In a series of interviews with Russian experts, political scientist Rafael Sattarov explores whether there is a new agenda in Russia's interaction with Central Asia. How do they study and how do they treat the changes in Central Asia in Russia? Will the Central Asian countries and Russia, bound by the historical legacy of authoritarianism and the remnants of a single economy, be able to find a new format for mutually beneficial relations?

In this interview, Arkady Dubnov, a political scientist, an expert on the CIS and Central Asia, talks about how the USSR collapsed, where the roots of Central Asian authoritarianism come from, and why the countries of Central Asia did not become the new "Asian tigers".

You are participating in an interesting project of the Yegor Gaidar Foundation and Slon Magazine – “How the USSR collapsed. From the first persons” - in which the main participants and eyewitnesses of the process, the presidents and chairmen of the parliaments of the union republics, tell you how they came up with the idea that the Union might not even exist. Did you personally have such thoughts or did you realize that the Union would inevitably fall apart?

No. In any case, there was no GKChP before the putsch, I can honestly say that such an idea would have seemed to me exclusively “seditious”. That is why I put this adjective in questions, because, as it seemed to me then, such countries as the Soviet Union simply do not have the right to disintegrate. After the GKChP, a chaotic story began with a very unknown ending. But to say that the USSR will soon end its existence, even then, I think, I would not have dared. If we then began to discuss this topic, I would say, are you crazy?

In the late eighties, they began to actively exaggerate the Central Asian agenda, this is the Uzbek or “cotton business”, these are demographic issues. They exaggerated the slogan "enough to feed Central Asia." So, for example, in Yegor Gaidar's book "The Fall of the Empire" it is indicated that if the Union had not collapsed, then Central Asia would have crushed the share of the Slavs with its demographic growth. That's how this Central Asian agenda was the trigger for the collapse of the Soviet Union?

This agenda was not a trigger. I think that for each republic there were specific events that were a trigger. I can list them for you. From West to East: Moldova - the execution of Ceausescu, the revolution in Romania, the opening of borders between the two states, only for Moldovan citizens. This was the first precedent for opening borders to the West for Soviet citizens and, in general, parts of the post-Soviet space with the West. The law on the language in Moldova, the Romanian language, authentic for Moldovans, is officially recognized as the state language, which caused opposition from the Russian-speaking citizens of the country. The disaster in Chernobyl for Belarus and for Ukraine, in large part for Belarus, despite the fact that the nuclear power plant was located on the territory of Ukraine. The Baltics - as I retell Landsbergis' clear answer to my question to everyone, when the idea of ​​a possible Lithuanian secession from the Soviet Union came to his mind, he replied: “Mr. Dubnov, you put the question wrong. We couldn't get out of where we've never entered." This is a characteristic detail for the entire Baltic region. Although there are details, let's say the Estonians were extremely careful to avoid the possibility of bloody events, especially after Lithuania and Latvia in 1991, because for such a small country with less than two million people, this is fraught with the loss of a large population.

Further, Armenia, the events in Karabakh and the earthquakes in Spitak, in Georgia are the wars in the Caucasus, the rise of the national movement in Abkhazia and the reciprocal steps of Gamsakhurdia, a completely insane leader. For Azerbaijan, this is the entry of the Soviet army in 1990, Karabakh, and in Central Asia, these are the Osh events for Kyrgyzstan, incredibly bloody terrible clashes in 1990 between the Kyrgyz and local Uzbeks. These events led to the fact that a non-communist leadership headed by Askar Akayev came to power.

That is, there was no general trigger for the collapse of the Union, except for two moments. The first is when random events turn out to be regular. The abolition of the sixth article of the Constitution on the leading role of the Communist Party, after which various parties immediately began to be created in the republics, which began to destroy the CPSU monopoly on power. The second is, of course, the GKChP, which became a catharsis for a significant part of the country's population, after which the light at the end of the tunnel for the USSR was no longer visible.

Leaders such as Saparmurat Niyazov, Nursultan Nazarbayev and Islam Karimov were leaders who came on the wave of perestroika and were considered quite people of perestroika. Saparmurat Niyazov was especially perceived as a man of the Leningrad circle of the intelligentsia, and in the memoirs of many former leaders of the Central Asian republics, in particular Rafik Nishanov, it was said that he was partly even Gorbachev's favorite. What made these leaders leaders of the authoritarian type?

Well, firstly, I do not really agree that these leaders are people of perestroika. More precisely, I would say that they came to power as a result of the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev in the Kremlin. Gorbachev needed his leaders, who would perceive him as their patron. That is, any new leader tries to put his people in all places. I must tell you that a man like Karimov did not look like Gorbachev's man at all. There were, probably, completely different circumstances, for example, a quarrel between the Uzbek clans, as a result of which Moscow decided to save one representative and appoint another.

I can give one detail. At one time, Karimov, when we often met one on one in the second half of the nineties, let me know that he had a very big resentment against Gorbachev, because he was preparing to remove Karimov from the post of first secretary, he was opposed to Karimov. Many, many years later, literally two years ago, at a conference of the Gorbachev Foundation, I asked Mikhail Gorbachev over tea: “Mikhail Sergeyevich, but Karimov says that you wanted to remove him and bullied him?” "I?! - Gorbachev was surprised, - What are you, I saved him and supported him from Usmankhodzhaev, who wanted to remove him completely from political life. I'm talking about the fact that we do not have sufficient objective evidence, because, firstly, these people were Gorbachev's, or Gorbachev patronized them all. He was the owner of the union center, and could not but support them, noble oblige- position obliges. On the other hand, it seems to me that Mikhail Sergeevich, in general, did not understand people very well. First, he knew them little, and second, by his nature, he did not capture very well what they really represent.

Therefore, such a person as Niyazov, who, as you say, was perceived as a representative of the Leningrad intelligentsia, could probably spread such an opinion about himself that, in general, does not correspond to reality. First, I happened to know him personally. We had a one-on-one conversation with him in Ashgabat. It was already in the late nineties. It so happened that some shade of personal relationship developed between us, because one day in 1998 he invited me to travel around the United States during his visit to this country. It was at the suggestion of Boris Shikhmuradov, with whom we were friends, the Minister of Foreign Affairs ...

...Who was then imprisoned?

He was accused of leading the conspiracy and disappeared into the Turkmen prisons after being sentenced to life imprisonment. Niyazov was an absolute orphan and, deprived of support from home, earned his living in Leningrad, where he studied, playing cards, he was a great gambler-preferans. In general, they say, they made good money for themselves. This already spoke of his good, I would say, not so much intellectual as playing abilities, which were useful to him in high office. He very skillfully made a career in Moscow, he managed to teach himself in this way.

How did he evolve into a tyrant? This is an interesting question and I am unable to fully explain it. I think that the retinue did the king in many ways, instilling in him that Turkmenistan, possessing untold wealth of gas, can become a “second Kuwait”, it is only necessary to separate the country from the post-Soviet space, make the country neutral and attract those opportunities that will help rapid development countries. In principle, there was a healthy grain in this, but Niyazov imagined himself omnipotent, absolutely independent, and suddenly this “Asianism” woke up in him, when you suddenly feel like the sole owner of space and people. In addition, this was facilitated by the Turkmen specificity and paternalistic mentality, where the clans mostly resigned themselves to power, since he represented the main ahal Teke clan, whose capital is Ashgabat. The one who sits in Ashgabat, representing this Akhalteke clan, becomes the will of Turkmen history and geography as the main contender for supreme power. But there were attempts by regional clans and tribes to resist this order of things, which Niyazov quite skillfully suppressed. This is how, in particular, Niyazov shaped himself as the "father of all Turkmens." It was important here that Moscow did not particularly oppose this even before the collapse of the USSR, since the union center was quite satisfied with the fact that Niyazov ensured stability in his fiefdom.

As for other countries, there are different reasons. Among them, Nazarbayev stood out very strongly, with whom at a certain stage Kazakhstan was lucky that at the head of the country there was such a person who grew out of the Soviet nomenklatura "trousers" with significant managerial experience and outlook. Since 1991, he has done extremely much for the country for its modernization, so to speak. Because he knew how to find people not only by the clan principle, but also by their abilities, which other leaders of the region did not have.

As for Tajikistan, you yourself know what the national tragedy of the civil war cost it. The damage from this war continues to affect to this day. It is very painful for me to watch this, because I was a witness to part of this civil war, and literally before my eyes the current Tajik president received power in 1992 from representatives of the northern clan of Leninabad (now Khujand). Rahmon's evolution took place before my eyes, surprisingly vulgar and very "Asian", much more Asian than Turkmen. It showed the entire level of wretchedness and narrow-mindedness of a leader who happened to be at the helm of power, who, in general, leads the country to a very miserable state, partly makes it a threat to the rest of the region. I would like to be wrong in saying these words, but it seems that the situation is developing in this way.

Many experts say that the stake on Rakhmon was a collective mistake of Russia and Uzbekistan.

