The first Chechen war lasted exactly one year and nine months. The war began on December 1, 1994, with the bombing of all three Chechen air bases - Kalinovskaya, Khankala and Grozny-Severny, which destroyed the entire Chechen aviation, which included several "corn" and a couple of antediluvian Czechoslovak fighters. The war ended on August 31, 1996 with the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements, after which the federals left Chechnya.
Military losses are depressing: 4,100 Russian servicemen were killed and 1,200 were missing. 15,000 militants were killed, although Aslan Maskhadov, who led the military operations, claimed that the militants lost 2,700 people. According to Memorial's human rights activists, 30,000 civilians in Chechnya were killed.
There were no winners in this war. The federals were unable to take control of the territory of the republic, and the separatists did not receive a real independent state. Both sides lost.
Unrecognized state and prerequisites for war
The only Chechen the whole country knew before the start of the war was Dzhokhar Dudayev. The commander of a bomber division, a combat pilot, at the age of 45 he became a major general of aviation, at 47 he left the army and went into politics. He moved to Grozny, quickly advanced to leadership positions, and already in 1991 became president. True, the president is only the unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. But the President! He was known to have a tough temper and determination. During the riots in Grozny, Dudayev and his supporters threw Vitaly Kutsenko, Chairman of the Grozny City Council, out of the window. He crashed, he was taken to the hospital, where the Dudaevites finished him off. Kutsenko died, and Dudayev became a national leader.
Now it is somehow forgotten, but Dudayev's criminal reputation was known back in that period in 1993. Let me remind you how much noise the “Chechen advice notes” have made at the federal level. After all, it was a real disaster for the national payment system. Fraudsters stole 4 trillion rubles from the Central Bank of Russia through shell companies and Grozny banks. That's a trillion! I will say for comparison that the budget of Russia in that very 93rd year was 10 trillion rubles. That is, almost half of the national budget was stolen from Chechen advice. Half of the annual salary of doctors, teachers, military personnel, officials, miners, half of all government revenues. Huge damage! Subsequently, Dudayev recalled how money was brought to Grozny by trucks.
It was with such marketers, democrats and supporters of national self-determination that Russia had to fight in 1994.
The beginning of the conflict
When did the first Chechen war start? December 11, 1994. So out of habit, many historians and publicists believe. They think that the first Chechen war of 1994-1996 began on the day when Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree on the need to restore constitutional order in Chechnya. They forget that ten days earlier there had been an air strike on airfields in Chechnya. They forget about the burned-out cornfields, after which no one in Chechnya or in the Russian armed forces doubted that a war was going on.
But the ground operation really began on December 11. On this day, the so-called "Joint Group of Forces" (OGV), which then consisted of three parts, began to move:
- western;
- northwestern;
- eastern.
The Western group entered Chechnya from North Ossetia and Ingushetia. Northwestern - from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia. Eastern - from Dagestan.
All three groups moved straight to Grozny.
The OGV was supposed to clear the city from the separatists, and then destroy the bases of the militants: first, in the northern, flat part of the republic; then in the southern, mountainous part of it.
In a short time, the OGV was supposed to clear the entire territory of the republic from Dudayev's formations.
On the outskirts of Grozny, on December 12, the North-Western grouping reached the first and got involved in the battle near the village of Dolinsky. In this battle, the militants used the Grad multiple launch rocket system, and that day they did not allow Russian troops to pass to Grozny.
Gradually, two other groups moved in. By the end of December, the army approached the capital from three sides:
- from the west;
- from North;
- from the east.
The assault was scheduled for December 31st. On New Year's Eve. And the eve of the birthday of Pavel Grachev - the then Minister of Defense. I will not say that they wanted to guess the victory for the holiday, but such an opinion is widespread.
Assault on Grozny
The assault has begun. The assault groups immediately ran into difficulties. The fact is that the commanders made two serious mistakes:
- Firstly. They did not complete the encirclement of Grozny. The problem was that Dudayev's formations actively used the gap in the open ring of encirclement. In the south, in the mountains, militant bases were located. From the south, the militants brought ammunition and weapons. The wounded were evacuated to the south. Reinforcements were coming in from the south;
- Secondly. We decided to massively use tanks. 250 combat vehicles entered Grozny. Moreover, without proper intelligence support and without infantry support. Tanks were helpless in the narrow streets of urban development. The tanks were on fire. The 131st separate Maykop motorized rifle brigade was surrounded, and 85 people were killed.
Parts of the Western and Eastern groups were unable to penetrate deep into the city and retreated. Only part of the North-Eastern group under the command of General Lev Rokhlin entrenched themselves in the city and took up defense. Some units were surrounded and suffered losses. Street fighting broke out in various districts of Grozny.
The command quickly learned the lessons of what had happened. The commanders changed tactics. Abandoned the massive use of armored vehicles. The battles were fought by small, mobile units of assault groups. Soldiers and officers quickly gained experience and improved their combat skills. On January 9, the federals took the building of the oil institute, and the airport came under the control of the OGV. By January 19, the militants left the presidential palace and organized defense on Minutka Square. At the end of January, the federals controlled 30% of the territory of Grozny. At that moment, the federal grouping was increased to 70 thousand people, it was headed by Anatoly Kulikov.
The next important change occurred on February 3rd. To blockade the city from the south, the command formed the "South" grouping. Already on February 9, it blocked the Rostov-Baku highway. The blockade is closed.
Half the city was reduced to rubble, but the victory was won. On March 6, the last militant left Grozny under pressure from the OGV. It was Shamil Basayev.
Major fighting in 1995
By April 1995, federal forces had established control over almost the entire flat part of the republic. Argun, Shali and Gudermes were taken under control relatively easily. The settlement of Bamut remained outside the zone of control. Fighting there continued intermittently until the end of the year, and even into the next 1996.
Quite a public outcry was received by the operation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Samashki. The propaganda campaign against Russia, professionally conducted by Dudayev's Chechen-press agency, seriously influenced world public opinion about Russia and its actions in Chechnya. Many still believe that the casualties among the civilian population in Samashki were prohibitive. There are unverified rumors about thousands of deaths, while the human rights organization Memorial, for example, believes that the number of civilians killed during the cleansing of Samashki is measured in dozens.
What is true here, and what is exaggeration - now it is no longer possible to make out. One thing is certain: war is a cruel and unjust business. Especially when civilians are dying.
Advancement in the mountainous regions was more difficult for the federal forces than a campaign across the plains. The reason was that the troops often got bogged down in the defense of the militants, there were even such unpleasant incidents as, for example, the capture of 40 paratroopers of the Aksai special forces. In June, the federals took control of the district centers of Vedeno, Shatoi and Nozhai-Yurt.
The most socially significant and resonant episode of the first Chechen war of 1995 was the episode associated with the release of events outside of Chechnya. The main negative character of the episode was Shamil Basayev. At the head of a gang of 195 people, he made a raid on trucks in the Stavropol Territory. The militants entered the Russian city of Budyonnovsk, opened fire in the center of the city, broke into the building of the city department of internal affairs, shot several policemen and civilians.
The terrorists took about 2,000 hostages and herded them into the building complex of the city hospital. Basayev demanded to withdraw troops from Chechnya and start negotiations with Dudayev with the participation of the UN. The Russian authorities decided to storm the hospital. Unfortunately, there was a leak of information, and the bandits had time to prepare. The assault was not unexpected, and failed. The special forces captured a number of auxiliary buildings, but did not break into the main building. On the same day they made a second attempt to storm, and she also failed.
In short, the situation began to become critical, and the Russian authorities were forced to enter into negotiations. The then Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin was on the telephone line. The whole country was watching the TV report intently, when Chernomyrdin spoke into the phone: "Shamil Basayev, Shamil Basayev, I am listening to your demands." As a result of the negotiations, Basayev received a vehicle and left for Chechnya. There he released the 120 remaining hostages. In total, 143 people died during the events, 46 of them were security officials.
Combat clashes of varying intensity took place in the republic until the end of the year. On October 6, militants made an attempt on the life of the commander of the United Forces, General Anatoly Romanov. In Grozny, on Minutka Square, in a tunnel under the railway, the Dudayevites detonated a bomb. The helmet and body armor saved the life of General Romanov, who was passing through the tunnel at that moment. From the wound he received, the general fell into a coma, and subsequently became a deep invalid. After this incident, “retaliation strikes” were delivered to the militant bases, which, however, did not lead to a serious change in the balance of power in the confrontation.
