainly under the control of foreign investors. The First World War and the Civil War partially destroyed even what was there. At the time of the formation of the USSR in 1922, the country's economy was a ruin and could not ensure the country's defense capability in a hostile environment.

The need for socialist industrialization of the economy of the USSR was finally realized by the ruling elites at the XIV Congress of the CPSU (b). The party forum was called the "industrialization congress" because it set a course for the complete achievement of the economic independence of the USSR. Despite the fact that in the resolutions the problem of industrialization was considered only in general terms, the decisions of the congress were of exceptional importance. The course towards industrialization provided for the super-accelerated pace of development of Soviet industry during the implementation of the plans for the first three five-year plans (1928-1932 and 1933-1937. The third, 1938-1942, was interrupted by the war).

Reasons for industrialization

After the USSR reached the economic indicators of 1913 by the mid-1920s, the prerequisites for overcoming were identified:

1. The backwardness of the country in the technical and economic field.
2. Technological and structural dependence of the domestic economy on the West, which significantly weakened the defense capability of the Soviet state.
3. Underdevelopment of the agricultural sector of the economy.

The prerequisites developed into the main reason for industrialization - the Soviet Union had to turn from a country importing equipment and machinery into a country producing means of production.

Goals of industrialization

The historical situation around the USSR determined the targets of the industrialization process:

1. The Soviet Union had to follow the path of sustainable scientific and technological development and technological breakthrough.
2. Creation of a full-fledged defense potential that provided all the military needs to protect the country's borders.
3. Development of new capacities in heavy industry and metallurgy.
4. Full economic independence from other (more developed states).
5. Improvement of the standard of living of the Soviet people.
6. Demonstration to the capitalist world of the advantages of socialism.

The achievement of the set goals was to ensure the USSR's exit from the state of glaring poverty to the transition to a phase of growth and all-round prosperity.

conditions for industrialization

The problems in the national economy were so obvious that they had to be tackled immediately, despite the not very favorable conditions:

1. Economic development was hampered by the devastating effects of the Civil War.
2. Acute shortage of qualified personnel.
3. Domestic production of means of production has not been established, the needs of the economy in machinery and equipment are met through imports.
4. Weakening, and in some moments the complete absence of international economic ties.

Such conditions for industrialization were extremely unfavorable and required decisive measures from the Soviet government.

Sources of funds for industrialization

The process of radical transformation of the country's economy required enormous costs. The sources of financing and implementation of a set of industrialization measures were:

• The transfer of funds from light industry to the development of heavy industry;
• transfer of material resources for the development of the agricultural sector to the industrial one;
• systematic internal loans from the working population;
• monetization of the labor enthusiasm of the people (socialist competition, mass overfulfillment of the plan, the Stakhanovist movement, etc.);
• income from international trade;
• almost gratuitous workforce of the Gulag.

The West constantly changed its demands for payment for its supplies of machinery and technology, which sometimes led to catastrophic imbalances (the famine of the early 1930s).

Industrialization Methods

Initiated state power industrialization was supported by the unprecedented enthusiasm of the masses. The command-administrative method of implementing all projects of economic reforms in the USSR dominated. Measures of accelerated industrialization were carried out at an accelerated pace and with serious shortcomings. But this is the case when "quantity grows into quality."

Progress of industrialization

First Five-Year Plan (1928 - 1932)

As a result of the activities for the implementation of the first five-year plan was:

1. More than 1500 industrial enterprises have been built.
2. The country's national income has been doubled.
3. The construction of Dneproges, the largest power plant in the world at that time, was completed.
4. Metallurgical production was put into operation in Lipetsk, Sverdlovsk (Uralmash), Chelyabinsk, Novokuznetsk, Norilsk and Magnitogorsk.
5. The production of tractors began in Stalingrad, Kharkov, Chelyabinsk and Nizhny Tagil.
6. Mass automobile production has begun at the GAZ and ZIS plants.
7. Construction of the White Sea Canal.
8. The construction of the Turksib (Turkestan-Siberian Railway) was completed.
9. There was a creation of a new industrial region - Kuzbass.
10. The introduction of a 7-hour working day with the complete elimination of unemployment.
11. Achieved 2nd place in the world in mechanical engineering, iron smelting and oil production, 3rd place in the production of electricity.

Second Five-Year Plan (1933 - 1937)

• Over 4,500 large industrial facilities have already been built;
• The construction of the White Sea Canal has been completed;
• the large-scale construction of the Moscow Metro began (the first metro line was introduced in 1935);
• mass construction of military factories;
• comprehensive development of Soviet aviation.

Third Five-Year Plan (1938 - 1942)

1. more than 3 thousand industrial enterprises were put into operation.
2. The Uglichskaya and Komsomolskaya HPPs have been launched.
3. Novotagilsky and Petrovsk-Zabaikalsky metallurgical plants were built.
4. The products were produced by the Balkhash and Sredneuralsk copper smelters.
5. An oil refinery in Ufa was put into operation.

What did the five-year plans give the country their significance for industrialization

With certain shortcomings, the successes of the first five-year plans are impressive.

First, the USSR became an industrial country as a whole.

Secondly, on the eve of the war, according to various estimates, in the structure of the revenue side of the budget, revenues from industry ranged from 50 to 70%.

Thirdly, the growth of industry was 2.5 times higher than in 1913.

Fourthly, the USSR took 2nd place in the world in terms of industrial volumes. Fifthly, the Soviet Union achieved complete state and military-economic independence.

Industrialization gave everything without which it is impossible to win a large-scale war.

Results of industrialization: positive and negative

Positive results	Negative results
9,000 new industrial facilities have been put into operation.	The people suffered hardships due to the deterioration of the work of light industry and the compulsion to borrow their funds from the state.
Creation of new industrial branches: tractor, automobile, aviation, chemical and machine-tool building.	Excesses with collectivization and the impoverishment of the countryside.
Gross industrial volumes increased by 6.5 times.	Difficult working conditions for workers and especially prisoners.
The USSR took 1st place in Europe and 2nd place in the world in terms of industrial volumes.	Completion of the formation of a command-administrative and planned economy
The USSR could independently produce all types of industrial products.	Creation of the Soviet industry as the basis of a totalitarian state.
The country has become urbanized, the urban population has grown to 40%.	Excessive volumes of grain export abroad, natural resources and even cultural values.
A powerful layer of domestic engineering and technical intelligentsia was created.	The growth of bureaucracy (the number of people's commissariats and departments has increased significantly).
Unemployment is completely gone.	Administrative arbitrariness.

Industrialization of the USSR - tough but timely transformations

In the 1920s and 1930s, the Soviet Union was in real danger of losing sovereignty. Only thanks to the tough and purposeful policy of the highest authorities, the enthusiasm and the greatest exertion of the forces of the Soviet working people, was it possible to make a powerful industrial breakthrough. The USSR became an independent economic and technical power, capable of providing itself with everything necessary for the reliable defense of its borders.

January 1929 - 1986

The period for which the central planning of the economy of the USSR was carried out.

"TECHNOLOGY SOLVE EVERYTHING!"

FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN (1928/29 - 1932/33)

It entered into force on October 1, 1928. The main task of the five-year plan was to turn the country from an agrarian-industrial into an industrial one. But by that time, the five-year plan assignments had not yet been approved. At the suggestion of Krzhizhanovsky, two versions of the five-year plan were developed - "starting" (minimum) and "optimal". The development was carried out with the participation of prominent scientists (A.N. Bakh, I.G. Aleksandrov, A.V. Winter, D.N. Pryanishnikov). The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks took as a basis the optimal version of the plan, which in May 1929 the Fifth All-Union Congress of Soviets adopted as a law.

The tasks of the optimal variant were about 20% higher than the starting one and could be completed only under a successful set of circumstances - a good harvest, the absence of international conflicts, ensuring the supply of equipment from Western countries, etc. However, historians and economists believe that this plan was a realistic program, taking into account the dependence of industrialization on the possibilities of peasant production. The plan provided for an increase in the five-year period of industrial output by 180%, the production of means of production - by 230%, agricultural products - by 55%; dramatically increase labor productivity. It was planned to build more than 1200 factories. Priority was given to heavy industry. The production of light industry and consumer goods was in a secondary position. The main slogan of the first five-year plan: "Technology decides everything!" It was about exceptionally rapid progress, which has no examples in world history.

The program of "socialist industrialization" was supplemented by a plan for the reconstruction of the national economy: a change in production techniques, the development of energy, the transfer of advanced American and European technology to the country's economy, rationalization, scientific organization labor, the transfer of production to sources of raw materials and energy, the specialization of regions in accordance with their natural and social needs. Through nationwide planning, it was supposed to realize the benefits of an economy free from the anarchy and competition of capitalism.

At the beginning of industrialization, much attention was paid to the re-equipment of old industrial enterprises. But at the same time, more than 500 new plants were laid, including the Saratov and Rostov agricultural engineering plants, the Kuznetsk and Magnitogorsk metallurgical plants, the construction of the Turkestan-Siberian railway (Turksib) and the Dnieper hydroelectric power station (Dneproges) began. The development and expansion of industrial production was carried out largely at the expense of the resources of the enterprises themselves. However, purchases abroad of machinery, equipment, licenses increased. Foreign specialists were attracted to the country for big money. On the basis of the Supreme Council of National Economy of the USSR, people's commissariats of heavy, light and forest industries were formed.

During the first years of the five-year plan, production came increasingly under centralized control from above. It seemed to many leaders that this situation was leading to the return of the "war communism" of the civil war period. Indeed, banks, joint-stock companies, stock exchanges, credit partnerships were liquidated. Unity of command was introduced at the enterprises, the directors appointed there became responsible for the implementation of the plan.

In the summer of 1929, a revision began in the direction of increasing the already adopted plan targets for the five-year plan. This was demanded by members of the government, directors of factories, and the workers themselves. Against the background of the economic crisis in the Western countries, the Soviet people sought by revolutionary methods to eliminate the backwardness of the Soviet state from the developed countries in the shortest possible time, to prove the advantages of the socialist system over the capitalist one. "Counter plans" were put forward and adopted, although sometimes there was no material support for them. In December 1929, he put forward the slogan: "Five-year plan - in four years!". The task was set to double capital investments annually, to produce twice as much as planned non-ferrous and ferrous metals, cars, agricultural machinery, cast iron, etc. The Kuznetsk and Magnitogorsk plants were to become four times more powerful, by 1930 such great construction projects as Dneproges and Turksib were completed . A course is being taken for a "great leap" in the development of industry. The 16th Party Congress (1930) approved the actions of the supporters of acceleration. The slogan "Tempos decide everything!" was put forward. In February 1931, Stalin declared: “We are 50-100 years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it or we will be crushed.” At the same time, it was decided to promote the achievements of the production drummers more widely.

Many historians today note that, despite the unprecedented pace of construction, there were failures in the fulfillment of the tasks of the first five-year plan. All this forced the country's leadership to announce at the beginning of 1933 its early implementation (4 years and 3 months). Further planning needed to be adjusted. At the January 1933 Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Stalin declared that now there was no need to "whip up and urge the country on." However, the growth in the production of heavy industry equipment, electricity, raw materials extraction was very significant. Thousands of new facilities have been laid by the selfless labor of the Soviet people. The elimination of unemployment was considered a huge achievement.

GREETINGS TO THE BUILDERS OF THE DNIPROSTROY

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR warmly greet the workers and workers, engineers, technicians and the entire leadership of Dneprostroy.

Congratulations, comrades, on the completion of the construction and early launch of the electrification giant, which has no equal in the world.

If the Soviet government succeeded in accomplishing this task of gigantic construction in a short time, at a time when a destructive crisis and unemployment are raging throughout the capitalist world, then this could only happen because the power of the Soviets is the only power in the world that has the selfless support of millions of workers and peasants. .

Long live the working class!

Long live the Leninist party!

Central Committee of the CPSU(b)

Council of People's Commissars of the USSR

"STAFF DECIDES EVERYTHING!"

SECOND FIVE-YEAR PLAN (1933-37).

Approved by the XVII Congress of the CPSU (b) in early 1934, proclaimed the main task of the five-year plan - the construction of the material and technical base of socialism. The main slogan of the second five-year plan: "Cadres decide everything!" A struggle has unfolded in the country to increase labor productivity. ¬

In the second five-year plan, the average annual growth rate of industrial output fell to 16.5% (against 30% in the first five-year plan). Miscalculations in the development of light industry were taken into account, which now had to outstrip heavy industry in terms of production growth. In addition, it was planned to expand the output of consumer goods at heavy industry enterprises. All this was due to the need to solve pressing social issues, to somehow raise the living standards of the working people.

It was planned to create new industrial centers in the Urals, Western and Eastern Siberia, Kazakhstan, Central Asia, Transcaucasia. As before, the main attention of the CPSU(b) was concentrated on the decisive areas of technical reconstruction: power engineering and mechanical engineering, ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, the fuel industry, and transport.

Along with a slowdown in the growth rate of industrial output, the second five-year plan was also characterized by a certain expansion of the independence of enterprises, a revival of material incentives for workers and employees, and a strengthening of the ruble. Piecework-bonus payment for the performance and overfulfillment of tasks was introduced into the economy. Salary differentiation was introduced - depending on working conditions. During the years of the second five-year plan of the Supreme Economic Council, G.K. Ordzhonikidze, V.V. Kuibyshev was transferred to the leadership of the State Planning Committee of the USSR. Ordzhonikidze was more realistic than many other leaders in assessing the situation in industry and the possibilities of the economy as a whole.

Economic stimulation was supplemented by a call for broad socialist competition. A Stakhanovite movement developed in the country, named after the miner Alexei Stakhanov. On the night of August 30-31, 1935, he set an unprecedented record of coal production, exceeding the norm by 14 times in one shift. Stakhanov's successes were marked by government awards and received all-Union fame. The Party called for work in the Stakhanov style in all branches of production. Now Stakhanovites have appeared in almost every enterprise. Note that their excess work was paid an order of magnitude higher than other workers. In addition, they received fame, recognition, the opportunity to move up the career ladder.