Listen, Rafael, the situation in 1992 was arch-dramatic. In any case, this is how she was perceived in Moscow and, first of all, in Tashkent. Dushanbe was occupied by those who opposed the communist Popular Front, this is the Islamic Democratic Opposition, led by the Nuri and the territorial and regional clans of Garma and Karategin. They seriously threatened the order of things that was considered natural and reliable for the Uzbek leadership, which Tajikistan perceived as a younger brother. It seemed to Karimov at the time, and it was a well-founded danger, that the Tajik civil war could spread to Uzbekistan due to the serious Islamist currents that he then faced. I mean the events in Namangan at the end of 1991, where he had to go in order to directly contact the leaders of the Adolat party, Takhir Yuldashev and Juma Namangani.

That is, at that time Karimov understood quite well what the threat of Islamic extremism and the desire to build a life according to Sharia was. He believed, not without reason, that a civil war might be brought to the territory of Uzbekistan. Thus, Karimov tried by all means to eliminate this threat, and therefore supported the forces of the Popular Front, which de facto was supported by Russia and the Russians, primarily by the 201st motorized rifle division, the deployment of which in Tajikistan was formed during the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Of course, the Tajiks who worked in this division were on the side of the government to which they were accustomed, and not the one that threatened the incomprehensible "green democracy". Indeed, on both sides there were many random people, among the opposition for sure. And they bear a great responsibility for what happened there. It was necessary to make decisions quickly, it was necessary to find people who could hold this popular front, and liberate Dushanbe first of all.

Then the search began, there are quite interesting memories of Colonel Kvachkov, who is now serving a prison sentence on charges of attempting to kill Anatoly Chubais. He says that he was sent there already on the instructions of the GRU of the Russian General Staff to search for a candidate for the presidency of Tajikistan. The well-known field commander and recidivist Sangak Safarov offered him such a guy, a young, active, former chairman of a state farm. He led the Kulyab regional executive committee, he was devoted to Sangak Safarov. The only problem was how to convince Islam Karimov that this man, Emomali Rahmonov, who is recommended by a criminal with 23 years of prison experience, can claim power. Well, Kvachkov somehow coped with this task, they managed to persuade Tashkent that he was a worthy guy, and so he was brought after a two-week pause to this XVI session of the Supreme Council of Tajikistan, it was explained to everyone that Rakhmonov received the support of Tashkent and Moscow, so the deputies he was chosen.

These are the events I saw with my own eyes. With the support of Tashkent and Moscow, Rakhmonov managed to throw tanks into Dushanbe and squeeze out the opposition from there, but as a result, such a full-scale and bloody fierce battle began to oust and destroy groups hostile to the Popular Front and destroy their supporting civilian population. At the CIS Summit in Bishkek in 1992, Kyrgyzstan asked Russia for a peacekeeping mandate for a settlement in Tajikistan, Yeltsin agreed with this mandate, and since I was then part of the presidential pool, I managed to join this Kyrgyz mission, since then my, so to speak, began , "Asian epic".

In fact, from 1993-1995. fears that the Central Asian region will inevitably sink into destabilization are beginning to be exaggerated. But today's observations show that the countries of the region have built some kind of stable system in their countries. At the same time, such arguments have not gone away and, as in the good old days, these same experts and journalists repeat the same theses. What is the immutability of such theses, the weakness of the Russian expert community or the weakness of the dissemination of information by journalists and experts from the countries of the region?

You know, both theses are justified.. They are just about different things... The two representatives of these points of view were not given the opportunity to agree on definitions and missions. The fact is that those who warn of impending destabilization proceed from the unrealizability of hopes for building a democratic type of statehood in Central Asia with a real separation of powers, regular democratic elections, that is, such a statehood, which is natural for today's Europe and to which that part of the post-Soviet space, which gravitates toward European values. The current statehood of the Central Asian countries is considered by such analysts as a historical and civilizational rollback, regression, and in some places even as a clear social and state degradation. There is a temptation to talk about these states as khanates and emirates, where the concept of democratic processes remained only on paper and the current rulers use them for demonstration purposes to play with the West, with the world community. And it sees and understands everything perfectly, taking part in this game due to quite pragmatic considerations, the West is the West, the East is the East, and they will never converge, as the great Kipling said ... It is appropriate to talk here about double standards, according to which in the West, the situation in a particular country

In your opinion, is the transformation of authoritarian regimes into a more democratic form of government expected, or is such a process not expected at all in the medium term?

The experience of the zero years of the 21st century, the events in the Middle East, the Arab Spring, the renaissance of passionate Islam, which today hopes for historical revenge in the battle with the conditional West, which has outstripped the conditional East in modernization, suggests that the stability of such regimes can only be maintained through violence. sometimes rough. In the West, resorting to verbal balancing act, they will try to pretend that the establishment of toy parliaments with manual parties means that such regimes will certainly evolve into democratic ones. They will not take risks there with warming up real democracy, mindful of the Arab Spring with the coming to power of the Muslim Brotherhood. Therefore, only a smile is caused by the attempts of our noteworthy propagandists who say that the Americans are ready to stir up "color revolutions" in Central Asia . Why do they need color revolutions that will bring real anti-Western Islamists to power? Therefore, in the coming years, I do not see a serious prospect for the transformation of these regimes into something similar, at least to South Korea…

Although it was expected that the countries of Central Asia would become the new "Asian tigers" ...

Maybe they expected it, but it seems that we simply do not know the laws of the development of civilization well. And who could have predicted the events of even this decade ten years ago? I will never take the liberty of saying that I had such a premonition. On the contrary, I see a reverse process, even where, in principle, it would be possible to develop along the path of modernization, say, in Kyrgyzstan…. But there, too, they are moving into the same track of authoritarianism .... We have to admit that there will be no movement in Central Asia towards openness, modernization and real democracy until Russia follows this path. This is simply an irrefutable fact and few people can convince me of this. And this does not contradict what I said in the answer to the previous question, for a simple reason: the Russian political one will not soon turn in the other direction either ...

Just for a long time, Russia has been considered and is considered the locomotive of the democratization of the post-Soviet space. What is the basis of such a hypothesis: what Moscow does is what the countries of the region do?

The post-Soviet space in one way or another tends to restore certain forms, not just the Soviet type, but forms acquired back in the days of tsarist rule. It must be admitted that, on the one hand, there are such centripetal movements towards rapprochement with Russia, because no one, except Russia, is ready to seriously invest in the development of these countries, because they do not see their future next to or together with them, except perhaps , China. And this in itself strains people in Central Asia, who are able to think for many decades ahead, having in mind this future under the same sky - pardon the tautology - with the Celestial Empire. On the other hand, the experience of tsarist times, the Soviet and Russian past, make us move away from Russia more and more, especially considering the last ten, fifteen years of the development of Russian society.

In itself, the movement towards Russia, unfortunately, does not increase the chances of survival, so to speak, of a democratic system. Because, as a rule, there is no historical base for this. That's what could be done in the Baltics, in Central Asia is missing. Even the example of Ukraine shows that these are very difficult processes, they come with catastrophic consequences. Nevertheless, I hope they go there, because they are fed by a certain national idea that they believe in, which may not be obvious to everyone - the idea of ​​Ukraine's state independence. Such ideas are just crystallizing in Central Asia, and often this happens on a Russophobic basis, they say, the farther from Moscow, the safer, which, unfortunately, is largely produced by the current government in Russia. But such a concept is too vulnerable to building a real sustainable statehood, the presence of an enemy in modern history does not guarantee the survival of such statehood, the creation of a single social whole, although some ideologists of independent Ukraine insist on this today.

Among the Russian expert community, there is a call to send the concept of the post-Soviet space to the archive and to abandon the priority of the CIS in Russia's foreign policy. That is, to consider Central Asia in relation to South Asia. How do you see such a proposal?

Interest Ask. There is a very important reason for this. When Moscow claims that the CIS is a priority, and at one time even Russia had a Ministry for CIS Affairs, this in itself somehow creates a myth about the possibility of recreating this space in one format or another on some unified basis with common goals, the center of which will be Moscow. This is what frightens and strains the national elites in these countries (CIS). Therefore, those who insist on the development of the CIS contribute, consciously or not, to the formation of certain illusions about this among those who are nostalgic about the Soviet past, or, without realizing it, form its image on the basis of Moscow-fueled propaganda. The dream that the Union can be restored, one way or another, at least in the form of this Eurasian Economic Union, is indestructible and partly has a basis, as was already mentioned above. However, these dreams are shattered into reality, which is visible and tangible in the practice of building the EAEU, which, due to the selfishness of Russian policy, imperial in nature, irritates Russia's allies and contributes to the rejection of the elites of these countries by Moscow.

There is no prophet in the native Fatherland. Recently, foreign experts have shown excessive activity in terms of distributing political forecasts regarding Kyrgyzstan. Against this background, the Moscow journalist Arkady Dubnov stands out in particular. In liberal circles, he is considered an expert on Central Asia, and the so-called democratic press actively disseminates his sometimes very strange conclusions.