Fighting in 1996
The new year began with another episode of hostage-taking. And again outside of Chechnya. The story is like this. On January 9, 250 militants made a bandit raid on the Dagestan city of Kizlyar. First, they attacked a Russian helicopter base, where they destroyed 2 incapacitated MI-8 helicopters. Then they seized the Kizlyar hospital and the maternity hospital. From the neighboring buildings, the militants drove up to three thousand citizens.
The bandits locked people on the second floor, mined it, and barricaded themselves on the first floor, and put forward demands: the withdrawal of troops from the Caucasus, the provision of buses and a corridor to Grozny. Negotiations with the militants were conducted by the authorities of Dagestan. Representatives of the command of the federal forces did not participate in these negotiations. On January 10, the Chechens were provided with buses, and the militants with a group of hostages began to move towards Chechnya. They were going to cross the border near the village of Pervomaiskoye, but did not reach it. The federal security forces, who were not going to put up with the fact that the hostages would be taken to Chechnya, opened warning fire, and the column had to stop. Unfortunately, as a result of insufficiently organized actions, there was confusion. This allowed the militants to disarm a checkpoint of 40 Novosibirsk policemen and capture the village of Pervomaiskoye.
The militants fortified themselves in Pervomaisky. The confrontation continued for several days. On the 15th, after the Chechens shot six captured policemen and two negotiators - Dagestan elders, the security forces launched an assault.
The assault failed. The confrontation continued. On the night of January 19, the Chechens broke through the encirclement and left for Chechnya. They took with them the captured policemen, who were later released.
During the raid, 78 people were killed.
Fighting in Chechnya continued throughout the winter. In March, the militants tried to retake Grozny, but the attempt ended in failure. In April, a bloody clash took place near the village of Yaryshmardy.
A new turn in the development of events was introduced by the liquidation of Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev by federal forces. Dudayev often used the satellite phone of the Inmarsat system. On April 21, from an aircraft equipped with a radar station, the Russian military located Dudayev. 2 SU-25 attack aircraft were raised into the sky. They fired two air-to-ground missiles along the bearing. One of them was right on target. Dudaev died.
Contrary to the expectations of the federals, the elimination of Dudayev did not lead to decisive changes in the course of hostilities. But the situation in Russia has changed. The election campaign for the presidential elections was approaching. Boris Yeltsin was keenly interested in freezing the conflict. Negotiations were underway until July, and the activity of both the Chechens and the federals has noticeably decreased.
After Yeltsin was elected president, hostilities intensified again.
The final battle chord of the first Chechen war sounded in August 1996. The separatists again attacked Grozny. The divisions of General Pulikovsky had a numerical superiority, but they could not hold Grozny. At the same time, the militants captured Gudermes and Argun.
Russia was forced to enter into negotiations.
Hot August 96th
The history of mankind is the history of betrayal. From the creation of the world and the first people of Adam and his son Cain to the present day, little has changed. This is especially noticeable in war, when the human spirit is subjected to special tests.
As once in the 41st ...
It all started in the early morning of August 6th. The militants, numbering about 1,000 people, who had accumulated in advance and concentrated in the city, suddenly attacked the railway station, the commandant's offices of Grozny, the Government House, the building of the FSB of the republic, the Coordination Center of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and almost all checkpoints.
The militants are firing
At the same time, hundreds of armed people gathered in advance in the suburban villages began to arrive in the city in an organized manner, safely bypassing the posts, some of which had been eliminated the day before as part of the Moscow and Nazran agreements. For the sake of truth, we must admit the fact: more than 130 roads lead to Grozny. Only 33 were directly under the control of the federal forces at that time, it is believed that there were not enough people for more.
Grozny Map
Subsequently, the total number of militants in Grozny reached 4-6 thousand people. They were led by the most experienced commanders headed by Maskhadov: Basaev, Gelaev, Israpilov, Khattab. A very serious "mess" was being brewed (the separatists gave it a loud name - operation "Jihad"), which could have been avoided, but, unfortunately, our guys had to disentangle. How could this happen?
A long time later, a document prepared in the bowels of the headquarters of Alexander Lebed, who in 1996 was the secretary of the Security Council of Russia, caught my eye. It contains, in my opinion, wording that reflects the essence of the current situation, to which not only the soldiers and officers of the group of forces in Chechnya, its commander, but, perhaps, the president himself have become hostages. I will quote a few paragraphs from the document: “The tension in Grozny did not decrease. The significant forces of law and order concentrated here provided only the appearance of maintaining public safety and protecting citizens from criminal encroachments. At night, the city, in essence, passed under the control of criminal elements and militants who penetrated into residential areas, since the patrol service and visits to the scene of incidents by the internal affairs bodies were not carried out during this period. So the "suddenness" was quite predictable. In addition, military intelligence reported on the impending attack, sparingly shared information from the FSB, and the information received through its channels was reported to the top by the MVD opera.
It is difficult, and hardly appropriate, to cite the chronology of those tragic days. Events developed on the rise, with kaleidoscopic diversity and speed. Today they are quite honestly and clearly recorded and reflected in a variety of documents: from summaries and reports to documentaries and memoirs. At the same time, there are still “white spots” in this dark story, which is yet to be shed light on. I will try to supplement this very colorful picture with my modest strokes of what I saw, heard, experienced, and thought about.
Leave to return
According to the plan of the command of the United Group, the defense of Grozny was entrusted to the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs. It was believed that there were about 12,000 law enforcement officers in the city (of which no more than 6,000 were servicemen of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs). The troops, mainly units of the 101st and 34th separate operational brigades (obron), stationed in the former 15th military camp, guarded 22 checkpoints, 5 commandant's offices and 2 commandant's stations; several detachments of OMON and SOBR reinforced the commandant's offices and administrative buildings. There were also several formations of the Zavgaev militia in the city. True, even the day before, just for August 6, an operation was planned in the suburbs of the Chechen capital, and part of these forces was withdrawn from Grozny. Army units with heavy equipment and weapons, for the most part, according to the orders of the command, were in the south of the republic.
101st defense
In the film of the famous TV journalist Alexander Sladkov “Shooting August”, the then acting commander of the United Group, Lieutenant General Konstantin Pulikovsky (instead of Lieutenant General Vyacheslav Tikhomirov, who had gone on vacation), admitted that he did not have enough to figure out the fidelity of such a decision on the alignment of forces. time, no authority - such a disposition was approved at the very top. I have not been able to determine the author of such a plan with absolute accuracy. Let the late Boris Nikolayevich, who approved such a decision, most likely without reading it, be the “extreme” one.
We, the officers of the 8th detachment of the special forces of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia "Rus", in which I was in Chechnya at that time, did not have the opportunity to master all the information, although our intelligence officers, wandering around the republic daily, brought news, the essence of which was reduced to the next - the silence that was established at the beginning of the summer, after the declarative statement of Boris Nikolayevich that, they say, "the war is over, that's enough, we've fought" was deceptive. By the way, our detachment is directly related to this propaganda and political action. During the famous May visit of President Yeltsin to the republic, a column of our armored personnel carriers “accidentally” caught the eye of the Supreme Commander, imitating the withdrawal of troops. Yeltsin, it seems, really believed then that "the process has begun", signing on the armor of one of our "boxes" a decree on reducing the service life of soldiers who served in Chechnya. And then the column, having made a detour, returned to the base - the war continued for us.
Yeltsin in Chechnya
The very beginning of this last operation of the first Chechen campaign found me in Rostov-on-Don, where I had flown on a business trip from still “peaceful” Chechnya just the day before. I returned a couple of days later in a completely different environment. The first thing I saw on the take-off of the Severny airport was cars standing in a row, from where they carried out a stretcher wrapped in foil. There were many. Somebody's legs, shod in sneakers of the 45th size, ran into my memory, going beyond the dimensions of the stretcher. I confess I was scared...
There is nothing to counterattack
We know the results of those heavy battles, which, however, we do not like to remember, but we must learn to face the truth: an almost complete loss of control over the city, a large number of dead and wounded, a blow to the prestige of the state and its security forces. However, this formal truth also has a kind of lining, consisting of thousands of "truths" of direct participants in the defense of Grozny.
One of the groups of our detachment, led by Captain Alexander Iglin in the amount of no more than 20 people, on August 6 was in the Coordination Center (CC) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which was located next to the republican Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FSB near the Dynamo stadium. The place is not the best even for conducting active defense, and even more so for deploying almost a counteroffensive, which General Pulikovsky blamed the policemen in the mentioned film. The KC itself is a closed building with “checkpoints”, a building surrounded by houses with an adjacent territory, surrounded by a concrete fence and the only entrance gate. From equipment - a pair of detachment BTR-80 - and that's it! True, as expected in large headquarters, there were many generals and officers who knew how to hold weapons in their hands.