Despite all the everyday difficulties, the idea of ​​the country's industrial upsurge spread ever deeper among the working people. Ideology and propaganda were combined with a patriotic spirit. A significant part of the Soviet workers wanted to prove with their labor that they could build more and produce faster than at construction sites and factories in the USA, Germany or England. However, the desire to set records led in a number of cases to damage to new and expensive equipment.

In the second five-year plan, the construction of factories, factories, power plants (4.5 thousand industrial enterprises) continued. The Ural machine-building and Chelyabinsk tractor plants, dozens of blast furnaces, mines and power plants were put into operation. The first metro line was opened in Moscow. Huge capital investments went into the industry of the Union republics. In Ukraine - in engineering enterprises, in Uzbekistan - metal processing plants, etc. New industrial centers and new branches of industry arose in the country: chemical, aviation, tractor-building. Scientific and technical backwardness was overcome. The industrial base began to move to the East. Compared to the first five-year plan, labor productivity has doubled. The import of foreign equipment decreased by 10 times. Significant progress has been made in the development of transport. The White Sea-Baltic Canal and the Moscow-Volga Canal, the Turkestan-Siberian Road were laid. Air transport arose, which played a decisive role in the development of the North. The Northern Sea Route through the seas of the Arctic Ocean was opened for navigation. The country gained economic independence and self-sufficiency. New enterprises provided 4/5 of all industrial output. Coal production has doubled, oil production has increased by almost one and a half times, and rolled steel has tripled.

The bulk of the new workers came from the peasantry (2/3 of the 12 million in the first five-year plan). The economy was in dire need of qualified personnel. The slogan "Cadres decide everything!" assumed gigantic efforts in the training of specialists in their field. In 1933, factory apprenticeship schools (FZU) were reorganized into vocational schools. During the years of the second five-year plan, 1.4 million people received working specialties. Refresher courses were opened at factories and factories.

In the mid-1930s, the Soviet military-industrial complex (MIC) was formed. In 1936, the People's Commissariat for the Defense Industry was formed, which controlled a large number of industrial enterprises, as well as various research organizations and design bureaus.

Completion of the second five-year plan was announced ahead of schedule - again 4 years and 3 months. However, modern historians provide data that during this time the second five-year plan was completed only by 75-77% of the original tasks. Nevertheless, the overall results of the second five-year plan proved to be more successful than those of the first.

STALIN I.V. RESULTS OF THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN

The main task of the five-year plan was to transfer our country, with its backward, sometimes medieval technology, to the rails of new, modern technology.

The main task of the five-year plan was to transform the USSR from an agrarian and weak country, dependent on the whims of the capitalist countries, into an industrial and powerful country, completely independent and independent of the whims of world capitalism.

The main task of the five-year plan was to, by transforming the USSR into an industrial country, completely oust capitalist elements, expand the front of socialist forms of economy and create an economic basis for the destruction of classes in the USSR, for building a socialist society.

The main task of the five-year plan was to create in our country an industry capable of re-equipping and reorganizing not only industry as a whole, but transport as well, but agriculture as well, on the basis of socialism.

The main task of the five-year plan was to transfer small-scale and fragmented agriculture to the rails of large-scale collective farming, thereby providing the economic basis for socialism in the countryside and thus eliminating the possibility of restoring capitalism in the USSR.

Finally, the task of the five-year plan was to create in the country all the necessary technical and economic prerequisites for the maximum increase in the country's defense capability, making it possible to organize a decisive rebuff to all and any attempts at military intervention from outside, to all and any attempts at military attack from outside.

FROM THE RESOLUTION OF THE XVII CONGRESS OF THE AUCP(b)

The 17th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks approves the program for completing the technical reconstruction of the entire national economy and increasing production in the second five-year period, presented by the State Planning Commission of the Union and adopted by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

The Congress of the CPSU (b) decides:

Set the volume of output for all industry in 1937, that is, at the end of the second five-year plan, at 92.7 billion rubles. (in 1926/27 prices) against 43 billion rubles. at the end of the first five-year plan - in 1932, that is, an average annual increase of 16.5% and an increase in the size of industrial output by 2.1 times, and in comparison with the pre-war level by about eight times. With regard to the production of consumer goods, to outline faster rates of development not only in comparison with the first five-year plan (an average annual growth rate of 18.5% versus 17% in the first five-year plan), but also in comparison with the rates of development of the production of means of production in the second five-year plan (average annual growth rate of 18.5% against an average annual growth rate of capital goods of 14.5%). (…)

The 17th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks establishes that the second five-year plan for the development of the national economy, presented by the State Planning Committee of the Union and adopted by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, provides:

a) the liquidation of capitalist elements and classes in general, the final liquidation, on the basis of the complete completion of the collectivization of peasant farms and the co-operation of all handicraftsmen, private ownership of the means of production; the elimination of the multi-structural nature of the economy of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the socialist mode of production as the only mode of production, with the transformation of the entire working population of the country into active and conscious builders of a socialist society;

b) completion of the technical reconstruction of the entire national economy of the USSR on the basis created during the first five-year plan and following the path of further rapid growth of industry that produces the means of production (heavy industry);

c) a more rapid rise in the well-being of the workers and peasant masses and, at the same time, a decisive improvement in all housing and communal services in the USSR;

d) strengthening economic and political positions proletarian dictatorship on the basis of an alliance between the working class and the peasantry for the final liquidation of capitalist elements and classes in general;

e) further strengthening of the country's defense capability.

The fulfillment of these tasks, leading to the ousting of the last remnants of the capitalist elements from all their old positions and dooming them to final destruction, cannot but cause an intensification of the class struggle, new attempts to undermine the collective farms on the part of the kulaks, and attempts at wrecking sabotage of our industrial enterprises by the anti-Soviet forces. On the other hand, the implementation of the tasks of the Second Five-Year Plan, the five-year plan for radically raising the living standards of the workers and peasant masses on the basis of completing the technical reconstruction of the entire national economy, cannot but arouse the enthusiasm of the working people, a surge of production activity and a growing desire to master new technology in the broadest masses of working people - builders. socialism.

Ruthlessly crushing the counter-revolutionary attacks of the class enemy and rallying the ranks of the shock workers of socialism for the victorious fulfillment of the second five-year plan, the working class, together with the masses of the collective farms, under the leadership of the Party, which is waging a relentless struggle against all kinds of opportunism, will overcome all and all difficulties on the path of building socialism.

ORDERS OF THE BELOMORKANAL

DECISION OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE UNION OF THE SSR

The Central Executive Committee of the USSR, having considered the proposal of the Council of People's Commissars on awarding the most distinguished workers, engineers and leaders of Belomorstroy with orders of the USSR, decides:

To award the Orders of Lenin:

1. Yagoda Genrikh Grigorievich - deputy. Chairman of the OGPU of the USSR.

2. Kogan Lazar Iosifovich - head of Belomorstroy.

3. Matvey Davidovich Berman - Head of the Main Directorate of Correctional Labor Camps of the OPTU.

4. Firin Semyon Grigorievich - head of the White Sea-Baltic forced labor camp and deputy head of the Main Directorate of Corrective Labor Camps of the OGPU.

5. Rapoport Yakov Davidovich - Deputy Head of Belomorstroy and Deputy. Head of the Main Directorate of Correctional Labor Camps of the OGPU.

6. Zhuk Sergey Yakovlevich - deputy. chief engineer of Belomorstroy, one of the best and most conscientious engineers, who, with his exceptional knowledge of the matter and his enormous ability to work, ensured the quality of the work.

7. Frenkel Naftaliy Aronovich - assistant head of Belomorstroy and head of work (who at one time committed a crime against the state and was amnestied by the Central Executive Committee of the USSR in 1932 with the removal of a criminal record), from the moment work began at Belomorstroy and to the end ensured the correct organization of work, high the quality of the construction and showed great knowledge of the matter.

8. Verzhbitsky Konstantin Andreevich - deputy. chief engineer of construction (he was convicted of sabotage under article 58-7 and released (early in 1932), one of the major engineers who most conscientiously treated the work entrusted to him.

Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR

M. Kalinin

Secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR

A. Yenukidze

"CATCH UP AND OVERCOME!"

THE THIRD FIVE-YEAR PLAN (1938 - 1942)

By the end of the 1930s, tendencies towards centralization and the strengthening of planning mechanisms intensified in the Soviet economy. All factories and factories were in strict subordination of the respective people's commissariats represented by their chiefs. The plan was understood as both far-reaching programs and the preparation of current even small tasks. The enterprises' initiative was curtailed. The main reasons for these phenomena were the increased threat to the security of the USSR, the aggressive behavior of Nazi Germany and its allies, the need for strict control over output and labor discipline. There was also a lack of material resources that had to be distributed in accordance with the main priorities.

In March 1939, the 18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks approved the third five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR for 1938-1942. It set the following tasks: to almost double the volume of industrial output, to create large state reserves and mobilization stocks, primarily for fuel and defense products; to increase agricultural production by 1.5 times. The focus continued to be on heavy industry. The country's leadership put forward the slogan: in the near foreseeable future, "to overtake and overtake economically the most developed capitalist countries."

The third five-year plan was no easier than the previous ones. People overworked themselves with the hardest work in production and new construction sites. From 1938 to 1940, industrial output increased by 45%, however, a number of industries (railway transport, oil production, energy) still lagged behind in their development. In view of the war that began on September 1, 1939 in Europe, all the most advanced went to equip, first of all, the Red Army. Its numbers increased from 1939 to 1941. from 1.5 to 5 million people It was necessary to create mobilization reserves, to speed up the strengthening of the country's defense power. The share of spending on military needs increased from 13 to 25%. Particular attention was paid to the development of defense industries in the east of the USSR. The construction of understudy plants went on in the Volga region, in the Urals and in Siberia. It was timely measures that allowed not only to preserve the military potential of the state in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War, but also to evacuate machine tools from enterprises located in the west deep into the USSR. But serious mistakes were made in defense construction. In pursuit of the number of tanks, planes, rifles, they lost sight of the fact that the troops received already outdated weapons designs. New samples were also developed and put into operation - MiGG, LaGG aircraft, KV and T-34 tanks, PPD submachine guns - but so far they were not enough to equip a modern-type army. The repressions of 1936-1938 also had an effect, from which not only the military, but also highly qualified specialists, engineers, and directors of enterprises undeservedly suffered.

In the third five-year plan, disciplinary punishments at work were tightened. Under the threat of criminal liability, workers and employees did not have the right to move from one enterprise to another without the permission of the directorate. In June 1940, the working day was extended from 7 to 8 hours, and the working week became seven days. A worker could be tried and sent to forced labor in the Gulag system for being late for work three times in a month. The cheap labor of prisoners was used in the construction of canals, roads, mines, and factories in Siberia, the Far North, Kolyma, Kazakhstan, and other places. The construction of facilities was carried out manually with a high mortality rate among convicts. However, the fact is that the standard of living of the population, especially in the cities, began to gradually rise. By the end of the 1930s, the life of ordinary Soviet people improved, and the production of essential goods increased.

RESULTS OF THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLANS

The revolution and civil war formed a special type of people who emerged from the turmoil and formed a new state, the Soviet Union, on the ruins of the Russian Empire. Many foreign specialists who came here in the 1930s had a hard time understanding how the majority of the country's population could live in de facto poverty by Western standards, but work hard almost for nothing for the ideals of a brighter future. However, getting closer to the spiritual qualities, skills and culture of the Soviet people, they understood that the USSR was at the stage of a gigantic reconstruction of its economy, which was supported by the vast majority of citizens. Indeed, the calls of the leadership to exert their strength day and night found a benevolent response among the workers.

They wanted to make their country prosperous, put an end to illiteracy, live with lofty thoughts, and save their children from constant need. Yesterday's peasant, who often did not see in his life a more complex mechanism than a clock with weights, in a few years became a class specialist: a driver, a machine operator, an engineer. The urban population by the end of the 1930s exceeded 30%. And although it was considered the norm of life for a family to live in one room, the presence of a single suit and one pair of shoes, people believed that in the future they, or their children, would live much better. It was a breakthrough of a peasant country into a modern industrial society. There were both heroic and tragic pages in this breakthrough. But by the end of the 1930s, the selfless labor of millions of people put the USSR on a par with the leading industrial powers.

ORDER of the NKVD of the USSR No. 00943

"ON THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW NUTRITIONS OF FOOD AND RETENTION FOR PRISONERS IN ITL AND ITK NKVD of the USSR"

Moscow city

Owls. secret

1. To put into effect from July 1, 1939, the norms of food and clothing allowance for prisoners in forced labor camps and colonies of the NKVD of the USSR in accordance with annexes No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 , 12, 13, 14, 15, 1b and the norms for replacing some products with others, according to Appendix No. 17.

2. For prisoners working in the Arctic Circle, as well as in underground work, the specified norms are increased by 25%, excluding the norms of bread, salt, bay leaves and pepper.

3. For prisoners in Norillag, Vorkutlag and the Abez Branch of the Sevzheldorlag, to maintain the food and clothing allowances approved by the plan for 1939/40.

4. Norms for meat, vegetable oil and sugar are introduced from the fourth quarter of 1939.

5. All previously established by the orders of the OGPU - the NKVD and the orders of the GULAG of the NKVD of the USSR, the norms of food and clothing allowance for prisoners in forced labor camps and colonies of the NKVD of the USSR - cancel.

Application: norms.

Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Divisional Commander CHERNYSHOV

Application No. 1

NORMA No. 1 allowances for prisoners in forced labor camps and colonies of the NKVD of the USSR, for those who do not work out production standards, household services, investigative and disabled people (per 1 person per day in grams)

Name of products / Quantity, gr.

Rye bread - 600

Wheat flour 85% - 10

Groats different - 100

Vegetable oil - 0

Surrogate tea - 2

Potatoes and vegetables - 500

Tomato puree - 10

Capsicum - 0.13

Bay leaf - 0.2

Note:

1. Prisoners engaged in basic production work and working out norms up to 60% receive food according to this norm.

2. Prisoners who work out production norms from 60% to 99% inclusive, receive in addition to the indicated ration of bread according to the following scale:

% by output

60-79% - 1st category - 100 gr.; 2nd category - 100 gr.; 3rd category and above - 200 gr.

80-99% - 1st category - 100 gr.; 2nd category - 200 gr.; 3rd category and above - 400 gr.

Beginning OOS GULAG" NKVD quartermaster of the 1st rank SILIN ...

1. Fur hats are issued for the Norillag.

2. Surrogate shoes are issued instead of leather shoes 1 pair for 4 months.

3. Paper footcloths are issued only to those who work outdoors, as well as in unheated premises.

4. A padded jacket is issued only to those working outdoors and in unheated premises. In the southern regions (Georgian, Azerbaijan, Armenian, Uzbek, Tajik, Turkmen SSR and Crimean ASSR), quilted jackets are not issued.

5. Wadded bloomers are issued only to those working in outdoor work and in unheated rooms.

6. Short fur coats are released at the rate of 7% of the composition of prisoners working for outdoors and unheated rooms.

7. Boots are issued only to those working outdoors. Felt boots can be replaced with shoe covers, cotton stockings with rubber boots.

8. Woolen mittens are issued in 2 pairs for outdoor workers and 1 pair for the rest.

9. Combined mittens are issued only to employees.

10. Youngsters are given the same material allowance, but of the appropriate size.

11. Those working by the Stakhanov methods are issued additionally in cash per person per year:

one). Undershirts - 1 pc.

2). Underpants - 1 pc.

3). T-shirt - 1 pc.

four). Panties - 1 pc.

5). Towels - 1 pc.

6). Summer footcloths - 1 pair

7). "-" paper - 1 pair

eight). Woolen mittens - 1 pair

9). Combined mittens. - 1 pair.

The above material allowance is issued no more than 3% of the total number of items released for the camp.

Beginning OOS GULAG NKVD Quartermaster 1st rank SILIN

Literature:

Related materials:

What is the NEP and why was it replaced by industrialization

Today, the next difficult question is number 10. It is formulated in the QS as follows: "The reasons for the curtailment of the NEP, an assessment of the results of industrialization, collectivization and transformations in the field of culture." By itself, the wording of the question covers a long period of time and several entities at once. Therefore, we will not meet the scientific certification once. To begin with, let us dwell on how modern historical science interprets new economic policy Soviet power.

Accomplishments of the era of the first five-year plans: what you need to know about it

Having considered last time the NEP and the reasons for its curtailment, we now turn to the specific results of those processes that were designed to ensure the construction of socialism in the USSR (in other words, to ensure the country's sovereignty and global competitiveness) - industrialization and collectivization.

NEP and five-year plans: what is written about it in school textbooks

The existing textbooks, on the whole, satisfactorily interpret a voluminous and apparently very difficult question. Here we meet with a rather rare phenomenon, when the results of the work of historians, noticeable on these subjects over the past 25-30 years, have become the property of school education.

Chervonets and merchants for the dictatorship of the proletariat. To coincide with the anniversaries of Soviet economic policy

On October 11, 1922, a new monetary unit, the chervonets, was introduced in Soviet Russia. And on October 11, 1931, private trade was banned. Today, on the day of the accidental coincidence of two dates at once, it is worth talking about the fact that the state economic policy and private entrepreneurship coexist in harmony in the concept of "economic sovereignty". And if they suddenly do not get along, then, probably, something is wrong in economic policy, and sovereignty will take revenge on such a policy.

8 Comments

Kovalenko Nadezhda Vyacheslavovna/ Lecturer in archiving, GAUGN

1. Since there is no separate article on industrialization on Lenta, here one could briefly point out the different views in power regarding its pace and resources: disagreements between the Supreme Council of National Economy (Kuibyshev) and Gosplan (Krzhizhanovsky), positions of intra-party oppositions (for example, on Bukharin's "turtle step towards socialism"). It would also be possible to briefly point out the disputes of scientists about a possible alternative to the Stalinist version of industrialization, which had a great resonance in society.
2. "... historians and economists believe that this plan was a realistic program, taking into account the dependence of industrialization on the possibilities of peasant production." Still, it is not entirely clear what factors historians meant when they spoke of a realistic program, what phenomena are admissible when it is recognized as realistic. After all, dispossession took place here, and the famine of the early 30s, and local outbreaks of discontent in the countryside, at construction sites and factories, and the most difficult working conditions, and lowering prices in production, and “sabotage” processes, i.e. related to the discrepancy between the quality of the technical base and the workforce to the tasks set. All these phenomena should also have been somehow more clearly mentioned, especially since the article contains a link to the special summary of the OGPU, covering some of them. In this context, Stalin's well-known article "Dizziness from Success" should also be mentioned.
3. The article quite rightly speaks of the labor feat of the people, of the enthusiasm of the Soviet people (moreover, as many as 3 times, in different places). But it also gives the impression that the increase in the pace of industrialization was solely the response of the authorities to the mood in society. (“In the summer of 1929, a revision began in the direction of increasing the already adopted five-year plan targets. This was demanded by members of the government, plant directors, and the workers themselves. Against the backdrop of economic crisis in Western countries, the Soviet people sought by revolutionary methods to eliminate the backwardness of the Soviet state from the developed countries as soon as possible, to prove the advantages of the socialist system over the capitalist. as is known, manifestations of dissatisfaction with the most difficult working conditions, for example, Stakhanovites, were often not favored by their labor collectives.
It should also be mentioned in more detail that, in addition to the labor feat of the people, certain initiatives of the authorities also played a decisive role. Thus, it was rightly mentioned about the development of vocational education, that the development of the plan was carried out with the participation of prominent scientists, about the purchase of equipment abroad and the invitation of specialists. Here it should be added, for example, about the policy of the authorities regarding the development of science, including applied science (an issue that is extremely relevant now).
4. The article refers to the centralization of management in those years of the economy and industry (... banks, joint-stock companies, stock exchanges, credit partnerships were liquidated. One-man management was introduced at enterprises, directors appointed there became responsible for the implementation of the plan). The phenomena mentioned here fit under the concept of “winding down of NEP”, which has long and firmly established itself in science as well, and it probably should have been brought here in relation to these processes. The article provides documents related to the work of Gulag prisoners, links to them. Perhaps, on the contrary, it should have been mentioned in the text itself that some of the objects were built by prisoners, and references and documents should be given in the article “Peak of Stalinist repressions”, here also links to scientific works and memoirs relating to the actual processes of industrialization (for example, Gimpelson E. G., Ehrenburg I.G.). Otherwise, readers may get the impression that it was the labor of prisoners that was the main "engine" of industrialization.

Gorbunova Marina/ honorary worker of education

1. I did not find in the explanatory material information about the transformations in the spiritual sphere during the first five-year plans (except for the creation of a system for the formation of workforce). Processes in the field of science, literature, fine arts, etc. remained undiscovered. Centralization, unification, increasing control by the political leadership, the assertion of the dominance of the principle of socialist realism - everything has become beyond the scope of what has been read.
2. There is no general picture of the social structure of society that took shape during this period, like a hierarchical ladder, each level of which was firmly fastened by complementary methods of material incentives and fear of repression, on the one hand, and on the other hand, by the assertion of the only and obligatory for all the dominant ideology, which, of course, contributed not only to the exaltation of the party elite, but also to the maintenance of mass labor and civic enthusiasm. The incredible complexity of an objective assessment of that period lies, it seems to me, in the contradictory nature of "then" reality, which makes it possible for both apologists and critics to use objective facts as an argument for their positions:
- real successes and achievements of socialist construction - BUT - merits and victories are attributed primarily to the wise party leadership and personally to Stalin;
- mass enthusiasm and solidarity of the working people, formed and maintained respect for working people - BUT - a feeling of a "besieged fortress" and a readiness to unanimously and without hesitation destroy anyone whom the authorities (!) call an external or internal enemy;
- confidence in a beautiful and inevitable future, the presence of a real upsurge, happiness and greatness among a part of the population - BUT - the impoverishment of the meaning of life, when the class struggle and work become its main content.
These oppositions can be continued further, but the main thing is that their presence does not allow reaching public consent so far, and modern realities exacerbate the split with twisted ideologemes that defame common sense and offend civic sensibilities.

Gurin Nikolai Alekseevich/ history teacher Perm

It is well written how the 1st five-year plan was prepared, and how indistinctly it is written that this plan, adopted by the supreme authority of the USSR - the V All-Union Congress of Soviets, and having the force of law, was NOT IMPLEMENTED AT ALL! What Stalin did is Stalin's five-year plan. These two plans differ both in indicators and methods and results.

Gurin Nikolai Alekseevich/ history teacher Perm

The plan was adopted in the spring of 1929 in an atmosphere of struggle against the "right deviation", therefore, of course, the plan was adopted in the best possible way. Well, the supporters of the starting plan were "stigmatized" with the appropriate wording. So, in May 1929, the plan was adopted with maximum tasks, and in July-August, and then in January 1930, Stalin approved new, even higher tasks. Stalin was guided, apparently, by the beautiful idea that "there are no such fortresses that the Bolsheviks could not take," and this one - "we need to run through .."
And what is the result? As a result of the implementation of the Stalinist 1st Five-Year Plan, not a single one! Stalin's increased task was not even close. For oil, they almost reached the task of the optimal plan, for the rest - in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe tasks of the "surrender" starting plan, or even less. At the same time, we are talking only about the tasks of heavy industry, because the five-year tasks for agriculture, food and light industry were not only not fulfilled, but many went into the red. Wherein! much more money was invested in the national economy than according to plan. 1st five-year plan failed. True, the people were not told about this. It's good that Stalin knew how to learn from his mistakes and the second Stalinist five-year plan was quite sane.

Gurin Nikolai Alekseevich/ history teacher Perm

About the first five years
The “optimal version” of the first five-year plan was in fact the maximum, and any attempt to further increase certain tasks could only lead to overstrain of the country’s forces, to material and human losses, and ultimately to the disruption of the plan, as happened in reality. Already in the autumn of 1929, the Stalinist leadership gave the process of radical reconstruction of the national economy the scale and pace of an unrestrained race.
Excessive forcing of the complete collectivization of millions of peasant farms, going as far as attempts to carry it out in the grain regions of the country for a year and a half and even "during the spring sowing campaign of 1930", meant the rejection of the Leninist cooperative plan and its basic principles. The widespread use of measures of administrative coercion, the dispossession of kulaks (in some places up to 15% of peasant farms) caused unjustified and incalculable damage. During 1929-1932, half of the livestock was exterminated. Agriculture has experienced a long decline. All this created enormous difficulties in the formation and development of collective farms as a socialist form of agricultural production, which, of course, had a negative effect on industrial development.
When it comes to the excesses and perversions committed during the years of the first five-year plan, we always confine ourselves to talking about the countryside. Meanwhile, they also took place in the city - in industry, especially in the policy and practice of industrialization. The task adopted in April 1929 to increase iron smelting to 10 million tons in a five-year period seemed insufficient to the Stalinist leadership. In January 1930, this task was increased to 17 million tons! Moreover, it was put forward before all party, trade union and public organizations as "the most important national economic task."
Stalin's "great leap" in metallurgy (as well as in a number of other branches of industry) led to the disorganization of industrial construction, to the extreme complication of the economic situation and the waste of material and human resources. One of the results was the failure to fulfill the plan for metallurgy: in the last year of the five-year plan, the country did not receive not only 10 million tons of pig iron, but also 8 million. In 1932, 6.2 million tons of pig iron were smelted in the country. The voluntaristic task was not fulfilled even in 1940, when iron smelting in the country reached 14.9 million tons.
Note that when evaluating all these figures, there is no way to refer to the lack of experience in planning, to the right to make a mistake, to “unexplored ways”, etc. The issues of the limits of possible growth - both for the economy as a whole and for individual industries - were discussed in wide press and became sufficiently clear during the development of the first five-year plan. The need for coordinating, coordinating, balancing (or, as they used to say, equilibrium) of specific tasks, the meaning of "bottlenecks" were fully disclosed. Already in the plans for 1929, a “problem” was laid down, which consisted in the fact that it was planned to build factories “today” from brick and metal structures that would be made “tomorrow”. N. I. Bukharin's article "Notes of an Economist", published in Pravda on September 30, 1928, was devoted to these issues. "Notes" was not directed against high rates; they revealed the harm of voluntaristic inconsistencies, which inevitably reduced real growth rates and, in the final analysis, made senseless the extraordinary efforts undertaken by society. The vicious prorabotochnaya, and not only prorabotochnaya, campaign against the "limiters", "succumbing to difficulties" (in which the "right deviation" allegedly manifested itself), removed the discussion of these issues. They, of course, very soon arose again, but in a different capacity: not as planning issues, but as issues of eliminating the consequences. The “contradictions” and “bottlenecks” were already mentioned when explaining the reasons for the long non-fulfillment of production plans, poor product quality, high accident rate, etc.
Let us see, however, what an additional increase in the five-year plan target for the production of pig iron by 7 million tons in a maximum of three years meant. This was equivalent to a task to start anew, complete construction and put into operation seven (!) Kuznetsk or Zaporozhye metallurgical plants with a design capacity of 1 million tons of pig iron each or three Magnitogorsk plants with a design capacity of 2.65 million tons. The state and prospects are already Kuznetsk, Zaporozhye and Magnitogorsk plants under construction at the beginning of 1930, they said with all certainty that their launch would take much more time and effort than expected. In order to obtain 17 million tons of pig iron in the last year of the five-year plan, all these real and hypothetical plants had to be fully commissioned in the previous, penultimate year! In fact, even the factories under construction were not and could not be put into operation either in 1932 or in 1933. In Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk in 1932, only the first heats were obtained at the first blast furnaces, from which years of work were required to "big cast iron". They reached their design capacity in 1934-1936. The symbol of the first five-year plan was not “big iron” (not finished products at all), but “pit”. The Platonic image of that time was not an artistic fiction, but “only” a fixation of reality, its visible manifestation. The foregoing allows us to state with full confidence that the revision of the tasks of the first five-year plan, which in themselves were extremely intense, was purely voluntaristic in nature and led to the disruption of the plan.