Here is what Dubnov wrote, and the local media circulated on the eve of the visit to Kyrgyzstan of the Chairman of the State Duma of Russia: “Tomorrow Vyacheslav Volodin arrives on an official visit to Kyrgyzstan, which looks like an event, frankly, outstanding. The official program only shows a meeting with a colleague, speaker of the Kyrgyz parliament But what is called, follow his hands, words, passes, and then, perhaps, it will become clear whether Moscow is ready to support as the next, 5th president of Kyrgyzstan, a protege of the current president Atambaev - Prime Minister Jeenbekov. The choice has not yet been made. And in another week, another speaker, Madame Matvienko, will arrive in Issyk-Kul.

There is, of course, a certain logic in what Dubnov writes. In principle, Moscow cannot care who becomes the next president of our republic. We are allies in the EAEU, SCO, CSTO and so on. And is it only Moscow that wants to see a reliable and understandable partner in the main state post? The forwarding of a liberal Russian observer about the "bride" and the "protege" is not entirely clear. If this is an attempt to cheat a little, then any student can draw the same insightful conclusions as Dubnov. Or is this a hint that Russian hackers and Kremlin trolls will elect a president in Kyrgyzstan in the same way as they did in the United States? What did the liberal observer mean?

Or maybe it's the other way around, and Washington and its Western allies also want to see their man as president of Kyrgyzstan, so to speak? Probably, the coming to power of one of the corrupt political puppets, of which we have more than a dozen, would suit the United States. Overseas, after all, they believe that, hiding behind pathos slogans about democracy and human rights, you can do whatever you want - arrange color revolutions and destroy states. Therefore, if we consider Dubnov's stuffing as a provocation, then everything lines up in a logical chain. The liberal observer is working on a grant and, to the best of his ability, is trying to influence the socio-political situation in Kyrgyzstan on the eve of the elections. By the way, another very important detail escaped Dubnov's field of vision. Two weeks later, for the first time in 25 years of independence, a representative delegation of American businessmen arrives in Bishkek.

Businessmen from the United States will meet with representatives of government agencies, international financial organizations and the private sector in narrow and extended formats. A business forum "Kyrgyzstan - USA" will also be held, where detailed information on the conditions and opportunities for cooperation with American companies will be presented. After all, no one will be hysterical about the fact that they remembered Kyrgyzstan only a quarter of a century later and only on the eve of the presidential elections. Maybe the "brides" will be behind the scenes or they will throw money for "democracy" to their protege along the way. None of the domestic political scientists, unlike expert Dubnov, puts forward such theories.

And in the meantime, the provocations are only getting stronger. So, for example, at the suggestion of the same Russian expert on Central Asia, the local press again tried to raise the topic of the mythical dispatch of Kyrgyz troops to the Middle East. "I'm unpopularly sure that Astana and Bishkek won't get away with the 'honor' of having their own military peacekeepers in Syria," Dubnov said.

This happened after the entire leadership of Kyrgyzstan, headed by President Atambaev, denied information about any negotiations on sending a contingent to conduct a police mission to Syria. Moscow has officially declared that no one will be drawn into the settlement process and the fight against terrorism. But Arkady Dubnov continues to actively pump the given topic. It's just that no one ever does things like that anywhere.

We asked domestic expert Bakyt Baketaev to evaluate the latest forecasts of Arkady Dubnov about the bride of the successor to the presidency of Kyrgyzstan and the dispatch of troops by Bishkek to Syria.

“I don’t know where he gets the information. But he is given such “noodles” that he broadcasts from Moscow, which is simply inconvenient. Therefore, you need to be very careful to focus on foreign political scientists who may not know our nuances. They can generally start our country it is not clear where, we see where Ukraine was taken, where people are shooting at each other. And this happened not without the help of some political scientists. I will not name their names. The same thing is happening in Syria and in other countries," Baketaev notes.

In general, according to domestic experts on the eve of the presidential elections, provocations will be arranged more often. Therefore, citizens should be more relaxed about such stuffing, especially from abroad. No need to take to heart the loud statements of little-known international organizations or human rights activists. There is a big game going on, and the unfolding hysteria is aimed only at stirring up society and sowing negative moods in the country. The main thing in such a situation is to remain calm and be skeptical of any "sensations". Too many fakes lately.

Arkady Dubnov

Press conference

Arkady Dubnov

Why does the USA need the countries of Central Asia? Will the Americans be allowed in? After the decision of Kyrgyzstan to expel from the country until August 18, 2009, the American air base, which was used as a transport hub for supplying troops in Afghanistan, the US quickly found alternative transit routes. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have already given their consent to provide their territory for the transportation of non-military goods. What might an American presence in these countries look like? What will the strengthening of American influence in the region mean for Russia? How have American interests in Central Asia changed with the advent of the new US administration? Arkady Yurievich Dubnov, an international columnist for the Vremya Novosti newspaper, answered these and other questions from Lenta.Ru readers.

Temur K.

Good afternoon!

1. why the US needs Central Asia;

2. Is it possible to logically explain the increase in the flow of drugs through the countries of Central Asia to Russia, maybe this is the US geopolitics;

3. with whom Central Asia is larger: with the Russian Federation, the USA, or already on its own;

4. Is it possible to annex the former territories of Russia from Kazakhstan (transferred by N. Khrushchev);

5. why the Russian Federation was going to invest $2 billion in Kyrgyzstan and is there where to invest that kind of money;

Tatar

Good afternoon!

The question is: "Which of the politicians is beneficial for the US in Central Asia?"

Artyom

Dear Arkady, please answer the following simple question. Is it true that after the occupation of Afghanistan by the US troops, the share of drug production increased many times over? If so, how do neighboring countries and Russia in particular react to this, why are there no complaints against the leadership of Afghanistan?

1. This is a very general question, so you will have to answer in the same way, in general. The United States is a world power that cares about its security - raw materials, economic, military. Central Asia is of interest as a source of resources and a huge market, as well as concern as a source of instability. Also, don't forget that in the early 1990s, the US assumed security guarantees for Kazakhstan after Kazakhstan (as part of the former Soviet Union) agreed to remove nuclear weapons from its territory. Therefore, the United States, one way or another, became one of the great powers that were directly involved in the new Central Asia, the new Central Asia.

2. In countries with a market economy, demand is always met by a corresponding supply, if there is a demand for drugs, there will always be a supply for it. It will be US geopolitics, it will not be US geopolitics, it will remain so. "Where people live, it's not good," said one wise man.

3. I don't understand the question. I better remember another case: many years ago, when Yeltsin was president of Russia, I had a chance to talk with one of the people very close to him. Then there was a period when we tried to establish an alliance with Belarus. I asked why Boris Nikolayevich needs an alliance with Belarus, which is headed by such a not very intelligible person as Lukashenka. This close person told me: "Well, I want the country to be bigger!" You ask me, I answer: at the expense of Belarus, or at the expense of such a regime as in Turkmenistan, I don’t want our country to be bigger at all. Ask the Americans yourself about this.

4. Why don't you ask if we can get back Alaska, which we sold to the Americans? Why don't you ask about Crimea? Is it more important for us to take territories from Kazakhstan than Crimea from Ukraine? If we continue such a conversation, then I am in favor of first taking Crimea away, and only then taking on Kazakhstan, and then Alaska. Yes, by the way, Koenigsberg can be given to Germany, and the Kuril Islands to Japan.

5. We are going to invest 1.7 billion dollars (and at a decent commercial interest) in the construction of the Kambarata HPP-1. The rest of the money is a soft loan, which Kyrgyzstan urgently needs today. The main concern of both Moscow and Bishkek is that this money be plundered to a minimum.

6. Proximity depends on where you look from. If from the west - then this is one thing, if from the east - another ...

But seriously speaking, it is impossible to make such a rating. You can put the question a little differently: "Which of the leaders in the region is the United States more comfortable to have relations with?" In this case, I would suggest that the US is easier to deal with the President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev. For many reasons, including his years in power and deeper reform of the country, Nazarbayev and the Americans have common ground. It is probably more difficult to talk with the President of Uzbekistan Karimov (and this despite the same long experience of being in power). It seems to me that it is not easy to communicate with the President of Turkmenistan, I think that it is sometimes very difficult for Americans to understand what he really wants. So I would not arrange a rating here, but some characteristics can be given.

Elena

Hello Arkady!

Is the agreement of these states to provide territory for transit a real increase in American influence in the region?

Will the United States, in your opinion, strive for leadership in the international arena or will it pay more attention to solving economic problems within the country?

Certainly it is.

The US will not seek leadership in the international arena. Today they have it, and their task is to maintain this leadership. Moreover, in your question there are two parts of the same problem: the solution of economic problems within the United States is the way to maintain US leadership. I think it is obvious to many today that how quickly and successfully the Americans solve their economic problems that have led the world to a crisis depends on how soon the post-crisis recovery of the whole world will come.

Denis

Hello

Will the collapse of the US financial system shake its position in SA?

Since I do not believe that the collapse of the financial system has already occurred in the United States, it is difficult for me to answer the question in this way.