The senior chief at the facility was the First Deputy Minister of the Interior of Russia, Militia Colonel-General Pavel Golubets. Later, he was accused of having removed himself from management, did not lead the defense of the city, and the forces entrusted to him. There were objective reasons for this: shortly after the start of intense fighting, the government communications line failed, which disrupted the unit control system. Yes, and what could be done when the enemy simultaneously attacked almost all the facilities where military personnel and police officers were serving, and the air was filled with pleas for help, screams of the wounded, curses against the militants and higher leadership, and squabbles.
In addition, outright "misinformation" was also broadcast on the radio channels, alternating with Maskhadov's appeal to the federal forces and Chechen policemen with a demand to lay down their arms. For example, there was information that the latter fled or completely went over to the side of the militants, which was not true: there were traitors and cowards among them, but those who remained faithful to the oath steadfastly defended the railway station, the base of the Chechen OMON, the location of the 2nd regiment of the PPSM of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Russia in the Czech Republic. At the same time, it is worth recognizing that the bandits managed, especially at first, to disorganize the work of managing units. However, it is, of course, impossible to talk about widespread panic, manifestations of cowardice or wholesale drunkenness of servicemen and employees who suddenly found themselves surrounded. My archive contains video footage, audio recordings of radio conversations, from which it becomes clear with impartial accuracy who did what, including the leadership.
KC Ministry of Internal Affairs and the entire so-called. the government quarter came under intense attack. Using 100% knowledge of the area, having studied all the approaches and weak points of the defense, the militants cut communications that were under fire, made several attempts to break into the territory of the KC. This was prevented by the competent actions of his defenders. Captain Iglin, as soon as it became known what was happening in the city, put a secret of two fighters on the roof of a nearby building. Their task was to monitor the situation around and, most importantly, the approaches to the KC and inform the commander by radio station.
The militants made their first serious attack around 6 p.m. on August 6. Prior to that, the bandits fired at the special forces from sniper rifles all day long. A group of militants, advanced from the side of the furniture factory, noticed the secret in time. They were fired from underbarrel grenade launchers, the fire was successfully corrected by fighters who were in secret. Several attackers were wounded, the assault organized by them was thwarted. By 23.00, when it was already dark, the militants again tried to attack the positions of the special forces. And again they ran into competent resistance. Underbarrel grenade launchers were used, and at the windows of the main post office, from where they were shooting especially densely, a detachment armored personnel carrier fired several long bursts. The attack was repulsed. But confident in their numerical and moral superiority, the militants launched a third assault around one in the morning. Radio interception showed: the bandits believed that there was almost no one to defend the object, everyone fled and therefore attacked furiously, went into the open. And again they stumbled upon an organized rebuff. No more assault attempts were made, but all the defenders were kept under the supervision of a sniper and machine gunners. By the way, the object was never handed over to the enemy.
Fighting in Grozny
According to eyewitnesses, the situation in the neighboring buildings of the FSB and the Department for Combating Organized Crime of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was worse. There, the bandits even managed to capture the lower floors, and the fighting went on inside the buildings. I had to call in aviation, which also suffered heavy losses: in the very first hours of the attack, militants shot down three helicopters.
Prolonged "Minute"
Another facet of the truth, its separate page, is the feat of soldiers and officers of the 34th Armored Forces of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, who defended two GPs in the area of Minutka Square and the so-called. "Romanovsky bridge". They fought for two weeks in complete encirclement, suffering losses (only 10 people died and died from wounds), experiencing serious problems due to lack of ammunition, medicines, food and water. The militants several times offered them to leave the buildings they held, guaranteeing safety, but the officers refused, hoping that they had not been forgotten, that the situation would soon be reversed and the victims they had suffered would not be in vain.
Soldiers of the 34th defense are fighting in the area of Minutka Square
And only when the defenders heard on the TV, reanimated with the help of tank batteries, that the main news of the day was the inauguration of the president, and “the situation in the Chechen capital is normalizing and being under control,” the defenders began to doubt that they were right. As a participant in those battles, Lieutenant Colonel Mikhail Polyakov later recalled: “Something inside us broke then, I won’t hide it. There were questions that had not arisen before. Why do we put boys? ... In general, the day after that “political information”, those who led the defense of the VOP began negotiations with Khunkar Israpilov, who got in touch, the field commander, who was in charge of the overall leadership of the actions of the militants in the Minutka area ... It was not about surrender, but about our ability to freely go to our own, along with weapons, the wounded and the bodies of the fallen. Which ultimately happened on August 19th.”
The language does not turn to accuse these soldiers and officers of treason or cowardice (although such attempts were later made by the competent authorities). They did more than was required of them, because some other defended objects fell much earlier. And the will of the defenders was broken by the indifference to their destinies, shown on the “box” of the country; the confusion of the command, the lack of will of the top leadership of the state and the clearly treacherous position of the media. It's no secret that during the attack on the city, journalists from the leading Russian TV channels found themselves in one of the basements of the attacked government buildings, from where, without sticking their noses out, they broadcast panic messages about the surrender of the city. I myself remember this moment very well: the commandant's offices, including the KC MVD, are fighting with might and main, and the journalists have already “surrendered” them! It is hard to imagine a better service rendered to the enemy, because the panic, reflected like an echo in the thousand-voiced crooked mirrors of the media, is capable of bringing down even a stronger defense!
Keyword - betrayal
And then the chief peacekeeper of the country, Secretary of the Security Council of Russia Alexander Lebed, arrived in Chechnya, with the wish of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, who was tired of the war, to stop it and with great authority. I personally, neither then, nor even now, had any objections to this, and I did not really believe in the effectiveness of the ultimatum of the generals Pulikovsky - Tikhomirov, announced to Maskhadov the day before: to leave the encircled city within 48 hours. There were good reasons to doubt. Until very recently, the bandits managed to leave the encirclement more than once. Yes, and in other cases, when the militants were strongly pressed, the command “cease fire” and “enter into negotiations” immediately came, so I did not flatter myself with illusions that this time it would be somehow different.
Tikhomirov and Kulikov in Khankala. Photo by Roman Ilyushchenko
But at what cost the next assault on the city would cost, I soon became convinced when I left with one of the groups of the detachment for negotiations, which were actively conducted between the parties to the conflict from the second half of August. On one of the streets of Grozny along the route of movement (in my opinion, Gudermesskaya) we came across a broken military column: gnawed skeletons of infantrymen with burnt-out wombs of airborne squads; unwound spools of caterpillars resembling the tails of dead alligators; spent shell casings, a helmet pierced by a bullet ...
The streets are deserted, there is dead silence, and on both sides of the road there are five-story buildings, from which, it seemed, death was watching us. One after another, the commands were passed: “do not open fire” and “do not jump onto the roadside”, which turned out to be mined. And then, as if from under the ground, armed people appeared, shaking their machine guns and greeting us with a victorious cry: “Allahu Akbar!”. Personally, I had a depressing feeling of moral superiority over us by the enemy, who was not at all going to capitulate.
During the negotiations, in which the well-known field commander Aslanbek Ismailov participated on the part of the militants, I managed to talk with some Chechens from his external guard. They celebrated victory and did not hide it. Barely restrained gloating and feigned nobility of "real warriors" is a typical appearance of the Chechen militia of that period.
I remember several episodes. I, not forgetting about the machine gun, tried to capture a historical event on a photo and video camera. Many bandits posed, making characteristic gestures. One of them showed a cockade with a wolf on a cap and added that they were made in Russia, naming a specific factory. Another showed us a “Chechen body armor”, shouting “Allahu Akbar!” three times, assuring us that he was not afraid to die. There was one among them who, sincerely rejoicing at the victory, invited me to visit him. Just like Hasek: "at 6 pm after the war." It is impossible not to mention the children scurrying around everywhere, harassing us with chants on the theme “Allahu Akbar”.
I’ll be lying if, for the sake of completeness, I don’t mention the Chechen woman, who treated both us and the militants with homemade pies, which we unanimously refused (we don’t sell for gingerbread), gloomily remaining faithful to the oath. However, we had no reason to have fun: in addition to everything else, yesterday, in the area of the 13th checkpoint, our comrade - intelligence officer, Sergeant Andrey Vasilenko, died in an ambush, on whom I had written a submission for awarding him the medal "For Courage" the day before.