Danilov V. The phenomenon of the first five-year plans.- Horizon. - 1988. - No. 5.- S. 33-35.

Gurin Nikolai Alekseevich/ history teacher Perm

About the second five-year plan
The Second Five-Year Plan (1933-1937) gave a 2.2-fold increase in the value of industrial output, which, of course, was another major step along the path of industrialization. At the same time, the growth of industry was uneven and was characterized by increased disproportions and difficulties. After the breakthrough of the first five-year plan with its almost 20% average annual increase in industrial output, a respite was required: 1933 gave an increase in its volume by only 5%. A new leap in 1934-1936 (an average annual rate of more than 20%) is replaced by a slowdown in industrial growth (in 1937 an increase in the number of products by 11%, in 1938 - by 12%) due to a sharp lag in the fuel and energy base. The mass repressions that fell upon the party, Soviet and economic cadres also had an effect. In 1936-1937, a wide range of managers of the largest factories, leading figures of industrial people's commissariats were destroyed. The deputies of the people's commissar of heavy industry disappeared one after another - G. I. Lomov, M. L. Rukhimovich, A. P. Serebrovsky, I. V. Kosior ... In February 37, he committed suicide (or was killed) and himself the legendary People's Commissar for Industrialization G. K. Ordzhonikidze. V. I. Mezhlauk, who replaced him, was soon also repressed. This fate was shared by the people's commissar of light industry I. E. Lyubimov, and the people's commissar of the forestry industry S. S. Lobov, the director of the Kuznetsk metallurgical plant K. I. Butenko, the Makeevsky metallurgical plant G. V. Gvakharia, the Stalingrad tractor plant V. And Mikhailov-Ivanov... The list of names of Soviet industry commanders who died as a result of Stalin's repressions can be continued for a very long time. But even this list could not be limited. The heaviest blow was dealt to the engineering and technical personnel. By the beginning of 1940, 2 (two!) Engineers and 31 technicians with diplomas remained at the Makeevsky Metallurgical Plant, and 270 engineering and technical positions were occupied by persons without appropriate education, at the Magnitogorsk Combine - 8 engineers and 66 technicians with diplomas and 364 practice. At other metallurgical enterprises, the picture was similar. Is it any wonder that the smelting of, say, pig iron increased by only 0.6% in 1937, by 1.1% in 1938, and decreased by 0.1% in 1939. In other words, the production of ferrous metallurgy did not grow during these years.
Similar difficulties were noted in other industries. Everywhere they led to a huge turnover of personnel, organizational confusion, people's fear of taking business initiative and taking responsibility, to the disruption of planned targets and, ultimately, to a slowdown in the process of industrialization just when the objective prerequisites for its real acceleration were created. The Stalinist mechanism of leadership inevitably reaped destructive results in the second five-year plan.
Finally, we can also appreciate the attempts to “write off” the “costs” of the Stalinist version of solving the problems that were then facing the Soviet country on the threat of war. The threat of war was real an important factor development of the country, requiring, above all, the acceleration of industrialization. But it also made the most stringent requirements for the most economical (reasonable, careful) use of material and human forces, for their accumulation, and not destruction ... This, I think, needs no explanation. It is absolutely clear that not only the repressions of 1936, 1937 and 1938 against the military, engineering and technical and party and state personnel, but also dispossession in the Stalinist style, and the famine of 1932-1933, and the insane pace of industrial construction imposed on the country, and the trampling of the Soviet democracy - all this led to a waste of the country's forces and resources, to the disruption of very real plans, and thereby to a weakening of the country's efficiency.
Danilov V. The phenomenon of the first five-year plans.- Horizon. - 1988. - No. 5.- S. 36-37.

Gurin Nikolai Alekseevich/ history teacher Perm

The "great turning point" that Stalin announced in November 1929
had nothing to do with the reality of the socio-economic
whom development - there was no supposedly huge growth in production
the nature of labor in industry, nor the alleged mass
collective farm movement in the countryside. With regard to that time,
one can speak of a "great turning point" in only one sense: Stalin
for the first time had the opportunity to impose the parties, the country's own
views, assessments, methods, its own policy - the policy of a dictatorial
voluntarism, inevitably accompanied by huge
human and material losses. with the most damage and
direct disasters, Stalinist voluntarism manifested itself in the
review of the tasks of the first five-year plan of the national economic
construction of the USSR (1928/29-1932/33).
Danilov V.P. On the history of the formation of Stalinism

Gurin Nikolai Alekseevich/ history teacher Perm

Here is a typical example. In order to find additional funds for the development of heavy industry, the Stalinist leadership agreed to place new large loans among the population, to sharply expand the sale of vodka. Quite recently, Stalin assured that alcohol, with the help of which tsarist Russia had half a billion in income, would not be distributed in Soviet Russia. A little later, he changed his point of view: it is naive, they say, to think that socialism can be built with white gloves. And in September 1930, he wrote directly to Molotov: “It is necessary, in my opinion, to increase (as much as possible) the production of vodka. We need to cast aside false shame and directly, openly go for the maximum increase in the production of vodka ... ”And this was done.
Another source of funds was the issue of money. Moreover, the growth of the money supply, not backed by goods, continued until the end of the first five-year plan, with all the ensuing inflationary consequences. Extraordinary measures ensured the export of grain. Even now, one can often hear that it was this export item that played a particularly important role in providing the state with currency for the purchase of equipment. The statistics, however, are not so categorical. The largest proceeds for the export of bread were obtained in 1930 - 883 million rubles. In the same year, the sale of oil products and timber yielded more than 1 billion 430 million rubles. Furs and flax added almost half a billion, and so on. In subsequent years, grain prices on the world market fell sharply. The export of a large amount of grain in 1932-1933, when the hungry sea mowed down the Soviet people, brought a total of only 389 million rubles, and the export of timber - almost 700 million, oil products - the same amount. Only the sale of furs in 1933 made it possible to raise more funds than for all the grain exported that year.
All this forces us to re-evaluate the methods that Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich and others used in raising funds for the needs of industrialization. In 1926, Stalin convinced the party and the people that the morals of landowner-bourgeois Russia ("We ourselves are undernourished, but we will export") are a thing of the past. Later he spoke regularly about the advantages of socialist industrialization, connected, in particular, with the steady growth in the well-being of the workers, of all working people. But how, then, to evaluate his actions in 1932-1933, when the proceeds for bread were too insignificant and, in fact, did not decide anything? Why was it necessary to export grain, which at that tragic hour would have saved the lives of many of our people? Obviously, the whole point is that grain was confiscated from the peasantry at a fabulously low price, and increasing the export of petroleum products and other types of profitable products required considerable effort.

V. Lelchuk, A. Ilyin, L. Kosheleva. Industrialization of the USSR: strategy and practice. In the collection “The lesson gives history / Under the general. ed. V. G. Afanasiev, G. L. Smirnova; Comp. A. A. Ilyin. - M .: Politizdat, 1989.

Tasks of the third five-year plan

The main attention was now paid not to quantitative indicators, but to quality. Emphasis was placed on increasing the output of alloyed and high-quality steels, light and non-ferrous metals, and precision equipment. During the years of the third five-year plan, serious measures were taken to develop the chemical industry and chemicalization of the national economy, to introduce comprehensive mechanization, and even the first attempts were made to automate production. For three years (until 1941) the volume of production increased by 34%, which was close to the planned figures, although they were not achieved. In general, the pace of economic development was rather modest. It was felt that the gains are given by a huge tension. The new technological level increased the requirements for the balance of all sectors of the economy, for the quality of management and for the workers themselves.

The political situation in Europe testified to the approach of war, so the third five-year plan became the five-year period of preparation for war. This was expressed as follows.

First, instead of giant enterprises, it was decided to build medium-sized backup enterprises in various parts of the country, but mainly in the east.

Secondly, military production grew at an accelerated pace. According to official data, the average annual growth rate of military production was 39%.

Thirdly, many non-military enterprises received military orders and mastered the production of new products, switched to their production to the detriment of civilian products. Thus, in 1939, the production of tanks doubled, and armored vehicles, 7.5 times, compared with 1934. Naturally, this led to a reduction in the production of tractors, trucks, and other peaceful products.

Buildings of the third five-year plan

Fourth, new construction, and for 1938-1941. about 3 thousand new large plants and factories were put into operation, it was mainly in the east of the country - in the Urals, in Siberia, in Central Asia. These areas by 1941 began to play a significant role in industrial production. In addition, during the years of the third five-year plan, the foundations of industrial infrastructure were laid here, which made it possible in the most difficult first months of the war to evacuate industrial enterprises from the western regions and put them into operation as soon as possible, which would be simply impossible without the industrial capacities existing there, railways, power lines, etc.

Features of the third five-year plan

The most important problem of the third five-year plan was the training of qualified personnel. The system of training workers in production through a network of courses and circles of technical study that had taken shape during the years of the second five-year plan no longer fully satisfied the rapidly growing needs of industry for qualified personnel. Therefore, on October 2, 1940, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, a system for training state labor reserves was created. It was envisaged that up to a million young men and women would be admitted annually to vocational and railway schools, FZU schools and their maintenance at the expense of the state. After graduation, the state had the right to send young workers at its discretion to any of the industries. Only in Moscow, 97 schools and schools of trade and educational institutions for 48,200 students and 77 vocational schools with a two-year training period were opened.

The country's institutes and technical schools continued to train workers of higher and secondary qualifications. By January 1, 1941, there were 2401.2 thousand graduates in the USSR, which was 14 times higher than the level of 1914.

And, nevertheless, despite the undoubted successes in this area, the needs of the economy were not satisfied to the proper extent. The quality indicators left much to be desired. So, in 1939, only 8.2% of workers had an education of 7 classes or more, which had a negative effect on the pace of mastering new technology, on the growth of labor productivity, etc.

Approximately the same picture was in relation to the ITR. By 1939, out of 11-12 million employees, only 2 million had a diploma of higher and secondary specialized education.

Discussions during the NEP period

Technology Import

Industrialization and cultural revolution

The origins of the first - Stalinist industrialization, plans for the industrial development of the country of the Tsar-martyr Nicholas II

Collectivization - industrialization of agriculture

Mobilization economy or what funds were used for industrialization?

Where does the money for industrialization come from?

About collectivization

On the role of industrialization in the victory in the Great Patriotic War

The first is Stalinist industrialization: the first five-year plan

The first is Stalinist industrialization: the second five-year plan

The results of collectivization

The results of the industrial development of the USSR in the postwar years

Stalin's plan for the transformation of nature

Quotes by I.V. Stalin on collectivization, on the need for collectivization

Quotes by I.V. Stalin on collective farm construction

Quotes by I.V. Stalin on industrialization

Quotes by I.V. Stalin on the results of collectivization

• – The material and technical base of socialism.
• – Public ownership of the means of production is the basis of the production relations of socialism.
• - The basic economic law of socialism.
• – The law of planned (proportional) development of the national economy
• - Social work under socialism.
• – Commodity production, the law of value and money under socialism
• - Wages under socialism.
• - Economic calculation and profitability, cost and price.
• – Socialist system of agriculture.
• – Commodity turnover under socialism.
• – National income of a socialist society.
• – State budget, credit and money circulation under socialism.
• – socialist reproduction.