Let me just say that the US position in Central Asia is unlikely to undermine the internal problems that Americans are experiencing today. A small example: US Ambassador to Tajikistan, Ms. Jacobson, recently said that if last year the financial assistance allocated to Tajikistan was $31 million, this year, due to the crisis, it will be a little less - $29 million.

No, I don't see such a connection.

George aka cyxymu

In your opinion, will the United States be able to persuade Turkmenistan to sell gas not through the Caspian gas pipeline, but through NABUCCO, the project of which has already been developed and approved during the gas crisis at the beginning of this year

Respectfully

George aka cyxymu1.livejournal.com

I think it is not so important whether the US can persuade Turkmenistan or not. It seems to me that it is much more important under what conditions the Turkmens will agree to transport their gas via Nabucco, bypassing Russia, under what conditions they will agree, as Georgy says, to US persuasion. It will be sad if the US pays for this by giving up the right to be critical of the nature of the regime in Turkmenistan. If the United States exchanges Turkmenistan's consent to divert its gas through Nabucco for the recognition of Turkmenistan as a civilized state, an equal partner in today's world, then this will also be sad, since Turkmenistan still has a long way to go before being recognized as a civilized country

Maxim N.

Hello!

1. What, in your opinion, is the attitude of the majority of the population of the region (Middle Asia) towards the United States in general and the American presence (albeit indirectly) in particular?

2. No one has ever managed to conquer Afghanistan. What are the chances for the USA? What are their REAL goals? Strategic (it is believed that Afghanistan is the key to India and other countries of the region)?

Thanks in advance!

1. A very different attitude, and this attitude is "plasticine" - in each country it is well molded by state propaganda, depending on the political situation. Therefore, it is not necessary to absolutize the specific current state of this relationship.

For example, in Kyrgyzstan, the history of the military base, of course, led to a reflexive state of anti-American sentiment. In Uzbekistan, the positive attitude towards the Americans during the short-term "romance" with the United States after the events of September 11 changed to a negative one after Andijan-2005. As soon as the Americans expressed their desire to conduct an independent international investigation of the Andijan events, Islam Karimov expelled the American base from Uzbekistan. Immediately, a negative attitude towards the Americans began to form. This "public mood" is very difficult to measure. In most countries of the region, it is set from above, like the exchange rate of the dollar to the Uzbek sum or the Turkmen manat, and has nothing to do with reality.

2. I agree that no one has ever succeeded in conquering Afghanistan. I think it would be wrong to say that the Americans are striving to conquer Afghanistan. Another thing is that the real goals that they pursue differ from those declared goals that they declare (as is often the case, and not only among Americans). For example, in Iraq, one goal was declared - the search for and destruction of weapons of mass destruction, but others were actually pursued ...

As for Afghanistan, I think that what Americans are primarily concerned about today is what they are declaring - to undermine the base of the emergence of a terrorist threat, to obtain guarantees that extremist Islamic forces will not come to power in Pakistan, which will be able to gain access to nuclear weapons. (let's not forget that Pakistan is a nuclear power). It is clear, of course, that the Americans need to get a government loyal to Washington in Afghanistan that would be stable and, from the American point of view, democratic. Another thing is that they will not succeed in imposing democracy according to American standards in Afghanistan (I hope the Americans already understand this), just as the Soviet Union failed to impose communism on the Afghans more than 20 years ago. I always remember one maxim that I heard many years ago in Afghanistan when I started traveling there in the early 90s. Afghans say to themselves: "We can be hired, but we cannot be bought."

Vladimir

Hello Arkady. I am from Kazakhstan, Karaganda. In Kazakhstan, people of any nationality already do not like America in their genes, and this opinion will not change in the next decade. But in Russia, people have already begun to call America their friend. Question: Why do you think people in Kazakhstan have a more negative attitude towards America than in Russia.

It is difficult for me to answer this question, since Vladimir, it seems to me, is wishful thinking. I would like to understand how he managed to find out that "people of any nationality in Kazakhstan already in their genes do not like America." In general, our trouble is that we give out our observations, our personal opinion for the general mood, for the voice of the people. I often visit Kazakhstan, I know a lot of people there, both in power and among people who are far from power. I did not observe a general cut of anti-American attitude in Kazakhstan.

Maria Andreeva

Hello Arkady Yurievich!

Please explain why in 2001 the agreement on the lease of the airbase at the Manas airport was concluded for a year, providing for the automatic extension of this agreement for subsequent annual periods in the absence of notification from Kyrgyzstan of its intention to terminate the lease? The notice, which had to be issued 180 days in advance and be pre-approved by the Kyrgyz parliament.

Wouldn't it be easier not to agree to an automatic extension of the treaty at all, and then it would not take years to get the United States to revise the issues of economic compensation, which Kyrgyzstan does not like? It is very likely that this is the true reason for the denunciation of the old agreement. Or is it not? How else can you explain the decision on March 3 of the Jogorku Kenesh (parliament of Kyrgyzstan) to postpone indefinitely the consideration of the issue of denunciation of the agreement with 11 countries of the anti-terrorist coalition on the presence of their military contingents on the territory of the Manas airbase or the BBC interview of the President of Kyrgyzstan Kurmanbek Bakiyev where he stated that although the airbase treaty was no longer in force, his country was ready to consider new proposals from the US government for the continued use of the airbase? Thank you.

I must tell you that the text of the agreement on the lease of the air base is not available to me, unlike, apparently, Maria, so it would be difficult for me to answer this question.

As for the reasons for the denunciation of the old agreement, I think you are right. Of course, first of all, the true reason for the denunciation lies in the economic plane. And here, I think, President Bakiyev called a spade a spade. As for the parliament's decision to postpone consideration indefinitely, the answer already came on March 6 - the parliament denounced these agreements with 11 countries, despite President Bakiyev's statements in an interview with the BBC that he was ready to consider new proposals. One does not contradict the other.

I would comment as follows: the President of Kyrgyzstan once again made it clear that no one can reproach him for changing his decisions on the go. Yes, he terminated the previous agreements on the same terms, without waiting for a response from Washington to his proposal to revise the existing agreement within the framework of its functioning, and now, on the other hand, he declares that it is possible to talk on other grounds.

Why does he do it? He does this not only because he hopes for some kind of economic and financial compensation from the Americans. I think that Bakiyev is a sober person, he understands that today, when the new American Obama administration has made the solution of the Afghan problem as the main point of its foreign policy doctrine, Kyrgyzstan's refusal to actually be a member of the antiterrorist coalition looks simply ridiculous, I will not explain why. Moreover, Kyrgyzstan found itself in a very, I would say, stupid position after Moscow called its decision "sovereign" (I mean the decision to abandon the American base). When the Russian leadership was asked if it could influence Kyrgyzstan, everyone in Moscow answered that this is a sovereign decision, we cannot influence it.

Excuse me, I ask, why does the leader of Kyrgyzstan, when making a sovereign decision, announce it in the capital not of his own country, not in the capital of the United States, whose base is in question, but in the capital of a third country, Russia, in Moscow? Moreover, not by itself, but only in response to a question not even of his own, a Kyrgyz, but a Russian journalist, moreover, on the same day and hour when it becomes known that an agreement was signed to provide Kyrgyzstan with unprecedented loans and financial assistance. The Kyrgyz understand that they have done what Moscow expected of them. But since they are a sovereign country, they want to remain an active member of the antiterrorist coalition in a region where this country is just as threatened by terrorism as other countries. Therefore, it is quite logical that Bakiyev made such a statement today.

Yes, however, today it is in the interests of Moscow. Recall how Washington, to put it mildly, was perplexed, how can the Russian leadership claim to support the Americans fighting terrorism in Afghanistan, and at the same time contribute to the closure of Manas? And if there are grounds for leaking information that, in correspondence with Dmitry Medvedev, Obama expressed the hope that Moscow will try to do everything to keep the American base in Kyrgyzstan, then everything falls into place, like the missing puzzles in the picture.

Sasha

Everything goes to the fact that the United States will not leave the Manas base until August 18 of this year. If they stay, how do you think - for how long? And how will it all be framed?

It seems to me pointless to guess on the coffee grounds: they will leave, they will not leave, and if they stay, then when and how. I repeat, I think that the main thing is that Kyrgyzstan does not withdraw from the common front of the fight against terrorism. Kyrgyzstan, perhaps more than other countries in this region, has already suffered from this threat, and how this country will format its participation in this front depends on its negotiations with the Americans. It seems to me that it is not so important how it will formally look. Yes, maybe the American flag will be lowered from the base and, say, there will be no military men in uniform, maybe they will be civilians, maybe it will be some kind of joint base with the participation of Russia as well (although I strongly doubt this ) - no matter. The main thing is that people in Kyrgyzstan, in Russia and in the States must understand that Kyrgyzstan does not join the ranks of Al-Qaeda.

Sanzhar

America doesn't know what it wants

Peace or war, drugs

Arkady, I have a question. If the air base in Kyrgyzstan closes, where in Central Asia it can open

Genady

Good afternoon.

It seems that the murder in December 2006 of tanker driver Ivanov by an American soldier at the checkpoint of the Manas base served as a catalyst for the overwhelmingly negative attitude of the population of Kyrgyzstan towards the American presence on the territory of this air base.