Soldiers with the body of the deceased A. Vasilenko. Photo by Roman Ilyushchenko
Another characteristic picture of those days that remains in my memory is the eyes of Chechen policemen who remained loyal to Russia. They were taken with their families and miserable belongings to Khankala. They wandered around the base lost, not knowing where to put themselves, because they could not return home. When I caught their distant gaze, I could not endure it for a long time, because we once again betrayed them. But they betrayed us in turn.
Betrayal is generally the key word for understanding this war. , the script of which, it seems to me, was written in advance, in the silence of high offices far from here. It seemed that the very hot to the limit, all-penetrating air of the Chechen capital was saturated with betrayal, dooming all our victories to defeat in advance. Indulged and sold (not without reason in Russian these words are so similar) not only defense plans or weapons, but also the soldiers themselves, officers, ordinary people, the interests of the state ... Wholesale and retail.
The late Alexander Lebed has been appointed to the role of one of the main traitors to the interests of the country. But I believe that he himself was sincere in his desire to bring peace to a weary country. Alexander Ivanovich's misfortune was that he was "drifted" in order, and he did not want to share the laurels of a peacemaker with anyone else, opening (as he really wanted) the way to the presidency. And in order to achieve this goal, he was ready for a lot. As time has shown - a lot. The victims of the ambitious Secretary of the Security Council were not only the army put on a short leash, and then actually expelled from Chechnya, but also Russia itself, its international prestige, which suffered as a result of the shameful Khasavyurt Treaty, is akin to the obscene Brest Treaty. I am sure that even by negotiating with the separatists, it was possible to beautifully get out of a difficult situation without losing face, while maintaining the status of a great power. Unfortunately, General Lebed, who fought well in Afghanistan and stopped the bloodshed in Transnistria, was much better than Lebed, a diplomat.
Aslan Maskhadov and Alexander Lebed
The signing of the Khasavyurt peace
Subsequent events showed that it is impossible to solve the "Chechen question" without taking into account the opinion of the Chechens and at the expense of the Chechens themselves . The times when Russian generals such as Alexei Yermolov, Yakov Baklanov or Soviet marshals such as Lavrenty Beria did politics in the Caucasus, catching up fear on the natives, have irrevocably gone. This was quickly understood when the new leader of Russia came to power (let me remind you, a retired FSB colonel), who, having shown outstanding diplomatic skills, managed to find the right and, probably, the only right solution.
Minutka Square area today
To judge who, in the end, was a hero, and who was a traitor; who is right and who is not, there will be God and descendants . But even repeatedly betrayed, Russian soldiers and officers continued to demonstrate high morale, believing in the coming victory. In confirmation, I will cite a little-known fact: the soldiers of the 101st Armored Forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia (brigade commander - Colonel Yuri Zavizionov), who were the last to leave Chechnya, whose losses were the largest - over 80 people, took with them a tank division standing on a pedestal in a former military town - the symbol of the Victory, the T-34 tank. And on the armor of their "boxes" leaving Chechnya under the hooting of the crowd, these people, deadly tired of the war, hiding their resentment deep in their hearts, wrote: "Let her be wrong, but this is our Motherland!"
And while the feeling of faith in Russia among its defenders is indestructible, we cannot be defeated.
P.S. As a result of the fighting in Grozny from August 6 to August 23, 1996, according to generalized data obtained from various sources, we lost up to 2080 people (almost 500 killed, over 1400 wounded, more than 180 missing). On the streets of the city, up to 18 tanks, 61 infantry fighting vehicles, 8 armored personnel carriers, 30 vehicles were burned, 4 helicopters were shot down. The losses of militants in manpower exceeded ours by 2-3 times.
Eternal memory to the soldiers of the Fatherland who fell in those battles!
Roman Ilyushchenko - reserve lieutenant colonel, combat veteran
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in many former republics of the USSR, organizations were formed that were of a nationalist nature. Among them was the association "National Congress of the Chechen People", which was formed on the territory of Chechnya. The purpose of the organization was to secede from the USSR and Russia. The leader of the movement was Dzhokhar Dudayev, who, under the Union, held the rank of General of the Soviet Air Force. But the militants were opposed by a powerful army led by Russian generals. In the Chechen war, their fates were intertwined, but for the most part they turned out to be tragic ..
Anatoly Romanov
The first to be awarded the title of Hero of Russia for participating in the first Chechen war was Colonel General Anatoly Romanov. He served as the commander of the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation and led the federal troops in Chechnya during the war. Unfortunately, the service did not last long, less than 3 months - from July to October 1995.
In October of this year, the column was blown up by a radio-controlled land mine. The general survived, but his injuries were so severe that he still cannot be rehabilitated. To this day, he is surrounded not only by medical personnel, but also by close friends and relatives. His wife Larisa has been caring for her hero husband for decades.
The main merit of Anatoly Romanov is a diplomatic gift, thanks to which he excellently negotiated. Romanov tried to resolve the conflict in the North Caucasus by peaceful means. The heroic title for his service in this region Anatoly Alexandrovich received a month after he was seriously wounded.
In addition, in 1994 he received the Order of Military Merit. He has many awards, including the Maroon Beret, the Order of the Red Star, received before participating in the Chechen conflict, the Order for Personal Courage, and the Medal for Impeccable Service. Romanov has many commemorative medals.
Nikolai Skrypnik
Anatoly Romanov was replaced at the post by Major General Skrypnik. He was also awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation. He headed the so-called tactical grouping of internal troops of the Russian Federation in Chechnya. But Nikolai Skrypnik did not survive this war: in 1996, in one of the villages, he carried out a cleansing of militants from a rather large gang led by Doku Makhaev.
The armored personnel carrier, on which Skrypnik was riding, was also blown up by a radio-controlled landmine. After receiving injuries, the general lived for only an hour. The title of Hero of Russia was awarded to him posthumously after the end of the First Chechen campaign in November 1996.
Lev Rokhlin
Another general who went through almost the entire military campaign in Chechnya took part in the battles in Afghanistan and Karabakh. refused the title of Hero of Russia for participation in the Chechen war. But he can be included in the list of generals-heroes of the Chechen war. The media say that his refusal is due to the fact that he considered the Chechen campaign not a glorious, but a mournful period in the life of his country.
Gennady Troshev
The famous trench general who went through the entire Chechen war. This is Gennady Troshev. His life was tragically cut short in 2008. But he died not in hostilities, but as a result of a plane crash. Gennady Troshev was a hereditary military man. The future general of the Chechen war Troshev was born in 1947 in Berlin. He spent his childhood in the Caucasus, in the city of Grozny. His father died early and Gennady, together with his two sisters, was raised by his mother.
Gennady Troshev was educated at the Kazan Higher Tank Command School and the Military Academy of the General Staff. Graduated from the Military Academy of Armored Forces. The general's career was going well. By the beginning of the First Chechen campaign, he was the commander of the 58th army, and then the commander-in-chief of the united group of troops. Soon he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general.
In the Second Chechen campaign, Troshev served as commander of the Federal troops, who fought against militants in Dagestan. He headed the Vostok group, in 2000 he earned the rank of colonel general. At the same time, he headed the United Federal Forces in Chechnya and Dagestan, and until the end of 2002 commanded the troops of the North Caucasus Military District. Troshev was a legendary general, he did not hide behind the backs of the soldiers, he was respected for this. He fully shared all the hardships of those who were subordinate to him, personally participated in the hostilities, controlled them.
He was a wise man who tried to resolve issues without bloodshed, to take settlements in the North Caucasus without a fight. Unfortunately, this was not always possible. The legendary general of the Chechen war, Troshev, deserved the Hero of Russia award, which was presented to him by Boris Yeltsin himself. In addition, he never hid from the media, actively contacted them.
During the Chechen campaign, his literary talent was discovered in him. One of the most popular books by Gennady Troshev “My war. Chechen diary of a trench general” was published in 2001. After the end of hostilities in Chechnya, they wanted to transfer him to the Siberian Military District. But since he gave his whole life to the North Caucasus, he did not begin to be transferred from these places, which became his family, and resigned.
Later, he dealt with issues of the Cossacks, worked in the North Caucasus until 2008. He was awarded the Order of Merit for the Fatherland, IV degree, but literally 2.5 months after the award, he died as a result of the crash of a Boeing 737. There are rumors that Troshev's death was not just a fatal accident, but a planned operation, but this version has not yet been confirmed.
human losses
Losses of human lives both among the military and civilians during both Chechen wars amount to hundreds of thousands. There are 14 generals who died in the Chechen war. And these are those who fought on the Russian side. But Chechens fought on the side of the militants, who had previously served their country - the USSR.
During the First Chechen campaign, 2 generals were killed. During the Second - 10, and in the interval between them - 2 generals. They served in different departments: the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the FSB, military justice and in the main special construction.