Energy is the basis of the economy

The second industrialization of Russia Industrialization Industrialization of the USSR New industrialization of Russia Industrialization of Russia 3D printers of the "Prizma" family with a unique print table cover 3S-separator for highly efficient gas separation at supersonic speeds Automation and robotization of production by industrial robots Automated line for the production of building products - Formanta Hercules molding complex Automated log saws, lines and centers Automated woodworking lines of the Bakout brand Automated lines for bottling water, drinks and other liquids Automatic and semi-automatic machines and lines for welding meshes, frames, 3D fences and railings Automatic powder coating lines Unmanned aircraft automatic control systems based on robotic complexes Concrete pumps, truck-mounted concrete pumps, stationary concrete pumps, distributing booms, truck-mounted concrete mixers CNC gas, gas and combined cutting Wind power plants, wind turbines Screw piles Water-coal fuel and technology for the production and combustion of water-coal fuel in boiler houses of various capacities High-performance electrolytic-plasma polishing unit High-performance multifunctional complex based on a wave power plant High-strength materials for 3D printing of a new generation High-strength glued veneer lumber (LVL lumber, LVL lumber) High-tech environmentally friendly electric transport High-precision, multifunctional Russian CNC FMS-3000 series High-yielding wheat varieties High-performance microbiological fertilizers High-performance organic fertilizers with desired characteristics and their production technology based on deep processing of animal waste High-performance Bugaets ignition wires (Bugaets) with zero resistance Highly efficient agricultural implements for tillage of new generations Gas-thermal technologies for applying protective coatings Helium-neon, helium-cadmium, wave and nitrogen lasers Hydraulic and electric drilling rigs of heavy, medium, light and self-propelled series Humates and technology for the production of humate and fertilizers based on it with specified characteristics by oxidation with active oxygen Disinfectants, new generation hygiene products POLYSEPT Cheap pre-fabricated industrial modular (block) film greenhouses Liquid thermal insulation Isollat ​​Substitutes for agricultural fertilizers of a new generation - mycorrhiza Impulse and energy supercapacitors Invest in technology! Intelligent autopilots for transport in warehouses Infrared electric heaters for industrial and domestic purposes IcoLine Cavitation-enzymatic technology for the treatment of waste, domestic and sewer water Frame-tent hangars Composite material that absorbs and reflects electromagnetic radiation Lithium-ion batteries of a new generation Liotech Linen thermal insulation and noise insulation Ecoteplin (linen boards) Ceramic-metal galvanizing based on Zinoferr zinc-silicate anti-corrosion composition Method for improving labor efficiency, 1939 “Soviet economic miracle” Microgels for water and hard surface purification Microdisplays based on organic light-emitting diodes Microorganisms that utilize plastic, plexiglass , oil products, organic waste and heavy metals Multifunctional laser equipment and technologies for welding, cutting, surfacing, engraving Multifunctional equipment for driving piles functional vacuum evaporators and systems Multifunctional plasma apparatus Multiplaz Multipurpose composite material "Polyceramoplast" based on ultra-high molecular weight polyethylene (UHMWPE) and modifying additives Mobile quick-assembly containers of the Mobil-Box brand Mobile automated building 3D printer "ApisCor" Fuel modifier "ECOS" to reduce consumption any type of liquid hydrocarbon fuel Motor-wheel (gearless energy-saving electric drive) We will select the technology for you! Domestic high-performance multi-tiered mobile hydroponic system Domestic fault-tolerant multicellular processors MultiClet Domestic processors "Baikal" based on a new generation architecture Heating of greenhouses and industrial premises with an environmentally friendly catalytic air heater Underground robot "Geohod" multi-purpose Anti-wear nanomodifier "Striboil" for the restoration of friction surfaces Industrial-type fish farms Prefabricated monolithic ceilings Secret Soviet control technologies "Sputnik" and "Scalar" Control system (technology) "KOMPAS". Socio-economic "miracle weapon" of the USSR. Or motivating staff on autopilot. Greenhouse screening system Evaporative cooling and humidification system for the greenhouse - fogging system System for feeding greenhouse plants with carbon dioxide Own home garden and garden in the apartment (house, office) Water-life post-treatment station for drinking water Ekranoplans and ekranoplanes - new generation transport

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Demand rate 3 382

The Stalinist industrialization of the late 1920s and 1930s was traditionally viewed by Soviet historiography (as well as Soviet propaganda) as a way to raise the economy of the USSR to the global level. This was a deliberate lie.

Under normal conditions, the growth of the economy is accompanied by the development of trade, entertainment infrastructure, the growth of public consumption and rising living standards. And the industrialization of the national economy means, first of all, the industrialization of the production of consumer goods.

In the USSR, everything was the other way around. The sharp growth of productive forces was accompanied by the elimination of trade, a sharp decline in the production of consumer goods, the reduction of consumption itself to a minimum level and, accordingly, a catastrophic drop in the standard of living of the population.

The first versions of the plans for the first five-year plan were developed in parallel in the Supreme Economic Council (for state industry) and in the State Planning Committee of the USSR (for the entire national economy) since 1926. The first five-year plan was approved in May 1929 at the Fifth Congress of Soviets. There are six or seven options in total.

During these four years in the USSR there was a change in the state regime and a change in state economic principles.

The dictatorship of the Politburo, established after Lenin's death, whose members were not united in their views on the future of the government's economic policy, was replaced by the sole dictatorship of Stalin.

The setting for the continuation and development of Lenin's "new economic policy", which was defended by the "right-wing communists" who were in the Politburo until 1928, was replaced by the Stalinist setting for the elimination of the NEP, the introduction of general forced labor and the concentration of all resources on the construction of heavy industry, which was by no means calculated to provide the population with the benefits of life.

The first five-year plans developed by NEP supporters proceeded from the uniform and interconnected growth of agriculture and industry, mutually providing each other with the necessary funds. And, as a result, from a gradual increase in the standard of living of the population.

The five-year plan approved in 1929 has already lost all connection with any meaningful economic calculations. It combined unnaturally high directive targets for the growth of industry, which had to be met at any cost, and obviously not designed to be met, purely fictitious fantastic rates of growth in labor productivity, national consumption, housing construction, etc. The first completely excluded the second. The implementation of Stalin's plans for industrial production could only be carried out at the expense of the population. This was clear to all the developers of the five-year plans.

The first authors of the five-year plans were convicted at the "trial of the Mensheviks" in 1931. The survivors lived in accordance with the aphorism attributed to Stanislav Strumilin, who at the initial stage led the development of five-year plans in the USSR State Planning Committee: “It is better to stand for high rates than sit for low ones.”

1. General results of the implementation of the first five-year plan

The extent to which the results of the first five-year plan did not correspond not only to the first versions of the five-year plan of 1927–28, but also to the officially approved project of 1929 can be judged from the volume “Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR” issued in 1933.

Of course, the statistics of this time should be treated with extreme caution: there is no doubt that they were generally falsified. At the same time, even based on unreliable data, guessing what exactly was falsified and for what purpose, one can understand the meaning of the economic and social processes taking place in the USSR.

Officially, the first five-year plan was completed in four and a quarter years. The optimal variant, approved in 1929, assumed especially favorable conditions for economic development and “… proceeded from a smaller share of defense spending in the national economy compared to the starting variant. However, in the course of the implementation of the five-year plan, in view of the increased military danger, the USSR was forced to increase its defense capability in the last year of the five-year plan to increase the defense program.<…>... especially favorable conditions, which, according to the five-year plan, should have ensured the implementation of the optimal variant in five years, were not only absent, but more than that, instead of them we had additional difficulties. And yet the plan was carried out and, moreover, on time, which was a stunning surprise for the enemies of the USSR.

The military danger did not intensify at all in 1932. In any case, not from the side of the Western neighbors in relation to the USSR, except perhaps vice versa.

It is safe to say that, increasing the pace of industrialization, Stalin built a mobilization-type economy, the meaning of which was the creation of a military industry and, as a result, the largest and most efficient army. All other sectors of the economy played a subordinate role and served the heavy and military industries.

As the American researcher Alec Nove wrote in 1989, “there are suggestions that the war psychosis was deliberately fomented as a weapon of internal party struggle, since, of course, the Soviet Union felt threatened by the capitalist encirclement. But there is another explanation as well. Years ago, the Polish economist Oskar Lange described the Soviet centralized system as a "special type of war economy." There is the logic and psychology of wartime, and as such they are not connected with ideology. For example, in Great Britain in 1943 the market equilibrium was disturbed, prices did not express consumer value, the currency was non-convertible, and bureaucrats distributed raw materials. All this was, as were bureaucratic perversions of all kinds. However, it was believed that these were the inevitable and necessary costs of wartime. Of course, at the end of the 20s there was no war as such, but the “military” psychology was and was deliberately implanted: the toughening of the class struggle, everywhere “fronts”, “bridgeheads”, “assaults” ... ".

But in the plans for the first five-year plan, as well as in its official results, there are no data on defense spending. There is only the column “administration and defense”, in which the expenditures on the state apparatus are combined with those on defense and are not differentiated in any way.

In figures, the increase in spending for these purposes is as follows. In 1927/28, 1.2 billion rubles were spent on administration and defense, which accounted for 23.7% of all budget expenditures (5.06 billion rubles).

In 1932, 1.84 billion rubles were already going through this column. making up 6.1% of all expenses (30.16 billion rubles). In total, over 4.25 years, 6.95 billion rubles were spent for these purposes, 9.7% of all budget expenditures for the five-year period, which amounted to 71.96 billion rubles. Thus, officially expenditures on apparatus and defense increased by 1932 by only one and a half times, while decreasing by a percentage of 3.9 times.

The population of the USSR in 1932 amounted to 165.7 million people, having increased by 11.5 million people since 1928. The urban population amounted to 38.7 million, the rural population - 127 million. The urban population has increased since 1928 by 11.1 million people, the rural population - by 0.4 million people. .

The number of people employed in agriculture decreased in general from 119.9 million people. up to 117.2 million people

These data reflect the intensive forcible transfer of the rural population to the cities, more precisely, to the construction sites of the five-year plan. According to Ginzburg's plan, based on natural migration to the cities from the countryside, the urban population was supposed to grow only to 30.1 million people, that is, to be 8.6 million people less.

The rural population almost did not increase numerically during the five-year period, while the number of people engaged in agriculture decreased by 2.7 million. This speaks of the colossal withdrawals of the population from the collective farms.

The collective-farm population, which in 1928 amounted to two million people, grew to 66.7 million people. (growth - 3300%).

The share of collective farmers in the agricultural population increased from 1.7% to 61.6%.

The number of state farms increased by 1932 from 3125 to 10203. The number of employees in them increased from 345.5 thousand to 1046.6 thousand people.

The number of collective farms increased from 33.3 thousand in 1928 to 209.6 thousand in 1932 (620.4% growth). The number of collective farms increased from 416.7 thousand to 14,707.7 thousand (3,529.4% growth) .

The growth in the number of collective farms by 38 times and state farms by three times meant the actual expropriation of personal property from the absolute majority of the rural population and the subordination of its former owners directly to the Politburo as forced laborers. The productivity of collective farms was much lower than that of private farms, but much more important was the possibility, without much hassle and without the need to negotiate with each individual farmer, to seize all the produced product into the ownership of the state and freely manipulate the labor force, moving it in the right quantities to where it was required. Currently.

Capital investments in Nar. economy for the five-year period amounted to 60 billion rubles. (in prices corresponding years), while in the socialized sector - 52.5 billion and in the private sector - 7.5 billion.

Including investments in the socialized sector of industry amounted to 24.8 billion rubles, agriculture - 10.8 billion rubles. .

The gross output of the entire census industry in 1932 amounted to 34.3 billion rubles. with a plan of 36.6 billion (93.7% completion).

For comparison, according to the Strumilin Plan, investments in the national economy were planned for the five-year period at 17.6 billion rubles, in state industry - 4.95 billion rubles, in agriculture - 1.2-1.3 billion rubles. . Gross industrial output was planned according to the Ginzburg plan in 1932 in the amount of 20.4 billion rubles.

The total number of workers and employees increased from 1928 to 1932 from 11.599 million people to 22.804 million people. (the planned figure for the five-year plan is 15.763 million people, according to the Ginzburg plan - 12.86 million). Growth - 196.6%.

Including in industry - from 4.534 million to 6.781 million (according to the plan - 4.602 million people). Growth - 191.9%.

In the licensed industry - from 3.126 million to 6.311 million people. (plan - 4.08 million people). Growth 201.9%.

In construction, the number of workers and employees increased from 723 thousand people (1928) to 3125.6 thousand people. (according to the five-year plan - 1882.5 thousand people). According to the five-year plan, the number of workers in construction in 1932 was to be 166% by 1928, and amounted to 432.3%.

These figures give an idea of ​​the extent of the forcible transfer of labor from the countryside and how it was used. The total number of wage laborers increased by 11 million people. over five years, 10 million more than was supposed under the Ginzburg plan, and 7 million more than according to the approved plan of 1929.

The average monthly wage in industry increased from 70.24 rubles. in 1928 to 116.62 rubles. in 1932 (66% increase).

The annual wages of the proletariat increased from 703.4 rubles. up to 1432 rubles. (growth 103%). The entire average wage during the years of the five-year plan has almost doubled, exceeding the outlines of the five-year plan (for 1932-33) by 44%.

At the same time, the growth in nominal wages outpaced the growth in labor productivity and lagged far behind the growth in prices, which will be discussed below.

The financial plan of the five-year plan was fulfilled by 131.1%. According to the plan, revenues and expenses for five years were to amount to 91.6 billion rubles, and for four and a quarter years they amounted to 120 billion. Of these, the income of the socialized sector amounted to 89.9 billion rubles. (74.9% of the total). According to the five-year plan, they were to amount to 70.9 billion rubles. (77.4% of the total). The five-year plan was exceeded by 126.8%.

According to Strumilin's plan, proceeding from the continuation of the NEP, the five-year financial plan was to amount to 39.68 billion rubles, but in reality amounted to three times more. It is clear that the remaining 80 billion rubles (in fact, even more, since the NEP mechanisms ceased to operate) were squeezed out of the population by various non-economic methods.

The results of housing construction are very sparingly covered in the Results of the Fulfillment of the Five-Year Plan. In total, 22,264 thousand square meters were put into operation during the first five-year plan. m of living space. Another 5 million should be handed over at the beginning of 1933.

The total housing stock in cities amounted to 162.46 million square meters in 1928. m, grew by 1932 to 185.6 million square meters. m.

Investments of the socialized sector in housing construction amounted to 4 billion rubles. .

No data on what the constructed living space was - what part of it was temporary housing, and what part was normal, in accordance with sanitary standards, what part was apartments, and what part was dormitories - is not presented in the "Itogi ...". As well as there are no data on the per capita norm of living space.

Based on the above data, then 38.7 million urban population in 1932 accounted for 185.6 million square meters. m. That is, the per capita rate fell from 5.6 square meters. m in 1928 to 4.8 sq. m in 1932 instead of growing to 6.9 sq. m. m at the starting point and up to 7.3 sq. m according to the optimal (approved) five-year plan.

According to the statistical yearbook of 1934, as of January 1, 1933, the urban population of the USSR was 38,739 thousand people. , and the housing stock in the cities of the USSR in 1933 - 191.5 million square meters. m. Hence the per capita norm is 4.94 sq. m.