Is it so? Why was Ivanov killed?

In addition, the President of Kyrgyzstan Kurmanbek Bakiyev, according to him, for more than two years raised the issue of completing the criminal case on the murder of Ivanov before US President Bush, former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Defense, senators, but then did not find any understanding there.

Is it true that the criminal case in this case was generally closed and resumed only in January 2009?

Of course. This is completely obvious. This murder was outrageous in nature, but even more outrageous in the way Americans justified this crime. We all remember how the base management published instructions that the military personnel of the base should use when using shooting to kill in some cases. I think this tragic incident was a serious lesson for the Americans. Not even then in 2006, it seems to me that they did not immediately understand how they looked in the eyes of the Kyrgyz population. They learned a lesson after the leadership of Kyrgyzstan, rightly blaming the United States for being so lenient on Kyrgyz grievances, went through with it. And this often applies to the behavior of Americans in general in the world, for which they are rightly disliked there. Their attitude towards the local population is similar to the attitude of aliens towards creatures that are at an incomparably lower level of development. And I can only say one thing - this causes justified resentment and even hatred, but unlike my country, Americans know how to learn from this. Anyway, I hope so.

As for the second part of the question about the criminal case, I have no information, but, apparently, this is the way it is. In such cases, the Americans, wherever they deploy their military, first of all seek immunity from the authorities of the host country in relation to possible criminal or any kind of prosecution of their citizens. And they really took their serviceman away from responsibility, we call it, as elsewhere, "hush up this matter." And they could have hushed him up if the financial wrangling with the family of this unfortunate driver had not looked so indecent. Today, when this case has moved into the political arena, any politician will always find an opportunity to reasonably cite such cases in order to justify his actions. I think that this is how it was, the Americans again brought this case to light, shook off the dust from it in order to answer the claims from Bishkek.

Slava

Now it is clear to everyone that Mr. Bakiyev is frankly trading at the price of the American base (judging by his last statement to the BBC on 03/04/09. However, whether there really was such a need to submit these "bargains" on the base can be said to the judgment of the world community after his recent statement in the Kremlin? After all, he put himself as president in a very uncomfortable position since now everyone can doubt his own statements voiced publicly, including on TV. Is Kyrgyzstan really so locked up or is it Mr. Bakiyev who feels that the chair is under does he stagger a lot and he fears for his power?

I think I have already answered this question above. I will add that Kyrgyzstan, unlike its neighbors in the region, is a country where such political decisions are made, as a rule, publicly, all the steps of the authorities there are quite transparent. They are so transparent that sometimes I would like to see the “curtains” when making some decisions, they sometimes look so strange ... But, nevertheless, I think that some of the neighbors, and my country should learn from that publicity , with which such decisions are being discussed in Kyrgyzstan. I don't see anything wrong with this.

Nomad

1. Why does Russia need Central Asia and what are the bases for?

2. The press writes that Water will be the bone of contention in Central Asia in the near future, in particular, the American press focuses on supporting not the Big countries (Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan), but namely water ones like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan ... Is this why Russia is going to take water Central Asia's leverage under its control by investing in HPPs?

3. How much influence does China have in this region?

1. The same thing that I answered in the first question - then, why the United States. Only, in contrast to that answer, I will say that, of course, for Russia, Central Asia is a much more natural region of its presence and influence. Americans have not lived there for a long time, but Russians, Russians, Russian-speakers do, they conquered, pacified this region, cultivated it, brought centers of civilization there, formed it. There was a lot of black, there was a lot of light, but the history of Central Asia is inseparable from the history of the Russian Empire and Soviet history, both in a good and a bad sense. It seems to me that there is no need to explain this, I will only add that Russians, Russian-speaking, still live in Central Asia, there are many hundreds of thousands of them. Therefore, of course, Russia cannot but have its own interests there.

What are the bases for? The bases in Tajikistan are a historical legacy of the Soviet Union, and this military presence played a significant role in the height of the civil war in Tajikistan in the early 1990s. By the way, it was thanks to the presence of these bases, Soviet, Russian, that the very Popular Front came to power in Tajikistan as a result of the war, from the ranks of which the current president of Tajikistan came out, by the name of Rakhmonov, who is now called Rakhmon.

2. Russia is interested in investing in the water and energy complex of Central Asia. Firstly, this is one of the ways to ensure stability in this region. A region cannot be stable in which there are no conditions for the elementary existence of people: light, heat, and so on. This is where, of course, all the problems begin, when people protest against such living conditions, go underground, armed resistance, and the result is what we have today in Afghanistan. This is the first.

Secondly, it is possible to invest in HPPs only in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, where there are hydropower resources. It is pointless to build a hydroelectric power station in Uzbekistan - rivers there do not gain such kinetic energy that is capable of driving turbines. Therefore, the question here is not in politics, here the question is in natural conditions. Another thing is how carefully Moscow will approach these problems of relations between countries that are upstream, downstream - this is really a problem, I think that Moscow has not yet learned how to solve it correctly.

3. See the answer to the next question.

Irina Popushkova

Arkady Yurievich, what do you think:

Is Russia interested in joining Kazakhstan and the Central Asian republics (within the former USSR) in the future?

If YES, in what capacity?

If NO, how will Russia's plans for rapprochement and interaction with China be implemented? Will Russia agree to let China annex Central Asia?

I would be interested to hear how the people of Central Asia would answer this question for Irina. I am sure that a significant part of the people would answer positively, because in Tajikistan, in Kyrgyzstan, many people live much worse now than in the days of the Soviet Union. But I think that these are geopolitical realities that are already irreversible, even if we imagine that someone in power in Russia would risk seriously raising this issue. I will name only one, perhaps curious, but, nevertheless, a real reason. Can you imagine that some president with his current unlimited power in his Central Asian country will again agree to become a local governor of Moscow, some kind of first secretary of a conditional "United Eurasia"? And in general, other trends have prevailed in the world over the past decades, it is striving for state fragmentation along national lines. Whether that's good or bad is another matter...

I don't know how Russia's plan for rapprochement and interaction with China will be implemented. I don't know if there is such a plan. I will tell you right away that rapprochement with China is greater than it is today - it is impossible, and it is not necessary. In general, by definition, no country in the world can get closer to China. China is a kind of historical cultural phenomenon that is self-sufficient, China does not need anyone to get close to it. I assure you, China does not have the task of annexing Central Asia in the way you understand this issue. China has already annexed it economically. Asia is a huge market for Chinese goods and Chinese investments. In this sense, yes, this process is quite organic, I consider it impossible today to artificially prevent it.

echo

How do you assess the policy of the Russian Federation towards the Central Asian republics during the Yeltsin period?

Don't you think that during this period the Russian Federation lost what was built by whole generations of people? The most important thing is trust between people

The policy of Russia under Yeltsin in relation to Central Asia can be assessed in different ways, depending on the point of view of the Yeltsin era in general. There are a huge number of people in Russia who hate Yeltsin, and there are many who respect and appreciate him. I am more of the latter, so for me those times are the times, first of all, of problems within Russia. Everything that was in Russia's foreign policy is, in fact, a product of the indistinctness with which domestic policy was built in Russia.

As for the policy in Central Asia, yes, those who believe that it was not successful are absolutely right, but there were also positive examples: we must remember the efforts of Russia that led to a peace agreement in Tajikistan that ended the civil war in 1992-1997. . One should remember the agreement on dual citizenship between Turkmenistan and Russia, which was concluded in 1993 by Yeltsin in Ashgabat, thanks to which a huge number of Russians and Russian-speakers in Turkmenistan could look to their future with greater confidence, despite the despotic regime of Turkmenbashi lining up before their eyes. . All this should be treated, as they say, "according to the Hamburg account."

As for losses: yes, Russia has lost a lot, not only outside, but also inside the country. The Chinese have such a curse: "May you live in an era of change!"; we have all suffered because we are in an era of change. But, by the way, the Americans, after their Iraqi campaign, lost a huge amount of trust not only in themselves, but also in the world. The fact that the United States is so negatively perceived in the world today is, first of all, because of the reasons for the campaign in Iraq, which began with false goals and led to what we are witnessing. But I repeat again, the Americans are a great nation because they know how to admit mistakes, change development paradigms inside and outside the country, and begin to rebuild everything based on the analysis of these mistakes. Unfortunately, in my country this is done with great difficulty, if at all.

guvanche

hello Arkady,

as you know, the general history of russia and central asia is not very pleasant for those mentioned

and the current relations are rather inactive (except for Kazakhstan) between these regions

In your opinion, shouldn't Russia pursue a more active and positive policy in Central Asia?

maybe Russia should be one step ahead of the US in Central Asia?

Yes, I think I should. But what is "positive" politics? Should we help with money or change inside? It seems to me that in order to be perceived positively in Central Asia, we must first change within our country, fix our brains, recover from xenophobia, from hatred of foreigners, stop comparing them with dirt, as we did recently on television . We must extract our values ​​from the pro-naphthalene chests of our grandmothers - if they were there at all, to understand that they are the same as those of the Americans, Europeans - the value of respect for human life, both for one's own and for others.