Dead Russian generals in the Chechen war
In the ranks of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation was Major General Viktor Vorobyov, who died on January 7, 1995. His death was due to the explosion of a mortar mine.
Another Major General of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Gennady Shpigun, was abducted in March 1999 in the city of Grozny. His body was found in March 2000 near the village of Duba-Yurt.
In the winter of 2002, a MI-8 helicopter was shot down. It killed the generals of the Chechen war:
- Lieutenant General Mikhail Rudenko;
- Major General of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Nikolaev Goridov.
The first served as Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation and was the head of the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The second was deputy commander-in-chief of internal affairs of the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation and commanded a grouping of internal troops in Chechnya.
In November 2001, Gaidar Gadzhiev, a major general and military commander of the Urus-Martan district of Chechnya, was mortally wounded. He did not die immediately - he died in the hospital a few days later.
- Major General Anatoly Pozdnyakov;
- Major General Pavel Varfolomeev.
Both of them served in the General Staff. Pozdnyakov was the head of the second department. Varfolomeev was the deputy head of the personnel department.
Mikhail Malofeev - Deputy Commander of the "North" grouping. He died from a bullet wound in battle on January 18, 2000 in one of the districts of Grozny.
Closes the list of generals of the Chechen war who died as a result of hostilities, Major General Viktor Prokopenko, Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff. In April 1998, as a result of shelling of a convoy, he was killed.
Generals whose heart could not stand
Several more generals of the Chechen war died from the fact that their health was undermined as a result of this bloody war. Major General Stanislav Korovinsky's heart could not stand it. He passed away on December 29, 1999. In March 2000, Major General Alexander Otrakovsky, commander of the Marine Corps, died of heart problems.
Vice Admiral German Ugryumov died in May 2001 from acute heart failure. He served as the head of the Regional Headquarters for the counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus.
Igor Prokopenko in his book cites previously unknown documentary facts and testimonies of participants and eyewitnesses of the Chechen war. The author makes you take a fresh look at the tragic events of that war. Why has such a terrible tragedy happened to our country? Why did the government make so many mistakes? Why, in terms of the scale of stupidity, betrayal, corruption and cynicism, this war was unparalleled? The main characters in that war, according to the author, were ordinary soldiers and officers who took responsibility for the decisions made, violating the charter, and sometimes even the orders of higher military officials. A military journalist reveals the secret springs of that tragedy, in which the betrayal of the "Kremlin nobility", illiteracy and cowardice of the highest echelon played the main role. Why is it so important to know the truth about the Chechen war? You will find the answer in this book...
A series: Military secret with Igor Prokopenko
* * *
by the LitRes company.
Generals and their army
November 29, 1994. Tuesday. Members of the Russian Security Council gather in the Kremlin for an emergency meeting: President Boris Yeltsin, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, State Duma head Ivan Rybkin and Chairman of the Federation Council Vladimir Shumeiko. In addition to them, the meeting is attended by the heads of all power departments and special services. There is only one question on the agenda: to start a war in Chechnya or not. Defense Minister Pavel Grachev is delivering a report on this subject.
I met with some of the participants in that meeting, as well as with the people who were to implement the decisions taken at it. That's what he told me Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces Vladimir Semyonov:
“This decision was made behind the scenes. Grachev spoke at the Security Council, convinced the president that we are ready, that we will put things in order there.”
Pavel Grachev himself has his own version of events. After his report, the members of the Security Council started voting. All those present voted for the introduction of troops into Chechnya. Everyone except him.
In conversation with me Defense Minister Pavel Grachev stated:
“I was the only one who spoke out at that ill-fated Security Council against military operations in Chechnya. I remember Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, once we were on very good terms with him, said: “Boris Nikolaevich, we don’t need such a minister, let’s quickly change him. He is afraid to go to Chechnya.” Then Boris Nikolayevich announced a ten-minute break, invited Chernomyrdin, Lobov, and Secretary of the Security Council Shumeiko to his office. 10 minutes passed, we sat down again, and Boris Nikolaevich announced: “Pavel Sergeevich, we have decided not to dismiss you, but within two weeks you must draw up a plan for bringing troops into Chechnya and lead the leadership at first.” That's how it happened."
Grachev probably could have refused and left. But... it meant betraying Yeltsin, who made him Minister of Defense. Therefore, Grachev accepted the rules of the game: he remained in the chair of the Minister of Defense, but for this he shouldered all the responsibility for the war.
A day after the secret meeting of the Security Council, President Yeltsin signed a decree "On measures to strengthen law and order in the North Caucasus", in which he invited all militants to hand over their weapons. Until December 15... This "two-week ultimatum", as historians would later call it, had the effect of an exploding bomb on the territory of Chechnya and forced the militants not to surrender, but, on the contrary, to purchase weapons. On December 11, 1994, Russian troops received an order, without waiting for the end of the ultimatum, to enter the territory of Chechnya.
1994 Grozny. Every day from here, from the city's railway station, passenger trains take away thousands of hastily assembled and poorly dressed people. All of them are Russians, residents of the city who will never be able to return to it.
The fact that in Chechnya almost every Chechen has a weapon, that they rob and kill Russians, was known in the Kremlin. They also knew that Chechnya was preparing to secede from Russia and that if this happened, the country would simply fall to pieces. That is why in just a couple of years almost all key politicians and prominent generals visited the republic. True, they all visited Chechnya secretly. Each of them tried to negotiate with Dzhokhar Dudayev. The commander of the air force, General of the Army Pyotr Deinekin, on whom the Kremlin placed special hopes, also tried to negotiate with him. After all, he knew Dudayev better than others: for several years, the general of the Soviet army, the commander of the heavy bomber division, Dzhokhar Dudayev, was under his direct supervision and was considered one of the best commanders.
I met with Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force Pyotr Deinekin. Here is what he told me:
“Well, Dudayev received me with respect, as in the past of his boss. But he categorically refused to return to the army, citing the fact that he was elected by the Chechen people and cannot go against their will. I flew there with Boris Vsevolodovich Gromov, who was then Deputy Minister of Defense, and with Grachev Pavel Sergeevich.
Defense Minister Pavel Grachev also met with Dzhokhar Dudayev. And ... also secretly. He visited Grozny 6 (!) times. But... These meetings did not bring any serious results. Everyone needed a war. Compromise no longer suited anyone.
Testifies Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev:
“I say:“ Dzhokhar, stop all this business. Announce that you need to think more, find some compromises, send your political advisers to us, let them solve the issue with our Minister for National Policy.” And he says to me: "It's getting late."
This meeting was the last attempt to prevent war. It took place when the Russian General Staff had already developed a plan for bringing troops into Chechnya. Army General Vladimir Semyonov at that time served as Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces. He was supposed to be in charge of the operation. According to the plan, Russian troops were supposed to enter Chechnya on December 11. From three directions: from Mozdok through Ossetia, from Vladikavkaz through Ingushetia and from Kizlyar – from the territory of Dagestan.
In conversation with me Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces Vladimir Semenov recalled:
“The plan that was developed by the General Staff was a map with three routes plotted. And there was nothing else in this regard. When I asked the district commander: “What is this, don’t you know what the plan of operation should look like?” - He told me: "I know, but look: it was signed by the Chief of the General Staff and approved by the Minister of Defense."
Why the military did not have time to prepare a plan that meets all the requirements is understandable. Nothing else could be done in two weeks. But... Pavel Grachev accepted Yeltsin's conditions and considered himself no longer entitled to break his word given to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
Just 9 days before the storming of Grozny, one incredible event happened in the Ministry of Defense: the Minister of Defense fired all his deputies!
December 21, 1994. Defense Minister Pavel Grachev flew to Mozdok and held a meeting. The main question is who will lead the grouping of troops in Chechnya.
Oddly enough, the main actors who were officially considered for this position were absent from this meeting. Only today, after almost 18 years, it can be said with certainty: they were not at the meeting only because they all, under various pretexts, REFUSED to lead the operation!
Pavel Grachev recalled how it all happened:
“All my deputies practically betrayed me. One did not want to lead the leadership due to the fact that from the first minute he did not agree with the entry of troops. Another said he was already tired. The third referred to the fact that in Afghanistan his heart became ill. The commander of the troops of the district agreed, but at the beginning of the commissioning he began to shout and swear at his subordinates so much that I could not even make out half of his conversations on the "wiretapping". I didn't understand what he was talking about at all. I then invited him to my place, I say - you fell ill, let's go to the hospital. There was also a general commanding the ground forces, and I, as expected, decided to appoint him, but he said that his wife was a Chechen, he could not ... He even cried ... "
According to Pavel Grachev, this general is the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces Vladimir Semyonov. He really was married to a Chechen woman and was himself a native of Karachay-Cherkessia. It is not known how much Pavel Grachev exaggerates, but something else is known for sure: Semyonov was relieved of his post "for actions discrediting the honor and dignity of a serviceman, incompatible with his position." The President of Russia released him.