Most likely, the data on the urban population is more or less correct, and the data on the built housing is overestimated. As well as the data on housing finance are overestimated. In any case, the real situation with housing in the cities of the USSR, especially in the new industrial cities, was much worse.

It turns out that the urban population, according to official data, has grown by 12.423 million people over the five-year period. (27.316 million at the beginning of 1929 and 39.739 million at the beginning of 1933). The living area has grown during this time by 23 million square meters. m. Consequently, an average of 1.85 sq. m. was built per new city dweller during the five-year period. m of living space. In 1931-32, this was approximately the same number per inhabitant of new industrial cities that did not have the old housing stock and, therefore, were deprived of the possibility of compaction.

For example, in Chelyabinsk, where a giant tractor plant was being built, the average per capita norm in 1933 was 2.2 square meters. m, in Perm - 2.8 sq. m. In Magnitogorsk, built in an open field - 1.6 square meters. m, and in Sverdlovsk, which had an old fund, - 4.2 square meters. m (in 1928 - 5.3 sq. m).

It is striking how much the volume of the “Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR” of 1933 differs from the editions of the plans for the first five-year plans, especially the first, 1927.

The statistics in it are extremely stingy, rough and unverifiable. Data on the implementation of production plans are given in monetary terms. What was produced and in what quantity is unclear in most cases.

As economic achievements, the volume of capital investments, the growth in the share of the socialized sector in industry and agriculture, the growth of the urban population and the relative decrease in the rural population, and the growth in the share of production of means of production are considered. That is, circumstances that do not characterize the state of the economy and the level of well-being of the population. Or characterize in a negative sense.

The growth in the volume of capital investments, carried out by reducing the level of consumption of the population, clearly indicates a decrease in the standard of living and increased exploitation of the population.

Behind the growth in the proportion of the socialized sector in industry and agriculture is the decline in labor productivity, the degradation of small industry, handicrafts, trade, and the decline in the production of consumer goods.

unnatural fast growth the urban population, while the rural population is declining, indicates the forced nature of this process, which became possible only thanks to terror in the countryside - “dispossession”, deportations and artificially organized famine as a result of the total withdrawal of food from the village.

An increase in the share of production of means of production could indicate the growth of the economy as a whole and the growth of well-being only if we were talking about the production of means of production of consumer goods. Or any products that generate income for the manufacturer. But at the same time, the trade network would inevitably have to develop. In the USSR, the opposite happened: private trade was completely destroyed, and the market was replaced by a system of state distribution.

In Itogi... there is no data on what kind of goods and in what quantity were produced (or should have been produced) as a result of a gigantic increase in the production of capital goods, mechanical engineering, electricity production, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, oil and coal production.

As agricultural achievements, the growth in the size of the crops of state farms and collective farms, the number of various machines received by the countryside, the overall growth of crops are indicated ... However, there are no data on agricultural production and consumption of agricultural products, including foodstuffs.

There is data on trade, but very scarce. And there is no data on foreign trade, except for general information about the shortfall in the export-import plan, in connection with political complications with England and the USA and the "slanderous campaign about" forced labor "in the USSR" .

For example, in the chapter "Commodity turnover" there is data that "the state procurement of grain grains increased from 12.1 million tons in 1928/29 to 23 million tons in 1931/32, that is, almost 2 times". But the chapter on agriculture lacks data on total grain production and yield dynamics. Instead, there are abundant data on the growth of the socialization of agriculture in percentage terms by 1928.

There are no data on small and handicraft industries.

The chapter "Consumption" is missing altogether.

There is no data on the situation with housing and changes in the per capita norm.

This work was published by the State Planning Committee of the USSR, but the State Planning Committee of 1933 is something completely different from five years ago. Both the aims and methods of work of Soviet economists have changed.

Accordingly, the results have changed.

It is interesting to compare the official results of the first five-year plan with the options for its planning at the beginning of the Stalin era, in 1927, which proceeded from the continuation of the NEP, the balanced growth of industry, agriculture and the welfare of the population.

A comparison of the data shows that the budget of the national economy has officially increased from 13 million rubles. in 1928/29 to 44.6 billion in 1932. In total, 120 billion rubles were invested in the economy in an incomplete five-year period. While according to the calculations of Strumilin's five-year plan, all savings for five years should have amounted to 12.8 billion rubles, and with loans, withdrawals from the budget and emission - 18.250 billion rubles.

It is impossible to explain the origin of these funds otherwise than by forcibly pumping them out of the population. The state did not have its own funds for the purpose of accelerated industrialization. As it did not have the necessary number of workers.

During the first five-year plan, there is a pathologically sharp increase in the so-called. "urban population", the number of employees, workers in state industry and construction, far exceeding the planned natural migration of the rural population to the city. At the same time, the same pathologically sharp relative reduction of the rural population in general and the population employed in agriculture takes place.

The social reforms carried out at that time with exceptional cruelty - the collectivization of agriculture and the complete abolition of private ownership of the means of production, that is, the destruction of small industry, crafts, trade, etc.

From the point of view of normal balanced economic development, these reforms were deadly. Enslaving the population and lowering the standard of living cannot be the goal of economic reforms - under normal conditions. Forced labor under normal conditions is also inefficient. The Stalinist reforms of the era of the first five-year plan led to a decrease in labor productivity, a decline in the well-being of the population, and in themselves were crimes. But without them, in principle, the goals set by the government could not be achieved.

It is quite obvious that the planned indicators for the growth of labor productivity, the growth of real wages, the growth of consumption and the per capita rate, contained in the approved five-year plan, were by no means designed to be fulfilled. They completely contradicted those indicators, the maximum possible fulfillment of which the government really demanded - the volume of capital investments, the growth of wage laborers, the socialization of the national economy, and so on.

2. Industry

According to Strumilin's plan, the growth of industrial production was to be 79%. According to the Ginzburg plan, the growth of industrial production in industry, planned by the Supreme Economic Council, was to be 82.1%.

According to the five-year plan of 1929, “... the physical volume of output of the entire licensed industry grows by 2.3 times according to the calculations of the starting variant and by 2.6 times according to the calculations of the optimal variant, while the output of the planned industry grows, respectively, according to the variants by 135% and 180 %".

According to Naum Yasny, “in the period of less than two years between the drawing up of the first and final versions of the plan, the planned figures for the growth of industrial production more than doubled. Shortly after the adoption of the five-year plan, in the resolution of the XVI Party Congress (June-July 1930) for some of the most important industries industry, a further increase in industrial production was envisaged. A worthy conclusion to this unrestrained orgy of planning was the decision of the VI Congress of Soviets (March 8–18, 1931): the approved plan targets of the five-year plan were to be completed in four years, and a period of three years was allotted for especially important industries. Thus, the figures in the assignments of the two five-year plans drawn up in the first half of 1927 were more than doubled, and in some cases almost tripled.

As a characteristic moment in the evolution of planning, Yasny notes the disappearance of data on the planning and production of small-scale industry.

“In 1927, the statistical reports still corresponded to reality, therefore both five-year plans drawn up by the State Planning Commission and the Supreme Economic Council and approved in 1927 contained some data on small industry. However, in the first five-year plan, data on the output of small industry are absent, although in general the plan itself was much more detailed than its draft, developed by the State Planning Commission in 1927. Starting from 1929, information on the output of small industry is missing in most statistical collections. .

According to Yasny's calculations, the planning of small-scale industry looked like this:

The fulfillment of the industrial production plan looked as follows: “According to official statistical sources, in four years, from 1928 to 1932, industrial output increased by 101% (for industry as a whole) and by 132% (for large-scale industry). At the same time, the output of small industry decreased by 2%. For comparison: it was planned to increase production growth by 136% for industry as a whole, by 164% for large and 50% for small industry.

The official figures given by N. Yasny for the increase in production in the first five-year plan give a good idea of ​​the priorities of the Soviet government during the implementation of the first five-year plan.

Official growth figures in the first five-year plan

First of all, the indicators of growth in the production of means of production, the most intense ones, were carried out (as far as possible). In the second - the entire industry. At the same time, the increase in the production of consumer goods, projected to be extremely insignificant, turned out to be completely negative. That is, the production of consumer goods has sharply decreased.

Despite the gigantic construction program of the five-year plan, "the production of building timber increased by 1.5% in three years (1930–1933), while the output of bricks and cement fell by 20% and 9.9%, respectively."

This indicates a catastrophic reduction in civil engineering in the USSR and an equally catastrophic decline in its quality.

It is quite obvious that the gigantic volumes of industrial construction absorbed almost all scarce building materials - cement, metal, brick ... The share of residential and municipal construction accounted for miserable remnants. The government constantly issued decrees to limit or completely ban the use of metal, cement, high-quality wood in civil construction, to replace scarce building materials with surrogates, and to reduce the cost of construction by thinning walls and using off-grade wood.

3. Agriculture

According to Naum Yasny, “instead of an increase of 55% over the five-year period from 1927/28 to 1932/33, which was provided for by the approved version of the five-year plan, the total agricultural output decreased by 14% between 1928 and 1933 G. . The output of livestock products decreased by 48% instead of the planned growth of 50-54%. This means that the five-year plan for these indicators was fulfilled by a little more than a third<…>In 1928, a slight increase (3%) was observed in agricultural production. After the approval of the first five-year plan in 1928, there was an annual decline in both total agricultural output and livestock output, and even to a greater extent.<…>in the last years of the first five-year plan, millions of people died of starvation. The famine continued during the period of the second five-year plan.

The mass famine in the USSR was caused not only by the fall in production and the total withdrawal of food from the collectivized village, but also by the export of food abroad. By itself, the fall in food production could not have caused such a catastrophe if it were not for exports. Export earnings were the main source of currency needed to purchase modern industrial technology, equipment for plants under construction and pay for specialists who installed Western equipment. And the main export, along with timber, was food, primarily grain.

4 . International trade

The approved five-year plan stated:

“A feature of the export plan is the restoration of grain exports. Due to the fact that the material growth of production is projected at even higher rates than exports, our trade relations will not grow relatively. In relation to the gross output of 1932/33, exports will amount to approximately 3%, which is close to modern ratios.<…>As for imports, in addition to its large growth, due to the strengthening of the role of agriculture as a raw material base for industry, its structure will change towards an increase in the importance of importing equipment at the expense of raw materials. This will make the Soviet market especially attractive to the world industry, which suffers from chronic overproduction.

The relationship between food exports, equipment imports and hunger in the USSR is well illustrated by data from Konstantin Trommel's dissertation work on the development of Soviet-German trade relations from 1928 to 1936 and defended in Leipzig in 1939.

Since 1928, Germany has been the most important trading partner for the USSR (ahead of England and the USA). Only in 1935, in terms of the volume of Soviet imports, Germany moved to third place (after the USA and England), but in 1936 it was again in first place.

In terms of the volume of Soviet exports, Germany was in first place only in 1928, 1929 and 1934, in other years England occupied the first place.

The maximum volume (in rubles) of German imports to the USSR reached in 1931 - 410 million rubles. This amounted to 37.2% of all Soviet imports in 1931 (1.105 billion rubles). The following year, the volume of imports decreased in absolute terms to 327.7 million rubles, but rose in relative terms to 46.5% (total 704 million rubles).

In total, during the years of the five-year plan (1928–1932), the USSR imported goods from abroad worth 4.7 billion rubles. , and took out 4.140 billion rubles. .

In general, the foreign trade of the USSR for 1928-1933. looked like this.

Trade between Germany and the USSR for the five-year plan looked like this: the bulk of Soviet imports were machine tools and apparatus, electrical equipment, metal products, cars and parts for them, tractors and agricultural machines.

From the above tables it can be seen that the maximum export from the USSR falls in 1929–1930, and the maximum import in the USSR falls in 1930–31. Almost exclusively industrial equipment of various types and raw materials (for example, wool, rubber) were also imported from Germany to the USSR. Consumer goods accounted for a few percent.

In 1930, goods worth 1.058 billion rubles were imported into the USSR, and 1.030 billion rubles were exported.

For comparison, in the relatively prosperous and well-fed year 1925, imports amounted to 724 million rubles, and exports - 559 million rubles. (for Germany, respectively - 102.7 and 87.4 million rubles).

The absolute maximum of imports from Germany falls in 1931 - 410 million rubles. Export from the USSR to Germany this year amounted to 129 million rubles.

The absolute maximum export to Germany - 1929 (251 million rubles).

Imports to the USSR from Germany in 1931 (762 million Reichsmarks) consisted of 89% of finished products, 9.3% of raw materials and semi-finished products, 0.9% of food and beverages.

Soviet exports to Germany in 1931 (303.45 million Reichsmarks) consisted of 27.4% food, 63.3% raw materials and semi-finished products, and 9.3% finished products.

In total, in 1931, the USSR exported abroad from a total amount of 811 million rubles. food for 302 million rubles, raw materials and semi-finished products for 418.9 million rubles, finished products for 89.6 million rubles.

In general, food exports from the USSR for the five-year period looked as follows:

The import of industrial equipment into the USSR developed as follows:

In total, during the five-year plan, only industrial equipment worth 2,236.5 million rubles was imported into the USSR, 47.5% of total imports.

It does not take into account other goods of a purely industrial nature - products from non-ferrous metals, chemical products, cotton, wool, rubber, etc.

Food exports for individual goods looked like this (million rubles; % of total exports):

For five years, from 1928 to 1932, the SSSO exported grain for 458.4 million rubles;

Oils for 120.6 million rubles;

Eggs for 76.2 million rubles;

Fish for 66.6 million rubles;

Sugar by 141.2 million rubles;

Cake for 82 million rubles.

The dynamics of Soviet food exports to Germany can be seen from the following table (in tons and millions of Reichsmarks).