This is not observed in my country today, and therefore we are so often hated and feared. For comparison: Americans are hated often deservedly, sometimes undeservedly, but at the same time they are respected for the fact that they know how to protect their citizens; Russians are feared, at the same time they are often hated and not respected because they do not know how and do not want to protect their citizens. This is the conceptual difference between Russia and America today and the attitude towards them in the countries of Central Asia.

Saymiddin Dustov

Mr Dubnov!

Do you agree that Russia does not have a clear policy towards the Central Asian countries, especially in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan?

I would say that we have a clear policy. It all depends on the definition. When we need to appease the leadership of Tajikistan, we allow the Tajik special services to steal from us in our country, literally near Moscow, one of the main political opponents of the President of Tajikistan. I'm talking about the leader of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, Iskandarov, who was kidnapped a few years ago in Korolyov near Moscow. He was secretly taken away, convicted, put in prison for more than 20 years, in fact, his party was smashed. Moscow did not apologize and did not respond to the attempts of his friends and associates to ask the question: How is this possible? We apparently thought that Rahmon would always be grateful to us for this help. The events of recent months show that we were wrong. We are simply used, and even despised for it.

We have a similar "clear" policy in relation to Uzbekistan, then we turned a blind eye to the Andijan massacre and fully supported Tashkent. Yes, it was very pragmatic. Tashkent immediately expelled the American base, with some pause joined the CSTO, the EurAsEC. What do we see today? Obviously, the Americans are returning, not in that form, but in another. Tashkent withdrew from the EurAsEC, Tashkent is offended by our policy towards Kyrgyzstan, to which we promise multi-billion investments in the construction of a hydroelectric power station, because we do not consult Uzbekistan on this issue.

We have such a "clear" policy in relation to each of the countries separately, but when these policies collide, it turns out "mess instead of music." Because this policy seems pragmatic, but in reality it turns out to be unprincipled

Vitaly

Dear Arkady Yurievich.

Over the past 18 years, the United States has gained great influence in the post-Soviet space, including in the CIS countries of Central Asia.

How do you think:

1. Do Russia have a chance to beat the US in the CIS countries??

2. Does Russia learn from its mistakes?

3. And is it possible, in your opinion, that in the near future a number of subjects of the Russian Federation may declare their desire to secede from the Russian Federation ???

1. In political science, there is the concept of "zero-sum games". The question, apparently, was asked in this sense, you, Vitaly, proceed from the fact that if America gets pluses somewhere in Central Asia, then for Russia this is a minus. Or vice versa - if we get pluses, then America gets minuses - this is a zero-sum game. But no one in such a situation asks the inhabitants of this region themselves: do you want to take part in the game? Therefore, I refuse to discuss the issue in such a formulation - "overplay", we do not play ping-pong on a wooden table. We play among the people, and people evaluate both Moscow and Washington in terms of what values ​​each country brings, how it helps.

2. I have already answered this question. The feeling that if he studies, it is very bad.

3. I hope not.

Andrew

Hello!

Please tell me, what do you think, is it time for Russia to introduce a visa regime with the countries of Central Asia. After all, as we see from there, only problems come to us: Drugs, illegal migrants (among whom there are many criminals), etc.

Yes, of course, as soon as we introduce visas, we will immediately have neither drugs nor criminals. After all, crime in our country, as domestic "patriots" say, is known from where - entirely of non-Russian origin. Does the reader know, for example, that, as a rule, one can get into Western Europe only by obtaining a visa, does the reader know that this visa regime does not in the least reduce the amount of drugs entering Europe? As for the introduction of a visa regime with the countries of Central Asia, there is such a country, Turkmenistan, which itself introduced a visa regime with us, and we responded to this. So what? How many tens of thousands of Russian compatriots are suffering: they cannot meet their relatives normally, they cannot send their children to study in peace, they cannot live with dignity at all. Do you want this happiness for your compatriots in other countries of Central Asia?

Nomad

Please answer objectively: If an internal conflict starts in the Central Asian region (for example, Uzbekistan with Tajikistan), will Russia have enough strength to localize it? The war in Georgia did not give much hope (maybe that is why the CRRF was prolapsed by Russia) ... but is the scale of Central Asia completely different?

First, God forbid. Secondly, if God does not hear and the conflict starts, then, of course, Russia would have enough military forces, but God forbid to use this military force, because then Russia will certainly become the most hated country, since it is impossible to please all parties. In addition, for such Russian intervention to be legal, at least both parties to the conflict must ask for it, which, in my opinion, is impossible.

I hope that Russia has enough political resources to localize threats of this kind and forestall them. But at the same time, Russian policy must be very carefully weighed, very scrupulous, very respectful towards these countries.

Ruslan

Good afternoon!

What, in your opinion, is the reason for the adherence to "reeling" of the leaders of the Central Asian countries from love and friendship for Russia and the unacceptability of the United States and vice versa. Moreover, these polar attachments to superpowers appear regularly. Is it the mentality of leaders or the ability to maneuver? Thank you.

Ruslan, I think that this is primarily due to the weakness of the political systems of these countries. In each of them, the main issue of politics is the preservation of power in the hands of the leader existing there. Therefore, every time someone or something inside threatens this power, the card of the "external enemy" begins to be played there. The easiest way is to unite the people against an external enemy, this enemy can be America, and then Russia helps to gather around America, this enemy can be Russia, then the West "will help us" to unite in front of the Russian threat. That's all. If the country had been strong enough in this region, then we would not have observed such "reeling".

Amir Azizov

Dear Mr Dubnov,

I would like to know which country, in your opinion, is the key one for both the United States and the Russian Federation in the Central Asian space?

Thanks in advance.

You know, when you move into a new apartment, you change the keys in the doors, insert new locks. When a new team moves into the White House in Washington, it also sort of changes the keys in foreign policy. Once upon a time, Kazakhstan was a key country for Washington (in the early 90s, when Kazakhstan abandoned nuclear weapons). Then in Kazakhstan, in the mid-1990s, when Akezhan Kazhegeldin was prime minister, serious economic reforms began to be implemented quickly. Then, after September 11, 2001, Uzbekistan became a key country, this country is rightly called the core of this region, with a huge amount of resources, population and proximity to the main modern source of instability - Afghanistan. After Andijan-2005, everything changed again, the United States again turned to Kazakhstan. We remember what epithets Condoleezza Rice awarded this country a couple of years ago when she visited Astana. It all depends on the current situation.

Interestingly, the Russian leadership team has not changed for many years, but sometimes priorities change, after the Andijan events, as I said earlier, Uzbekistan has become a key country for us. We made every effort to pull Tashkent closer to us after it left us for the West. But I believe that for Russia the key country is and will be Kazakhstan, if only for a simple geographical reason. Neighbors, like parents, are not chosen: 7,500 kilometers between Russia and Kazakhstan determine this connection on their own, in addition, vast expanses, huge raw materials resources and, in general, the intellectual potential of Kazakhstan make it a key country for Russia

Yura Eurasia Heritage Foundation

Good afternoon! Arkady Yurievich, tell me, please.

1. Is it correct to compare the new Federal Agency for CIS Affairs with USAID. How would you rate the potential and effectiveness of the new agency;

2. How do you assess the overall effectiveness of the system of US and Russian government agencies in working with the CIS (Central Asia);

3. What structures or personalities are currently in charge of the CIS (Central Asia) in the Obama Administration, who can claim the role of Obama's chief adviser on the CIS, are there advisers on the CIS (Central Asia) in the Russian Presidential Administration;

4. What changes can be expected in the work of American NGOs in the CIS (countries of Central Asia) and what is the difference between their activities and Russian NGOs in the post-Soviet countries;

5. Why do you think the US interacts with the entire political spectrum of the countries of Central Asia, from the opposition to the authorities, while Russia usually keeps in touch only with the leadership of the country.

Thanks a lot.

1. All the time we are tempted to compare with the Americans. If you were asked to compare the dollar with the ruble, I would tell you that the ruble is 35 times cheaper than the dollar. Of course, I cannot compare the Federal Agency for CIS Affairs with the American USAID in such a ratio, but, frankly, such analogies suggest themselves. If only because the Americans have a much larger budget, and the understanding of where to invest this money is better.

2. The effectiveness of American state and non-state structures in this region is higher than that of Russian ones. Examples can be given for a long time, but I'll just ask: have you seen a lot of public speeches by Russian ambassadors in the region, in each of these countries? Yes, there people do not know at all the name of this or that Russian ambassador, because these people are afraid of publicly evaluating any events in the host country. And when the ambassador or some diplomatic representative of Russia makes some statements, then it’s time to grab his head, it would be better if he didn’t stick out at all ... Recalling a very recent incident, the Russian charge d’affaires in Tajikistan answered questions media community after the heinous crimes of Russian skinheads, when a Tajik guest worker was beheaded near Moscow. The answers of this diplomat only warmed up anti-Russian phobias. Here is the efficiency...