What the “discrediting” and “incompatible” actions of the commander-in-chief consisted of is still unknown. Vladimir Semenov himself speaks reluctantly on this subject.
In conversation with me Vladimir Semenov uttered only one sentence on this occasion:
"I have not been to Chechnya, here is my personal attitude to these events."
None of the leaders of the military department wanted to take responsibility for the implementation of the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
Each refused under different pretexts. So, in fact, he violated the Oath. It is easy to imagine what would have happened to a general who dared not follow the order of the Supreme, for example, in the harsh thirties, and even in the stagnant seventies. But in 1994, everything was different in the new Russia. And every owner of the general's office understood: by refusing to go to war, in the worst case, he risks being dismissed. With a general's pension, a general's apartment and a dacha.
Perhaps that is why the “unenviable” post was abandoned: the commander-in-chief of the ground forces, General of the Army Vladimir Semenov, and Pavel Grachev’s deputies - Valery Mironov, Georgy Kondratyev. According to Anatoly Shkirko, after a little command, the commander of the North Caucasian Military District, Colonel-General Alexei Mityukhin, also refused.
In conversation with me Anatoly Shkirko recalled:
“He refused to act, that's all. For a week, maybe. Then he said: "I will not command." During this time, he did not sign a single document. Legally, not a single combat order. He was then the commander of the North Caucasian district.
The last person that Defense Minister Pavel Grachev tried to appoint to the post of commander of the operation to storm Grozny was Eduard Vorobyov, the first deputy commander of the ground forces. Pavel Grachev regarded his refusal as a betrayal.
During our meeting Pavel Grachev He described the course of his conversation with General Vorobyov in the following way:
“Then I suggested to Vorobyov, I say: “Here, Eduard Arkadyevich, please lead the group. You are an experienced comrade and can lead. And he tells me: "I will not lead." I asked why? “Because the troops are not prepared.” I say: “How are you not prepared, dear? How many days have you been reporting to me that the troops are ready, but the troops, it turns out, are not prepared!
Today Colonel General Vorobyov asserts: Pavel Grachev has no right to such words. The former deputy commander of the ground forces is absolutely convinced that the responsibility for training troops has nothing to do with him.
Here is what he told me Colonel General Vorobyov:
"Well what can I say? Of course, this is not true. The real lie. No Vorobyov was involved in the preparation of the operation. I can prove that a week before that I had been studying in the Leningrad Military District. And before that, the Commander-in-Chief (Vladimir Semenov) told us that there are recommendations not to meddle in the North Caucasian Military District.”
It turns out that on the eve of the war no one was involved in anything and no one was responsible for anything. But the army ALWAYS lived under the command of these generals. It was they who reported on exercises and firing, on "combat coordination, on successful combat and political training" ... A week before the storming of Grozny, all these reports turned out to be many years of fiction.
I bring comments General Konstantin Pulikovsky:
“I will give you an example. On command to open fire, the artillery opened fire on an unplanned target in 40 minutes! The first shot was fired when the target was already leaving. And according to all standards, it is necessary to fit in a minute, at most - in two ... "
The army was not ready for war. That's just her generals could refuse to go to war, but ordinary soldiers and officers - no. As a result, on the eve of a serious test, the Russian army was practically decapitated. But even despite this, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev had to pretend that everything was going according to plan.
December 30 at the Mozdok airfield for me personally Pavel Grachev said the following words. Here's a verbatim transcript:
“Although we are not forcing our actions, because we still hope for prudence, that they will raise a white flag. Even we, the military, do not want too much blood. Although we could have completed this task a few days ago.”
Defense Minister Grachev uttered these words exactly one day before the start of the assault on Grozny. Although he certainly knew that the well-armed and determined militants were not going to surrender.
December 31, 1994. 6 a.m. Columns of federal troops began to move towards Grozny. According to the plan, troops should enter the city in four directions: east, west, northeast and north. It was in this grouping of troops "North" that the 81st Samara regiment marched.
Testifies Chief of Staff of the 81st Regiment Semyon Burlakov:
“The task was the following. The first assault detachment was to take control of the railway station. And the second assault detachment was to take control of the square, take Dudayev's palace and, as Kvashnin said, hoist a banner on the ruins of Dudayev's palace, present orders and medals to distinguished fighters.
Burlakov himself walked along with the first assault detachment. By 7 o'clock in the morning, the detachment managed to occupy the Severny airport and, having cleared several bridges near the Neftyanka River, began moving towards the city center. But unexpectedly, the detachment came under heavy fire from the militants. To break their resistance, the command made a decision: to process the quarter with artillery. But for this you need to pull the entire column back. The first assault detachment received an order: full back.
About what happened after that Semyon Burlakov remembered as a terrible dream:
“During the understaffing, we received absolutely untrained driver-mechanics, who during the entire summer training period, one might say, walked around the BMP, and did not drive them. They could only start the car and move off, they could not do anything else. And when the regiment began to take back, it turned out a terrible crush. Cars ran over, literally piled one on top of the other.
So right in the center of Grozny, a convoy of Russian troops got stuck in a traffic jam. Field commander Aslan Maskhadov, a former colonel in the Soviet army, immediately reacted to this. On his orders, the militants began to converge towards the center. The slightest delay for the Russian troops could lead to the fact that they would have to fight with the enemy, who had already taken advantageous combat positions. And then Lieutenant Colonel Burlakov, whose car did not get into a traffic jam, offered the command the only way out of the situation: he quickly pulls the first assault detachment out of the traffic jam and, leading it, continues to advance towards the railway station.
I bring a story lieutenant colonel Burlakov:
“I went to the station, and there the Maikop brigade with brigade commander Savin was already on the defensive. And Savin told me: “Here is the order of the 1st: I occupy the station building itself, the hotel under construction, which adjoins the station, it will become our dividing line, and everything else is yours.” And we had to occupy the whole area. And we must remember that the fire was very strong. And I had to set a task for people under fire.
The first assault detachment of the 81st regiment, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Burlakov, took up defense in the forecourt buildings. Across the street from the railway station was a five-story building. The field Chechen commander Maskhadov stationed almost one and a half hundred militants in it. Having examined the positions of the defenders from the upper floors of the building, they started a fight. This battle did not stop for almost a day.
I bring memories regiment commander Yaroslavtsev:
“And my first battalion, and one battalion of the Maikop brigade with a brigade commander at the head, they were all at the station. And they were completely cut off from the rest of the parts. There was Semyon Burlakov, the chief of staff. These two battalions were completely cut off, not a single infantry fighting vehicle, not a single tank passed to them during the day "...
If on that fateful night the generals did not shift responsibility to each other, did not hide in the corners, but remembered what they were taught in the academies, there would certainly have been much fewer victims of this senseless New Year's assault. Even the fact that aviation could be used to support the bleeding advanced units was remembered when it was already too late.
Here's what he said in a conversation with me Commander of the Air Force General Pyotr Deinekin:
“Without prejudice, I’ll say that the ban on the use of aviation, although the weather was fine, WAS ... I just arrived home on the 31st, when Anatoly Vasilyevich (Kvashnin) called me and asked for help. I immediately went back to the command post, but, unfortunately, aviation was not able to help directly in combat at that time, because it came to hand-to-hand combat. For example, at the railway station ... "
There, at the station, the 81st Samara Regiment and the 131st Maikop Brigade and its brigade commander Ivan Savin perished.
The 81st Samara Regiment and the 131st Maikop Brigade, squeezed in the ring, held back the onslaught of the militants as best they could. But... the forces were unequal. Almost all equipment: tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and self-propelled guns - was burned. Hungry and exhausted soldiers collapsed from fatigue, there was not enough food and medicine, ammunition was running out ... But most importantly, the militants broke into the station building. The surviving fighters controlled only the waiting room.
Realizing that help would not come, and the militants would break in any minute, the officers decided to break through to their own. The fighters found the surviving tank, which knocked out the corner of the building. Through this hole, an urgent evacuation of the wounded began on the remaining BMPs.
The car, in which the wounded brigade commander Savin ended up, was ambushed by militants. Nobody survived. His body, mutilated by militants, with a scalpel removed, was discovered only in March.