Import of Soviet food products to Germany

From the above tables it can be seen that the peak of food exports from the USSR as a whole falls on 1930–31–32. It coincides with the peak of imports to the USSR of machinery and machine tools, and also coincides (partially preceding it) with the mass famine of 1932–33. with millions of victims. The maximum import of industrial equipment to the USSR falls in 1931, the maximum export of food in 1930 - the year of collectivization.

At the same time, the maximum export of grain (805,709 tons) and oil (13,438 tons) to Germany falls on 1932 - the peak of famine in the Soviet countryside.

At the same time, by simple calculations, one can find out that grain prices fell from 308 Reichsmarks per ton in 1928 to 90.8 in 1932 (by 3.4 times). Accordingly, oil prices fell during this time from 3010 to 1174 Reichsmarks per ton (2.6 times). That is, by the end of the five-year plan, the USSR exported food at dumping prices.

In 1929, grain was exported abroad for 23.9 million rubles, and in 1930 (at the height of collectivization) - for 207.1 million rubles, that is, almost 9 times more (in monetary terms). Given the dumping prices at which the USSR sold its goods, the difference in quantity should have been even greater. Even in the terrible year of 1933, grain was exported for 46.5 million rubles, almost the same as in the relatively well-fed 1925 (51.4 million rubles) and four times more than in 1928 (11, 8 million rubles).

The five-year plan of 1929 proceeded from “... the task of doubling the starting point and increasing more than two and a half times for the optimal variant of our exports<…>by the end of the five-year period, grain exports should grow to 50 or 80 million centners<…>Expansion of export of page - x. products (butter, eggs, etc.) is planned with full consideration of the needs of the domestic market and the tasks of the so-called improvement of the structure of consumption (growth in the consumption of eggs, butter, etc.), which should naturally accompany the industrial and cultural growth of the country.

The following table gives an idea of ​​the ratio of the dynamics of Soviet exports for the five-year period as a whole, food exports and exports of grain and legumes in monetary terms according to Tremel's data.

The table shows that the entire export of 1929 exceeded the export of 1928 by 15%, the export of 1930 - by almost 30%, the export of 1931 was practically equal to the export of 1028, and the export of 1932 fell by 28%.

That is, in the first three years of the five-year plan, Soviet exports grow, reaching a maximum in 1930, and then fall sharply, falling below the 1928 level in 1932.

At the same time, food exports as a whole in the second year of the five-year plan almost did not increase compared to 1928, in 1930 it increased by 60%, in 1931 it exceeded the export of 1928 by 40%, and in 1932 it amounted to only 66 % of the first year of the five-year plan.

This means that the share of food in total exports increased until 1931 and fell sharply only in 1932, lower than in 1928.

A completely different picture is given by the dynamics of the export of grain crops.

In 1929, grain export revenues more than doubled compared to 1928 (202%). In 1930, an increase of 17.5 times (1755%), in 1931 - 13 times (1336%), in 1932 - almost five times (494%) compared with the first year of the five-year plan.

Grain exports rose sharply by 1930, but even after falling in 1931 and 1932, they were many times higher than at the beginning of the five-year plan.

The export of bread gives the maximum revenue in 1930 and 1931. But even in 1932, when a massive famine set in, the proceeds from grain exports were 5 times greater than in the relatively prosperous 1928.

The data on the export of grain in tons is even more expressive and shows how much importance the Politburo attached to the export of grain as a source of financing for industrialization.

Export of grain crops from the USSR (in tons)

The maximum export of grain crops falls in 1931 - 5,182,835 tons (51.8 million centners) and exceeds the export of 1927/28 by 15 times. This is almost the level of the planned assumptions of 1929 at the end of the five-year plan - "50 or 80 million centners", except for the fact that these achievements led to mass famine in the country.

For comparison, grain exports in the relatively prosperous years of the NEP amounted to 2,068,777 tons in 1925/26; in 1926/27 - 2,177,714 tons.

In 1928, grain exports accounted for only 1.5% of total exports. Butter and eggs gave 4.9% and 5.2%, respectively. In subsequent years, the export of these products fell sharply (in 1930, respectively, 1.1 and 0.4%), but the share of grain rose in 1930 to 25.5% of total exports.

These regularities can be easily explained by collectivization, the height of which falls exactly in 1930. The production of butter and eggs sharply decreased after the destruction of individual peasant farms and small private industry. The task of the collective farms was to produce as much grain as possible, which was almost completely removed from the village.

This situation is very clearly illustrated and explained by Stalin's letter to Molotov in August 1930: “Mikoyan reports that procurements are growing and every day we export 1-1.5 million poods of grain. I think this is not enough. We must now raise (the norm) of daily exports to at least 3-4 million poods. Otherwise, we run the risk of being left without our new metallurgical and machine-building (Avtozavod, Chelyabzavod, etc.) plants ... In a word, we need to madly speed up the export of grain.

The supply of equipment for factories directly depended on the export of food from the USSR.

Curious data on the supply of Soviet timber to Germany.

The table shows a sharp increase in supplies, peaking in 1930 - 1.309 million tons, four times more than in 1925 (at the height of the NEP). At the same time, prices are falling sharply, in 1932 - almost twice as compared with 1928.

Here it must be borne in mind that almost the entire plan for logging was carried out with the help of forced labor.

According to the reference book "Control figures for labor for 1929-30" lumber harvesting in 1927/28 involved 1.0 million foot and horse workers, in 1928/29 - 1.198 million. In 1929/30, it was planned to use 2.307 million foot and horse workers. Another 793 thousand workers were planned to be used for alloying.

Reality looked like this:

"At the spring plenum of the Central Committee<1928 г.>it turned out that it was impossible to carry out the logging program of 1929 using the old means and methods. By this time, collectivization had just begun. The commissar for agriculture in charge pointed out that collectivization would be impossible if, as before, logging during the winter season was carried out by forcibly recruited masses of peasants with their horses, who, upon returning home, were not only monstrously reduced in number, but also so exhausted that they are not able to participate in spring work ... According to the accepted methods and organization of work, already in 1928, for logging and transporting timber for four months from November 15 to March 15, a total of about five million people and two million horses were required.

These unimaginable masses of people were forcibly sent to an area without roads, and not the slightest concern was shown about their accommodation and provision.

5 . Consumption

The first five-year plan, approved in 1929, included indicators of growth in food consumption.

Growth in food consumption according to the five-year plan of 1929

As can be seen from the table, in 1932/33 the urban population had to eat as much bread as in 1928, eat 12% more meat than in 1928, eggs - 71% more, dairy products - by 55% more. The consumption of the rural population also had to grow, although not so significantly.

It can be said with full confidence that the planned figures for the growth of consumption by the population were a deliberate bluff already at the time the five-year plan was approved. Nobody was going to fulfill them, and it was impossible. The government pursued tasks of the opposite kind - reducing consumption to the minimum possible. At the same time, the rural population found itself in a much worse situation than the urban population, which also starved.

As Elena Osokina writes, “... the state supply system was based on the assumption of self-sufficiency for the rural population. However, the possibility of self-sufficiency was undermined by the ever-increasing state procurement, which seized not only the commodity, but also the product necessary for the consumption of the villagers themselves. As a result, the collective farms were left with a small amount of money - the procurement prices for the collective farms were unprofitable - and with a small stock of products grown by them, from which seed and reserve funds had yet to be allocated. As a result, as the Russian proverb says, “the shoemaker sat without boots”: the grain growers did not have enough bread, those who raised livestock did not eat meat, did not drink milk.

Cleaning out the collective farm bins, the state supplied the rural population poorly and irregularly. Although the rural population was more than three times larger than the urban population, during the period of the rationing system, rural supplies accounted for only about a third of the country's trade turnover. The commodity was imported mainly in the third and fourth quarters to stimulate the harvest. In 1931-33, the People's Commissariat of Supply provided only 30-40% of garments, shoes, soap, and knitwear for the supply of the rural population. Even worse, the rural population was provided with food. During this period, Narkomsnab sent to the cities of the USSR more than half of the market fund of vegetable oil, about 80% of the funds of flour, cereals, animal oil, fish products, sugar, almost the entire fund of meat products (94%), all margarine, a third of all state funds of tea and salt .

Considering that the cities, receiving the lion's share of state funds, were provided extremely insufficiently, it is clear that the crumbs remaining for the rural population could not improve their situation.

Even these data, being averaged, only weakly characterize the paucity of state supplies for the rural population. The funds sent to the countryside were earmarked. This means that the goods were not distributed equally among the inhabitants, but were used to provide for certain groups of the population, primarily employees of political departments, MTS and state farms. By the time the goods arrived at the general store, most of them were assigned to certain groups of consumers.

6. Prices

One of the most obvious symptoms of the catastrophe that ended the first five-year plan is the rise in consumer prices and the decline in trade in consumer goods.

“... During the entire period of the first five-year plan, and especially in the last two years of the five-year plan, there was a huge increase in prices for consumer goods and a sharp drop in the supply of these goods to the retail network. These figures are especially impressive when viewed on a per capita basis. According to Malafeev, sales of food products through state-owned retail trade decreased from 7367 million rubles. in 1930 to 5538 million rubles. in 1932 . Throughout the five-year period, sales of retail products, excluding foodstuffs, grew, but their growth was only 1.5% But at the same time, prices for both categories of goods increased by 62.4% between 1930 and the first half of 1932. This meant that in two years, from 1930 to 1932, the actual volume of state trade was reduced by more than half.

In the same short period, private market prices rose by 233%. Already in 1931, in private trade, the rise in prices for retail products was quite high. Between 1927/28 and 1930 the price increase was 131%, and between 1927/28 and the first half of 1932 there was an almost eightfold increase in prices. The next significant jump in prices for retail goods occurred in the second half of 1932.

Official data on the results of the first five-year plan (as well as materials for the preparation of the approved five-year plan with all the changes) do not answer the main question - what was its goal?

It is clear that the USSR produced a huge amount of coal, oil, electricity, metals, machine tools and other intermediate products intended for the production of something final. But this final product was never mentioned.

Practically none of the goods produced at the enterprises built during the years of the first five-year plan were exported. They also did not enter the domestic market. Moreover, by 1930, private trade had already been destroyed, and the supply of the population with essential goods took the form of rationing.

In the same way, the initial data that served as the basis for calculating Soviet industrialization was never mentioned. Planning for the construction of about one and a half thousand new enterprises had to proceed from the planning of the production of their final products, which definitely could not be just iron, steel, electricity, or even tractors with cars.

Tractors and automobiles, data on the planned production of which are given in the documents of the five-year plan, are also not final goods. They are also a means of production, especially since cars for private individuals were not produced at all.

The data on the growth in the production of consumer goods (obviously bullshit) given in the "Results ..." do not explain in any way all the superhuman efforts to build the production of means of production. Moreover, these conditional data concern only state production, the growth of which took place against the background of the destruction of private small-scale industry, which, in fact, provided the household needs of the population under the NEP.

During the first five-year plan, an industry was built whose production goals were never elucidated. Social reforms were carried out, which were reduced to the introduction of general forced labor. Forced labor is the least productive form of labor. But it is extremely effective when the task is to build something that ultimately does not have a direct economic effect on society and is unprofitable for the population. And when the organizer of this construction does not have the means and opportunities to provide the construction with funds and a free labor force.

7. The problem of foreign investment

A characteristic (and surprising, at first glance) feature of the Soviet industrialization plans is the absence of any mention of the possibility of attracting foreign investors. They are not even in the very first plans of the first five-year plan. Although it would seem that foreign investment could play a key role in the rise of the national economy. The fact that this topic was discussed in government circles is confirmed by the publication in 1929 in foreign languages ​​of several books in the series "Concession objects of the Soviet Union." Among them, there are definitely the Magnitogorsk plant, the Nadezhda and Taganrog iron foundries, the Svir power plant and the Volga-Don Canal.

In the book of prof. M.I. Bogolepov "Financial plan for the five-year plan", which is a detailed version of the corresponding section of the five-year plan approved in 1929, indicates the sources of financing for the five-year plan, which are determined in the amount of 76,800 million rubles. There are no foreign investments among them.

Stalin's negative attitude towards concessions is well known.

Some light on the explanation of this fact is shed by the memoirs of Grigory Besedovsky, a Soviet diplomat who fled to the West (that is, literally through the wall of the Soviet embassy in Paris) in 1929. The memoirs were first published in Paris in 1930. The former Social Revolutionary Besedovsky became the highest-ranking diplomat - a defector of the Stalin era, at the time of his flight he acted as the Soviet plenipotentiary in Paris. Besedovsky was well aware of the internal discussions and contradictions of the Soviet political elite. Here is how he describes the situation in the summer of 1928:

“... Inside the country, there was almost no hope left that it would be possible to avoid a new outbreak of war communism, even more acute in its appearance and even more unbearable psychologically, since this time there was a war on the borders of the country, and inside the country there was no enemy threatened the peasant.

However, I still cherished faint hopes that if I could bind Stalin with a series of concessions in foreign policy and thus enable the country to receive financial assistance from outside, it would be possible to soften Stalin's policy without bringing matters to an open break with the peasantry.

It seemed clear to me that the pressure on the peasantry was growing as a result of that absurd line towards the rapid industrialization of Russia, which was taken by the Stalin government. This super-industrialization required colossal funds for its implementation and had to force Stalin, in the final analysis, to increase his pressure on the peasantry to the point beyond which starvation and death of millions of people begin.

I understood perfectly well that Stalin's foreign policy for this period of time would be a derivative of his so-called “general line”. But at the same time, in the field of foreign policy, it was possible to put pressure on Stalin much more successfully than in the field of domestic policy. The prospect of obtaining a large foreign loan could have caused some change in mood among influential members of the Politburo and Stalin's immediate circle. The party apparatus, led by Molotov, unquestioningly followed the latter, pulling him towards the implementation of Stalin's directives on the ground. But the party apparatus moved reluctantly, reluctantly, because the difficulties and dangers that arose on this new path of sharp struggle against the peasantry were clear to all party workers in the localities. That is why the prospect of revitalizing financial and economic relations with foreign countries could even change the mood of the party apparatus and make it difficult, if not impossible, for the Stalinist policy of turning against the peasant.