3. I don't know. Watching the Obama administration choose its representatives in the most important areas of foreign policy in the Middle East, in Afghanistan, I understand that the responsibility with which policy is formulated there cannot but lead to the fact that people will be appointed to these posts, who know the regions well and understand what the Americans want. And at the same time - endowed with serious powers. If we had a similar approach in the Russian administration… Do we have such an adviser? I do not know the names of such advisors. I'm afraid no one else knows them either.

5. Great question. I ask: why should the Russian authorities treat the opposition in a foreign country better than they treat the opposition in their own country? Just the other day the President of Russia, talking to Spanish journalists, said that "our opposition can yell anywhere." In general, I am very careful about the use of the Russian language, and the word "yell" has a very contemptuous connotation. In fact, here we see the attitude of the Russian authorities towards the opposition.

No matter how it really looks, there must be some rules for a civilized attitude towards the opposition. Anyway, public. Moreover, since the beginning of this century, people with a legal education have been in power in Russia. Let's remember the previous president of Russia, who once reproached the Ukrainian president Yushchenko that, they say, he meets with his oppositionists, he answered clearly and clearly: "It is not in Russian traditions to deal with the opposition." Moscow deals only with the authorities existing in the country. That's all.

Leonid

Most questions are based on conflict, on opposition of interests. Obviously, from the standpoint of geopolitics, this is normal. But from the standpoint of humanitarian development, are there any related questions, when the interests of the superpowers coincide and when the population receives positive, benefits, etc.? (I did not mean the fight against terrorism and drug addiction - these are related issues and here everyone has the same interests). Thank you.

Thanks for the question. That is how it should be. Humanitarian aspects in relations must prevail, humanitarian interests must be crystallized, we must understand that we are not reacting to something, but creating something. The more educational programs there are, the more humanitarian aspects of the coincidence of interests, contacts, the less likely it will be that people will go into drug addiction, terrorism, and so on. Some attempts are being made in Russia, the Russkiy Mir Foundation has been created. But a certain aspect of how these goals were stated confused me a little. When the idea is imposed in the countries where the fund works that all the best and the most excellent comes from Russia, this often repels people in Central Asia. I just saw how students in Kazakhstan reacted to such statements, they would like a respectful attitude towards their culture, the same equal treatment of Western culture, Anglo-Saxon traditions and so on.

Igor

It is obvious that the closure of the American base in Manas will negatively affect the supply of NATO troops in Afghanistan. Who can hold back the Taliban if the Americans leave Afghanistan? Don't you think that Russia should be more afraid of the expansion of Islamic fundamentalism than the expansion of NATO? Do Russian politicians understand that Russia and America are on the same side in the war on terrorism?

I think that these questions already have an answer. I agree with you, it seems to me that Russia should be more afraid of the expansion of Islamic fundamentalism than the expansion of NATO, I think that not all Russian politicians understand that Russia and America are on the same side in the war with the Taliban. And if they do, they carefully hide it, because today it is politically unprofitable to be on the same side with America. We, on the other hand, constantly have a desire to play a zero-sum game: how is it beneficial for America? So it's not good for us.

You know, there is such a well-known apocryphal story about how Joseph Brodsky was asked during perestroika how he relates to the dissolution of collective farms, so, they say, Yevtushenko is for the dissolution. To which he replied: "Ah, since Yevtushenko is for the dissolution, then I am for the preservation of collective farms." It's funny, but very revealing. Approximately the same with what America is doing, everything is lined up.

Adkham Mirsaidov

Are there any geopolitical interests of Central Asia with the attitude of the USA?

Can Central Asia become a separate region independently of either the US or the Russian Federation in the sphere of world politics?

Do you consider Afghanistan as a state?

No, It is Immpossible. In the short term, Central Asia cannot become a region similar to the European Union. Do I need to explain why?

As for Afghanistan, of course, today it is more a territory than a state. I would not dare to make forecasts regarding state building there now.

Sergei from Novokuibyshevsk

Good afternoon!

I was born and lived in Kazakhstan for a long time.

I have several questions:

1) what are the real goals (it is hard to believe that this is all because of the kindness of the soul) pursued by Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Tupkmenia, agreeing to provide their territory for the transportation of goods?

2) in your opinion, isn't everything that is happening in the world now, and in particular in relations between Russia and the USA, the beginning of World War 3? Maybe it's time to stock up on salt and cook footcloths?

1. Earn money, get prestigious points as a civilized member of the world community, get confidence that the ruling regime that represents this consent will be positively evaluated by the United States. That is, there is a huge number of factors of internal motivation, in principle, folding into one vector. There is no other way out today. It is necessary to bring to a real logical conclusion what was started in Afghanistan, but not in the way some politicians see it - to destroy, say, the Taliban. Destroying the Taliban is the same as destroying, excuse me, the Pashtuns - the state-forming ethnic group in Afghanistan. With them, one way or another, but you have to negotiate.

2. If you think so, then it's time. The main thing is not to forget about matches ...

a lion

Hello, Arkady Yurievich!

Do you think there is any threat to the current special relationship between Russia and Kazakhstan? How interested is the younger generation of the Kazakh elite in continuing the policy of N.A. Nazarbayev in relation to the Russian Federation? Should we expect any changes in the foreign policy of this state in the future?

Thanks in advance!

Apparently, you are very sensitive to these threats, which consist in the fact that the younger generation of the elite will be reoriented in a direction other than Russian. This trend is taking place, and in Russia, as well as in Kazakhstan, they should think about it, because without trusting relations with Russia, the future of Kazakhstan does not exist. On the other hand, if we see the future of Kazakhstan as a country focused exclusively on cooperation with Russia and having no other interests, then this is also a problem and even a disaster. I think the truth is somewhere in the middle.

Peter

Good afternoon, Arkady Yurievich!

Thank you for your posts - they are always interesting!

Since I lived in Samarkand for a long time, this problem cannot but excite me, although there are already very few of my friends left there - the majority (even Uzbeks with higher education) moved closer to Russia.

I have two questions.

1. Why, in your opinion, has Turkey's influence in Central Asia, which was so strong in the early 1990s, weakened? And in general, pan-Turkism in the sense of choosing the least of the evils - is it good or bad?

2. What is your attitude to the Akramiya movement and the events in Fergana? In Islamist circles, they like to say that it was an attempt to form alternative Islamic institutions of power (or, if you like, Islamic self-government), built on qualitatively different, more just principles, taking into account the specifics of Uzbek society and relying on mahalla traditions? From here it is concluded that the thoroughly corrupt and inefficient secular power, realizing that it cannot withstand this competition, set in motion force. Did the US understand who they were standing up for when they condemned Karimov for the events in Andijan? And how does this look against the background of their "mission" in Afghanistan?

1. There is no short answer to this question. I think that Turkey at one time overestimated its strength, offering its services as the main reference point for the post-Soviet development of the region. On the other hand, the importance of the Turkish example has also been overestimated in Central Asia. Here, for example, how it was in Uzbekistan, when Islam Karimov called Turkey a landmark. Here, after all, the problem is that in Turkey, unlike these countries, by some time national ideas and national consciousness were formed, certain conditions were ripe for the emergence of charismatic national leaders who managed to unite the country around a clear goal. In addition, Turkey managed to build a democracy with a Turkish face, the guarantor of which, by the way, is the army. None of the countries of Central Asia can boast of such success so far.

2. I understand the invectives of Peter, who believes that the Americans were mistaken in not seeing the danger of Islamic extremism in this movement. Maybe he is right, maybe the Americans did not see this, for this they should have had access to information about what is happening in Uzbekistan, but neither they nor many other observers and diplomats could get such information. Perhaps the United States stood up for those people who were innocent victims and wanted an explanation why there was such a terrible bloodshed in Andijan. But no one has given them an honest answer so far. We understand that there really was a serious threat to the regime existing in this country, and the Uzbek authorities still do not dare to tell the truth about those events. Perhaps because it is capable of sowing doubts about the adequacy of the actions of the authorities. But what current Central Asian ruler would allow this?

Rustem

1. I once read an interview with your colleague Malashenko in a magazine, in which he expressed the idea that globalization would bypass Central Asia and this region would only lose in this big game.

I'm interested in your opinion on this matter. Focus on Kazakhstan, please.

2. Well, what is your assessment of the efforts of the current Kazakh authorities to transition to an innovative economy. How do you assess the potential of Kazakhstan in this matter?

3. Your opinion about our elite is also interesting. Do you think it is being selected correctly and what is its quality?

The more frank, the better.

1. I agree with my colleague Malashenko that globalization can indeed bypass Central Asia. For example, in such countries as Tajikistan, Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan, people are reassured that the crisis has not affected them much. But if the world crisis has touched little, then the civilizational flow is passing by. Another question is how much this flow really improves the regime, and mores, and living conditions. But this is a philosophical question. Jean-Jacques Rousseau asked them whether the progress of civilization contributes to the improvement of morality?

2. You know, it is difficult for me to assess the efforts, I know that they really take place and Kazakhstan has a high potential in this matter, but it is too early to draw conclusions. The only thing that can be said for sure is that, one way or another, they are trying to find some solutions, unlike most other countries in the region.