The infantry vehicle, in which Semyon Burlakov ended up, came under fire and caught fire. Lieutenant Colonel Burlakov, who was sitting at the hatch, pulled the handle, fell out of the BMP and found himself in a ravine.
In this ravine he was found by a simple Russian woman. A resident of Grozny, who on New Year's Eve 1994, like Lieutenant Colonel Burlakov, found herself in the middle of nowhere. For almost two weeks, she nursed the wounded. And then she managed to bring him to the Russian checkpoint.
Semyon Burlakov was one of the few who were lucky. Those who were less fortunate were never able to get out of Grozny. As a result, in just a few days of the assault, the Russian army lost several thousand soldiers and officers killed and wounded.
Former Defense Minister Pavel Grachev Eighteen years after the tragic New Year's storm, he recalls those events in our conversation:
“... There were huge losses. What can I say - an oversight, a miscalculation ... You see, I took it upon myself. So I did something wrong. So, I did not disturb the commanders at that time. And it was necessary to constantly beat, beat, beat on the headset, so as not to calm down on what has been achieved. Because the first successes were very easy ... We entered the city ... Silence ... Well, we relaxed ... "
After it became clear that the assault on Grozny not only failed, but turned into a bloody massacre, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev was immediately reminded of a phrase that he had uttered just a few days before the start of the operation:
"We will take Grozny with one airborne regiment in two days."
Today, 18 years later, Pavel Grachev is ready to apologize for this phrase. But... he still insists: the phrase was taken out of context.
During our meeting, he stated:
“Of course I want to apologize for this statement. They grabbed him. Well, how do they get it? Do you understand? Caught when I said there "one parachute regiment." It broke out! Well, this phrase slipped out of me! Well, let's shoot then."
But ... neither for this phrase, nor for the assault, which turned into the death of thousands of Russian soldiers, of course, no one shot Defense Minister Pavel Grachev. He was not suspended, fired, or even reprimanded. Moreover, the worse things were in the war, the more valuable the figure of Grachev himself became every day. He was fired only when it was required by the campaign headquarters. The high-profile resignation of an unpopular minister was to be Yeltsin's strongest card in the presidential election.
Here's what he told us Pavel Grachev about the events of that time:
“Boris Nikolaevich says to me: “I want to appoint Lebed as Secretary of the Security Council.” I say: "Your will, Boris Nikolaevich, but he always opposed you." And then he says: “Well, you can’t work together. How can you be relieved of your post? For what?" I say: “Boris Nikolaevich, don’t torture your head, I’ll go out and write myself why I want to leave this position.” This is how we said goodbye. I went to the reception room, asked for a sheet of paper and a fountain pen, and wrote a report to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief: they say, I ask you to relieve me of my post in connection ... But I myself think: in connection with what? And the thought itself came somehow: "in connection with the circumstances."
Exactly one day before this conversation, on June 16, 1996, an event took place in the country that meant that a new president might appear in Russia. Alexander Lebed took third place in the first round of the presidential election. Voters cast their votes for him in the hope that this particular man, a fighting Soviet general who managed to restore order in Transnistria, will be able to restore order in the country. And then for many, order was synonymous with the end of the Chechen war. The pre-election logic demanded simple and understandable promises to the people. And Lebed was ready to make these simple promises. As a result, he turned out to be an ideal figure to support the weakening and ailing Yeltsin, and a bet was placed on him.
Lebed easily promised to solve the problem of the Chechen war and, as a result, easily took an honorable third place in the election race. What followed was a matter of technique. In exchange for the support given to Yeltsin in the second round, he is offered the post of secretary of the Russian Security Council with "special powers." Lebed, on the advice of Boris Berezovsky, agrees. Boris Abramovich quickly explained to the general with the profile of Napoleon the simple arithmetic of the struggle for power: before you become a ruler, you need to get power, and power in Russia is the army. General Lebed immediately began his game.
I quote the words spoken in our conversation General Konstantin Pulikovsky:
“... He (Lebed) immediately called me and in a rather friendly tone, by name and patronymic, said: here, Konstantin Borisovich, so and so, tell me how you command there, who commands you. I told him: Alexander Ivanovich, I am commanded by the President of the Russian Federation, I was appointed by his decree. “Well, from this day on,” he replies, “I will be in charge.” I say: “Alexander Ivanovich, I will not carry out any of your commands, because you are nowhere on the list of bosses that the President of the Russian Federation has determined.” But the next day, a presidential decree arrived by fax. The swan called me again and said: did you get a fax? I say yes. Under it was Yeltsin's signature.
Alexander Lebed managed to receive this decree signed by the President in a day! And this despite the fact that Yeltsin at that time was preparing for a heart operation. The decree allowed Lebed to make ANY decisions on behalf of the President of Russia.
This meant only one thing: Alexander Lebed received practically unlimited power with Yeltsin's absolute anarchy, who at that time had another heart attack. It's time for a real fight for the presidency.
By this time, commanders who knew how to fight had already appeared in Chechnya, and the soldiers felt the taste of victory. The desire to avenge their dead comrades made them go forward. And simple conscript boys worked wonders in battle. Russian troops managed to liberate almost all the flat regions of Chechnya from the militants, and they began to withdraw into the mountains. It seemed that the end of the war was near. It is only necessary to finish off the remaining field commanders and their depleted gangs.
But here, in order to buy time, Aslan Maskhadov resorted to a trick. He proposed negotiations... Yeltsin's entourage understood that without ending the war in Chechnya, the elections could not be won. That is why the peacekeeping efforts were launched. Prominent officials frequented the militants, they began to create all sorts of concessions for the bandits.
However, in order to create the appearance of peace, it was necessary to enlist not only the support of the leaders of the militants, but also to prevent their generals, who smelled a close victory, from finishing off the enemy driven into a corner. Secret information flowed like a river to Maskhadov. As soon as the generals were planning another strike, an order followed from Moscow: back. In the spring of 1996, Alexander Lebed, the new secretary of the Security Council, became the main tool in this task. At his press conference, he announced that he would soon have a meeting with Maskhadov, after which there would be a ceasefire and an exchange of the wounded would begin.
Meanwhile, in Chechnya, assault detachments and groups of federal forces are carrying out reconnaissance and search activities. The command received reliable information about the locations of the bases of the militants, their warehouses with weapons and ammunition. Artillery works on these squares. And then ... unexpectedly a new moratorium.
In early August 1996, the situation began to get out of control altogether. Feeling that Moscow needed at least a semblance of peace, the leaders of the militants decided to strengthen their positions before the upcoming negotiations and decisively capture Grozny.
From the operational summary of the Joint Forces Headquarters:
“At 5.50 am, about 200 militants seized the goods yard of the railway station and began to move towards the government house, subjecting the positions of federal forces and local authorities to a massive blow.”
They knew why they needed to capture the station. These freight wagons, stuffed with weapons and ammunition, stood on the tracks for more than one day. It is clear that they were not left here by accident. Armed, the bandits quickly dispersed throughout the city. Everything was thought out in advance.
Meanwhile, a strange decision is being made in Moscow. Instead of sending troops and regaining control of Grozny, General Lebed contacts Maskhadov and proposes a truce.
This is where the unexpected happens... The commander of the united group of troops, Konstantin Pulikovsky, realizing that Grozny, with the tacit consent of Moscow, has been handed over to the militants, which means that victory is almost in their hands, gets out of control, and, contrary to the statements of Lebed , and hence the Kremlin, announces an ultimatum. He offers civilians to leave the city within 48 hours, and the militants to surrender. He plans to launch a large-scale military operation.
At this time, General Lebed is negotiating with Maskhadov. The militants continue to capture Grozny, the remaining units are left to fend for themselves. At this moment, it becomes clear why all this is started! Lebed decides to seize power in the country and become president instead of Yeltsin. He immediately meets with the personnel of the federal troops and openly declares: Yeltsin is no more. He, General Lebed, future President.
Here's what he told me about how it was:
“Swan said bluntly: “I came to stop the war.” Nobody controls the country, because Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin is on bypass surgery, after his inauguration, after the secondary elections. And he lied to us, of course, he said that he had already been sent to England, that the operation would be in England. And a decision has already been made, and early presidential elections have already been scheduled for October. “I came third in this election,” he said. “Now I will be president. And only this war prevents me from becoming president.”