Besedovsky tried to convince the members of the Politburo to agree to the payment of the Russian debt to France, which could be beneficial for the USSR, as it greatly improved the conditions for obtaining loans and freed up funds for industrialization and opened up wide opportunities for the USSR in the French market. Stalin vetoed Besedovsky's report.

According to Besedovsky, in October 1928 he was summoned to see Stalin, who, among other things, said:

“We cannot pay our debts without changing the class essence of our power<…>You think that it is possible to establish a long financial cooperation with the capitalist world. But by surrendering to Poincaré, we will lose all possibility of revolutionary maneuvering, we will lose one of the most important positions - the refusal to recognize old debts. We overpay on abnormal loans. You're right. But on the other hand, we preserve the complete independence of our economic system in its struggle against the capitalist encirclement. You have to be naive to think that in France we can get long-term loans without any conditions. Conditions will be imposed on us, as a result of which we will not be able to run our economy the way we want. We will not lead, but we will be led. Understand that short-term commodity credits, for all their high cost, save us from political bondage. We do not need large external loans. Or rather, we still won't get them on the terms we can offer. To think otherwise is to fall into disgusting opportunism, to make possible a long cooperation between two irreconcilable economic systems» .

The most important thing in this speech is the fundamental rejection of the prospects for foreign loans, since they will inevitably entail external control over the economic use of investments: "we will not be able to manage our economy the way we want." Short-term credits are unprofitable, expensive and forced to deplete the national economy, but at the same time the Soviet government is spared from any external control.

This way of developing the economy is beneficial only if the results of industrialization must be kept secret from the outside world, and a military clash with it is considered inevitable.

Besedovsky, at his own peril and risk, tried to negotiate with a consortium of British banks on the financing of Soviet industrialization on a fairly large scale. Based on the data received from the State Planning Commission, Besedovsky drew up a general plan for possible British investments and handed it over to the British side. This plan in itself is of undoubted interest as a list of objects that Gosplan could theoretically imagine in the form of investment, that is, capable of generating income in the future.

Besedovsky comments: “This plan, of course, sinned by being schematic and insufficiently substantiating the figures given in it, but basically it exhausted the content of the work plan of the State Planning Commission. It is clear that if both sides accepted such a broad plan, which amounted to an impressive figure of five billion gold rubles (that is, by that time, about ten billion chervonets rubles, since the fall of the chervonets was already proceeding at a rapid pace), a complete political agreement was necessary and a far-reaching agreement between both parties. This plan, if successful, provided a fairly solid basis for the five-year plan without the abolition of the NEP creating a serious political conflict in the country and jeopardizing the existence of Russian agriculture, and, consequently, the country's economy as a whole. I hoped that this plan could also be a fairly reliable platform for the right side of the Politburo in their desire to repel Stalin's more and more developed offensive against the economic and political system of the NEP.

Besedovsky's description of his activities to attract British investment in the USSR is rather confusing, but it is clear that it could lead to success, since the British side expressed a clear interest. In the autumn of 1928, Besedovsky began to carefully inform the Moscow authorities about its results. The reaction was more than cold. Besedovsky was ordered to stop negotiations, which were completely cut off in March 1929. In September 1929, Besedovsky was summoned to Moscow, but, knowing the morals of his superiors, he preferred to flee.

This whole detective story testifies, first of all, to Stalin’s fundamental unwillingness to attract foreign investment to the USSR and not only to put the Soviet economy under the control of potential investors, but also, in principle, to expand Soviet economic ties that go beyond the trade in Soviet raw materials and the purchase of Western technologies.

It seems to us that there can only be one explanation. The industrialization of industrial production, which was carried out by Stalin, did not aim to receive income from the sale of manufactured products. Moreover, the very nature of these products, as well as the purpose of their production, were a state secret.

Hence the conclusion. The specifics of the ways and methods by which Stalin industrialized in the USSR can only be explained by the construction of a military industry and, as a consequence, a huge mechanized army. With any other setting of goals and objectives of industrialization, other methods could and should have been used that would lead to different results.

Notes

1. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, M., 1933, p. 12.

2. Nove Alek. About the fate of the NEP. Letter to the editors of the journal Questions of History. "Questions of History". No. 8, 1989. - S. 172-176

3. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, M., 1933, p. 272.

4. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, M., 1933, p. 252.

5. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, M., 1933, p. 252.

6. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, M., 1933, p. 264.

7. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, M., 1933, p. 265.

8. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, M., 1933, p. 253.

9. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, M., 1933, p. 253.

10. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, M., 1933, p. 254.

11. Prospects for the expansion of the national economy of the USSR for 1926/27 - 1030/31. S. 47.

12. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, M., 1933, p. 179.

13. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, M., 1933, p. 178.

14. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, M., 1933, p. 271.

15. Materials for the five-year plan for the development of industry of the USSR 1927/28 - 1931/32, M., p.635

16. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, M., 1933, p. 186..

17. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, M., 1933, p. 186..

18. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, M., 1933, p. 186.

19. Socialist construction of the USSR. Statistical Yearbook. M., 1934, p. 353

20. Socialist construction of the USSR. Statistical Yearbook. M., 1934, p. 436

21. Socialist construction of the USSR. Statistical Yearbook. M., 1934, p. 353

22. A.V. Bakunin, V.A. Tsybultnikov. Urban planning in the Urals during the period of industrialization. Sverdlovsk, 1989, Tab. one.

23. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, M., 1933, p. eleven.

24. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, M., 1933, p. 191.

25. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, M., 1933, p. 271.

26. Prospects for the development of the national economy of the USSR for 1926/27 - 1030/31. S. 29

27. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, M., 1933, p. 271.

28. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, M., 1933, p. 271.

29. Prospects for the expansion of the national economy of the USSR for 1926/27 - 1030/31. pp. 32-33

30. Materials for the five-year plan for the development of industry in the USSR 1927/28 - 1931/32, M., p.551.

31. “Materials for the five-year plan for the development of industry in the USSR 1927/28 - 1931/32”, M., p.17

32. Results of the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR, M., 1933, p. 253

33. Materials for the five-year plan for the development of industry in the USSR 1927/28 - 1931/32, M., p.87.

34. Five-year plan for the national economic construction of the USSR. M., 1929, 2nd ed. Volume 1, p. 129

35. Materials for the five-year plan for the development of industry in the USSR 1927/28 - 1931/32, M., p.89.

36. Five-year plan for the national economic construction of the USSR, M., 2nd ed. Volume 1, p. 129.

37. Five-year plan for the national economic construction of the USSR. M., 1929, 2nd ed. Volume 1, p. 58

38. Five-year plan for the national economic construction of the USSR. M., 1929, 2nd ed. Volume 1, p. 70

39. Five-year plan for the national economic construction of the USSR. M., 1929, 2nd ed. Volume 2, Part 2, p. 288

40. Materials for the five-year plan for the development of industry of the USSR 1927/28 - 1931/32, M., pp. 107-108

41. Prospects for the expansion of the national economy of the USSR for 1926/27 - 1030/31. App., p. 163.

42. Five-year plan for the national economic construction of the USSR. M., 1929, 2nd ed. Volume 1, p. 70

43. Prospects for the development of the national economy of the USSR for 1926/27 - 1030/31. Tab. P. 3 (Quoted by Yasny, p. 96)

44. Materials for the five-year plan for the development of industry of the USSR 1927/28 - 1931/32, M., p.403

45. Five-year plan for the national economic construction of the USSR. M., 1929, 2nd ed. Volume 1, 83.

46. ​​Naum Yasny, Soviet Economists of the 1920s. The debt of memory. M. 2012, p. 95-96

47. Naum Yasny, Soviet Economists of the 1920s. The debt of memory. M. 2012, p. 96-97.

48. Naum Yasny, Soviet Economists of the 1920s. The debt of memory. M. 2012, p. 99

49. Industry of the USSR. Statistical collection. M .: Statistics, 1957. S. 31. The same indicators are repeated in the book "The National Economy of the USSR in 1958" (p. 135). Indicators for small industry are determined on the basis of general values ​​for industry and data for large industry. - Note. N. Yasnoy

50. Naum Yasny, Soviet Economists of the 1920s. The debt of memory. M. 2012, p. 100.

51. Naum Yasny, Soviet Economists of the 1920s. The debt of memory. M. 2012, p. 108.

52. Five-year plan for the national economic construction of the USSR. M., 1929, Volume 1, 131. - approx. N. Yasnoy

53. National economy of the USSR in 1958 Stat. Yearbook. M. Statistics, 1959, p. 136.

54. Naum Yasny, Soviet Economists of the 1920s. The debt of memory. M. 2012, p. 109

55. The national economy of the USSR in 1958 Stat. Yearbook. M. Statistics, 1959, S. 350.

56. Naum Yasny, Soviet Economists of the 1920s. The debt of memory. M. 2012, p. 95-96

57. Five-year plan for the national economic construction of the USSR. M., 1929, 2nd ed. Volume 2, Part 2, p. 418.

58. Trömel, Konstantin, Die Entwicklung der deutsch-sowjetrussischen Handelsbeziehungen seit 1928 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung ihrer handelsvertraglichen Grundlagen. Dissertation. Leipzig: Moltzen, 1939, Tabelle 3a.

59. Tromel, Konstantin, Die Entwicklung der deutsch-sowjetrussischen Handelsbeziehungen seit 1928 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung ihrer handelsvertraglichen Grundlagen. Dissertation. Leipzig: Moltzen, 1939, Tabelle 3b.

60. Trömel, Konstantin, Die Entwicklung der deutsch-sowjetrussischen Handelsbeziehungen seit 1928 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung ihrer handelsvertraglichen Grundlagen. Dissertation. Leipzig: Moltzen, 1939, Tabelle 3a.

61. Trömel, Konstantin, Die Entwicklung der deutsch-sowjetrussischen Handelsbeziehungen seit 1928 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung ihrer handelsvertraglichen Grundlagen. Dissertation. Leipzig: Moltzen, 1939, Tabelle 3b.

62. Trömel, Konstantin, Die Entwicklung der deutsch-sowjetrussischen Handelsbeziehungen seit 1928 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung ihrer handelsvertraglichen Grundlagen. Dissertation. Leipzig: Moltzen, 1939, Tabelle 8.

63. Five-year plan for the national economic construction of the USSR. M., 1929, 2nd ed. Volume 1, p. 101.

64. Socialist construction of the USSR. Statistical Yearbook. M., 1934, p. 382-383

65. Five-year plan for the national economic construction of the USSR. M., 1929, 2nd ed. Volume 1, p. 101.

66. Letters to I.V. Stalin V.M. Molotov. 1925-1936. M., 1995, p. 198, 203-205.

67. “Control figures for labor for 1929-30”, M. 1930, p. 89-90.

68. Karl I. Albrecht. "Ber Verratene Sozialismus", Berlin, 1942, p. 67-68

69. Five-year plan for the national economic construction of the USSR. M., 1929, 2nd ed. Volume 1, p. 106

70. If in 1927/28 11.5 million tons of grain were harvested, then by the end of the rationing system in 1934/35 - more than 26 million tons. (The Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union. P. 290) - Footnote by E. Osokina.

71. In 1931, the directive grain procurement prices were about 5-12 kopecks. per kg. At the same time, the cost of one kilogram of wheat flour, even at low card prices, was 25-28 kopecks, and on the market - 4-5 rubles. In the same year, state procurement prices for beef and mutton ranged from 17 to 36 kopecks. per kilogram, for milk - 17 kopecks. per litre. At the same time, the lowest price for meat in trade (card supply in the city) was 1 ruble in 1931. 50 kopecks, in 1932 - more than 2 rubles. Commercial and market prices were significantly higher. So, in 1932, the average market price for meat in Moscow was 11 rubles, for milk - 2 rubles. (Osokina E.A. Hierarchy of consumption. P. 46). - Footnote by E. Osokina

72. Elena Osokina. BEHIND THE FACADE OF "STALIN'S ABUNDANCE". Distribution and the market in the supply of the population during the years of industrialization 1927-1941. Moscow, ROSSPEN, 1999, p. 115-116.

73. Malafeev A.N. The history of pricing…. S. 172. - Note. N. Yasnoy

74. Malafeev A.N. The history of pricing…. S. 402. - Note. N. Yasnoy

75. “This is clearly demonstrated by the data given by Malafeev (p. 402). If we take the prices of 1927/28 as 100, then the retail price indices in the first half of 1932 were: public sector - . 176.6; private sector- 760.3; the general index is 251.8 If we take the prices of 1928 as 100, then the index of retail prices in state and cooperative trade in 1932 was 255 (Ibid., p. 407). Thus, the increase in retail prices in the public sector in the second half of 1932 was so great that if the analysis takes into account the data for the second half of 1932, then the price increase index in the public and the private sector applicable to characterize a single public sector" - approx. N. Yasnoy.

76. Naum Yasny, Soviet Economists of the 1920s. The debt of memory. M. 2012, p. 110.111.

77. P.S. Yegorov. THE MAGNITQGORSKY (MAGNET MOUNTAIN) METALLURGICAL WORKS MOSCOW, 1929; Prof. A.S. Axamitny. Die Volga-Don Grosswasserstrasse. Moscow 1929; Sergej Andreevič Kukel'-Kraevskij. Die Swir-Wasserkraftanlage für die Elektrizitätsversorgung[!] des Leningrader Gebiets. Moskau: (Upravl. Del. SNK SSSR i STO), 1929; Kostrow, I. N. Eisenhüttenwerke in Nadeschdinsk und Taganrog/.. - Moskau: , 1929