3. The Kazakh elite looks, of course, much more presentable than in the neighboring countries of the region. But she seems very much like that, you know, "with fingering." Somehow she is very little reflective, not very good at evaluating and observing herself from the outside. In this, it differs little from the Russian one, it just seems to me that two or three generations of this elite have already changed in Russia, and in Kazakhstan, this process probably looks different. But I am not a great specialist in the Kazakhstani elite, so it is difficult for me to give any assessments.

Another thing is that one must understand that corruption in power, primarily in Kazakhstan (as well as in Russia), is so significant that it cannot but spoil the elite. When any major corruption scandal leads to the resignation of high-ranking officials, this forms the elite, forms concepts - what is good, what is bad. So far, there are very few examples that scandals of this kind in Kazakhstan or Russia form an elite.

Evgeniy

Hello! Arkady Yuryevich, how do you assess the geopolitical position and, consequently, the possible policy of Tajikistan in the region, given that it borders both Afghanistan and the western regions of China, and not far from Pakistan. Will they (Tajiks) play constant cat-and-mouse with the US and Russia, or will they finally join one of the parties? What tricks do they have up their sleeves?

Thanks in advance!

Great question. They will not join either Russia, or the United States, or China. In general, none of the countries of the CIS and Central Asia will ever finally join anyone without risking losing their sovereignty. Small countries, poor countries (such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) will always be forced to play cat and mouse. We have already talked about Tajikistan quite a lot, I do not want to repeat myself.

In my opinion, the problem is that when we say "the countries of Central Asia", we are talking, in fact, about the regimes ruling there. If you find out what people think about this or that president in their country, then it will be very interesting for you. People there are accustomed to the fact that once they get this leader, they will wait a long time for the development of natural biological processes in order to see another policy of another leader. Therefore, here it is necessary to speak more carefully about the policy of this or that country, rather, about the policy of this or that leader, who is striving to stay in power. It will be more accurate.

Michael

Good afternoon. Do you think the United States will indeed deploy its military bases in Afghanistan, incl. strategic, for total control over all of Asia?

There will be no US strategic bases in Afghanistan, and in general there will be no permanent bases in Afghanistan, because this is Afghanistan, we have already talked about this.

There may be some temporary infrastructure, but it is too early to talk about it. The Afghans will not allow anyone to think that they are occupied or under someone's protectorate.

Artyom G.

What, in your opinion, will be the US policy towards Iran?

More "Eastern" in character, more accurate and, I would say, respectful, but no less American-style resolute. I think that many more interesting events await us in this direction.

Victor

In your opinion, in the case of a US military operation against Iran, is it possible to destabilize Middle Ashchia as a consequence?

I am afraid that as a result of a military operation against Iran, a very serious global destabilization is possible, and not only in Central Asia. That is why I am sure that there will be no US military operation against Iran.

Kosmopletov A.M.

In the publications of WP and IGT, it was suspected that Russia at some hour "X" could block the corridor of military supplies to Afghanistan and force international forces to withdraw from this country. It looks like speculation, but if we assume that the Taliban will somehow return to power in this country, then what are the pros and cons of Russia in Central Asia in this case?

There is a saying: "I will gouge out my eye so that my mother-in-law has a crooked son-in-law." If Russia behaves like this, then it will look like this son-in-law-masochist.

As for the second part of the question, referring to the possibility of the Taliban returning to power, I can say that they do not enter the same water twice. One way or another, the Taliban (Pashtuns, moderates or any other representatives of that Afghan, sorry, elite, which is patriotic or against the presence of Western troops) will be drawn into power.

Recently, the Deutsche Welle radio station reported that in two dozen Afghan provinces at the local level, the Taliban are creating government bodies, and these government bodies enjoy much more respect and influence than the central government in Kabul, because the Taliban severely punishes corruption, calls for observance of national customs and so on.

Afghanistan is a very traditional society, in which the authorities that will call for these values ​​will be popular, so those who build politics here need to understand this. I will add that it is time to stop scaring the Asian regions and Russia with the fact that if the Taliban come to power, then they will go on a military campaign against Samara and Saratov. As in his time the late General Lebed loved to scare. The Taliban need Afghanistan and they will not go beyond its borders. But in this situation one should not confuse the Taliban and all sorts of "wild geese" - terrorists from Al-Qaeda, who do not care where to fight, so they can come to Central Asia.

Gairat

Good afternoon! As you know, Karimov has been ruling the country for 20 years, and only after 4 years will his (hopefully) last term of presidency expire. Who do you think could be his successor?

Thank you

His next term will come if he is healthy.

Dmitry

Good afternoon, Arkady.

Do you think it's time to stop demonizing the United States, as well as idolizing them, to distance ourselves and finally deal with our long-standing internal problems, and not virtual geopolitical projects.

As the poet says: "It's time, my friend, it's time!"

Eugene B.

Arkady, tell us about the role that Israel plays in relations with the countries of the region. Does he have his own interests in Central Asia (for example, "hydrocarbons"), does he act as a conductor of American influence, what levers and opportunities does he have to influence the balance of power in the region, etc.

This role is quite interesting. It is, first of all, determined, of course, by Israel's concern for the safety of the Jews, the Jews who live in this region. If they are not going to leave for Israel, then Israel makes sure that their religious communities are preserved, prosperous and have the opportunity to observe their traditions so that they are not oppressed. On the other hand, they are always ready to urgently evacuate their compatriots to their historical homeland in Israel, in case of a threat to their safety.

But there is also the economic presence of Israel in some countries, not necessarily the state, at the level of private structures. Israeli technologies are in great demand, especially in agriculture, which is especially important for the regions of Central Asia.

Israel is not a great power, it does not have serious ambitions in this region, but it pursues its interests there quite carefully, trying to prevent too high Iranian influence under the current leadership in Tehran.

Sometime in the late 80s, the wise Russian poet, a Jew by origin Naum Korzhavin, when I complained about the abomination of perestroika in a conversation with him - it was the time of the Memory society, the sad memory of the scandal in the House of Writers, consoled me: “ You know, Arkady, where people live, it’s not good.” Anti-Semitism as a historical abomination of the human race in the post-Christian era is a natural thing in Russia, just like in the rest of the world. True, shades of abomination have their own characteristics. For a significant part of the people in our country - it's just garbage in the brain. This garbage, like on our streets, is occasionally removed, occasionally cleaned, then forgotten about it again, and when it is not cleaned well, it starts to stink. In such a garbage atmosphere it is always easier to find the sources of one's illnesses, to find the causes of one's grievances. But since people, as a rule, are not used to cleaning up after themselves, this garbage is removed only from time to time. For the political elite, anti-Semitism in Russia today is a means to show their democratic civilized thinking, that is, a way to find themselves in the ranks of a decent society, where it’s not worth picking your nose and blowing your nose into the curtains, that is, not admitting to your anti-Semitism. For the intellectual elite, talking about anti-Semitism is another resource to speculate about the Messianic destiny of Russia, where not remembering the Russian-Jewish question is a sign of bad taste. For those who still consider themselves a Jew in Russia, anti-Semitism is an eternal and inexhaustible source of life drive that does not let you relax and makes you ask the same question again and again: why am I like this and, if I am a Jew, then why am I in Russia? I hope that the answer to this question, which makes many of us consider ourselves living in Russia as in our native country, is not meaningless.

Exactly 50 years ago, on June 5, 1967, one of the most famous and fleeting wars of the 20th century began - the Six Day War of Israel against its Arab neighbors, Egypt, Syria and Jordan, which ended in the complete defeat of those who threatened to "throw the Jews into the sea." It was with these words that the Hero of the Soviet Union, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser made the Egyptians rejoice and savor the future destruction of Israel.

It turned out differently, Cairo asked Tel Aviv for peace on the third day of the war, having lost almost all of its aviation and the Sinai desert, which Israel returned 12 years later in exchange for a peace treaty with Egypt. However, like the Gaza Strip ...

And then, in the 67th, the Jews regained access to their holy places in Jerusalem, which they had been deprived of for many years, took control of the territories of Judea and Samaria, intended by the UN decision to create a Palestinian state, but captured by Jordan ...
Solzhenitsyn, whose attitude to the "Jewish question" in Russia was very critical, wrote about the Six-Day War as follows:
“The Israelites came to the Wailing Wall - and it was a high point, the Bible breathed into the radio broadcasts of the twentieth century. And we rejoiced together with the Israelis: Isn't it just their return to Jerusalem?.. It seems to me that the duty of all the nations of the world, as having a home for the homeless, is to help the Jews build this house. Extreme savagery that the Soviet government made its political toy out of the Israeli question…”. The brilliant victory of Israel was at the same time a grandiose defeat of the Soviet Union, which supported and armed Egypt and Syria, pitting them against the Jewish state. The Soviet leaders then responded to the Arab catastrophe and their own humiliation with a new wave of state anti-Semitism, reawakening popular and everyday anti-Semitism. (From an article on the website "Echo of Moscow" 06/06/2017 -A.Z.)