The swan bluffed. Yeltsin was in Moscow, no one called early elections. There was only one truth in his words: he really wanted to become president and for this he was ready to agree to any conditions of the enemy. Understanding that Pulikovsky's ultimatum could result in a complete defeat of the militants in Grozny, Maskhadov calls on General Alexander Lebed to "use all his influence to stop the impending madness." Exactly two days after this appeal, Lebed met with Maskhadov in the village of Novye Atagi. With his power, he canceled Pulikovsky's ultimatum, and removed the general himself from command of the troops. Another general, Tikhomirov, took part, and Konstantin Pulikovsky ended up in the hospital.
I am commenting on this Konstantin Pulikovsky:
“I had a serious hypertensive crisis. My heart could not withstand this pressure, I spent two weeks in intensive care. Those who participated in the withdrawal of troops, of course, tell terrible pictures of how these militants scoffed, escorting each column, shouting, insulting, shouting “Allah Akbar”.
August 31, 1996... In Khasavyurt, a small Dagestan town on the border with Chechnya, after numerous negotiations with Maskhadov, the Khasavyurt agreements were signed, according to which Russian troops were obliged to leave the territory of the Chechen Republic. Why these agreements were signed on such unfavorable terms for Russia is still a mystery. Perhaps simply because peace in Chechnya was vital for Alexander Lebed. After all, he was preparing to become president of Russia. These dreams were not destined to come true. Not forgiving Pulikovsky obstinacy, Lebed, returning to Moscow, decided to call him for dressing right from the hospital.
Here's how he commented on this episode General Konstantin Pulikovsky:
“I say: “Well, give the command to the doctors. They will deliver me, I am lying here in the hospital, everyone knows. If you want to put handcuffs on me, then it is not necessary to put them on in Moscow. Give the command, they will put them on for me here. Why do you need me there?
He cursed, so he swore and hung up. Well, literally four days after this conversation, he was removed from his post. And he has already ceased to be the secretary of the Security Council.”
This was the beginning of the end for Alexander Lebed. Using an ambitious general, he will be pushed out to lead the Krasnoyarsk region, where the failed general president will end his political career, and then die in a plane crash, in which many people still do not believe that it was an accident.
Defense Minister Pavel Grachev after his resignation, he will break with the president's entourage and will work for a long time in Rosvooruzhenie. They will fire him from there exactly two days after the death of Boris Yeltsin.
Former Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces Vladimir Semenov, the only one, according to many, of all the generals who really had a good reason to refuse to fight in Chechnya, will be elected president of Karachay-Cherkessia.
His Deputy Eduard Vorobyov, refusing to lead the operation to storm Grozny, will become a deputy of the State Duma, where he will fiercely criticize the actions of the generals fighting the militants.
Konstantin Pulikovsky, Commander of the United Group of Forces in Chechnya, having retired from the army, he will become the presidential representative in the Far East.
Gennady Troshev, Deputy Commander of the North Caucasus Military District, will fight in the second Chechen war. In 2008, he died in a plane crash.
The fate of the missing Russian soldiers and officers is still unknown.
* * *
The following excerpt from the book Chechen trap: between betrayal and heroism (I. S. Prokopenko, 2012) provided by our book partner -
Corpses in the back of a truck in Grozny. Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev
Exactly 23 years ago, on December 11, 1994, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree "On Measures to Ensure Law, Law and Order and Public Security on the Territory of the Chechen Republic." On the same day, units of the Joint Group of Forces (Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Internal Affairs) began hostilities in Chechnya. Maybe some of the participants in the first clashes were mentally prepared for death, but hardly any of them suspected that they would get stuck in this war for almost two years. And then it will come back again.
I would not like to talk about the causes and consequences of the war, about the behavior of the main actors, about the number of losses, about whether it was a civil war or an anti-terrorist operation: hundreds of books have already been written about this. But many photographs must be shown so that you never forget how disgusting any war is.
Russian Mi-8 helicopter shot down by Chechens near Grozny. December 1, 1994 
Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev
Despite the fact that the Russian army officially began hostilities in December 1994, back in November, the first Russian soldiers were captured by the Chechens. 
Photo: AP Photo / Anatoly Maltsev
Dudayev's militants pray in front of the Presidential Palace in Grozny 
Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev
In January 1995, the palace looked like this: 
Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev
Dudayev's militant with a handicraft submachine gun in early January 1995. In Chechnya in those years, various types of weapons were collected, including small arms. 
Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev
Padded BMP-2 of the Russian army 
Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev
Prayer against the backdrop of a fire caused by shrapnel falling into a gas pipe 
Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev
Action 
Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev
Field commander Shamil Basayev rides in a bus with hostages 
Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev
Chechen fighters ambushed a column of Russian armored vehicles 
Photo: AP PHOTO / ROBERT KING
On the eve of the new year 1995, the clashes in Grozny were especially cruel. The 131st Maykop motorized rifle brigade lost many soldiers. 
The militants fire back from the advancing Russian units. 
Photo: AP PHOTO / PETER DEJONG
Children play in the suburbs of Grozny 
AP PHOTO / EFREM LUKATSKY
Chechen fighters in 1995 
Photo: Mikhail Evstafiev / AFP
Photo: Christopher Morris
Minutka Square in Grozny. Evacuation of refugees. 
Gennady Troshev at the stadium. Ordzhonikidze in 1995. The lieutenant general led the Joint Group of Forces of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Chechnya, during the Second Chechen War he also commanded Russian troops, then was appointed commander of the North Caucasus Military District. In 2008, he died in a Boeing crash in Perm. 
A Russian serviceman plays a piano left in Grozny's central park. February 6, 1995 
Photo: Reuters
Intersection of Rosa Luxembourg and Tamanskaya streets 
Photo: Christopher Morris
Chechen fighters run for cover 
Photo: Christopher Morris
Grozny, view from the Presidential Palace. March 1995 
Photo: Christopher Morris
A Chechen sniper who has settled in a destroyed building is aiming at Russian servicemen. 1996 
Photo: James Nachtwey
Chechen negotiator enters the neutral zone 
Photo: James Nachtwey
Children from the orphanage play on a damaged Russian tank. 1996 
Photo: James Nachtwey
An elderly woman makes her way through the ruined center of Grozny. 1996 
Photo: Piotr Andrews
Chechen militant holding a machine gun while praying 
Photo: Piotr Andrews
A wounded soldier in a hospital in Grozny. 1995 
Photo: Piotr Andrews
A woman from the village of Samashki is crying: during the operation of the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, helicopters or RZSO shot her cows. 
Photo: Piotr Andrews
Russian checkpoint near the Council of Ministers, 1995 
Photo: AP Photo
People left homeless after the bombing of Grozny cook on a fire in the middle of the street 
Photo: AP Photo / Alexander Zemlianichenko
People are fleeing the war zone 
Photo: AP Photo / David Brauchli
The CRI command stated that at the height of the conflict, up to 12 thousand fighters fought for it. Many of them were in fact children who went to war after their relatives. 
Photo: AP Photo / Efrem Lukatsky
On the left is a wounded man, on the right is a Chechen teenager in military uniform 
Photo: Christopher Morris
By the end of 1995, most of Grozny was a ruin 
Photo: AP Photo / Mindaugas Kulbis
Anti-Russian demonstration in the center of Grozny in February 1996 
Photo: AP Photo
A Chechen with a portrait of separatist leader Dzhokhar Dudayev, who was killed in a rocket attack on federal troops on April 21, 1996 
Photo: AP Photo
Before the 1996 elections, Yeltsin visited Chechnya and in front of the soldiers signed a decree on the reduction of military service. 
Photo: AP Photo
Election campaign 
Photo: Piotr Andrews
On August 19, 1996, the commander of the grouping of Russian troops in Chechnya, Konstantin Pulikovsky, issued an ultimatum to the militants. He suggested that civilians leave Grozny within 48 hours. After this period, the assault on the city was to begin, but the commander was not supported in Moscow, and his plan was thwarted. 
On August 31, 1996, agreements were signed in Khasavyurt under which Russia undertook to withdraw troops from the territory of Chechnya, and the decision on the status of the republic was postponed for 5 and a half years. In the photo, General Lebed, who was then the presidential envoy in Chechnya, and Aslan Maskhadov, field commander of Chechen fighters and the future "president" of the CRI, are shaking hands. 
Russian soldiers drink champagne in the center of Grozny 
Russian soldiers are preparing to be sent home after the signing of the Khasavyurt Accords 
According to human rights activists, up to 35,000 civilians died during the First Chechen War. 
Photo: AP PHOTO / ROBERT KING
In Chechnya, the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements was perceived as a victory. In fact, that's what she was. 
Photo: AP Photo / Misha Japaridze
The Russian troops left with nothing, losing many soldiers and leaving ruins behind them.
In 1999, the Second Chechen War will begin ...